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INTRODUCTION
It was not even 8:00 p.m. in the east when NBC announced that
Vice President Al Gore had carried Florida in the 2000 presidential
election.' Gore's supporters were elated, because it had long been
clear that Florida was critical to a Gore victory2 and yet was sharply
divided between Gore and Governor George W. Bush.3 The euphoria
1. Nancy Gibbs, Reversal of... Fortune, TIME, Nov. 20, 2000, at 28, 37; James
Poniewozik, TV Makes a Too-Close Call, TIME, Nov. 20, 2000, at 70, 70; DAVID VON
DREHLE, DEADLOCK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S CLOSEST ELECTION 35 (Leo-
nard Downie Jr. et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter DEADLOCK]. NBC, CBS, CNN, and
FOX all called Florida for Gore. Id. at 35-36.
2. See DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 16. For any not familiar with the electoral
college system in the United States, see infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
3. See Richard L. Berke, Florida Is Pivotal: Long Night of Seesawing Tallies for
Governor and Vice President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at Al. The National Journal,
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peaked when the press announced that Gore had carried Pennsylvania
and Michigan, the other two "battleground" states where the election
was thought to be closest.4
In the next two hours, however, Bush appeared on the networks
criticizing their prediction of Florida's vote,5 and around 10:00 p.m.,
the networks reversed their call for Gore.6 At 2:16 a.m., the networks
began announcing that in fact Bush had carried Florida and won the
election.7 Very shortly thereafter, based on the press announcements,
Gore called Bush and conceded the election.8
Bush's reaction was gracious, and Gore headed for the Nashville
War Memorial to deliver his concession speech.9 As the motorcade
traveled the streets of Nashville, however, the Gore campaign's chief
of staff received a call from the campaign's Florida field director re-
porting that Bush's lead in Florida had been slipping very rapidly,
from thousands, to 900, to 200, and as a result, there would be an
automatic recount.1l By cell phone, Gore's campaign chair William
Daley told the chief of staff to grab Gore and keep him from going
onstage. 1
A little over an hour later, Gore called Bush back.12 Gore observed
that "things have changed," and the election was now too close to
concede. 3 Bush said, "Let me make sure I understand. You're call-
ing me back to retract your concession?," to which Gore responded,
"There's no reason to get snippy."' 4 When Bush insisted that the net-
works now had the correct result, and indicated that his brother, Flor-
ida Governor Jeb Bush, had the numbers from the Florida website to
a nonpartisan political organization, had released an electoral college map late in the
week preceding the election assigning 269 votes, including Florida's, to Gore, and 248
votes to Governor George W. Bush. See Alan Bernstein, Campaign 2000: Nation
Might Have To Wait; Tuesday's Vote Just First Step to Presidency, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Nov. 5, 2000, at Al. Only three states-Maine, Arkansas, and Washington, totaling
21 votes-had been left unassigned. Id. This meant that if Bush were to arrive at the
270 votes needed, he would not only have to pick up all of the unassigned states but
also reverse the prediction in at least one additional state. Florida was one of the
states presenting the best possibility of such a reversal. Conversely, had Florida gone
to Bush, Gore would have had to win all the unassigned states and reverse a state that
had previously been assigned to Bush.
4. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 37; Kevin Sack & Frank Bruni, How Gore Stopped
Short on His Way To Concede, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 9, 2000, at Al.
5. Berke, supra note 3; Gibbs, supra note 1, at 37.
6. Poniewozik, supra note 1, at 70; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 39-40.
7. Poniewozik, supra note 1, at 70-71; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 43-44.
8. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 39.
9. Id.
10. Id.; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 47.
11. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 39; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 47.
12. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 39; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 49.
13. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 39; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 49; Sack & Bruni,
supra note 4.




prove it, Gore said, "Let me explain it to you. Your younger brother
is not the ultimate authority on this."15 "Well, Mr. Vice President,"
Bush said, "you need to do what you have to do."16 By 4:00 a.m., the
networks found themselves reversing yet again, acknowledging that
the final outcome of the election might not be known for several
days.
1 7
So began perhaps the most protracted (although not longest)18 pres-
idential election in the history of the United States. Tens of legal bat-
tles would follow, in the courts of Florida and elsewhere, and the
outcome would not be known until Gore's second concession thirty-
six days later, following the United States Supreme Court's decision to
end any further counting of ballots.
The extraordinary nature of the events has prompted a vast amount
of commentary in the popular and academic media. Alan Dershowitz
and Vincent Bugliosi have both written books accusing the majority
members of the United States Supreme Court of voting with their
robes. 9 Bruce Ackerman has accused the Florida Legislature of at-
tempting a constitutional coup.2" Richard Posner has insisted that the
Supreme Court acted justifiably to avert a national crisis.2' Erwin
Chemerinsky and Cass Sunstein have focused on what the Supreme
Court's decision means for political question doctrine2 2 and equal pro-
tection law. 3 Over 550 law professors signed a statement published in
15. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 39; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 49; Sack & Bruni,
supra note 4.
16. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 39; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 49.
17. Poniewozik, supra note 1, at 71.
18. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., It's a Mess, But We've Been Through It Before, TIME,
Nov. 20, 2000, at 64, 64 (describing the post-election maneuvers in the presidential
contests of 1800, 1824, and 1876, the last of which was resolved only three days before
the inauguration of Rutherford B. Hayes); see also infra notes 239-51 and accompa-
nying text (describing the 1876 election).
19. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT Hi-
JACKED ELECTION 2000, at 12 (2001) ("This book is about the culpability of those
justices who hijacked Election 2000 by distorting the law, violating their own ex-
pressed principles, and using their robes to bring about a partisan result."); VINCENT
BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME COURT UNDERMINED
THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT 16-17 (2001) ("[T]he fact remains
that on December 12, in direct defiance of the Constitution they swore to uphold, and
without any authority at all, the Supreme Court chose Bush to be the next President
of the United States.").
20. Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Constitutional Coup, YALE L. REP., Summer
2001, at 34, 37.
21. Benjamin Wittes, Maybe the Court Got It Right: A Judge's Defense of the Flor-
ida Election Decision, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2001, at A23 (quoting Judge Richard
Posner) ("'What exactly is the Supreme Court good for if it refuses to examine a
likely constitutional error that if uncorrected will engender a national crisis?"').
22. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1093, 1105-12 (2001).
23. Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE
SUPREME COURT 205, 218-221 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
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the New York Times objecting to the Supreme Court's decision to stay
the recounts in Florida pending the Court's decision three days later.
24
Very few of these commentators, however, have provided their
readers with the full legal context. It is as though they reached their
opinions about the controversy as it was happening, and have since
focused on bolstering their opinions (some better than others), but
have decided not to provide their readers with the full legal or factual
background of the case. This approach has tended to reduce a very
complex legal controversy into a series of sound bites to which par-
tisans can turn for dinner party conversation. For those who have liti-
gated complicated controversies before, it is a lot like the talking head
who opines on the proper verdict after hearing only the opening
statement.
It is easy to see why this has happened. All of us were glued tO the
television sets, the Internet, and the newspapers. We think we know
what went on. There was such a crush of information, however, in
such a short period of time, that no one merely observing could have
obtained all the necessary information, researched the law, and then
processed it sufficiently to reach objective and fully informed conclu-
sions. Commentators favoring the Democratic position, for example,
seem unaware that David Boies admitted in the first Florida proceed-
ing that a variation in the way counters looked at ballots might well be
unconstitutional.25 Commentators favoring the Republican position
do not appear to realize that Florida's electoral votes were never "in
jeopardy," as the GOP so often claimed, because Jeb Bush had al-
24. See Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7. The statement read:
By Stopping the Vote Count in Florida, The U.S. Supreme Court Used Its
Power To Act as Political Partisans, Not Judges of a Court of Law[.] We are
Professors of Law at 120 American law schools, from every part of our coun-
try, of different political beliefs. But we all agree that when a bare majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court halted the recount of ballots under Florida law,
the five justices were Acting as political proponents for candidate Bush, not
as judges. It is Not the Job of a Federal Court to Stop Votes From Being
Counted[.] By stopping the recount in the middle, the five justices acted to
suppress the facts. Justice Scalia argued that the justices had to interfere
even before the Supreme Court heard the Bush team's arguments because
the recount might "cast a cloud upon what [Bush] claims to be the legitimacy
of his election." In other words, the conservative justices moved to avoid the
"threat" that Americans might learn that in the recount, Gore got more
votes than Bush. This is presumably "irreparable" harm because if the re-
count proceeded and the truth once became known, it would never again be
possible to completely obscure the facts. But it is not the job of the courts to
polish the image of legitimacy of the Bush presidency by preventing dis-
turbing facts from being confirmed. Suppressing the facts to make the Bush
government seem more legitimate is the job of propagandists, not judges.
By taking power from the voters, the Supreme Court has tarnished its own
legitimacy. As teachers whose lives have been dedicated to the rule of law,
we protest.
Id.
25. See infra note 550 and accompanying text.
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ready certified the Republican electors to the United States Archi-
vist's office, and the law made it clear that if the contest were not
completed, Congress would have to honor that certification.26 And
the 550-plus law professors objecting to the stay (and in particular
Scalia's reference to irreparable harm) probably do not know that it
was initially Gore who argued that reversing a declaration of the win-
ner would constitute irreparable injury. 7
Yet if one seeks to evaluate the election controversy with anything
approaching objectivity, if one really wants to understand the tumble
of events that ended with Bush's ascension to the Presidency, then the
details matter. Fully explored, they show both a Florida Supreme
Court and a United States Supreme Court engaging in some intellec-
tual dishonesty, but they also show that those courts were faced with
very difficult legal questions. They show both that there were several
reasons that the Supreme Court should not have taken the case, and
that there was some potential for a constitutional crisis. But most con-
sistently of all, they show that the attorneys arguing the case missed
significant portions of the applicable law, failed to reach a full under-
standing of others, and in the end, never presented the courts with
arguments that would enable them to reach the soundest decisions
possible.
In short, if there is any overriding explanation for the chain of
events that ended with Gore's concession, it may well be the mistakes
that were made by otherwise brilliant attorneys and underinformed
courts operating under the tightest of time constraints and incredible
pressure. This is a less glamorous conclusion, to be sure, than Bug-
liosi's theory of black-robed "ladies of the night,"28 or Ackerman's
"constitutional coup," or Posner's "national crisis." Practicing lawyers
will be reminded, however, how important the less visible aspects of
their work are. And the fact that the lawyers did not handle the case
well says much about whether the courts' decisions should be attrib-
uted to partisanship.
This Article presents the factual and legal history of Bush v. Gore,2 9
in the detail that is warranted for a case of this magnitude and com-
plexity. Part One sets forth the legal framework within which the case
unfolded, acquainting the reader with the breadth of Florida and fed-
eral law that governed the controversy. Part Two reviews what hap-
pened-the factual and legal developments from the time Gore
requested manual counts in four Florida counties through the Su-
preme Court's decision ending the statewide recount the Florida Su-
preme Court had ordered-and focuses on the attorneys' arguments
at each stage. Part Three then explores how a fuller and more accu-
26. See infra notes 272, 277, 743-44 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 472 and accompanying text.
28. BUGLIOSI, supra note 19, at 152.
29. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2002]
112 TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
rate presentation of the applicable law, particularly by Gore's legal
team, might have brought the controversy to a different end. With any
luck, the partisan outrage will be replaced with responsible analysis,
and the profession will be reminded of what trial lawyers both love
and fear about their work. In litigated cases, there are usually two
closely matched sides, and "justice" frequently turns on which lawyer
better handles the case he or she is given.
PART ONE: THE LAW GOVERNING THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The first, uncertified set of election returns reported to the Florida
Division of Elections on Wednesday, November 8, 2000, showed that
Governor Bush had received 2,909,135 votes to 2,907,351 votes for
Gore, a difference of 1784 votes, or three-hundredths of one per-
cent.30 Under section 102.141(4) of the Florida Code, this tiny margin
triggered an automatic recount. If the margin held, all of Florida's
30. Scott Hiaasen & Marc Caputo, Outcome May Now Hinge on Palm Beach
Nonvotes, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 11, 2000, at Al; Richard L. Berke, Vice-
President Clings to Slim Edge in Popular Vote Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000,
at Al.
31. The Florida Code provides:
If the returns for any office reflect that a candidate was defeated or elimi-
nated by one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast for such office,... the
board responsible for certifying the results of the vote on such race ... shall
order a recount of the votes cast with respect to such office ....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(4) (West Supp. 2001). The law does not make it entirely
clear what form any such recount is supposed to take: whether it is supposed to in-
volve only re-adding the returns from each precinct, running the ballots through a
counting machine again, or some more searching look. The law provides only that
"[e]ach canvassing board responsible for conducting a recount shall examine the
counters on the machines or the tabulation of the ballots cast in each precinct in
which the office ... appeared on the ballot and determine whether the returns cor-
rectly reflect the votes cast." Id. Notably, a broad interpretation of this law suggests
that the county canvassing boards could have begun looking at ballots by hand as
early as the automatic-recount stage. Indeed, the first pleading the Bush team filed in
federal district court asserted, and attached statements confirming, that the Gadsden
County Canvassing Board had done just that:
The multiple counting of the returns has raised several issues. For example,
in at least one county (Gadsden County), the ballots were not merely re-
counted but rather "interpreted"-or reinterpreted-by the county's can-
vassing board. This resulted in additional ballots being counted. This
recount calculated a result different from that of the original count, resulting
in a net gain of 153 votes in favor of the Democratic presidential ticket. See
Exhibit A (Statements of John M. Leace and Edgar E. Stanton).
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief T 31, at 7-8 (filed Nov. 10, 2000),
Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla.) (No. 00-9009-CIV), affd, 234 F.3d
1163 (11th Cir. 2000).
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electors would go to Bush,32 and Bush's electoral total would rise to
271, one more vote than necessary to win.3 3
With the national election outcome turning on the Florida vote,
Gore was faced with the decision whether to let the automatic recount
proceed as it would and then accept the outcome, or use Florida law
to its fullest in an effort to emerge victorious. Since early on Election
Day, there had been reports of problems with the voting: African-
Americans who had registered and arrived to vote, only to be told that
they were not on the rolls,34 and Palm Beach County voters com-
plaining of the now infamous "butterfly" ballot, on which Gore was
assigned the third punch-hole, even though his name appeared second
in the lefthand column.35 More importantly, the counties in which
punch card ballots were being used-counties that tended to be much
more heavily Democratic than others-were reporting a very large
number of "undervotes," ballots as to which the counting machines
registered no selection for President.36 Based on the turnout, Gore's
field workers were insisting that if the undervotes in those heavily
Democratic counties were tallied, the election would turn in his
favor.37
To appreciate the strategic decisions facing the two candidates'
teams, and the developments that would follow, one has to under-
stand the complex legal framework in which the case unfolded. The
sections that follow will set forth the state election law, and the federal
32. Under Florida law, the votes cast for the various presidential candidates "shall
be counted as votes cast for the presidential electors supporting such candidates."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.011 (West 1992). The winner statewide receives all of Flor-
ida's electoral votes: "The Department of State shall certify as elected the presidential
electors of the candidates for President and Vice President who receive the highest
number of votes." Id.
33. See Phil Kuntz & David S. Cloud, The Neverending Election: What Next? If
Florida Mess Is Unresolved, Scenarios Include Having Congress Pick the President,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2000, at B1. Immediately after the election, Florida was not the
only state in question. It was believed that Gore had won in Iowa (seven electoral
votes) and Wisconsin (eleven votes), but the votes there were very close. Id. Moreo-
ver, New Mexico (five votes) and Oregon (seven votes) continued to count for several
days after the election. Id. But barring at least three of these states ultimately going
for Bush, Florida was the only state in which he could pick up enough votes to gain a
majority.
34. See DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 76; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, in VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (June 2001), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/ex-
esum.htm ("During the November 2000 election, Florida's overzealous efforts con-
ducted under the guise of an anti-fraud campaign resulted in the inexcusable and
patently unjust removal of disproportionate numbers of African American voters
from Florida's voter registration rolls.").
35. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 65-70.
36. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 78. Some of these same counties were also re-
porting a substantial number of "overvotes," or ballots that could not be counted
because they reflected two selections for the presidency. See id. at 76, 79.
37. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 78.
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constitutional and statutory provisions, that both sides had to take
into account.38
I. THE FLORIDA LAW GOVERNING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
A. Florida's Election System
Elections in Florida are governed most immediately by the county
in which a voter lives. Each county's board of county commissioners
is responsible for adopting the method of voting to be used in the
county 39 (subject to the approval of the Secretary of State), a° and the
expense of whatever system is adopted is borne by the county.4' The
county commissioners are also responsible for drawing precinct
lines.42
Under the Florida Constitution, each county elects a supervisor of
elections to serve for a four-year term. 3 The supervisor of elections is
responsible for designating polling places within each precinct, main-
taining the lists of registered voters, and a host of other election-re-
lated duties.4 The supervisor also appoints one or two "election
boards" for each precinct, consisting of three inspectors and a clerk,
not all of the same party, who conduct the elections at the polls.
4 5
When an election is over, the inspectors at each precinct either
count the votes, in the case of paper ballots, or run the machines that
electronically record the votes.4 6 These returns are then submitted to
"canvassing boards" in each county, no later than noon of the day
following the election.47 The canvassing boards are each composed of
the county's supervisor of elections, a county court judge (who serves
as the chair), and the chair of the board of commissioners.4 8 The can-
vassing boards are responsible for reviewing the precinct returns, de-
tecting errors and omissions, and totaling the vote for the county. 9
38. So that the reader can effectively be placed in the position of the lawyers han-
dling the controversy, this Part sets forth the law as it existed at the moment the
controversy began, without regard to the courts' later decisions or the steps the Flor-
ida Legislature has since taken to amend the law. See, e.g., 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40
(revising various aspects of Florida election law effective Jan. 1, 2002).
39. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.29 (West 1982).
40. See id. § 101.015(1), (3), (4) (West Supp. 2001).
41. Id. § 101.29 (West 1982).
42. Id. § 101.001(1) (West Supp. 2001).
43. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
44. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.001(1) (designating polling places); id. § 98.015
(maintaining registration lists and other duties).
45. Id. § 102.012(1), (2), (4).
46. Id. § 102.012(4), (7). Alternatively, the elections supervisor may designate a
central counting location, or no more than three regional counting locations, in which
event the inspectors deliver the ballots to that location, and they are counted under
the direction of the canvassing board. Id. § 101.5614(1)(b), (2), (3).
47. Id. § 102.141(3).
48. Id. § 102.141(1).
49. Id. § 102.141(3).
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The canvassing boards are also responsible for opening and counting
the absentee ballots and adding them to the total drawn from the elec-
tion board's returns.5 ° In the event of an automatic recount, which is
required when there is a margin of victory of less than one-half per-
cent,51 the canvassing boards direct that process.52
Florida's Secretary of State is considered the "chief election officer"
of the state,53 and the State Department promulgates rules that gov-
ern registration,54 voting systems,55 and counting procedures56 in the
state. In a statewide or federal election, the Secretary of State is also
responsible for receiving the certified returns from each of the county
canvassing boards.57 The state Elections Canvassing Commission
then certifies the returns and declares the winner.58 The Elections
Canvassing Commission is made up of the Secretary of State, the Di-
rector of the State Department's Division of Elections, and the
Governor.59
B. The Timing of Election Certification Under Florida Law
The Florida Code directs each canvassing board to "certify" the re-
sults of every election. Section 102.151 provides that "[tihe county
canvassing board shall make and sign duplicate certificates containing
the total number of votes cast for each person nominated or elected,
the names of persons for whom such votes were cast, and the number
of votes cast for each candidate or nominee.'"60 As the reference to
the "total" number of votes suggests, the certification cannot occur
until the canvassing board has completed its duties and counted all
ballots. Although it uses the term "official return," rather than "certi-
50. Id. §§ 101.5614(8), 101.68, 102.141(2).
51. See supra note 31.
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(4).
53. Id. § 97.012.
54. See, e.g., id. § 97.052(1) ("The department shall prescribe a uniform statewide
voter registration application for use in this state.").
55. See, e.g., id. § 101.015(1), (3), (4) (directing the Secretary of State to establish
minimum standards for electronic and electromechanical voting systems, rules "to
achieve and maintain the maximum degree of correctness, impartiality, and efficiency
of the procedures of voting, including ... counting, tabulating, and recording votes by
voting systems used in this state," and minimum standards of security for all voting
systems).
56. See id. § 101.5614(2)(b).
If ballots are to be counted at the precincts, such ballots shall be counted
pursuant to rules adopted by the Department of State, which rules shall pro-
vide safeguards which conform as nearly as practicable to the safeguards
provided in the procedures for the counting of votes at a central location.
Id.
57. Id. § 102.111(1) ("Immediately after certification of any election by the county
canvassing board, the results shall be forwarded to the Department of State concern-
ing the election of any federal or state officer.").
58. Id. §§ 102.111, 102.121 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001).
59. Id. § 102.111(1) (West Supp. 2001).
60. Id. § 102.151.
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fied return," section 101.5614(8) supports this reading: "The return
printed by the automatic tabulating equipment, to which has been ad-
ded the return of write-in, absentee, and manually counted votes, shall
constitute the official return of the election." '61
With respect to general elections for federal and state offices, three
different sections of the Code exhort the canvassing boards to file the
certified returns "immediately" with the State Department.62 One of
those sections includes an express deadline. Section 102.112 states:
"Returns must be filed by 5 p.m. on the 7th day following the . . .
general election ... 63
Notwithstanding the clear deadline, the Code is not clear on what
the State Department, and in turn the state Elections Canvassing
Commission (who is to declare the winner), should do in the event a
canvassing board misses the deadline. Section 102.111(1), which was
enacted in 1951,64 states: "If the county returns are not received by the
Department of State by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an elec-
tion, all missing counties shall be ignored, and the results shown by the
returns on file shall be certified. '6 5 Section 102.112(1), however,
seems to contemplate that the State Department could choose to in-
clude late returns. That section provides:
(1) ... If the returns are not received by the department by the time
specified, such returns may be ignored and the results on file at that
time may be certified by the department.
(2) The department shall fine each board member $200 for each day
such returns are late, the fine to be paid only from the board mem-
ber's personal funds.
66
Neither statute says anything, however, about circumstances in which
the Elections Canvassing Commission might be compelled to include
late returns.67
61. Id. § 101.5614(8) (emphasis added).
62. See id. §§ 102.111(1), 102.112(1), 102.151.
63. Id. § 102.112(1).
64. See Fla. Laws ch. 26870, § 6 (1951) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.111).
65. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.111(1) (emphasis added).
66. Id. § 102.112(1), (2) (emphasis added).
67. Even before the conflict between the mandatory exclusion and the permissive
exclusion arose, when only section 102.011-requiring exclusion-was in effect, there
were cases in which a candidate sought to force the Elections Canvassing Commission
to accept returns submitted after the deadline. These cases address two situations. In
the first, returns were submitted late but before the state Canvassing Commission had
canvassed the vote. The Florida Supreme Court held that it was the Commission's
duty to include the returns, as if they had been submitted on time. State ex rel. Blox-
ham v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55, 74 (1871). In the second situation, a county attempted to
submit an amended return after the deadline to correct inaccuracies in the original
return. The Supreme Court refused to mandamus the Canvassing Commission to re-
convene and include the amended return, holding that the statute conferred no such
discretion. State ex rel. Catts v. Crawford, 73 So. 589, 590 (Fla. 1916).
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The discrepancy between the mandatory language of section
102.111(1) and the permissive language of section 102.112(1) is further
complicated by the fact that regulations promulgated by Florida's
State Department expressly dictate that in a federal election, absentee
ballots arriving from overseas must be counted as late as ten days af-
ter the election, provided they are postmarked on or before the day of
the election. Section 1S-2.013(7) provides:
With respect to the presidential preference primary and the general
election, any absentee ballot cast for a federal office by an overseas
elector which is postmarked or signed and dated no later than the
date of the Federal election shall be counted if received no later than
10 days from the date of the Federal election as long as such absentee
ballot is otherwise proper.68
This regulation exists, even though the Florida Code expressly re-
quires that absentee ballots arrive in the county election supervisor's
office by election day, and does not exempt overseas ballots: "All
marked absent electors' ballots to be counted must be received by the
supervisor by 7 p.m. the day of the election. All ballots received
thereafter shall be marked with the time and date of receipt and filed
in the supervisor's office."6 9 Although ordinarily a regulation in con-
flict with a state statute would not be valid, apparently the State De-
partment and the elections supervisors honor the ten-day rule with
respect to overseas ballots because the regulation was promulgated in
1984 to end a federal lawsuit against Florida70 brought under the Uni-
formed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act.7"
To the extent that the overseas-ballot regulation is honored, it be-
comes impossible for a county canvassing board to certify the county's
returns within the seven-day time frame specified by both sections
102.111 and 102.112. As described above, the canvassing board is re-
quired to certify the "total" number of votes in the county.7 2 Like-
wise, a county's "official return" is composed of "[t]he return printed
by the automatic tabulating equipment, to which has been added the
return of write-in, absentee, and manually counted votes."7 3 Thus, a
canvassing board with outstanding overseas ballots faces two choices
that theoretically, at least, both involve violating some law: (1) submit
68. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013(7), 2002 WL 1 FL ADC 1S-2.013
(emphasis added).
69. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.67(2).
70. United States v. Florida, No. TCA-80-1055 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 1984) (order
dissolving consent decree).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973cc-1973cc-26 (1976), repealed by Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924, 930 (1986) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1973ff-6 (1994)). Notwithstanding Florida election of-
ficials' obedience to the State Department regulation, the current federal statutes
governing overseas ballots do not include any requirement that states accept overseas
absentee ballots arriving ten days after the election.
72. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(8) (emphasis added).
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a certified return within seven days that therefore cannot include any
overseas ballots arriving between day seven and ten and be in viola-
tion of the Code's provisions regarding certification of "all ballots"
and "official results"; or (2) wait to certify any return until after the
ten days for receiving overseas ballots have passed and be in violation
of the seven-day deadline. Judging by her actions in the presidential
election, the current Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, believes
that a county canvassing board should choose the first option, but that
she should accept amended "certified" returns including the overseas
ballots after the seven-day deadline.74
C. The Procedures for Challenging Election Results in Florida
Florida has had statutes allowing a candidate to challenge an elec-
tion for a very long time.75 These statutes have received a great deal
of legislative attention in recent years, however, primarily because
there have been substantial problems with fraud in Florida elections.76
The Florida Legislature's amendments in 1989, 77 1995,78 and 199979
seem designed both to provide more of the procedure that should gov-
ern election challenges and to expand the right of a candidate to
object. 80
Apart from the section calling for an automatic recount, the Florida
Code includes three procedures for challenging election results: a
"protest"; a request for a manual recount; and an election "contest."
The first two of these procedures-the "protest" and the request for a
manual recount-are set forth in the same statute, Florida Code sec-
tion 102.166. The third procedure, a "contest" proceeding, is de-
scribed primarily in Florida Code section 102.168.
74. On November 14, 2000, Secretary Harris announced her intention to certify
the result of the election based on the returns already submitted as soon as the over-
seas ballots could be tabulated and certified. See infra note 411 and accompanying
text.
75. The statute permitting a "contest" of an election has existed, albeit in different
form, since 1845. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 historical note (West 1982) (tracing
statute to 1845 Fla. Laws ch. 38, art. 10, §§ 7, 8); see also Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243, 1250 n.8 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Likewise, the
"protest" procedure has been in place since 1937. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166
historical note (tracing statute to Laws 1937, ch. 18405, § 9).
76. See, e.g., In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in the Nov. 4,
1997 Election for City of Miami, Florida, 707 So. 2d 1170, 1173-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that legally appropriate remedy was to invalidate all absentee ballots
where evidence supported determination that "massive absentee voter fraud" af-
fected electoral process).
77. Voter Protection Act, ch. 89-348, sec. 15, § 102.166, 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-348
(current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West Supp. 2002)).
78. Act of May 2, 1995, ch. 95-147, sec. 602, § 102.168, 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-147
(current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. 88 102.166, 102.168 (West Supp. 2002)).
79. Act of June 11, 1999, ch. 99-339, 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-339 (current version at
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.166-.168, .171 (West Supp. 2002)).
80. Compare, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West 1982), with FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.168 (West Supp. 2001).
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1. Protests and Requests for Manual Recounts
Under Section 102.166
During the election controversy, the media, the attorneys, and even
the courts blurred the line between a "protest" and a request for a
manual recount.8' There are, however, substantial differences be-
tween the two procedures, with respect to who may bring them,82
when they must be brought,83 and how Florida's various county can-
vassing boards are supposed to react to them.84
Subsection (1), authorizing the "protest" procedure, provides that
"[a]ny candidate for nomination or election, or any elector qualified
to vote in the election related to such candidacy, shall have the right to
protest the returns of the election as being erroneous by filing with the
appropriate canvassing board a sworn, written protest."85 Subsection
(2) goes on to state that any protest must be filed with the canvassing
board either before the canvassing board certifies the results or within
five days after midnight of the election date, whichever is later.86 The
form that a protest must take is provided by section 102.167.87
In contrast, subsection (4)(a), authorizing manual recounts, pro-
vides that "[a]ny candidate whose name appeared on the ballot,... or
any political party whose candidates' names appeared on the ballot
may file a written request with the county canvassing board for a man-
ual recount. The written request shall contain a statement of the rea-
son the manual recount is being requested." '88 Such a request for the
manual recount has to be filed with the county canvassing board ei-
ther prior to the canvassing board's certification or within seventy-two
hours after midnight of the date the election was held, whichever oc-
curs later.89
As this shows, a "protest" can be filed by a voter-the term "elec-
tor" as used in the Florida Code means a voter 9 0-but a request for a
manual recount cannot. Conversely, a political party can request a
manual recount, but cannot file a "protest." The procedures are also
different in that an eligible party could well have two days more to file
a "protest" than that party would have to request a manual recount
81. In its December 8, 2000, decision ordering a statewide manual count of votes,
for example, the Florida Supreme Court seemed to refer to Gore's initial request as a
"protest." See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1252 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
82. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(1) (West Supp. 2001), with id.
§ 102.166(4)(a).
83. Compare id. § 102.166(2), with id. § 102.166(4)(b).
84. Compare id. § 102.166(3), with id. § 102.166(4)(c)-(d), (5).
85. Id. § 102.166(1).
86. Id. § 102.166(2).
87. Id. § 102.167.
88. Id. § 102.166(4)(a).
89. Id. § 102.166(4)(b).
90. Id. § 97.021(10) ("'Elector' is synonymous with the word 'voter' or 'qualified
elector or voter,' except where the word is used to describe presidential electors.").
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(depending on whether the alternative date, the board's certification,
occurred outside the five days specified for the protest or the seventy-
two hours specified for the recount request). Finally, a person filing a
protest must suggest that the returns are "erroneous," although a per-
son or party requesting a manual recount need only state "a reason"
for making the request.
It appears that the Florida Legislature also intended that a county
canvassing board's responses to a protest and a recount request would
be different. The statute is not express on this point, but it seems that
subsection (3), following as it does immediately upon the description
of the protest procedure, was intended to address what the canvassing
board is required to do in the event of a protest:
(3) Before canvassing the returns of the election, the canvassing
board shall:
(a) When paper ballots are used, examine the tabulation of the pa-
per ballots cast.
(b) When voting machines are used, examine the counters on the
machines of nonprinter machines or the printer-pac on printer ma-
chines. If there is a discrepancy between the returns and the coun-
ters of the machines or the printer-pac, the counters of such
machines or the printer-pac shall be presumed correct.
(c) When electronic or electromechanical equipment is used, the
canvassing board shall examine precinct records and election re-
turns. If there is a clerical error, such error shall be corrected by the
county canvassing board. If there is a discrepancy which could af-
fect the outcome of an election, the canvassing board may recount
the ballots on the automatic tabulating equipment. 91
As this section indicates, the canvassing board is required to take ac-
tion in response to a protest, but the action does not appear to include
checking any ballots other than paper ones for votes.
92
91. Id. § 102.166(3) (emphasis added).
92. As close analysis of this section reveals, and a variety of other sections of the
Florida Code will confirm, Florida's election law is not particularly artfully drafted.
With all respect to the difficulty of drafting perfect legislation on something as com-
plex as voting procedures, which in Florida differ from county to county, the Code
frequently raises as many questions as it answers. This section is such an example,
inasmuch as one cannot be certain whether the direction to "examine the 'tabulation'
of paper ballots" in subsection (a) means reevaluating who a voter voted for; or what
ballots qualify as "paper ballots" subject to the examination; or whether subsections
(2) and (3) dealing with voting machines and electronic devices are intended to be
mutually exclusive with subsection (1). These questions might be more readily an-
swered if the legislature had defined "tabulation," or even "paper ballots," but, not-
withstanding, that there are three different "definitions" sections in the elections title,
none of those sections defines either term. See id. § 97.021 (definitions for the
"code"); id. § 101.292 (definitions for use in construing sections 101.292 through
101.295); id. § 101.5603 (definitions relating to the Electronic Voting Systems Act).
The general definition section, section 97.021, does provide that
(2) "Ballot" or "official ballot" when used in reference to:
(b) "Paper ballots" means that printed sheet of paper containing the names
of candidates, or a statement of proposed constitutional amendments or
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In contrast, a canvassing board's response to a manual-recount re-
quest appears to be entirely discretionary, at least as an initial matter.
Subsection (4)(c) of section 102.166 states simply that "[t]he county
canvassing board may authorize a manual recount."93 The statute
does not provide any criteria for deciding when a recount request
should be granted and when it should not.
If the canvassing board does decide to act, the procedures that must
be followed are quite stringent and detailed. The recount must en-
compass at least three precincts and at least one percent of the total
votes cast, and the board must permit the recount-requesting party to
choose the three precincts.94 Finally, "[i]f the manual recount indi-
cates an error in the vote tabulation95 which could affect the outcome
of the election," the canvassing board "shall" pursue one of three op-
tions: "(a) Correct the error and recount the remaining precincts with
the vote tabulation system; (b) Request the Department of State to
verify the tabulation software; or (c) Manually recount all ballots."96
If the last option-a second manual recount, of all ballots, not just
the one percent-is pursued, the canvassing board is required to ap-
point "as many counting teams of at least two [voters] as is necessary
to manually recount the ballots."97 Each counting team is required,
"when possible," to have members of at least two political parties.98
During the recount, "[i]f a counting team is unable to determine a
voter's intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be presented to the
other questions or propositions submitted to the electorate at any election,
on which sheet of paper an elector casts his or her vote.
Id. § 97.021(2)(b). However, this tells the reader only which part of a paper ballot to
treat as a "ballot," not what ballots are to be considered "paper ballots" in the first
place. It is as though the legislature decided that all who might care to be reading the
election law would already know what a paper ballot is.
In voting procedure lingo, a "paper ballot" is generally considered to be a sheet on
which one marks his or her choice of candidate that is then hand-counted. Richard
Lacayo, Is This Any Way To Vote?, TIME, Nov. 27, 2000, at 54, 54-55. This popular
definition is supported by Florida's description of what a "ballot" means when it is
used in reference to "[e]lectronic or electromechanical devices:" "a ballot which is
voted by the process of punching or marking with a marking device for tabulation by
automatic tabulating equipment or data processing equipment," FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 97.021(2)(c), but the free mixing of ballot labels and voting methods is certain to
leave any reader confused.
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(c) (emphasis added).
94. Id. § 102.166(4)(d).
95. It bears repeating that the term "tabulation" is not defined by the Florida
Code, see supra note 92, so it is unclear whether the legislature intended "an error in
the vote tabulation" to address any kind of error in how the ballots were counted, or
only some kind of operational error by the counting machines, or, in the case of paper
ballots, the people counting.
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 102.166(7)(a).
98. Id.
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county canvassing board for it to determine the voter's intent."99 The
recount operations must be open to the public.1"'
Importantly, both the protest and manual recount provisions appear
to be available with respect to all elections in Florida: section 102.166
does not distinguish between elections for local, state, or federal elec-
tions. Subsection (1) permits a protest by "[a]ny candidate for nomi-
nation or election, or any elector qualified to vote in the election
related to such candidacy."' 1 Subsection (4)(a) permits "[a]ny candi-
date whose name appeared on the ballot, any political committee that
supports or opposes an issue which appeared on the ballot, or any
political party whose candidates' names appeared on the ballot" to file
a request for a manual recount.'
0 2
Because the statute does not distinguish between different types of
elections, it likewise does not address whether a candidate for state-
wide or federal office who protests or seeks a manual recount must do
so in every county where the candidate appeared on the ballot. Sub-
section (1) states that the candidate "shall have the right to protest the
returns of the election as being erroneous by filing with the appropri-
ate canvassing board a sworn, written protest."'01 3 Subsection (4)(a)
states that the candidate "may file a written request with the county
canvassing board for a manual recount."'01 4 Nothing further is said
with regard to the locations in which protests or requests for manual
recounts should be filed.
99. Id. § 102.166(7)(b).
100. Id. § 102.166(6).
101. Id. § 102.166(1).
102. Id. § 102.166(4)(a).
103. Id. § 102.166(1). One might interpret the term "appropriate" in the protest
subsection to suggest that the protest must be filed in all counties involved in the
relevant election. An alternative interpretation is available, however: the word "ap-
propriate" might refer back to the earlier phrase "being erroneous." In other words,
the "appropriate" canvassing board is the one in which the protestor believes an error
occurred. This would seem the better interpretation because, in contrast to requests
for manual recounts, protests may be brought by voters, and it seems unlikely that the
legislature would want to allow a voter in one county to claim error in counting by
another county. Even so, the statute is not entirely clear on the point.
104. Id. § 102.166(4)(a). As with the provision regarding where to file protests, see
supra note 85 and accompanying text, this language is subject to interpretation. One
might argue that the reference to "the" canvassing board suggests that this statute is
available only in races that do not extend beyond a single county. That interpretation
would conflict, however, with the extremely broad language used to describe who
may file a request for a manual recount: "[any candidate whose name appeared on
the ballot, any political committee that supports or opposes an issue which appeared
on the ballot, or any political party whose candidates' names appeared on the ballot."
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(a). This is especially true given the inclusion of politi-




2. Contest Proceedings Under Section 102.168
When a candidate invokes Florida's protest and recount-request
procedures, those processes are carried out on a decentralized basis.
County canvassing boards, and even two-member counting teams in
the event a canvassing board decides to manually recount all ballots,
review the tabulation of the ballots and ultimately make the decisions
as to how the votes are counted. Theoretically, the judiciary is not
involved.
The third procedure for challenging an election outcome under
Florida law-the "contest" proceeding-is quite different. Section
102.168, entitled "Contest of election," provides that any candidate,
voter, or taxpayer, "respectively," 10 5 can contest the certification of
election of any person (other than a member of the state legisla-
ture)1" 6 in the "circuit court."10 7 If the complaint contests a county or
local election, the circuit court is the court of that county, but if the
election contested involves more than one county, the appropriate cir-
cuit court is that in Leon County, the county in which the state capital
of Tallahassee is located.0 8 The "proper party defendant" is the "can-
vassing board or election board," and the successful candidate is con-
sidered an indispensable party.'09 The complaint must be filed
within 10 days after midnight of the date the last county canvassing
board empowered to canvass the returns certifies the results of the
election being contested or within 5 days after midnight of the date
the last county canvassing board empowered to canvass the returns
certifies the results of that particular election following a protest
pursuant to s. 102.166(1), whichever occurs later.1 °
105. Id. § 102.168(1). The term "respectively" appears in the statute, apparently
indicating that if a candidate files a contest, then a voter or taxpayer cannot.
106. Section 102.171 provides that the jurisdiction to hear any contest of the elec-
tion of a member of either of Florida's legislative houses is "vested in the applicable
house," and that house "is the sole judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns
of its members." Id. § 102.171.
107. Id. § 102.168(1).
108. Id. § 102.1685 (West 1982).
109. Id. § 102.168(4) (West Supp. 2001).
110. Id. § 102.168(2). There is an anomaly particularly worth noting about this tim-
ing provision. The procedure authorized involves contesting "the certification of elec-
tion or nomination of any person to office." Id. § 102.168(1). In Florida, all elections
of federal and state officers are "certified" by the State Elections Canvassing Com-
mission (consisting of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the
Division of Elections). See id. § 102.111.
Immediately after certification of any election by the county canvassing
board, the results shall be forwarded to the Department of State concerning
the election of any federal or state officer. . . . The Elections Canvassing
Commission shall, as soon as the official results are compiled from all coun-
ties, certify the returns of the election and determine and declare who has
been elected for each office.
Id. § 102.111(1) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding this fact-that it is the certifica-
tion of the State Elections Canvassing Commission that is being contested, the dead-
line for contesting cues off of the actions of "the last county canvassing board
20021
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As amended in 1999, section 102.168(3) sets forth with considerable
specificity the grounds on which an election contest may be based,
which have to be set forth in the complaint:
(a) Misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of any election of-
ficial or any member of the canvassing board sufficient to change or
place in doubt the result of the election.
(b) Ineligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination or
office in dispute.
(c) Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of
legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the
election.
(d) Proof that any elector, election official, or canvassing board
member was given or offered a bribe or reward in money, property,
or any other thing of value for the purpose of procuring the success-
ful candidate's nomination or election or determining the result on
any question submitted by referendum.
(e) Any other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show
that a person other than the successful candidate was the person
duly nominated or elected to the office in question or that the out-
come of the election on a question submitted by referendum was
contrary to the result declared by the canvassing board or election
board.'
The statute is considerably less specific about what is to happen after
the complaint is filed. The defendant is given ten days after service to
answer,1 12 but, on the other hand, the contestant is "entitled to an
immediate hearing." '113 Ultimately, the court to whom the contest is
assigned is granted extremely broad discretion, both in hearing the
case and in resolving it. The court is expressly authorized to limit the
amount of time devoted to testimony, "with a view ... to the circum-
stances of the matter and to the proximity of any succeeding primary
empowered to canvass the returns certifies the results of the election being con-
tested." Theoretically, then, if the State Elections Canvassing Commission did not
certify the election until eleven days after the last county canvassing board certified
the election results, the contestant would either have to file in anticipation of the
statewide certification, before it was entered, or miss the deadline.
This confusion could be explained by assuming that the legislature was focused only
on county elections in which the ultimate certification comes from the county canvass-
ing board. The timing provision's very reference to the "last" county canvassing
board to certify, however, makes it quite clear that the legislature had statewide, not
just countywide, elections in mind. Given this legislative indication that it did intend
statewide elections to be covered, its use of the certifications of county canvassing
boards as the trigger for the contest deadline, and its identification of county canvass-
ing boards and election boards, id. § 102.166(4)-both local entities-as the proper
party defendants, it seems quite possible that the legislature intended the contest pro-
ceeding to be available to challenge not just the overall result in a statewide election
but perhaps just the certification of a single county.
111. Id. § 102.168(3).
112. Id. § 102.168(6).
113. Id. § 102.168(7) (emphasis added).
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or other election."' 14  The court is also empowered to fashion
whatever orders "he or she deems necessary to ensure that each alle-
gation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to pre-
vent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief
appropriate under such circumstances.115
Other than directing the judge to consider "the circumstances of the
matter" and "the proximity of any succeeding primary or other elec-
tion," the contest statute does not provide any deadline for resolving
the contest. 1 6 Nor does the statute provide specifically for appeals
from the Leon County circuit court's decision.
1 7
II. THE FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
If Florida had not had in place the law for requesting manual re-
counts and challenging election results, Al Gore's quest for the presi-
dency certainly would have ended much sooner.1 8 Florida law was
not the only consideration, however, for there was a panoply of fed-
eral constitutional and statutory provisions governing presidential
elections that the lawyers also needed to examine and take into ac-
count. This section explores that law in depth, focusing primarily on
Article II of the Constitution and Title 3 of the United States Code.
A. Constitutional Provisions Addressing Presidential Elections
1. The Electoral College
The President of the United States is not elected by the popular
vote of United States citizens, but by obtaining a majority of the votes
of the presidential "electors." ' a Under Article II and the Twelfth
Amendment to the Constitution, each state is allotted a number of
electors equal to the number of senators and representatives it has
114. Id.
115. Id. § 102.168(8) (emphasis added).
116. Id. § 102.168(7).
117. See id. § 102.168.
118. Any possibility of a change in the outcome would then have had.to rest on
challenges based directly on the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, the federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973p (1994 & Supp. V 1999),
or the Twelfth Amendment, U.S. CONsT. amend. XII. There were lawsuits filed in-
voking such theories. See, e.g., Complaint for Deprivation of Constitutional Rights
Under Color of State Law, Dickens v. Florida, No. 4:00cv420-WS (N.D. Fla. filed
Dec. 9, 2000) (alleging equal protection violation in treatment of African-American
voters); Emergency Amended Complaint and Application for Injunctive and Declara-
tory Relief at 3-4 (filed Nov. 22, 2000) (alleging that Texas electors could not cast
votes for the Bush-Cheney ticket because both Bush and Cheney were residents of
Texas, and the Twelfth Amendment requires that electors vote for either a presiden-
tial candidate or vice presidential candidate from a state different from their own),
Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex.) (No. 300-CV2543-D), affd, 244 F.3d
134 (5th Cir. 2000).
119. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CoNST. amend. XII.
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been given,'120 the latter based on its population.' 2 1 The electors are
appointed by whatever method their state legislatures choose to
adopt,122 and, as a group, are commonly referred to as the "electoral
college." The electors then meet in their respective states to select the
President.
123
The results of the electoral college voting in each state are sent to
Washington, "sealed," to the President of the Senate. 124 When the
results from each state are opened, in a joint session of both houses of
Congress, any candidate who has received a majority of the electors'
votes for President is named to the office. 125 If no candidate has re-
ceived a majority of the votes, then the House of Representatives
must convene immediately to choose the President from the three
candidates with the most electoral votes.'26 In this House balloting,
the votes are not cast by the representatives individually; each state
delegation casts a single vote.127 A majority of votes is necessary, and
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The Twenty-Third Amendment provides that
the District of Columbia is allotted a number of electors equal to the number of sena-
tors and representatives it would have if it were a state, "but in no event more than
the least populous [s]tate." U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1, cl. 1-2.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Although the procedures vary somewhat from
state to state, the appointment of electors in every state follows from the results of a
popular election. Most commonly, a state holds a popular election listing on the bal-
lot the names of the various presidential candidates and then asks the party of the
winning candidate to provide a list of electors who will cast their votes for that candi-
date. See, e.g., Office of the Fed. Register: Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., A Pro-
cedural Guide to the Electoral College, http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/
proced.html#states (April 14, 2002). Under this method, state law may or may not
bind the electors to vote for the candidate who won the state, but even when the law
does not bind the electors, the electors are unlikely to vote for another candidate
because of loyalty to the party that named them. See, e.g., Office of the Fed. Register:
Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., U.S. Electoral College: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/faq.html#wrongvote (April 14, 2002). Some
other states actually have their voters select the electors, who are identified on the
ballot with a particular candidate. See, e.g., Office of the Fed. Register: Nat'l Archives
& Records Admin., U.S. Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://
www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/faq.html#selection (April 14, 2002).
123. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
124. Id.
125. U.S. CONsT. amend. XII. The same procedure is followed for the election of
the Vice President; the Twelfth Amendment dictates that the presidential electors
vote separately for Vice President and send separate results to the Senate with respect
to that race. Id. ("The Electors... shall name in their ballots the person voted for as
President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall
make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President .... ). This provision for separate balloting for the two offices is the
primary respect in which the Twelfth Amendment modified the Constitution. Com-
pare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, with U.S. CONST. amend. XII. For a discussion of
the difficulties in the second presidential election that led to the adoption of the
amendment, see Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 n.11 (1952).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
127. Id.
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if a majority vote is not reached by the time the outgoing President's
term has expired, the Vice President assumes the office.
128
2. Congress's Limited Role in Regulating Presidential Elections
Although Article II and the Twelfth Amendment detail the manner
in which Congress is to count the electoral votes from the states, 29
and speak at length about what Congress must do if the electoral col-
lege fails to produce a majority vote for the Presidency, 3 ° the Consti-
tution otherwise assigns Congress a minimal role in presidential
elections. The only other provision addressing Congress is Section 4
of Article II. That section empowers Congress to set the date on
which the states appoint electors, what is now thought of as "Election
Day," and the subsequent date on which the electors in each state
meet to vote,1 3' or the date of the "electoral college. 132
128. Id. As it does for the office of President, the Twelfth Amendment provides
that the Vice President must be elected by a majority of electoral votes. Id. In the
event that there is no majority candidate, then the Senate convenes immediately to
select the Vice President from the top two candidates (in contrast to the top three
candidates eligible for the Presidency in the House election). Id. Because the selec-
tion is limited to two candidates, and each Senator votes individually, including the
outgoing Vice President in the event of a tie, a majority will necessarily be reached.
Thus, if no candidate emerges victorious from the House, a Vice President will always
be available to serve in the Presidency.
129. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
131. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("The Congress may determine the Time of chus-
ing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes;. which Day shall be
the same throughout the United States."). Because the Framers chose to use the term
"Time" in the first clause, dealing with Election Day, and yet the term "Day" in the
second clause, dealing with the date of the electoral college, and then repeated the
term "Day" in the third clause, one could conclude that the Constitution requires only
that the date of the electoral college be uniform throughout the United States.
Whatever ambiguity the provision presents, however, has largely been rendered moot
by the fact that Congress has by statute set an election day for appointment of the
presidential electors, see 3 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1999), and the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997). In Foster, Louisiana was, in effect, electing
its members of Congress in October rather than on the November day specified by
Congress for congressional elections, 3 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7, and the Court held that the
statute required that all congressional elections take place on the same day through-
out the United States. Foster, 522 U.S. at 71-72. The same presumably would be true
of presidential elections.
This issue took on some importance in the November 2000 election because there
were many who believed that Florida should cure the problem with the "butterfly
ballot" in Palm Beach County by holding a revote in that county. See, e.g., Complaint
for Declaratory Relief, Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., (Fla. Cir. Ct.
filed Nov. 8, 2000) (No. CL-00-10965AN) (seeking revote based on the design of the
presidential ballot). Democratic lawyers undoubtedly felt that, in light of Foster, the
Supreme Court probably would not allow such a revote, on a different day, to take
place.
132. Pursuant to this authority, Congress has set the Tuesday after the first Monday
in November as "election day," 3 U.S.C. § 1, and the first Monday after the second
Tuesday in December as the date of the "electoral college." 3 U.S.C. § 7. In 2000,
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3. State Power Over the "Manner" by Which Electors Are
Chosen: The "Electoral Appointments" Clause
of Article II
Article II of the Constitution empowers Congress to set the dates
for Election Day and the electoral college,'133 but the Constitution ex-
pressly leaves it to the states to decide on the method by which their
own presidential electors will be chosen. Section 1 of Article II reads,
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sen-
ators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress.
134
The Supreme Court has only infrequently addressed this constitu-
tional provision lodging power in the states. During the nation's en-
tire first century, the Court cited the provision only twice, and then
only as support for more general arguments about state power 135 and
an individual's right to vote. 136 In the last 115 years, the Court has
paid somewhat more attention to the provision,137 but for example,
even through the 2000 election, the Court had never labeled the
clause. To distinguish it here from the rest of Article II, Clause 2 of
Section 1 of Article II will be called the "electoral appointments
clause.
13 8
The first case in which the Court examined the electoral appoint-
ments clause directly was In re Green,139 in 1890. Green was disquali-
fied from voting under Virginia law because he had been convicted of
petty larceny.1 4° After he voted in an election for both presidential
electors and congressional candidates, he was convicted under state
law of intentionally casting illegal votes.' The federal circuit court
for the eastern district of Virginia then granted Green a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the existence of a federal statute governing
the same conduct deprived the state court of jurisdiction. 42
this meant that November 7 was Election Day, and December 18 was the date of the
electoral college vote.
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. See infra notes 213-30 and accompanying text
(discussing statutes enacted pursuant to this power).
134. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
135. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 313-14 (1821) (reciting the
provision in the course of recounting Virginia's argument that the Supreme Court
could not review state court judgments).
136. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (using the clause to support
the idea that voting is not a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship).
137. See infra notes 139-207 and accompanying text.
138. The Court has referred instead only to "Article II, section 1, clause 2." For
ease of reference here, it will be called the "electoral appointments clause," but the
reader should be aware that this is not a term of art beyond the Author's creation.
139. 134 U.S. 377 (1890).
140. Id. at 377.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 378.
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The Supreme Court reversed, upholding Green's conviction. 143 The
Court declined to decide whether the federal government had exclu-
sive jurisdiction to regulate congressional elections,' 4 but made it
quite clear that the states, rather than the federal government, held
the power to regulate presidential elections.' 45 The Court observed
that
[t]he only rights and duties, expressly vested by the Constitution in
the national government, with regard to the appointment or the
votes of presidential electors, are by those provisions which author-
ize Congress to determine the time of choosing the electors and the
day on which they shall give their votes, and which direct that the
certificates of their votes shall be opened by the president of the
Senate in the presence of the two houses of Congress, and the votes
shall then be counted. 46
According to the Court, Congress had recognized its limited role in
presidential elections: it had exercised its power to set dates for the
appointment of presidential electors and the vote of the electoral col-
lege, but had otherwise "left these matters to the control of the
States." '147 The Court left little doubt that the states' power should be
broadly construed, closing with a sweeping pronouncement that the
states' power was "unaffected by anything in the Constitution and laws
of the United States.'
' 48
Two years later, the Court undertook a more specific interpretation
of the electoral appointments clause. In McPherson v. Blacker,'49 the
Michigan Legislature had enacted a statute changing Michigan's
method of appointing electors from an at-large system (in which every
Michigan citizen voted for all the presidential electors) to a by-district
system (in which voters would select only an elector for one of two at-
large districts and an elector from their own congressional district). 5°
A group nominated to be presidential electors asserted that the
change violated the electoral appointments clause and the Fourteenth
143. See id. at 380.
144. See id. ("The question whether the State has concurrent power with the
United States to punish fraudulent voting for representatives in Congress is not
presented by the record before us. It may be that it has.") (citations omitted).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 379 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XII).
147. See id. at 380.
148. Id. at 380 (dictum) (emphasis added). The Court's statement suggests that the
states' exercise of power under the electoral method clause could not be considered
subject to the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Inasmuch as there was no
issue in the case pertaining to the Constitution, the Court's suggestion that the state's
power could not be affected by anything in the Constitution has to be considered a
dictum. In any event, it was effectively discredited by the Court's later decision in
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), and subsequent cases. See infra notes 183-84
and accompanying text.
149. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
150. See id. at 4-5.
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and Fifteenth Amendments.151 In the plaintiffs' view, the new system
violated the electoral appointments clause because the clause called
for "the State" to appoint electors, and that language meant that the
State must appoint as a single "unit," rather than on a district-by-dis-
trict basis, because a district-by-district system improperly delegated
the appointment to the voters of the various districts.1 2 The plaintiffs
claimed that the statute violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments because the new system deprived them of the right
those amendments conferred to vote for all of the state's presidential
electors. 53
Before reaching the merits of the plaintiffs' claims,154 the Court ad-
dressed the possibility that the case presented a nonjusticiable politi-
cal question.1 55 According to the Court, the defendants argued
that all questions connected with the election of a presidential elec-
tor are political in their nature; that the [C]ourt has no power finally
to dispose of them; and that its decision would be subject to review
by political officers and agencies, as the state board of canvassers,
151. See id. at 24. The plaintiffs also attacked the Michigan statute on the ground
that the date it set for the electors' vote conflicted with the federal statute setting the
date on which the electoral college was to meet. Id. at 24, 40-41. The Court acknowl-
edged that there was a conflict between the dates but found the conflict insufficient to
invalidate the substantive provisions of the law. See id. at 41.
152. Id. at 24-25 ("[I]t is argued that the appointment of electors by districts is not
an appointment by the State, because all its citizens otherwise qualified are not per-
mitted to vote for all the presidential electors.").
153. See id. at 38 (suggesting that the plaintiffs argued that the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments conferred the right to vote in presidential elections as it existed
at the time the Amendments were adopted).
154. The Michigan Supreme Court had upheld the law against the plaintiff's consti-
tutional challenges. See id. at 23.
155. The political question doctrine requires that federal courts decline to hear
claims that are more appropriate for resolution by the political branches-the legisla-
tive and executive branches-than the judiciary. The doctrine has its roots in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), when Justice John Marshall wrote that,
out of respect for its coordinate branches, the judiciary should not undertake review
of acts within the executive branch's discretion. Id. at 166 ("[W]here the heads of
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to exe-
cute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses
a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their
acts are only politically examinable."). The modern formulation of the doctrine ap-
pears in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan sur-
veyed the Court's prior holdings with respect to political questions and concluded that
the Court should deem a claim a nonjusticiable political question whenever there was
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and managea-
ble standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronounce-




the legislature in joint convention, and the governor, or, finally, the
Congress.'
56
Judging by the curtness of the Court's response, the argument gave
the justices little pause. The Court noted simply that "the judicial
power of the United States extends to all cases in law or equity arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and this is a case
so arising, since the validity of the state law was drawn in question as
repugnant to such constitution.' 1 57 There was no further analysis of
the political question argument, only language suggesting that the
Court felt its legitimacy threatened by the very assertion that the
question was inappropriate for the judiciary: "we cannot decline the
exercise of our jurisdiction upon the inadmissible suggestion that ac-
tion might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment
of the highest tribunal of the State as revised by our own."'
1 58
The Court went on to reject the plaintiffs' federal constitutional
claims and uphold the Michigan statute. Chief Justice Fuller observed
that the Constitution did not confer any rights to elect the president
upon the "people" of the states, or the "citizens" of the states, but
vested complete power in the state legislatures to choose the method
by which their states' presidential electors were appointed.' 59 Be-
cause this meant that the legislature could actually choose to appoint
the electors itself, "it is difficult to perceive why, if the legislature
prescribes as a method of appointment choice by [citizen] vote, it must
necessarily be by general ticket and not by districts."16
As it had done in In re Green, the Court emphasized the breadth
and exclusiveness of the states' power. 161 The McPherson Court,
however, went even further than the Court had in In re Green. Chief
Justice Fuller located the electoral appointment power very specifi-
cally in the state legislatures, not only to the exclusion of the federal
constitution and federal law, as In re Green had done, but also to the
exclusion of the state constitutions. The Court wrote:
156. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 24.
159. Id. at 25. The Framers chose to do so, according to Fuller, to "reconcile[ ]
[their] contrariety of views" because the members of the Constitutional Convention
could not agree on a uniform method, and at least five different methods for electing
the president-ranging from direct election by the people (not through the state in
any way) to selection by electors appointed by the state legislatures-had been voted
down. Id. at 28.
160. Id. at 25.
161. See, e.g., id. at 35.
Congress is empowered to determine the time of choosing the electors and
the day on which they are to give their votes, which is required to be the
same day throughout the United States, but otherwise the power and juris-
diction of the State is exclusive, with the exception of the provisions as to the
number of electors and the ineligibility of certain persons, so framed that
Congressional and Federal influence might be excluded.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The clause under consideration does not read that the people or the
citizens shall appoint, but that "each State shall"; and if the words
"in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct," had been
omitted, it would seem that the legislative power of appointment
could not have been successfully questioned in the absence of any
provision in the state constitution in that regard. Hence the insertion
of those words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in re-
spect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be
held to operate as a limitation on that power itself.
162
In other words, if the electoral appointments clause had not included
the reference specifically to the legislature, then a state legislature's
power of choosing a method for appointing electors would have been
subject to its own constitution, but because the Framers included the
reference to the "legislature," the legislature's power could not be al-
tered even by the state's constitution.
Thus, as of 1892, the Court had clarified several aspects of the elec-
toral appointments clause. First, individuals did not have any right to
vote in presidential elections. 163  Second, the Constitution allowed
Congress to set the dates for Election Day and the electoral college,
but otherwise conferred upon each state legislature the power to regu-
late the appointment of presidential electors by its state.164 Third, the
power held by state legislatures was not subject to alteration by the
federal constitution, federal law, or even the state's own
constitution.1
65
Forty years later, however, when the Court again took up the elec-
toral appointments clause, it began a lengthy shift away from In re
Green's and McPherson's sacrosanct view of the states' power under
Article II. In Burroughs v. United States, 6 6 the defendants were
charged with violating the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, which re-
quired them to report contributions they had accepted on behalf of a
162. Id. at 25 (emphasis added) (dictum). This statement should be regarded as a
dictum. The opinion does not indicate that the plaintiffs ever claimed that the Michi-
gan Constitution conferred upon them a right to vote for all (not just some) of the
presidential electors that should be regarded as superior to the legislatively dictated,
by-district method. Their argument appeared to turn instead upon the language of
the electoral appointments clause itself, which refers to the "state's" appointment of
electors. Further, because the Court made the statement in the course of emphasizing
that "[t]he State does not act by its people in their collective capacity, but through
such political agencies as are duly constituted and established," and that "[t]he legisla-
tive power is the supreme authority except as limited by the constitution of the State,"
id., it appears that the Court made the statement solely to emphasize the degree of
error in the plaintiffs' argument. In other words, the Court seemed to be saying only
that the state legislature would have had the power to choose this method of appoint-
ment even without the words, "in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct,"
and the inclusion of the phrase made that especially so. See id.
163. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 148, 162 and accompanying text.
166. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
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political committee for the purpose of influencing a presidential or
vice presidential election in two or more states. 167 The defendants ar-
gued that the Act exceeded Congress's power, because the electoral
appointments clause conferred on the states exclusive power to regu-
late the appointment of presidential electors, and Congress's only role
was to set the dates for the election and the electoral college. 168 The
Supreme Court disagreed:
So narrow a view of the powers of Congress in respect of the matter
is without warrant.
The congressional act under review seeks to preserve the purity
of presidential and vice presidential elections. Neither in purpose
nor in effect does it interfere with the power of a state to appoint
electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made. It
deals with political committees organized for the purpose of influ-
encing elections in two or more states, and with branches or subsidi-
aries of national committees, and excludes from its operation state
or local committees. Its operation, therefore, is confined to situa-
tions which, if not beyond the power of the state to deal with at all,
are beyond its power to deal with adequately. It in no sense invades
any exclusive state power.'
69
Given this language, the Court might later have limited federal power
to electoral activities spanning two or more states. The Court chose
instead to advance further into state territory, with a series of cases
subjecting the states' electoral appointment power to a variety of
other constitutional provisions.
The first such case was Ray v. Blair.7 ' In Ray, the plaintiff sought
to appear on the ballot in Alabama's presidential primary as a Demo-
cratic elector.' 7 ' If a person acted as a party elector on the ballot,
Alabama law allowed the party itself to dictate the elector's qualifica-
tions.172 The state Democratic Party chair refused to certify the plain-
tiff as an elector because the plaintiff would not sign a pledge that he
would support whomever was eventually nominated by the national
party.173 The plaintiff's mandamus petition asserted that requiring the
pledge violated the Twelfth Amendment, which the plaintiff claimed
prevented a state from binding electors to any particular presidential
choice, as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
74
167. Id. at 540-41 (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-48 (1994)).
168. See id. at 544.
169. Id. at 544-45.
170. 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
171. See id. at 215.
172. Id. at 217 & n.2 (quoting 17 ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 347 (1940) (current version at
2001 Ala. Acts 1131)).
173. Id. at 215.
174. Id. at 215-16; see id. at 226 n.14.
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The Court upheld the state-sanctioned party rule as a proper exer-
cise of Alabama's power under the electoral appointments clause. 7
5
In so ruling, however, the Court did not hesitate to consider the merits
of the constitutional challenges to the state law. The Court held that
the Twelfth Amendment did not require that an elector have discre-
tion on how to vote, but it explored the issue fully.'7 6 The Court like-
wise reached the merits of the due process and equal protection
claims, rejecting them only because "the requirement of this pledge
... is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective-namely,
to protect the party system by protecting the party from a fraudulent
invasion by candidates who will not support the party. ' 177 No men-
tion was made of In re Green's statement that the states' electoral
appointment power was "unaffected by anything in the Constitution
and laws of the United States."' 78
The Court's next decision firmly established that there would be
substantial federal oversight of the states' electoral appointments
power. In Williams v. Rhodes, 79 the Socialist Labor Party and the
Ohio American Independent Party (a group without formal party
structure organized around the presidential campaign of George Wal-
lace) charged that several provisions of Ohio election law violated the
Equal Protection Clause.18 ° The law automatically placed on the pres-
idential general election ballot the candidate of any party that had
received at least ten percent of the vote in the last gubernatorial elec-
tion, but required any other party to submit, ninety days before the
primary election, a petition signed by more than fifteen percent of the
total people who had voted in the previous gubernatorial election.18
As Michigan had argued in McPherson, Ohio argued in Williams
that the case presented a political question the Court could not de-
175. See id. at 226-27 & n.14, 231.
176. Id. at 231. Justice Reed acknowledged that the Framers seemed to have de-
signed the electoral college to be an elite group most qualified to select the best candi-
date, but the justices found more persuasive the historical practice of electors
committing themselves in advance: "[t]his long-continued practical interpretation of
the constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate
for elector as to his vote in the electoral college weighs heavily in considering the
constitutionality of a pledge, such as the one here required, in the primary." Id. at
229-30. The Court found, alternatively, that even if the TWelfth Amendment required
that an elector have complete discretion in voting, it would not have been violated
under these circumstances because Alabama law allowed Blair a procedure for be-
coming an independent elector, i.e., one not associated with the Democratic Party. Id.
at 228-30 (citing 17 ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 145 (1940) (current version at 2001 Ala. Acts
1131)).
177. Id. at 226 n.14.
178. See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 380 (1890) (dictum) (emphasis added); see also
supra note 148 and accompanying text.
179. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
180. See id. at 26.
181. Id. at 24-26 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.01) (Anderson 1953)); id. at
52 (noting ninety-day provision).
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cide. The Court reacted much the way it had in McPherson, dis-
missing the suggestion without analysis:
Ohio's claim that the political-question doctrine precludes judicial
consideration of these cases requires very little discussion. That
claim has been rejected in cases of this kind numerous times. It was
rejected by the Court unanimously in 1892 in the case of McPherson
v. Blacker ... and more recently it has been squarely rejected in
Baker v. Carr, . . . and in Wesberry v. Sanders .... Other cases to
the same effect need not now be cited. These cases do raise a justici-
able controversy under the Constitution and cannot be relegated to
the political arena.
182
Ohio argued to no avail that its power under the electoral appoint-
ments clause was not subject to other constitutional constraints. Jus-
tice Black acknowledged that "this section does grant extensive power
to the States to pass laws regulating the selection of electors," but ob-
served that every constitutional grant of power, to the States or to
Congress, is subject to the other specific provisions of the Constitu-
tion. 183 "Obviously," Black wrote, "we must reject the notion that
Art. II, § 1, gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to
vote, where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other constitu-
tional provisions. We therefore hold that no State can pass a law regu-
lating elections that violates the [Equal Protection Clause]. 184
Five members of the Court then held that the Ohio election law
violated the Equal Protection Clause.185 The Court found that the
Ohio law burdened the rights to vote, and to associate for advance-
ment of their political beliefs, of those who would support a third
party.186 As a result, the law would be subjected to a form of strict
scrutiny:
In determining whether the State has power to place such unequal
burdens on minority groups where rights of this kind are at stake,
the decisions of this Court have consistently held that "only a com-
pelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amend-
ment freedoms."
187
182. Id. at 28 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1892); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 208-37 (1962); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1964)).
183. Id. at 28-29.
184. Id. at 29.
185. See id. at 34. Chief Justice Warren and Justices White and Stewart all wrote
dissents, and Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment because he believed the case
should be decided under the First Amendment as incorporated through the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring in
result); id. at 48 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 61 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 63
(Warren, C.J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 30.
187. Id. at 31 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
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In the Court's view, none of the interests asserted by Ohio was suffi-
ciently compelling to justify the burden on voters' rights.1 88
Since Williams v. Rhodes subjected the states' electoral appoint-
ments power to scrutiny under other constitutional provisions, the
Court has struck down every state law regulating the appointment of
presidential electors that has come before it.' 89 This consistency in
result, however, belies some confusion-and considerable disagree-
ment-within the Court as to its analytical approach in such cases. In
Williams, for example, five members of the Court concluded that the
law violated the Equal Protection Clause,19 ° but Justice Harlan con-
curred only in the judgment because he believed the case should rest
on First Amendment analysis under the Due Process Clause, and held
serious doubt whether equal protection doctrine "may properly be ap-
plied to adjudicate disputes involving the mere procedure by which
the President is selected, as that process is governed by profoundly
different principles."'' Other members of the Court appear to have
shared that doubt, because in all four of the presidential election cases
that followed Williams, the Court relied on the First Amendment and
not on the Equal Protection Clause, even when the latter was ar-
gued.' 92 The Court may simply have decided not to reach any equal
188. See id. at 31-33. Ohio asserted its interests in: (1) promoting a two-party sys-
tem to encourage compromise and political stability; (2) ensuring that the ultimate
winner would not be a plurality candidate that did not truly represent the majority of
Ohio voters; (3) ensuring that the "disaffected" voters would have a primary in which
to choose the best dissenter; and (4) avoiding a confusing ballot situation. See id. The
Court did not quarrel with several of these interests in the abstract but concluded that
the law did not serve them well enough to pass constitutional muster. With respect to
the first interest, the Court found that the law did not merely promote a two-party
system but granted Republicans and Democrats a monopoly hold; the second interest
was valid but still presented too great a burden on the voters' associational rights; the
third interest was a "desirable goal," but the law advanced it ineffectively because
voters cannot even know whether they are "disaffected" until after the major parties
hold primaries and develop platforms, at which point the law makes it too late for the
disaffected to respond in primaries; and the fourth interest was not served because
Ohio's own history shows that a multitude of groups do not emerge to crowd the
ballot even under a markedly less restrictive system, such as requiring the signatures
of only one percent of the voters. See id. at 32-33.
189. See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986); Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983); Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975).
The Court has also allowed Congress to set a uniform age of eighteen for voters in
federal elections, including that for President, albeit in a decision that did not result in
an opinion of the Court or even a plurality opinion. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 124 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); id. at 142 (opinion of Douglas, J.); id. at 242
(opinion of Brennan, J.).
190. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 31-33.
191. Id. at 43 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
192. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806; La Follette, 450 U.S.
at 126; Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-91. It is not as though the Court in these cases indi-
cated that there was something improper about applying the Equal Protection Clause.
To the contrary, in at least one case, the Court seemed comfortable enough relying for
support on equal protection cases in other election contexts:
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protection claim, given its roughly contemporaneous decisions that a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires discriminatory intent
by the state, 93 an element not required to show a First Amendment
violation, but it never actually explained its shift over to the First
Amendment.
Similarly, the Court has been less than steadfast with respect to the
standard of review in the presidential election cases. In Williams v.
Rhodes, the Court unabashedly required that the state show that the
law served a "compelling" state interest,' 94 suggesting a form of strict
scrutiny.' 95 The majority did so even though Ray v. Blair had applied
only a rational basis standard,196 and in the face of vigorous dissents
by Justice Stewart and Chief Justice Warren asserting that considera-
bly more deference was due the states because of the power expressly
granted the states by the electoral appointments clause.1 97 Justice
Stewart argued that "[i]n view of the broad leeway specifically given
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause anal-
ysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election
cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These cases, applying the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection
analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights impli-
cated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and candidates, and have
considered the degree to which the State's restrictions further legitimate
state interests.
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 n.7 (citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 23; Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Ill. Elections Bd. v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1979)).
193. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976).
194. Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
195. The Court's three-tiered level of scrutiny in equal protection cases is now well
established: "strict scrutiny," applied to laws that intentionally classify on the basis of
race, national origin, religion, or resident alien status, requires a state to show that the
law is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling" state interest; "intermediate scru-
tiny," applied to laws that intentionally classify on the basis of gender, requires a state
to show that the law bears a "substantial relationship" to an "important" state inter-
est; and "rational basis review," applied to most other legal classifications, requires a
state to show only that the law is "rationally related" to a "legitimate" state interest.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 638-44
(6th ed. 2000).
196. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214,
226 n.14 (rejecting the due process and equal protection claims because "the require-
ment of this pledge ... is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective")).
197. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 48, 60-61 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 63, 68 (War-
ren, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stewart was troubled by the stringency of the standard
applied by the Court, see id. at 51-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and Chief Justice War-
ren complained that the decision was inconsistent with the deference shown the states
in reapportionment and school desegregation cases. In those cases, the Court had
typically given the states an opportunity to correct any constitutional defects, had
often "tolerated a temporary dilution of voting rights to protect the legitimate inter-
ests of the States in fashioning their own election laws," and "ha[d] even counseled
abstention where First Amendment rights ha[d] been allegedly infringed by state leg-
islation." Id. at 66-67 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
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the States by Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution," the Court should strike
the law "'only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective.'"198
In the two cases that immediately followed Williams, the Court con-
tinued to require a "compelling" interest from the states.' 99 Very
soon thereafter, however, the Court unmistakably distanced itself
from the strict scrutiny of the previous cases, and adopted a much
more malleable balancing test. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, ° ° the
Court wrote:
[A] court must resolve [a constitutional] challenge [to election laws]
by an analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary litigation.
It must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifica-
tions for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the
[c]ourt must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each
of these interests, it also must consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only af-
ter weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to
decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional °.20
Eliminating any doubt that this standard was intended to be more le-
nient than the compelling interest standard the Court had previously
used, Justice Stevens employed several lower-level scrutiny
watchwords20 2 in making a decidedly deferential point: "the State's
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 739 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 692-93 (1964); Har-
rison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959)).
198. Id. at 51 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425 (1961)). Chief Justice Warren also believed that the Court did not suffi-
ciently consider that the state was acting pursuant to a power expressly given it by the
Constitution:
The result achieved here is not compatible with ... our traditional concern,
manifested in both the reapportionment and school desegregation cases, for
preserving the properly exercised powers of the States in our federal system.
Moreover, in none of these analogous areas did we deal with an express
constitutional delegation of power to the States. That delegation is unequiv-
ocal here.
Id. at 68 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
199. Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
107, 121 (1981) (referring to Cousins' finding that the state's interest was not compel-
ling and deeming that holding controlling); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489
(1975) ("[Tjhe 'subordinating interest of the State must be compelling .. .' to justify
the injunction's abridgement of the exercise by petitioners and the National Demo-
cratic Party of their constitutionally protected rights of association." (quoting NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).
200. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
201. Id. at 789.
202. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 195, § 14.3, at 638-44 (setting forth the three
levels of scrutiny and the terms of art associated with each). It is especially worth
noting that Justice Stevens is the author of Anderson v. Celebrezze, inasmuch as he
has on several occasions expressed his disdain for the limiting nature of the Court's
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important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reason-
able, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 1 °2 0 3 Three years later, in Tashjian
v. Republican Party, °4 the Court reiterated the balancing test from
Anderson,20 5 and found the state law unconstitutional on the ground
that the state's interests were "insubstantial '20 6  and not
"legitimate. 1 °2 0 7
Thus, at the time that Bush v. Gore arose, the Court's electoral ap-
pointments law was in a state of some confusion. There was precedent
on the issues from virtually every angle, none of which had been ex-
pressly overruled. In re Green and McPherson stood for a sort of ab-
solute state legislative power under the electoral appointments clause,
although Williams and the cases that followed had fairly well settled
that the Supreme Court would impose at least the federal Constitu-
tion on that exercise of power. Williams had applied the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to state presidential election law, but in later cases the
Court had apparently become somewhat skittish about applying the
Equal Protection Clause, presumably in light of its discriminatory in-
tent requirement, and had chosen to confine itself to First Amend-
ment analysis. Finally, the Court had set forth competing standards
for addressing the states' election laws, suggesting that it was uncer-
tain of the best way to resolve conflicts between the express delega-
tion of power to the states and the remainder of the Constitution.
B. Federal Statutes Addressing Presidential Elections
The federal statutes governing presidential elections appear in
chapter 1 of Title 3 of the United States Code, the title denominated
simply, "The President. '20 8 Because, as described above, the Consti-
tution assigns Congress a limited role in regulating presidential elec-
tions, 09 there are essentially only three categories of such statutes in
three-tiered approach. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[O]ur cases reflect a continuum of
judgmental responses to differing classifications which have been explained in opin-
ions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one extreme to 'rational basis' at the
other. I have never been persuaded that these so-called 'standards' adequately ex-
plain the decisional process."); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 246
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Adarand, Justice Stevens wrote:
[I]f the Court in all equal protection cases were to insist that differential
treatment be justified by relevant characteristics of the members of the fa-
vored and disfavored classes that provide a legitimate basis for disparate
treatment, such a standard would treat dissimilar cases differently while still
recognizing that there is, after all, only one Equal Protection Clause.
Id.
203. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (emphasis added).
204. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
205. Id. at 214.
206. Id. at 225.
207. See id. at 219.
208. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-21 (1994).
209. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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chapter 1: (1) those setting the dates for Election Day and the electo-
ral college;210 (2) those directing the states how to certify to Congress
their chosen electors and the electors' votes;21' and (3) those gov-
erning the process by which Congress counts the electoral votes. 212
These statutes will be addressed below, by category. All of the refer-
enced sections appear in chapter 1 of Title 3.
1. The Dates of Election Day and the Electoral College
Pursuant to its constitutional authority under Article 11,213 Congress
has fixed by statute the date on which the states appoint their presi-
dential electors, and the date of the electoral college. Under § 1, each
state must appoint its electors on the Tuesday after the first Monday
in November in every fourth year.214 Under § 7, the electors across
the country vote on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in
December.215 In 2000, this meant that Election Day was November 7,
and December 18 was the date of the electoral college vote.
Two federal statutes provide for unusual contingencies that may
transpire between Election Day and the date on which the electoral
college is to meet. Under § 2, "[wlhenever any State has held an elec-
tion for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a
choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on
a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may
direct. 216 Under § 4, "[e]ach State may, by law, provide for the filling
of any vacancies which may occur in its college of electors when such
college meets to give its electoral vote. '21 7 Both of these statutes
were enacted in 1845, along with § 1, which establishes federal Elec-
tion Day.218 To appreciate the precise meaning of §§ 2 and 4, it is
necessary to explore the history behind the 1845 act of which they
were a part.
In 1844, several members of Congress had become concerned that
many elections-both congressional and presidential-had been
210. See 3 U.S.C. § 1-2. Section 3 merely codifies the constitutional provision that
the number of electors in each state shall be equal to the number of senators and
representatives that state is allotted. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 3.
211. 3 U.S.C. H§ 6, 8-14.
212. 3 U.S.C. H8 5, 15-18. The three remaining statutes in chapter 1 include two
sections addressing events subsequent to the selection of the President and a defini-
tions section. Section 19 describes the line of succession in the event there is a va-
cancy in the offices of both President and Vice President, id. § 19; § 20 describes the
evidence necessary to conclude that a President has resigned or refused to serve, id.
§ 20; and § 21 provides that the chapter's references to "states" include the District of
Columbia, id. § 21.
213. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
214. 3 U.S.C. § 1.
215. Id. § 7.
216. Id. § 2.
217. Id. § 4.
218. See Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721; see also CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong.,
2d Sess. 149 (1845) (final passage in House of Representatives).
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tainted by fraud.219 With respect to presidential elections, many ob-
jected particularly to the practice known as "pipe-laying"-i.e., parties
arranging for people to vote in one state and then moving them so
they could vote in another 22 -a practice that was possible because
the states held their elections on different days. To eliminate the prac-
tice, Representative Alexander Duncan of Ohio invoked Congress's
constitutional power to set the date on which states will appoint their
electors, and introduced a bill establishing a uniform federal election
day, what eventually would become § 1.221 Duncan's bill easily passed
the House,2 2 but the Senate tabled it after several senators voiced
fears that the states would have insufficient time to adapt their voting
procedures before the 1844 presidential election.223
In 1845, convinced that the legislation could pass the House again,
and would now present no problem of states having time to change
their election procedures, Representative Duncan reintroduced the
bill. 24 Duncan was insistent that the bill be taken up immediately, by
the Committee of the Whole, rather than referred to committee.225 A
few legislators balked, stating that even after voting for the bill the
previous session, they now believed it would benefit from further con-
sideration by a standing committee.226 Duncan persisted, however,
and so several legislators addressed from the floor certain problems
that they anticipated and suggested amendments. Representative El-
mer suggested the language that ultimately became § 4: allowing
states to later appoint electors "who may be prevented by sickness or
any other cause from fulfilling the duties of their appointment.
227
And Representative Hale explained why the type of language eventu-
ally appearing in § 2-permitting the legislature to act if the people
voted and yet "fail[ed] to make a choice"-was necessary. As it was
reported in the Congressional Globe,
219. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 1st Sess. 357-58 (1844) (Rep. Duncan)
(identifying a number of congressional elections in which fraud allegedly had oc-
curred); id. at 634 (Rep. Hamlin) (referring to "frauds which had heretofore been
perpetrated upon the elections").
220. See, e.g., id. at 728 (Sen. Atherton) (alleging that "men had been transferred
from one part of the Union to another, in order to vote[, a] system which had now
received the technical name of pipe-laying"); id. (Sen. Allen) (referring to "frauds
committed by the transfer of voters from the adjoining States to the State of Ohio");
id. at 358 (Rep. Duncan) (complaining of "the importation of voters from one State to
another, and from one county to another").
221. See id. at 170 (introducing "a bill to establish a uniform time for holding the
elections of members of the House of Representatives and of the electors of President
and Vice President of the United States throughout all the States of this Union").
222. See id. at 635 (noting that the results in the House were "yeas 141, nays 34").
223. See id. at 727-29.
224. See CONG. GLOBE, 28th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1845).
225. See id.
226. See id. (remarks of Reps. Elmer, Barnard, and Hamlin).
227. Id. at 14.
2002]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
MR. HALE desired to make a suggestion to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Duncan], and the other friends of this bill. This bill ap-
peared to him be framed on the idea that the choice of electors
would always be perfected in one day; now it appeared to him that
the bill was deficient, as it made no provision for an election, if the
people should fail to elect on the day designated. In the State which
he had the honor to represent, a majority of all the votes cast was
required to elect the electors of President and Vice President of the
United States, and it might so happen that no choice might be made.
If such a law had existed in some of the larger States, that would
have been the position in which they would have been placed. In
the large State of New York, for instance, a majority of all the votes
given was not given for the electors, of whom, by the laws of that
State, choice was made. He threw out these suggestions for the gen-
tleman of Ohio, that provision might be made for such a
228contingency.
Representative Duncan then amended the bill to include the provi-
sions that became §§ 2 and 4,229 and it was that amended version that
ultimately passed both houses.230
From this history, it is obvious that Congress intended § 4 to allow
states to provide for substitute electors in the event an appointed elec-
tor becomes ill or otherwise disabled from participating in the electo-
ral college. And § 2 was intended to cover situations in which a state
requires a majority vote, but the election does not produce a majority
outcome: in those situations, the legislature can provide for a runoff or
some other method of appointment. There is no indication that § 2
was designed to address situations where a dispute arises merely over
which candidate has garnered a majority of the votes.
2. State Certification of the Electors and Their Votes
As soon as possible after Election Day, the state executive is re-
quired to certify the electors who have been appointed. Under § 6, it
is "the duty of the executive of each State, as soon as practicable after
the conclusion of the appointment of electors in such State by the final
ascertainment, under and in pursuance of the laws of such State pro-
viding for such ascertainment," to certify the electors' appointment to
the Archivist of the United States and the electors themselves.2 31
After the electoral college votes in mid-December, the electors are
to create six certificates of their votes for President and Vice Presi-
dent, and attach to each a copy of the certified list of electors provided
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. See id. at 21; see also id. at 31 (Rep. Hale acknowledging that the bill had been
amended to remedy his concerns regarding states that require majority votes).
230. See id. at 35 (House passage); id. at 149 (House debate noting Senate passage
with a grammatical change); id. (final House passage).
231. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994).
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them by the state executive.232 Each of these "electoral certificates" is
then to be sealed2 33 and sent to the President of the Senate, the secre-
tary of state of the state, the Archivist of the United States, and the
federal district judge in the district where the electoral college vote
took place.234 In the event the officials in Washington do not receive
the certificate by the fourth Wednesday in December, §§ 12 through
14 provide a series of steps by which the federal officials retrieve it
from the secretary of state and the federal district judge.235
3. The Process for Counting the Electoral Votes
Some of the statutes in chapter 1 survive in virtually their original
form from the Act of March 1, 1792.236 Others date, as described
above, from the Act of January 23, 1845.237 Much of chapter 1, how-
ever-in particular, the provisions currently governing the process of
counting electoral votes-comes from the Act of February 3, 1887,
also known as the Electoral Count Act.238 Thus, to appreciate the
basis of the current law, it is important first to examine the origin of
the 1887 Act: the 1876 presidential election.
a. The Current Law's Roots in the 1876 Presidential Election
In the presidential election of 1876, Democratic candidate Samuel
Tilden faced Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes.2 39 The
morning after Election Day, most newspapers, and even Hayes him-
self, were convinced that Tilden had won.240 The Democratic Party,
however, sent two telegrams to the New York Times, asking the paper
to provide its estimate of the electoral votes for Tilden, specifically in
Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina.241 This caused the predomi-
nantly Republican political writers at the Times to focus on the electo-
232. See id. § 9.
233. See id. § 10.
234. Id. § 11. The Secretary of State and the Archivist each receive two copies.
One is to be held "subject to the order of the President of the Senate," and the other
is to be "preserved ... for one year and shall be a part of the public records of his
office and shall be open to public inspection." Id. Interestingly, this law does not
state whether the state secretaries of state or the Archivist has an obligation to open
the records for public inspection immediately, even before the opening of the electo-
ral certificates on the congressional floor.
235. See id. §§ 12-14.
236. Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 239 (1792) (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. §§ 3, 9, 10, 14).
237. Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721; see also supra notes 219-30 and accom-
panying text (describing the Act's legislative history).
238. Electoral Count Act, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887) (codified as amended at 3
U.S.C. H8 5-7, 15-18).
239. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 129 (1994).
240. Id. at 131; see also LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, The Electoral
College Primer 2000, at 28 (1999).
241. HARDAWAY, supra note 239, at 131; LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 240, at
28-29.
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ral votes, and once they did so, they realized that if Hayes carried the
three states the Democrats apparently were worried about, Hayes
would win the electoral college by a single vote.242
The managing editor of the Times then contacted the Republican
Party chair, and set in motion a campaign to skew the certified results
in the Republicans' favor.2 43 On the public front, both the Times and
the Republican Party immediately announced that Hayes had won. 4 4
Behind the scenes, the certifying election boards-which were in all
three states Republican-met in executive session, and began disqual-
ifying just enough votes to produce Republican majorities.
245
The Democrats responded to the boards' certifications of Republi-
can electors by sending to Washington competing electoral slates.246
Ultimately, Congress received three slates of electors from Florida,
and two slates each from Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon. 47
Because neither the Constitution nor any federal law addressed the
situation, Congress was at a loss as to how to handle the counting. 48
Eventually, Congress agreed to allow a commission consisting of ten
members of Congress-evenly divided between House and Senate,
and Republican and Democrat-and five Supreme Court justices-
two chosen by Democrats and two chosen by Republicans, the fifth to
be mutually agreed upon-to evaluate the electoral submissions.249
Given the events of 2000, the result can only be described as eerily
ironic. The mutually agreed upon justice, who was Republican but
thought nonetheless to be objective, 250 cast the tie-breaking vote with
respect to all four of the disputed states in favor of the Republican
slates.251
The ten years following the 1876 election brought a multitude of
proposals to prevent a recurrence of the controversy. Some proposed
amending the Constitution to provide for direct election of the Presi-
dent. 52 At the other end of the spectrum were proposals to retain the
242. HARDAWAY, supra note 239, at 131; see also LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note
240, at 28.
243. HARDAWAY, supra note 239, at 131-32.
244. Id. at 132.
245. Id.; see also LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 240, at 29.
246. HARDAWAY, supra note 239, at 132, 134; see also LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra
note 240, at 29.
247. HARDAWAY, supra note 239, at 132, 134.
248. See id. at 133.
249. Id. at 134. Under the joint resolution that created the commission, its deci-
sions could be overruled if five senators and congressmen objected and the houses
took concurrent action. Id. at 133-34.
250. Id. at 134; LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 240, at 29. The justice eventually
named, Joseph Bradley, had struck several provisions of major Republican legislation.
HARDAWAY, supra note 239, at 134.
251. HARDAWAY, supra note 239, at 134; LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 240, at
29.
252. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 156, 48th Cong. (1884); 15 CONG. REc. 1.024 (1884)
(describing Rep. Townshend's introduction of H.R.J. Res. 156, "proposing an amend-
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electoral college but allow the judiciary to resolve any disputes over
which electors should be allowed to vote.253 In the end, the electoral
college remained essentially intact, and Congress remained in charge
of counting the electoral votes, but Congress enacted the excruciat-
ingly detailed legislation described below to guide it in resolving dis-
putes over electoral slates.254
In evaluating this legislation, and its ultimate prominence in the
2000 election, it bears special note that throughout its consideration,
the sponsoring legislators expressed their belief that electoral disputes
were for Congress, not the federal courts, to resolve. As early as 1879,
when some of the first versions of the legislation were proposed, the
House Select Committee on the State of the Law Respecting Ascer-
tainment and Declaration of Result of Election of President and Vice
President wrote:
If both houses must count the votes, it follows that both houses
must determine what votes are to be counted. The Constitution de-
clares that "each State shall appoint its electors in such manner as
its legislature shall direct," but the questions, Who are the electors
appointed? Are they duly qualified? Have they acted according to
law? are not answered in the Constitution, and in the absence of any
statute, the determination of such questions belongs of necessity to
the tribunal appointed by the Constitution to ascertain and declare the
result of the election, to wit, the Congress.
255
More importantly, in 1886, in the House report accompanying the bill
that ultimately became the law, the Select Committee on the Election
of President and Vice President wrote: "The power to determine
[what electoral slate is valid] rests with the two houses, and there is no
other constitutional tribunal. Congress prescribes the details of the
ment to the Constitution ... in relation to the election of President and Vice-Presi-
dent, providing for their election by a majority of the voters of the people and the
abolition of the electoral college"); see also H.R. REP. No. 46-347, at 1, 2 (1880) (ac-
companying H.R.J. Res. 223, 46th Cong. (1880)) (describing resolution as providing
for people to appoint electors by direct vote and in proportion to the popular vote in
each state).
253. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 47-1207, at 7 (1882) (accompanying H. R. 5569)
("[B]eyond the mere enumeration of unchallenged votes, every question arising in a
disputed Presidential election requires the interpretation and application of existing
law to fact conditions. This power, the Constitution, when it vested the 'judicial
power of the United States' in the courts, devolved on the judiciary exclusively.").
254. See infra notes 262-81 and accompanying text.
255. H.R. REP. No. 46-6, at 2 (1879) (emphasis added); see also 15 CONG. REC.
5102 (1884) (Rep. Pryor) (examining electoral votes, "the labor of this body becomes
authoritative, investigatory, conclusive, and binding upon all parties thereto, being a
political forum of the last resort"); 15 CONG. REC. 5079 (1884) (responding to sugges-
tion that judiciary should resolve electoral disputes, "I propose that this question shall
be determined by the men who have the constitutional power to determine it, and by
nobody else") (emphasis added).
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trial and what kind of evidence shall be received, and how the final
judgment shall be rendered." '256
b. The Basic Procedure for Counting the Electoral Votes
Under § 15 of Title 3, Congress must be in session on January 6
after an election, and meet in joint session in the House of Represent-
atives at 1:00 p.m. that day for the opening of the electoral certifi-
cates.257 The President of the Senate (the sitting Vice President)
presides, and he opens in alphabetical order by state, "all the certifi-
cates and papers purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes."
The President of the Senate then hands all those certificates to one of
four "tellers, ' 258 who read the certificates.259 After each state certifi-
cate is read in this fashion, the President of the Senate calls for objec-
tions.260 To be accepted, any objection must be in writing, state the
grounds for objections "clearly and concisely, without argument," and
be signed by at least one member of each house.261
c. The Procedure for Handling Objections and Competing
Slates of Electors
In the event of such an objection to an electoral certificate, the two
houses immediately part ways to consider the objection, without mov-
ing on to the next state's vote.262 In the sessions that follow, the
houses may each debate the objection, but each member may speak to
the objection for only five minutes and not more than once.263 At the
end of two hours of debate, the presiding officer is required to "put
the main question without further debate. ' '26
256. H.R. REP. No. 49-1638, at 2 (1886) (emphasis added).
257. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). Notably, Congress has changed the January 6 date, for a
single election, three times in recent years. See Act of Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
296, 110 Stat. 3558 (changing the date to January 9, 1997); Act of Nov. 9,1998, Pub. L.
No. 100-646, 102 Stat. 3341 (changing the date to January 4, 1989); Act of Oct. 9, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-456, 98 Stat. 1748 (changing the date to January 7, 1985).
258. Two tellers are appointed by the Senate and two by the House. See 3 U.S.C.
§ 15.
259. Id. § 15. Even the seating is prescribed by statute. Id. § 16.
260. Id. § 15.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. § 17.
264. Id. When the joint session has broken up to consider an objection, the objec-
tion does not necessarily have to be addressed immediately; the law allows either
house to recess "not beyond the next calendar day, Sundays excepted, at the hour of
10 o'clock in the forenoon," unless the electoral vote counting has gone more than
five days, in which event no recesses are allowed. See id. § 16. It is hard to imagine
how the electoral vote counting could extend more than five days unless there were
objections to several states' electoral votes because the law does not allow any discus-
sion during the electoral vote counting other than questions on a motion by either
house to withdraw. See id. § 18.
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Section 15, the statute governing this objection process, contem-
plates, as an initial matter, two different situations.265 The first is a
situation in which only one electoral certificate is received from a
state, but there is nonetheless a question as to its validity. The second
is a situation in which more than one electoral certificate has been
received.
In the first situation, in which Congress has received only one elec-
toral certificate meeting the requirements above, § 15 provides:
no electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have been reg-
ularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully certi-
fied to according to section 6 of this title from which but one return
has been received shall be rejected, but the two Houses concur-
rently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that such vote
or votes have not been so regularly given by electors whose appoint-
ment has been so certified.26
In other words, a certificate submitted by electors who have been rec-
ognized and certified by the state executive, as described above, 67
must be treated as valid in its entirety unless both houses of Congress
concurrently decide that all or some of the votes recorded on the cer-
tificate should not be counted because they were not "regularly
given. 1268
In the second situation, in which more than one electoral certificate
from a state has been submitted, the guidelines for Congress's deci-
sion are markedly more complicated. 69 Indeed, the procedures are
265. See infra notes 266-81 and accompanying text.
266. 3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6.
267. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
268. The statute does not define what a "regularly given" vote is, but the legislative
history suggests that Congress was addressing the potential for some irregularity to
occur when a state's electors meet to vote, ranging from the state college voting on a
date other than the one set by Congress, to an elector having sold his or her vote, to
an elector refusing to vote for a candidate to which he or she was bound, to an elector
voting for a candidate ineligible to be President. 18 CONG. REc. 52 (1886) (statement
of Rep. Adams) ("The title of the electors may be valid, and yet their votes may be
invalid, and the words 'regularly given' referred not to the title of the electors them-
selves, but to the validity of their votes after they have been regularly elected."); see
also H.R. REP. No. 47-1207, at 6 (1882) (accompanying earlier bill) (describing elec-
tions in which Georgia and Wisconsin electors failed to vote on the day prescribed by
law); 15 CONG. REC. 5101 (1884) (remarks of Rep. Pryor on earlier bill) (observing
that a vote might be invalid because it is not "free, unbought, undeceived, and cast by
one entitled to vote, and for one entitled to receive a vote"). Also unclear from Title
3 is what happens if only one electoral certificate has been received from a state, but
the electors named as voting in the certificate have not been certified by the state
executive under § 6, or by any other authority under § 5. See infra note 275 and ac-
companying text (describing the potential for a state to set forth a procedure by which
the judiciary or some other authority certifies the electors).
269. As an initial matter, the Code does not make clear whether the houses with-
draw to consider an objection (or objections) to the first purported certificate, decide
that objection, and then return to the joint session only to hear the next certificate
from the same state read, and an objection (or objections) made to that one as well.
Section 15 provides, in relevant part:
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sufficiently complicated that it is necessary to quote the relevant pas-
sage from § 15 and identify separately the various clauses that provide
Congress its direction. The last two sentences of § 15, with their five
clauses identified by bracketed numbers, read as follows:
[1] If more than one return or paper purporting to be a return from
a State shall have been received by the President of the Senate,
those votes, and those only, shall be counted which shall have been
regularly given by the electors who are shown by the determination
mentioned in section 5 of this title to have been appointed, if the
determination in said section provided for shall have been made...
; [2] but in case there shall arise the question which of two or more
of such State authorities determining what electors have been ap-
pointed, as mentioned in section 5 of this title, is the lawful tribunal
of such State, the votes regularly given of those electors, and those
only, of such State shall be counted whose title as electors the two
Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide is supported by
the decision of such State so authorized by its law; [3] and in such
case of more than one return or paper purporting to be a return
from a State, if there shall have been no such determination of the
question in the State aforesaid, then those votes, and those only,
shall be counted which the two Houses shall concurrently decide
were cast by lawful electors appointed in accordance with the laws
of the State, [4] unless the two Houses, acting separately, shall con-
currently decide such votes not to be the lawful votes of the legally
appointed electors of such State. [5] But if the two Houses shall
disagree in respect of the counting of such votes, then, and in that
case, the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been
certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall
be counted.27°
Two tellers ... shall be handed, as they are opened by the President of the
senate, all the certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the
electoral votes, which certificates and papers shall be opened, presented, and
acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States, beginning with the letter
A; and said tellers, having then read the same in the presence and hearing of
the two Houses, shall make a list of the votes as they appear from the said
certificates .... Upon such reading of any such certificate or paper, the
President of the Senate shall call for objections, if any .... When all objec-
tions so made to any vote or paper from a State shall have been received and
read, the Senate shall thereupon withdraw, and such objections shall be sub-
mitted to the senate for its decision; and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives shall, in like manner, submit such objections to the House of
Representatives for its decision ....
3 U.S.C. § 15 (emphasis added). This language unmistakably contemplates that when
the houses separate, the houses will take all objections to a single certificate with them
for debate, but the consistent use of the singular of "certificate" and "paper" makes it
seem as though the houses are to consider only one certificate at a time. As a practical
matter, this might not make much difference, because one might expect that the ac-
tion on one certificate would effectively resolve the objections to the others, but that
outcome certainly is not assured.
270. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
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With the clauses so identified, it is relatively easy to see that the stat-
ute contemplates three primary scenarios when there are two or more
electoral certificates purporting to be the proper certificates from a
single state. In the first scenario, addressed by clause [1], one certifi-
cate is unquestionably the result of "the determination mentioned in
section 5," and Congress is required to accept it, provided the votes
reflected in it were "regularly given. '27 1 In the second scenario, ad-
dressed by clause [2], each of two or more state authorities has
claimed that it is the tribunal lawfully entitled to make the final deter-
mination under § 5 as to who are the rightful electors. In this situa-
tion, clause [2] directs each house of Congress to determine which
authority is the tribunal "authorized by [the state's] law" to have
made the final determination, and if both houses agree on the tribu-
nal, count the votes cast by the electors approved by that tribunal,
provided the votes were "regularly given." In the third scenario, ad-
dressed by clause [3], either the state has not provided for any final
determination of electors that would qualify under § 5, or, for some
reason, neither certificate can be considered the product of such a de-
termination. In this situation, clause [3] directs Congress simply to
determine which certificate reflects the votes of electors appointed "in
accordance with the laws of the state" and count those votes, provided
they were "lawfully" cast. 72
Clauses [2] and [3], by their terms, suggest that the two houses of
Congress might disagree in reaching a conclusion under those
clauses:2 73 both clauses require "concurrent" decisions by both houses,
271. It is important to observe the distinction the statute draws between disputes
over who are the proper electors, on the one hand, and whether those electors' votes
are lawful, on the other. In the first two clauses, for example, that distinction is re-
flected within the clause itself by the reference to "regularly given" votes. Id.; see
supra note 268.
272. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. While it is clear from the statute's
language that Congress intended to draw a distinction between who are the proper
electors and which votes have been "lawfully" cast, what is less clear is how Congress
should act if it decides which certificate reflects the properly appointed electors but
believes that a vote or votes in the certificate were somehow not lawfully cast. Un-
doubtedly, if that problem arose in a situation where the electors were approved
under clause [3], the language immediately following clause [3] would apply: "unless
the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently decide such votes not to be the
lawful votes of the legally appointed electors of such State." 3 U.S.C. § 15. Most
likely, even though Congress tacked this language on to the very end of the entire
sentence and separated it from clause [3] by only a comma, when the other clauses
were separated by semi-colons, Congress intended it to apply to decisions under the
first two clauses as well. Otherwise, Congress might choose a slate of electors under
clauses [1] or [2], but have no direction on how to handle a challenge not to the
electors, but to the electors' votes themselves.
273. As described, both clauses expressly require Congress to evaluate state law:
clause [2] requires Congress to decide which tribunal is the proper one under state
law to make the final determination under § 5, and clause [3] requires Congress to
decide which group of electors has been appointed in accordance with state law. See
supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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"acting separately." In the event that both houses do not agree,
clause [5] provides the method for breaking the tie. The votes cast by
the electors certified by the state executive are to be honored.
Clause [4] addresses a situation in which Congress has decided
which group of electors should be approved, but there remains a ques-
tion as to whether certain of the electors' votes have been "regularly
given." In that situation, the statute directs Congress to count the
votes in the certificate of the approved electors unless both houses
agree that particular votes should not be counted. This is essentially
the same way Congress is directed to handle a situation where only
one certificate has been received from a state, but there is some chal-
lenge to the votes within the certificate, as described above. 74
Because, as just described, clause [1] of § 15 requires Congress to
honor an electoral slate that is the product of a "determination" under
§ 5, it is critical to understand that section completely. Section 5 reads
as follows:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day
fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination
of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or
any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or
procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least
six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on such day,
and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the elec-
tors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by
such State is concerned. 75
If one translates the date references into modern terminology, the
statute becomes easier to understand. In short, it means that if a state
puts in place prior to Election Day ("the day fixed for the appoint-
ment of the electors") a judicial or other method for finally determin-
ing any controversy or contest concerning the electors, and a "final
determination" is reached by that method at least six days prior to the
electoral college ("the time fixed for the meeting of the electors"),
then that final determination is "conclusive," and "shall govern in the
counting of electoral votes . . . , so far as the ascertainment of the
electors of such State is concerned."
At a minimum, this means that if Congress receives votes from
competing slates of electors, then it must honor the slate of electors
resulting from use of the method the state had adopted prior to Elec-
tion Day, provided that there was a "final determination" pursuant to
that method by six days prior to the meeting of the electoral college.
The statute leaves two questions unanswered, however. First, what
274. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
275. 3 U.S.C. § 5.
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happens if the state has adopted a method of "final determination,"
but that method is not completed by six days before the electoral col-
lege? Second, what does it mean that the product of a final determi-
nation "shall be conclusive," especially given that this phrase appears
in addition to the phrase, "and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes"?
276
With respect to the first question posed by § 5-what happens if the
state's method of "final determination" does not reach fruition-§ 15
itself provides the answer. As described above, § 15 contemplates
three scenarios: one in which a final determination has indisputably
been made, one in which there is a question about which state author-
ity is the proper tribunal to make the "final determination," and one
in which, for whatever reason, neither electoral certificate can be con-
sidered the result of a § 5 determination. Recall that clause [3] oper-
ates as a sort of catch-all provision, broad enough to deal with a state
that either has no procedure in place or does not complete its process:
"in such case of more than one return or paper purporting to be a
return from a State, if there shall have been no such determination of
the question in the State aforesaid, then those votes, and those only,
shall be counted which the two Houses shall concurrently decide were
cast by lawful electors appointed in accordance with the laws of the
State. '2 77 In effect, Congress is left to evaluate state law itself and
decide which electors were appointed more in accordance with that
law.
The second question-what it means to say that the product of a
"final determination" of electors is "conclusive"-is somewhat more
difficult to answer. One interpretation would be that the term "con-
clusive" is merely synonymous with the phrase that follows it: "and
shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes." In other words,
the product of a "final determination" bears an irrebuttable presump-
tion of validity in the event two or more electoral certificates are sub-
mitted, and § 5 is intended only to address a situation in which there
are competing electoral slates. Another interpretation would be that
"'conclusive" means that the product of a "final determination" is
completely insulated from challenge by Congress, at least to the ex-
276. One would of course welcome case law that might help to answer these ques-
tions. At the time Bush v. Gore arose, however, no court had ever addressed either
statute. As a result, one must turn to the traditional sources of statutory interpreta-
tion: the statute's relationship to other statutes and any legislative history that is avail-
able. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132-39 (1998) (examining
legislative history and other statutory sections for purpose of determining the mean-
ing of the word "carry" in criminal statute); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145,
147 (1995) ("We consider not only the bare meaning of the word but also its place-
ment and purpose in the statutory scheme.").
277. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
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tent of the electors who cast the votes (as opposed to the issue of
whether those votes were "regularly given").,78
It seems highly likely that the second interpretation is the proper
one. Generally one must assume that if Congress chose to include two
phrases describing the outcome in the event of a determination under
§ 5-i.e., "shall be conclusive" and "shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes"-it intended some unique meaning for each
phrase.279
Moreover, in the final congressional report before the adoption of
§§ 5 and 15, Congress made clear its belief that if only one electoral
certificate were submitted by a state, then Congress should not ques-
tion whether the electors were validly appointed. As the House Select
Committee on the Election of President and Vice President wrote:
"The majority of the committee were of opinion that where there was
but a single return from a State the two houses should not have the
power to reject the vote of the State." 8 ' For this reason, the House
Committee included an amendment to the provision that ultimately
became § 15 (section 4 of Senate Bill 9) that expressly required Con-
gress to honor an electoral certificate that had been certified by the
executive when only one certificate had been received from a state.
281
Hence, § 5's reference to the "conclusiveness" of a slate appointed
pursuant to a final "judicial" or "other" method most likely embodies
the same concept when the electors are certified not by the executive
of a state, but by its judiciary. In other words, when only one electoral
certificate has been submitted by a state, and it is certified by the ex-
ecutive, section 15 requires Congress to accept that slate of electors;
and when only one electoral certificate has been submitted by a state,
and it is certified not by the executive under § 6, but by the judiciary
or other authority pursuant to a § 5 "final determination," then sec-
tion 5's reference to "conclusiveness" requires Congress to accept that
slate, whether there are competing slates or only one.
However complex these procedures under §§ 15 and 5 may seem,
one fact clearly emerges: Congress thought it critical to establish rules
of decision for evaluating electoral certificates but wanted to ensure
that in no case would a state end up with no vote at all in the counting.
In the event only one slate of electors, certified by the executive, is
submitted, § 15 requires that Congress honor the votes of that slate (at
278. There is no reason to believe that § 5 would insulate an electoral certificate
from a challenge based on whether the votes given by the electors were "regularly
given." Section 5 itself makes clear that the "final determination" would be conclu-
sive only "so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is con-
cerned." 3 U.S.C. § 5 (emphasis added).
279. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 145 ("'Judges should hesitate ... to treat [as surplusage]
statutory terms in any setting."') (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135,
140-41 (1994)).




least to the extent the votes were "regularly given," i.e., were not in
some respect illegal votes). In the event only one slate of electors,
certified by the judiciary or other authority empowered to make a fi-
nal determination, is submitted, § 5 requires that Congress honor the
votes of that slate (subject to the same provision concerning the na-
ture of the votes). In the event that multiple slates of electors, certi-
fied by whomever, are submitted, § 15 sets forth a variety of
guidelines as to which slate should be chosen and directs Congress to
honor any slate on which the houses of Congress can agree but ulti-
mately also includes a tiebreaker: the slate certified by the executive
wins.
It is surely safe to imagine that very few attorneys in the country
were familiar with all this law at the time the 2000 election contro-
versy arose. There were certainly election law specialists, but one
would have been hard pressed to find a presidential election law spe-
cialist. So when the election ended in a dead heat, the question be-
came which of the two teams' attorneys would become the first to
master the law and marshal it to its candidate's advantage. The next
Part of this Article-relating the intricacies of the court battles in
Florida and the federal courts-is designed to answer that question.
PART Two: THE RESOLUTION OF THE 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
After retracting his concession to Bush in the early morning of No-
vember 8, Gore went to bed for the first time in forty-eight hours.282
At 4:00 a.m., however, most of the significant members of his cam-
paign team met to assemble an initial strategy. 283 Because of reports
by Gore political strategists that the election would be very close in
twenty states, the Democratic Party's general counsel, Joseph Sandler,
and other DNC lawyers had collected summaries of recount laws and
procedures from those states prior to the election.284 Having done so,
Sandler told the group assembled on November 8 that the automatic
recount meant that they could expect a day or two to be spent can-
vassing, or formally tallying the votes, and another day or two spent
running the ballots back through the counting machines.285 At that
point, Sandler said, the losing candidate could challenge the results.
286
By the end of the day, Gore's top strategists and dozens of volunteers
had left Nashville for Florida.287
282. Kevin Sack, In Desperate Florida Fight, Gore's Hard Strategic Calls, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at Al.
283. Id.; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 55-57.
284. Sack, supra note 282.
285. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 56.
286. Id.
287. Sack, supra note 282; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 57, 72.
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The automatic recount was proceeding, with the press watching
every move. The Associated Press had agency reporters in all of Flor-
ida's sixty-seven counties and was reporting the results as they were
announced by the counties.288 The trend of the counting seemed to
favor Gore,2 89 but even more notably, many of the counties were re-
porting substantially different totals.
In Pinellas County, the automatic recount produced 400 additional
votes for Gore.290 The Pinellas Supervisor of Elections explained that
a clerk apparently had overlooked some ballots on election night.291
In Palm Beach County, the automatic recount produced 859 addi-
tional votes, 751 for Gore and 108 votes for Bush.292 The Palm Beach
Elections Supervisor, Theresa LePore, attributed 391 of the newly
found votes to a precinct that was not counted because the person
originally running the ballots through the card reader had activated
the "clear" button rather than the "set" button.2 93 LePore was unable
to account for the retrieval of the other 468 votes, other than to say
that she understood that other counties had also recovered lost votes
when they performed the machine recount.2 94 Indeed, eventually
fifty-five of the counties reported different total numbers of votes:
forty-four counties reported greater totals, eleven reported lower
totals, and only twelve stayed the same.2 95
I. THE REQUESTS FOR MANUAL RECOUNTS IN VOLUSIA, PALM
BEACH, BROWARD, AND MIAMI-DADE COUNTIES
A. The Decision on Where To File: Isolated (Democratic?)
Counties or Statewide
While the automatic recount moved forward, the Gore team turned
its attention to what it might do in the event that the margin did not
swing in Gore's favor. The lawyers and strategists concluded that any
requests for manual counts had to be made within seventy-two hours
of the election.296 Concerned that the seventy-two hours would expire
288. See R.W. Apple, Jr., Democrats Widen Attack-Recount Seems To Erode
Bush's Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at Al.
289. Id. (referencing an Associated Press survey that found that with sixty-six of
sixty-seven counties counted, all but Republican-dominated Seminole County, the
margin had been cut to 229 votes).
290. Don Van Natta, Jr., Democrats Tell of Problems at the Polls Across Florida,





295. Richard Perez-Pefia, One County Is Puzzling over a Mystery Involving 218
Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at A15.
296. Gore's team drew this conclusion apparently in spite of the Florida law's re-
quirement that such requests be filed either prior to the canvassing board's certifica-
tion or within 72 hours after midnight of the date the election was held, whichever
occurs later, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(b) (West Supp. 2001), and the fact that
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on Friday, November 10, which was the state's holiday for Veterans'
Day, they aimed for a decision by Thursday and began focusing al-
most immediately on where to file the requests.297
Because the Democrats had experienced problems with Volusia and
Palm Beach during the voting and subsequent tally, the first counties
that came to mind were those.298 Volusia had experienced serious
trouble with its machines on election night, when a computer glitch
subtracted 16,000 votes from Gore and from Nader, added 2800 to
Bush, and conferred 9888 on the Socialist Workers' Party candi-
date.299 In Palm Beach, a variety of events had called the results into
question. In the early hours of the morning, when the network calls
were going back and forth and the votes from most other counties
were in, Palm Beach still had 100,000 votes left to count.3 °° Pat
Buchanan was reported to have garnered 3407 votes in the staunchly
Democratic county, well over three times as many as he received in
any other county in Florida, 30 1 and many claimed that those were
votes for Gore that were mistakenly cast due to the "butterfly ballot"
design.30 2 Palm Beach County had also reported a very large number
of "overvotes," in which a ballot reflects more than one selection for a
candidate,30 3 and "undervotes," in which a ballot reflects no choice at
all for a candidate.30 4
With some reticence, Gore Campaign Chair Daley and former Sec-
retary of State Warren Christopher (who had become Gore's spokes-
person on Florida) 30 5 approved filing requests in those two
the counties could not have properly certified the vote without the overseas ballots
and before the automatic recount was complete. See supra notes 72-74 and accompa-
nying text.
297. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 77.
298. Id. at 78; see also Sack, supra note 282.
299. Van Natta, Jr., supra note 290; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 42.
300. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 46.
301. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Dana Canedy, Florida Democrats Say Ballot's Design
Hurt Gore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at Al. Buchanan's second best showing was in
Pinellas County, where his campaign was headquartered. Id. In Miami-Dade and
Broward Counties, both of which had more votes cast on Election Night, he had re-
ceived only 561 and 789 votes, respectively. Id.
302. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief, supra note 131; Class Action Complaint
for Violation of Civil Rights, Horowitz v. LePore, No. CL-00-10970-AG (Fla. Cir. Ct.
filed Nov. 9, 2000); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Elkin v. LePore, No. CL-
00-10988-AE (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 2000); Complaint, Rogers v. Elections Can-
vassing Comm'n, No. CL-00-10922-AF (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 2000); Class Action
Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights, Gibbs v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
No. CL-00-11000AH (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 2000); Emergency Motion for Injunc-
tive Relief, Miller v. Harris, No. 00-9004-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 8, 2000).
303. Van Natta, Jr. & Canedy, supra note 301 (reporting Palm Beach County ad-
ministrator statement that there were 19,000 overvotes).
304. See Dexter Filkins, Local Officials Say System Failed on Election Day, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2000, at All (reporting 11,000 undervotes in Palm Beach County).
305. See Sack, supra note 282. Daley and Carter Eskew, another of Gore's top
advisors, had made the decision to ask for Christopher's help without even first alert-
ing Gore. They awoke Christopher at 3:30 a.m. Pacific time on the morning after
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counties. °6 Lawyers with the campaign then suggested that Gore also
consider asking for recounts in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties.
30 7
Like Palm Beach County, both Miami-Dade and Broward used punch
card ballots and had large numbers of undervotes, and perhaps most
importantly, both counties were Democratic strongholds. 308 Daley
and Christopher, already concerned about the negative public reac-
tion that Gore was going to receive for prolonging the election, re-
sisted at first.3 9 On Thursday, however, the Gore campaign sought
manual recounts in all four counties.310 At that time, the state had not
released the official results of the automatic recount,311 but it was re-
ported that Bush led by 327 votes.312
Democratic strategists have said since that they gave little thought
to requesting manual recounts in every Florida county.313 Some mem-
bers of the team knew from experience that most recounts produce
little change, but when the automatic recount began reducing Bush's
margin considerably, it seemed that seeking a count of more ballots
rather than fewer was likely to produce the biggest net change for
Gore.314 Even so, a statewide request seemed out of the question, for
several reasons. First, a statewide hand count had never been done in
a presidential race, and Florida law did not have any provision specifi-
cally allowing for it.315 Second, they were already concerned about
appearing indiscriminate to the public in requesting a recount in four
counties; it seemed inconceivable to press for what would inevitably
be an even more protracted and burdensome process.316 Third, they
did not have enough legal manpower to cover manual counts all over
Election Day, and he was on a plane to Nashville within three hours. Id.; see also
DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 79.
306. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 78.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 78-79; see also Sack, supra note 282.
310. Apple, Jr., supra note 288; see also DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 79; David
Firestone, Democrats' Eyes on Recounts and Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2000, at
Al.
311. The Florida Division of Elections released numbers on Saturday, November
11, showing that Bush led by 961 votes after the automatic machine recount. NEW
YORK TIMES, 36 DAYS: THE COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION CRISIS 274 (2001).
312. Sack, supra note 282.
313. Id.
314. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 77.
315. Id.
316. David Barstow & Adam Nagourney, Gore's Failure To Ask for Manual State-
wide Recount May Have Been Critical Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A23;
Sack, supra note 282; see also DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 78.
[Vol. 8
THE 2000 ELECTION
the state.317 Finally, they were uncertain whether the other counties
would produce the best, or even positive, results.318
B. Initial Reactions to the Requests: Secretary of State Harris's
Warning, the Canvassing Boards' Approvals, and the Bush
Team's Federal Lawsuit
On Thursday, November 9, the same day Gore filed the requests for
manual recounts, Secretary of State Katherine Harris invoked the
seven-day certification deadline319 in sections 102.111 and 102.112.320
She announced that it was up to the individual counties whether they
would conduct manual counts, but if the results were to be included in
the final certification, the counties would have to complete the counts
by Tuesday, November 14.321 She stated that her figures would re-
main unofficial until that date, when all the counties had reported.322
She added that the winner would not be known until after November
17, because overseas absentee ballots arriving through that date would
have to be counted and added to the counties' totals.323
The four counties in which the requests for manual recounts were
made reacted differently. In Volusia, the county with the fewest bal-
lots cast, the canvassing board quickly agreed to count manually the
entire county's ballots, beginning at 8:00 a.m. on Saturday, November
11.324 The county apparently believed it had authority to count all the
ballots, because the manual recount law, section 102.166(4)(d), per-
mitted the canvassing board to manually count at least one percent of
the ballots. 325 In Palm Beach and Broward Counties, the canvassing
317. Barstow & Nagourney, supra note 316; Sack, supra note 282; see also DEAD-
LOCK, supra note 1, at 78.
318. Sack, supra note 282 (quoting top Gore aide as saying, "We had to keep our
focus on where our biggest return was, and we couldn't stretch our resources.").
319. Apple, Jr., supra note 288.
320. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
321. Apple, Jr., supra note 288.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Frank Bruni, G.O.P. Considers Trying for Injunction To Halt Manual Re-
counts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2000, at Al.
325. Complaint, McDermott v. Harris, No. CV-00-2700, at 1-3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed
Nov. 12, 2000); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text. The New York Times
reported that the Volusia County Canvassing Board decided to count the entire
county because it had received a request from the Republican Party as well as the
Democratic Party. Van Natta, Jr., supra note 290. The Volusia County Supervisor of
Elections, Deanie Lowe, states that this is not true: the County received a request
only from the Democrats and decided to count all of the county simply because there
had been the computer error on election night and the board wanted the public to feel
completely comfortable with the result. Telephone Interview with Deanie Lowe, Su-
pervisor of Elections, Volusia County, Fla. (Aug. 2, 2001). Further, the complaint
cited above and filed by the canvassing board itself states that the canvassing board
granted the Democratic request and does not mention any Republican request. Com-
plaint, supra, at 2.
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boards agreed to count one percent of the ballots,326 the minimum
required by section 102.166(4)(d),327 beginning on Saturday and Mon-
day mornings, respectively.3 28 In Miami-Dade County, the canvassing
board agreed only to consider the request on Tuesday morning, No-
vember 14.329
The counties' decisions on the recount requests prompted the Bush
team to act. On Friday, November 10, 2000, the Bush campaign filed,
on behalf of Governor Bush and several Florida residents within and
outside the counties requested to count, the first lawsuit brought by
either campaign.33 ° Suing all four canvassing boards that Gore had
asked for a manual recount, Bush complained that section 102.166(4),
and the actions the canvassing boards had taken in reliance on it, vio-
lated the plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause, the First
Amendment, and the Due Process Clause.3 3 '
The statute, the plaintiffs asserted, unconstitutionally allowed for
manual counts in some counties and not others, provided no standards
to guide the counties in deciding whether to undertake a manual re-
count, and provided no standards to guide the counties as to how they
should evaluate the ballots, which in turn allowed for partial indenta-
tions to be counted in one county and not another.332 The voting
plaintiffs claimed that the statute and the boards' actions were subject
to strict scrutiny, because their "fundamental right to vote" was at is-
sue.3 3 3 The relief sought was expansive: removal of all Florida cases
involving the election; an order that the counties cease all manual re-
326. See Bruni, supra note 324.
327. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
328. Bruni, supra note 324.
329. Firestone, supra note 310.
330. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 31, 31, at
7-8. A spate of lawsuits had already been filed by Palm Beach County citizens com-
plaining of the butterfly ballot, and at least one complaint had been filed by an Afri-
can-American that he had been discriminated against on account of his race because
his precinct had required picture identification before he could vote. See supra note
302 (listing the original "butterfly" ballot lawsuits); Complaint for Deprivation of
Constitutional Rights Under Color of State Law, supra note 118 (alleging equal pro-
tection violation in treatment at the polls).
331. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 31, TT 53, 55,
57, 61, 64, at 14-16. Three days later, on November 13, 2000, three voters from Bre-
vard County filed a similar complaint and motion for temporary restraining order in
the federal district court for the Middle District of Florida. See Plaintiffs' Verified
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief (Injunctive Relief Sought) (filed Nov.
13, 2000), Touchston v. McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Fla.) (No. 6:00-CV-
1510-Orl-28C), affd, 234 F.3d 11.33 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1061 (2001);
Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
(filed Nov. 13, 2000), Touchston v. McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Fla.) (No.
6:00-CV-1510-Orl-28C), affd, 234 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1061 (2001).
332. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 31, TT 45-47,
at 11-13.
333. Id. T 55, at 14.
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counts and certify their results at once; an order that the counties not
count any overvoted ballots; and a declaration that the "butterfly"
ballot was valid.334 The following day, the Bush campaign followed
with a motion for immediate injunctive relief.
335
By the time Bush filed the federal lawsuit, many of the issues in the
controversy were beginning to crystallize. First, what were the legal
requirements for undertaking a countywide manual recount? Second,
when did the counties have to finish a manual recount? Third, how
should the canvassing boards evaluate the ballots in a manual re-
count? And finally, was there something unconstitutional about man-
ual recounts per se, about conducting them only in certain counties, or
about allowing counties to evaluate the ballots differently? The court
decisions over the next thirty-two days would resolve these issues in
roughly that order.
C. The Canvassing Boards in Limbo: Whether To Count and
How To Count
As Bush pressed the issue in federal court on Saturday morning,
November 11, the Volusia and Palm Beach canvassing boards began
their work. Because Volusia County planned to count the entire
county, and 184,339 votes had been cast,336 the county went immedi-
ately to the procedure laid out in section 102.166(7)) 7 with several
teams of counters, each consisting of a Democrat and a Republican,
and all disputed ballots reviewed by the canvassing board.338 By Mon-
day, at 5:30 p.m., the counting teams had finished their work, and all
that remained was the canvassing board's review of disputed
ballots.339
The scene in Palm Beach County was very different. The board
there planned to count only the one percent sample described by sec-
334. Id. at 16-17.
335. See Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary In-
junction and Supporting Memorandum of Law (filed Nov. 11, 2000), Siegel v. LePore,
120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D.Fla.) (No. 00-9009-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS), affd, 234
F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000).
336. Somini Sengupta, Recount Near End, Red Faces Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2000, at A22.
337. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
338. Telephone Interview with Deanie Lowe, Supervisor of Elections, supra note
325.
339. Sengupta, supra note 336. According to Elections Supervisor Lowe, Volusia's
manual count probably went much more quickly and smoothly than the other coun-
ties because their voting system was an optical scan system in which voters filled in an
oval rather than punched through a card. Telephone Interview with Deanie Lowe,
supra note 325. Ms. Lowe indicated that much of the change in their numbers was
due to situations where voters had marked an "X" over the oval rather than filling it
in, or had filled in the oval for a candidate and also written the name of their candi-
date in, or had filled in the wrong oval and then erased it or written "No" out beside
it. Id. The machine would have rejected all such ballots, but the canvassing board
treated them as votes. Id.
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tion 102.166(4),340 approximately 4600 ballots, and then decide
whether a full countywide count was warranted. 34' Before the board
began looking at ballots Saturday morning, Elections Supervisor The-
resa LePore reviewed the County's past practices in manual count-
342 Serlting. She related a policy adopted by the County in 1990 that called
for counting all ballots on which a chad was punched through to some
extent and rejecting all ballots that bore only an indentation.343 She
went on to reveal, however, that the county's practices had not been
consistent: in other recounts the board had applied a "three-corner"
rule, which counted a ballot only if three corners of the chad were
dislodged, and in still others, the board had applied a "sunshine" rule,
under which a ballot was counted if light could be seen through the
chad next to a candidate's name.344 The Democrats in the room
pressed for a policy broader than all these: counting all indications of
a vote, including indentations, even if light could not be seen.345 The
Republicans pressed for the sunshine rule, and that was the rule the
board adopted.346
As the morning wore on, the attorney representing the Republican
Party became convinced that the board was seeing light through the
ballots when there was none, and began strenuously and repeatedly
objecting to the board's decisions.3 47 By the time the board broke for
lunch, the board was only halfway through the first precinct, and Gore
had a net gain of 11 votes.348 Judge Charles Burton, the chairman of
the board (and a Democrat), left the scene for forty-five minutes, and
when he returned, he announced that the sunshine rule was inappro-
priate given the existence of the 1990 standard.349 The board's deci-
sion to follow the narrower 1990 standard set off the same barrage of
objections to every ballot from the Democratic counsel.35°
When the sample count was completed late Saturday night, the
Palm Beach board had found thirty-three additional votes for Gore,
fourteen for Bush, and thus a net gain of nineteen for Gore.35" ' The
board then met for two hours to decide whether to conduct a county-
340. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
341. See Don Van Natta, Jr. & Rick Bragg, Two Camps Clash Vote by Vote, Scrap
by Scrap, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at Al.
342. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 86-87.
343. Id. at 87.
344. Id. at 87-88.
345. Id. at 88.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.; Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 341.
349. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 88. It was later discovered that he had gone to
discuss the standard with a lawyer from Katherine Harris's office and two county
lawyers. Id. at 89.
350. Id. at 89; see also Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 341.
351. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 89.
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wide vote.352 Burton was uncomfortable deciding without first asking
the Secretary of State whether a recount was proper, but Commis-
sioner Carol Roberts insisted that the law was clear and pressed for a
vote.353 At 2:00 a.m., LePore joined Roberts for a 2-1 vote to conduct
the recount of more than 460,000 ballots.354
As had been true in Palm Beach, when the Broward County board
convened on Monday to begin its sample recount,355 the meeting be-
gan with a discussion of the standard for evaluating the ballots 6.3 5  The
meeting ended, however, quite differently. After the board counted
the one percent sample, Gore had gained four votes. 7 The canvass-
ing board, made up of two Democrats, a county judge and a county
commissioner, and one Republican,358 the elections supervisor,359
voted 2-1 not to conduct a full recount.3 60 The Democratic county
judge explained that he had joined the Republican member to vote
against the recount because he had read a newly issued opinion issued
by the state's Director of the Elections Division, Clayton Roberts.36'
That opinion stated that manual recounts were warranted only in the
event that "the vote tabulation system fails to count properly marked
• . . ballots": in effect, only when some sort of machine error had
occurred.362
352. See Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 341.
353. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 89; see Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 341.
354. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 89.
355. Broward had a total of 587,928 ballots cast. Don Van Natta, Jr., Fatigue in
Florida: Bush's Slim Lead Holds as Rules Change and Challenges Pile Up, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at Al. One percent of this total would be approximately 5900
ballots.




359. Don Van Natta, Jr., Democrats Seek Wider Standard for Tallies in Two Coun-
ties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at Al.
360. Canedy, supra note 356.
361. Id.
362. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, Fla. Democratic Party v. Carroll, No. 00-
19324, Exhibit A, at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 14, 2000) (Nov. 13, 2000 Roberts opin-
ion letter); see also Canedy, supra note 356 (quoting the Roberts opinion). The Wash-
ington Post has reported that the opinion letter from Roberts was essentially
engineered by the Bush campaign. Reportedly, the lawyer for Katherine Harris with
whom Palm Beach County Chair Burton had spoken on Saturday, November 11, see
supra note 349 and accompanying text, had urged him to ask the Secretary of State
for an opinion on when manual recounts were warranted, but Burton did not immedi-
ately do so. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 98; see also Trial Transcript, 2000 WL
1802941 at 106 (testimony of Judge Burton that Elections Division lawyer encouraged
him to ask for opinion), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1790621 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4), rev'd,
772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Impatient
that Burton's request was not forthcoming, Bush lawyer Frank Jimenez called Clay-
ton Roberts, who told Jimenez that an advisory opinion did not have to be requested
by a canvassing board but could be requested by political party. DEADLOCK, supra
note 1, at 98. Jimenez then had Florida Republican Party Chair Al Cardenas fax over
a request. See id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, supra, Exhibit A (Nov.
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While the Broward County Canvassing Board was conducting its
sample recount, the Volusia and Palm Beach County boards grew ner-
vous about whether the full recounts they had decided upon would be
honored by Secretary of State Harris. Harris had made quite clear
that any manual recounts must be completed and the returns submit-
ted by Tuesday, November 14.363 On Monday, Volusia County's re-
count was almost complete, but the board could not be sure that it
would finish in time.3 64 In Palm Beach, the board had voted only
early Sunday morning to conduct the count, and the logistics of count-
ing 467,587 votes were such that the recount would not even begin
until 7:00 a.m. on November 14.365
Volusia County decided to have the issue resolved by filing suit in
circuit court in Leon County, the capital, to enjoin Harris from refus-
ing the returns if they were submitted after 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, No-
vember 14.366 Palm Beach and both campaigns moved to join the
suit.3 67 On Monday afternoon, Judge Terry Lewis held a hearing to
address the issue.
368
While there were arguments in the state court addressing the Flor-
ida statutes, Judge Donald Middlebrooks heard from the attorneys on
Bush's federal case alleging that any manual recounts were unconsti-
tutional. 369 After two hours of argument, Judge Middlebrooks ruled
immediately from the bench, following it up later with a written deci-
370sion. The court denied Bush's motion on the ground that he had
failed to establish the prerequisites for an injunction: he had not
shown a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm in the
absence of an injunction, or that the injunction would serve the public
interest.37'
13, 2000) (Roberts opinion letter referencing Cardenas's request). Harris's personal
lawyer, J.M. Stipanovich, then advised Harris and her staff to go home and issue the
opinion the next day because it would not look good for them to be seen in their
office on Sunday night responding to a Republican Party request. DEADLOCK, supra
note 1, at 98. On Monday, Roberts issued the opinion, and Cardenas presented it to
the Broward County Board for its consideration in deciding whether to undertake a
full recount. See Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, supra, $ 14, at 4. The Post writers
quote Stipanovich as saying, "Katherine kept turning the screw to bring this election
in for a landing." DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 99.
363. See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
365. Don Van Natta, Jr. & Rick Bragg, Voters' Lawsuits Delayed by Recusal, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000, at A22.
366. Complaint, supra note 325, at 3.
367. McDermott v. Harris, No. CV-00-2717 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000) (order
granting in part and denying in part motion for temporary injunction).
368. Todd S. Purdum & David Firestone, U.S. Judge Refuses to Block Hand Re-
count of Ballots, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 14, 2000, at Al.
369. See Kevin Sack, Saying He Doesn't Expect to Be Final Arbiter, Judge Won't
Stop Hand Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000, at A21.
370. Id.
371. See Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1052-54 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 234 F.3d
1163 (11th Cir. 2000). As noted above, on the same day Judge Middlebrooks ruled, a
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The court wrote that Supreme Court precedent established a sliding
scale approach to First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to
election laws, ranging from strict scrutiny when a state's election laws
severely restricted the right to vote, to a rational-basis analysis when
state laws imposed reasonable and nondiscriminatory restrictions.372
Florida's manual recount provision, the court held, was "a 'generally
applicable and evenhanded' electoral scheme designed to 'protect the
integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself,' the type of state
electoral law often upheld in federal legal challenges. 3 73 It served the
important governmental interest of "securing, as near as humanly pos-
sible, an accurate and true reflection of the will of the electorate. 374
The fact that the canvassing boards had discretion to conduct the re-
count did not render it "standardless," as Bush claimed. The boards
were allowed by the statute to conduct recounts "to remedy 'an error
in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the elec-
tion,'" and the four challenged canvassing boards had "reported vari-
ous anomalies in the initial automated count and recount.
375
As the court characterized it, "[t]he thrust of Plaintiffs' position is
that Florida's decentralized county-by-county electoral system can
yield disparate tabulating results from county to county": two ballots
punched the same way could be treated differently in one of two ways,
either because two boards subjectively evaluating the ballot would dif-
fer on it, or because one board chose to hand recount and another did
not.376 The court recognized that such discrepancies were possible but
did not consider them sufficient to constitute constitutional injury,
particularly given that the law afforded both candidates the opportu-
group of voters brought a similar case in the Middle District of Florida. See supra
note 331. The judge in that case heard oral argument on the request for injunction on
Tuesday, November 14, and, like Judge Middlebrooks, immediately denied the re-
quest. Touchston v. McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1056 (M.D. Fla.), affd, 234
F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1061 (2001).
372. See Siegel, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 & n.4.
373. Id. at 1050 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
374. Id.
375. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.1.66(5) (West Supp. 2001)). The court
seemed to conclude that the counting machines' inability to pick up "imprecise perfo-
rations" qualified as the type of tabulation error with which the statute was con-
cerned. In the course of discussing the "tabulation error" basis for manual recounts,
the court dropped a footnote:
One of the main rationales behind a manual recount system is [to] observe
whether an imprecise perforation, called a "hanging chad," exists on the
physical ballot. If the blunt-tipped voting stylus strikes the ballot imper-
fectly, the chad, the rectangular perforation designed to be removed from a
punch card when punched, can remain appended to the ballot (although it is
pushed out), and an automated tabulation will record a blank vote. This
problem is particularly associated with counties that still rely on punch card
technology. Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade all use punch card vot-
ing systems.
Id. at 1050 n.9.
376. Id. at 1051.
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nity to request manual recounts. 377 Nor did the court deem the
threatened harm to Bush irreparable, because the counties had just
begun the process of counting, and Florida law provided for a post-
certification contest procedure in which Bush could complain that
votes were counted that should not have been.378 The court con-
cluded that "[t]he mere possibility that ... the challenged manual re-
counts will . . . envelop the president-elect in a cloud of illegitimacy
does not justify enjoining the current manual recount processes ....
Nowhere can the public dissemination of truth be more vital than in
the election procedures for determining the next presidency.
3 79
By Tuesday morning, notwithstanding the federal ruling in its favor
on the constitutional challenge, the Palm Beach board continued to
have qualms about conducting a countywide manual count. The
counting was scheduled to begin at 7:00 a.m., but Judge Lewis had not
yet ruled on whether Secretary Harris could reject recount results sub-
mitted after 5:00 p.m. that day. Of even more concern, the board had
received the night before, by fax, a copy of the Division of Elections
opinion that manual recounts were not permitted unless there had
been a demonstrated error by the counting machines. 38 0 This
presented an issue different from the one argued before Judge Lewis,
whether Harris could accept returns submitted after Tuesday, Novem-
ber 14. The Divisons of Elections opinion raised the issue of whether
manual recounts under these circumstances could be valid even if they
were completed by Harris's seven-day deadline.38" ' The board also had
to contend with a temporary restraining order, issued two days after
the election by a Palm Beach County judge who had been assigned
one of the butterfly ballot cases, that prohibited the county from certi-
fying any results.382
If the temporary restraining order were not dissolved, and Judge
Lewis ruled that Harris could treat 5:00 p.m. as a final deadline, then
Palm Beach could end up unable to have any returns at all included in
the state's vote. As a result, the Palm Beach board voted to postpone
377. See id. at 1051-52 & n.10. The court wrote: "Unless and until each electoral
county in the United States uses the exact same automatic tabulation (and even then
there may be system malfunctions and the like), there will be tabulating discrepancies
depending on the method of tabulation." Id. at 1052; see also id. ("While some level
of error is inherent to manual tabulation, no method of tabulation is free from
error.").
378. See id. at 1052-53.
379. Id. at 1054.
380. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 99; Don Van Natta, Jr., Palm Beach Panel Votes
To Proceed on Count, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at Al.
381. Later that day, the board would receive an opinion from Attorney General
(and Democrat) Robert A. Butterworth, stating that Roberts's opinion was incorrect.
See Van Natta, Jr., supra note 380; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 99. The Washington
Post has reported that the board asked for the opinion at the urging of Butterworth's
staff. See id. at 100.
382. Rogers v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, No. CL-00-10992AF (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 9, 2000) (order granting temporary preliminary injunction).
[Vol. 8
THE 2000 ELECTION
the manual count of the ballots and seek a court order dissolving the
temporary injunction and ruling on the Roberts opinion.383 The board
searched frantically to find a judge who would hear the request imme-
diately. Several refused before Palm Beach County Judge Jorge
Labarga agreed.384
As the Palm Beach board sought its own order,385 Judge Lewis
handed down his decision on Volusia County's motion to enjoin Har-
ris from refusing returns certified after November 14.386 Judge Lewis
refused to force Harris to accept late returns, but he also ordered her
to withhold her determination not to accept the results of the recounts
until she had considered all "relevant facts and circumstances consis-
tent with the sound exercise of discretion." '387 In Judge Lewis's view,
there was nothing to prevent the counties from certifying by 5:00 p.m.
their returns from the automatic recount and then amending them
later based on the manual recount results, subject to Harris's
discretion.388
Explaining his decision, Judge Lewis observed that the statutory
scheme as a whole attempted to strike a balance between "finality"
and "accuracy. "389 On the finality side, he acknowledged the seven-
day deadline cited by Harris, but observed that the relevant statute,
section 102.112, stated that returns "may" be ignored if not filed
within seven days.390 This, Judge Lewis felt, called for the exercise of
discretion on the Secretary's part.391 On the accuracy side, he noted,
the statutes expressly allowed for manual recounts, beginning with a
one-percent sample recount and then a full recount, if warranted, as
well as protests.392 Because the deadlines for filing such challenges
were set at seventy-two hours and five days, respectively, it was
easy to imagine a situation where a manual recount could be law-
fully authorized, commenced, but not completed within seven days
of the election. The Secretary of State responds that the authority to
383. Van Natta, Jr., supra note 380.
384. Id.; see also McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000)
(order dissolving injunction, requiring certification of returns, permitting manual re-
counts of returns).
385. Relying on Clayton Roberts's opinion, the Broward County board had de-
cided at this point not to conduct a countywide manual recount. See supra notes
360-62 and accompanying text. The Democratic Party went into court in an effort to
reverse the Broward County decision. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, supra note
362. The matter became moot, however, when the Broward County board reversed
itself and decided to proceed with the countywide count. See infra note 406 and ac-
companying text.
386. McDermott v. Harris, No. CV-00-2717 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000) (order
granting in part and denying in part motion for temporary injunction).
387. Id. at 3.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 2.
390. Id. at 1, 3.
391. Id. at 3.
392. Id. at 2.
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authorize a manual recount is subject to the requirement that such
recount be done and the results certified no later than the deadline
imposed by Section 102.112, Florida Statutes. This would mean,
however, that only in sparsely populated counties could a Canvass-
ing Board safely exercise what the Legislature has clearly intended
to be an option where the Board has a real question as to the accu-
racy of a vote.
39 3
Judge Lewis also observed that, due to the consent decree with the
federal government concerning overseas ballots, the county canvass-
ing boards could not even report their final returns until November
17, three days after the deadline Harris was seeking to impose.39 4
In light of the balance the legislature intended to strike, Judge
Lewis concluded, Harris could require the counties to submit certified
returns by 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, but should exercise her discretion in
determining whether to accept amendments to those returns based on
manual recounts authorized by the statute.395 And to declare ahead
of time that one would accept no amendments other than those neces-
sitated by an act of God was an abuse of that discretion.3 96
Notably, Judge Lewis did not address the issue raised by the Divi-
sion of Elections opinion, whether there was any authority to conduct
manual recounts in the absence of an error by the counting machines.
Judge Lewis also did not address the conflict between section 102.111,
which states that the secretary "shall" ignore late returns, and section
102.112, which says the Secretary "may" ignore late returns. 397 He
relied entirely on the latter.398 He did so because "[t]he Secretary of
State acknowledges that Section 102.112, rather than Section 102.111,
Florida Statutes, prevails as to the question of the [sic] whether the
Department has any discretion in whether to ignore late filed
results.
'3 99
Judge Labarga, hearing Palm Beach County's case, ruled the same
way.40 ° Judge Labarga directed Palm Beach to file certified returns by
5:00 p.m., but stated that the Secretary should, for the reasons stated
in Judge Lewis's order, exercise her discretion in considering amended
returns submitted by the county after conducting a manual recount.40 '
On the issue of the recount's validity, Labarga ruled simply, without
explanation, that the board had the discretion to decide whether to
393. Id.
394. See id. at 3.
395. Id. at 4.
396. Id. at 3.
397. See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict).
398. See McDermott v. Harris, No. CV-00-2717 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000) (order
granting in part and denying in part motion for temporary injunction).
399. Id. at 2 n.1.
400. McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2000) (order dissolv-




conduct one.4 °2 Labarga also dissolved the temporary injunction en-
tered in the butterfly ballot case.40 3
Although both the lower federal court and the state courts had not
disapproved of the manual recounts, neither had they specifically ap-
proved of them or required the Secretary to accept their results.
Judge Lewis's order had left open the possibility that Secretary Harris
could still reject the results of any manual recount completed after
November 14. Unhappy with this aspect of his order, Volusia County
appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, and asked that the
appellate court certify the case to the Florida Supreme Court.40 4 As
an intervenor in the case before Judge Lewis, Palm Beach County
joined that appeal.40 5
With the appeal by Volusia and Palm Beach Counties pending, the
Broward County board voted, 2-1, to "reconsider" its earlier decision:
the Democratic judge who had earlier voted against a countywide
count changed his vote with no explanation.40 6 The Palm Beach
board voted to submit the results of the automatic recount by 5:00
p.m., but proceed to the manual recount in the hope of amending the
board's return after Tuesday.40 7 The Volusia board kept on task and
actually completed its countywide manual recount in time to include it
in the return it filed at 4:55 p.m. 40 8 In Miami-Dade, the board under-
took the one-percent recount, but then voted 2-1 against taking the
manual count countywide.40 9
Invoking the discretion permitted her by Judge Lewis's order, Sec-
retary Harris announced at 7:40 p.m. on Tuesday that any county an-
ticipating the submission of amended returns based on manual
recounts must submit by 2:00 p.m. Wednesday, November 15, an ex-
planation of the reasons she should accept such amended returns.4 1°
Harris warned that unless she determined, in the exercise of her dis-
cretion, that the facts and circumstances warranted accepting the
amendments, she would follow the Elections Canvassing Commis-
sion's "usual and normal practice" of certifying the results turned in
on Tuesday, await the counties' reports on overseas ballots and certify
402. Id.
403. See id.
404. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1226 (Fla.),
vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
405. Id.
406. Dana Canedy, A County Reconsiders a Hand Count, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2000, at A22.
407. Van Natta, Jr., supra note 380.
408. Todd S. Purdum, Bush Lead at 300: G. 0. P. Official Demands Written Justifica-
tion for Further Tallies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000, at Al. In the final tally, Gore had
a net gain of 98 votes. Id.
409. Id.; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 126. At the end of the one-percent recount in
Miami-Dade, Gore had a net gain of 6 votes. Id.
410. Purdum, supra note 408; see also DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 104-05.
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them when they arrived, and then declare the winner.41' She also re-
ported that with all sixty-seven counties reporting, George W. Bush
led by 300 votes.412
The next day, Wednesday, November 15, Palm Beach, Broward and
Miami-Dade Counties all submitted requests to be allowed to amend
their Tuesday returns.413 Harris responded quickly, announcing that
"[t]he reasons given in the requests are insufficient to warrant waiver
of the unambiguous filing deadline imposed by the Florida Legisla-
ture," and that she was certifying the results-reflecting Bush's 300-
vote lead-submitted by the counties on Tuesday.41 4 If her public per-
sona radiated certainty, however, Harris's actions were more ambigu-
ous. Even as she made the public announcement, she filed an
emergency petition with the Florida Supreme Court against the circuit
court judges and canvassing boards in all three counties, asking the
court to decide whether the recounts were legal, to enjoin the canvass-
ing boards from proceeding with manual recounts until it resolved the
issue, and to direct the local circuit courts that all election issues were
to be heard in the circuit court for Leon County, the capital. 41 5 The
Florida Supreme Court issued a one-paragraph order the same day,
denying her petition without prejudice to her right to raise the issue in
the trial courts.4 16
The canvassing boards were now in serious limbo. There were two
issues requiring immediate resolution. First, were the countywide
manual recounts unauthorized because a machine breakdown had not
been involved? The canvassing boards had Judge Labarga's decision
stating that the recounts were proper, but Labarga had not fully ad-
dressed the authorization issue, and, in the meantime, the boards had
received conflicting advice from two different state agencies.41 7 Sec-
ond, even if the counts were authorized, would Harris be compelled to
accept them? The boards had Judge Lewis's decision that Harris
should give fair consideration to the counties' recounts, but he had left
the decision to her discretion, and she had announced that she was
exercising that discretion against the results.
The lawyer for the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board realized
that because the board now had in hand two conflicting opinions from
411. Purdum, supra note 408.
412. Id.
413. Richard L. Berke, Republicans Reject Offer That Two Sides Accept a Count by
Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at Al.
414. Id.
415. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief at 10-11 (filed Nov. 15, 2000),
Harris v. Circuit Judges of the 11th, 15th, and 17th Judicial Circuits of Fla., 2000 WL
1702529 (Fla. 2000) (No. SCOO-2345).
416. Harris v. Circuit Judges of the 11th, 15th, and 17th Judicial Circuits of Fla.,
2000 WL 1702529 (Fla. 2000) (No. SCOO-2345) (order denying Harris's petition with-
out prejudice).
417. See supra notes 361-62, 381, 402 and accompanying text.
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state agencies, he could invoke an unusual procedural mechanism to
get at least the issue of the recounts' validity immediately before the
Florida Supreme Court.418 On Thursday, the board filed an emer-
gency petition for an extraordinary writ directed to state officers,
which invoked the Florida Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.419
By that afternoon, the Florida Supreme Court had issued an "in-
terim" order allowing the recounts to continue, on the authority of the
trial courts' decisions.420 The court said simply: "there is no legal im-
pediment to the recounts continuing. Thus, Petitioners are authorized
to proceed with the manual recount.
421
The Florida Supreme Court ruling, however, still did not guarantee
that Harris would have to accept the results of the recounts. To re-
solve this issue, the boards returned to Judge Lewis, asking him to rule
that Harris had abused her discretion again, in refusing to allow the
counties to amend their returns to include the results of authorized
manual recounts.422 Judge Lewis disagreed, and refused to enter the
injunction.423
The Democratic Party and Gore appealed Judge Lewis's ruling to
the district court of appeals, asking that the intermediate appellate
court certify the case to the Florida Supreme Court.4 24 The district
court of appeals passed the case on, along with the earlier appeal by
Volusia County.425 The supreme court accepted jurisdiction and con-
solidated the two appeals with Palm Beach County's petition for an
extraordinary writ.426 The court then issued an order enjoining Harris
from certifying the results of the election. 427 Neither Gore nor the
party had asked specifically for such an order: the court acted on its
own motion.428 The parties were directed to file briefs over the week-
418. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 99-100.
419. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ, Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.) (No. SC00-2346), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
420. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. SCOO-2346 (Fla. Nov. 16,
2000) (interim order allowing recounts to continue).
421. Id. at 1.
422. Emergency Motion of Democratic Party of Florida and Vice President Al
Gore To Compel Compliance with and for Enforcement of Injunction, McDermott v.
Harris, No. 00-2700 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 16, 2000).
423. McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 2000) (order denying
emergency motion to compel compliance with and for enforcement of injunction).
424. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227 (Fla.),
vacated sub noma. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
425. Id.
426. See id.; Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. SCOO-2346 (Fla.
Nov. 17, 2000) (order accepting jurisdiction, setting oral argument, and setting brief-
ing schedule).
427. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (stay order).
428. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1227; see also Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000) (stay order).
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end, and the case was set for oral argument on Monday, November
20.429
By sua sponte enjoining Harris's certification, the Florida Supreme
Court certainly suggested that it would react favorably to the recounts
and require Harris to accept them. Further, it appeared as though the
federal courts were content to let the Florida courts handle the con-
troversy. On the same day the Florida court issued the stay, the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, denied the Bush
campaign's request for injunction pending appeal of the district court
decision rejecting Bush's constitutional claims.43 ° The Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not reach the merits of Bush's constitutional claims, or even
the likelihood of Bush's success on the merits, but denied the injunc-
tion because the state proceedings were "not in any way inadequate to
preserve for ultimate review in the United States Supreme Court any
federal questions arising out of [the state court decisions]. 431 In light
of these developments, the Miami-Dade canvassing board voted to re-
verse its earlier decision and begin a manual recount of the entire
county, some 654,000 ballots.
432
The supreme court case, however, did not mean that all of the man-
ual recount issues would be finally resolved. There remained the issue
of what type of marks on the ballots could be considered votes. As
described above, before they manually counted a single ballot, both
the Palm Beach and Broward County boards had held extensive dis-
cussions of what kind of marks would constitute a vote,433 and the
Palm Beach board had actually narrowed its approach-from applica-
tion of the "sunshine rule" to a "hanging chad" rule-in the middle of
its sample recount.434 As a result, the Florida Democratic Party had
gone into court on Tuesday, November 14, seeking orders prohibiting
the Palm Beach435 and Broward 436 boards from per se excluding any
ballot on which a chad was not dislodged and directing the boards to
429. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, No. SCOO-2346 (Fla. Nov. 17,
2000) (order accepting jurisdiction, setting oral argument, and setting briefing
schedule).
430. See Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying
injunction pending appeal of Middle District of Florida case); Siegel v. LePore, 234
F.3d 1162, 1163 (14th Cir. 2000) (denying injunction pending appeal of Southern Dis-
trict of Florida case for the reasons set forth in Touchston).
431. Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1133.
432. See Todd Purdum, A Monday Hearing: Manual Count Goes on in a Day of
Confusion and Court Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at Al; Rick Bragg, Counting
Goes On, and On, With None of the Big Gains Sought by Democrats, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2000, at A35.
433. See supra notes 342-46, 355-56 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 343-49 and accompanying text.
435. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Petition for Writ
of Mandamus, Fla. Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. CL
00-11078AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 14, 2000).
436. Motion for Declaratory Judgment, Fla. Democratic Party v. Carroll, No. 00-
19324 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 17, 2000).
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consider ballots on which the chad was merely indented (the so-called
"dimpled" ballots). Both courts ruled that the boards could not auto-
matically discount ballots with dimpled chads but should consider
from the "totality of the circumstances" whether the voter's intent
could be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained.437 In response to these
orders, the counties allowed the counting teams to count ballots on
which at least two corners were dislodged, but had the counters sepa-
rate out for the boards' consideration any ballots that had only one
corner torn or were merely dimpled.438
Further, even as the Florida Supreme Court was set to resolve at
least two of the issues involved in the manual recounts, two huge con-
troversies unrelated to the recounts emerged. First, on Friday, No-
vember 17, a well-known Democratic lawyer in Seminole County filed
suit alleging that the Seminole County Elections Supervisor had per-
mitted local Republican officials to correct absentee ballot applica-
tions, in violation of Florida law requiring that those applications be
completed by the voter himself.439 Second, the counties began count-
ing the absentee ballots from overseas on Friday and discarded hun-
dreds without opening them because the boards concluded they had
various defects under Florida law: no date, no postmark, a postmark
after Election Day, the absence of any ballot request form, the voter's
failure to be registered, or the voter's having voted elsewhere.44 °
437. See Fla. Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. CL-00-
11078-AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 2000) (declaratory order dissolving injunction); Peti-
tioner Broward County Canvassing Board's and Broward County Supervisor of Elec-
tion's Initial Brief on the Merits at 1-2, 8 & n.1 (filed Nov. 18, 2000) (referencing
court's oral ruling), Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220
(Fla.) (No. SCOO-2346), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
438. See Bragg, supra note 432; Dana Canedy & David Gonzalez, Judge Leaves
Chads, Dimpled or Otherwise, to Discretion of Recount Team, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2000, at A15.
439. Complaint and Contest of Election (filed Nov. 17, 2000), Jacobs v. Seminole
County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000) (No. 00-CA-2203-16-L); Michael
Moss, G.O.P.'s Help for Absentees in a County Is in Court, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2000, at Al. Ultimately, this lawsuit was moved to Leon County, along with another
almost identical suit from Martin County, and tried on December 6 and 7, 2000. Ja-
cobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2816, 2000 WL 1793429, slip op. at
*1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8) (final order), affd, 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000); Taylor v.
Martin County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2850, slip op. at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8) (final
judgment for defendants), affd, 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000). Both suits ended in judg-
ments for the canvassing boards, and those judgments were affirmed by the Florida
Supreme Court. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., slip op. at *6 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 8) (final order), affd, 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000); Taylor, slip op. at *9. Be-
cause this Article focuses primarily on the cases that directly ended Gore's quest for
the Presidency, the developments in these absentee ballots cases will not be covered
in detail. For a good discussion of the cases and the Democratic Party's connection to
them behind the scenes, see DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 175-78.
440. See Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Floridians Abroad Are Counted, or Not, As Counties
Interpret "Rules" Differently, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at All [hereinafter P6rez-
Pefia, Floridians Abroad]; Richard P6rez-Pefia, Military Ballots Merit a Review, Lie-
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
Of the overseas ballots that were counted, a vast majority went to
Bush. The Division of Elections reported that Bush gained 1380
votes, or sixty-four percent of the overseas ballots, and Gore gained
only 750 votes.44 1 So Bush went into the Florida Supreme Court argu-
ments on Monday nursing a lead of 930 votes,44 2 630 more than the
total Harris had reported on Tuesday, November 14.
II. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT PROCEEDING ON MANUAL
RECOUNTS AND CERTIFICATION
When the Florida Supreme Court ruled on the appeal by Gore and
the county canvassing boards, on the following Tuesday, November
berman Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at Al [hereinafter P6rez-Pefia, Military Bal-
lots]; Richard P6rez-Pefia, Bush Files Suit To Restore Rejected Military Ballots, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at A36. The counties initially threw out 1420 overseas ballots,
or thirty-nine percent of the total. See Pdrez-Pefia, Military Ballots, supra. In coun-
ties that had voted Democratic, the average percentage of discarded ballots was sixty
percent; in counties that had voted Republican, the average percentage discarded was
twenty-nine percent. Richard P6rez-Pefia, Absentee Ballots: G.O.P. and Democrats
Trading Accusations on Military Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at Al [hereinafter
P6rez-Pefia, Absentee Ballots]. Notably, Secretary of State Harris had instructed the
counties during the week after the election that they should not discard overseas bal-
lots bearing no postmark or a late postmark as long as they were signed and dated by
Election Day. P6rez-Pefia, Floridians Abroad, supra; see also supra note 68-70 and
accompanying text (quoting the regulation and indicating that Harris was correct on
the regulatory language, apart from the issue of whether a regulation in conflict with
a state statute could be honored). A few counties, including Leon and Miami-Dade,
openly defied these instructions in the belief that Harris had misinterpreted state law
and simply wanted more overseas ballots counted because they were likely to favor
Bush. P6rez-Pefia, Floridians Abroad, supra. Republicans were outraged by the
counties' actions, claimed that they were the product of a concerted effort by Demo-
crats to disenfranchise the military, and released an internal memo from the Gore
campaign instructing field workers on how to challenge the overseas ballots. P6rez-
Pefia, Absentee Ballots, supra; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 126-27. The Democrats
publicly denied that they had undertaken any systematic campaign to disqualify mili-
tary ballots, P6rez-Pefia, Absentee Ballots, supra, but senior Gore aides later told the
Washington Post that the memo on challenging overseas ballots had been circulated at
"the highest levels" of the campaign in the fear that Bush would gain 700-2000 more
votes from them. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 130. The public relations debacle
caused vice presidential candidate Lieberman to call publicly for the canvassing
boards to reconsider their disqualification of the ballots, much to the shock and dis-
may of the Democratic workers on the ground. Id. at 130-32. In addition, the Bush
campaign filed a lawsuit against thirteen county canvassing boards, and dismissed it
only after asserting that several of the canvassing boards had agreed to go back and
include many of the overseas ballots. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Bush v. Bay
County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2799 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 25, 2000); see also DEAD-
LOCK, supra note 1, at 250 (attributing 176 Bush votes to overseas ballots that were in
the final tally but could have been disqualified under Florida law). Because this Arti-
cle focuses primarily on the cases that directly ended Gore's quest for the Presidency,
the legal developments with the overseas ballots will not be covered in detail.
441. David Firestone, Both Sides Await Court Hearing Tomorrow on Florida Dis-
pute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at Al.
442. Id.
443. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
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21, 4 4 4 it certainly did not end the election controversy. Indeed, by the
time that Florida decision was argued before the United States Su-
preme Court, some legal commentators insisted that more recent
events had rendered the case moot.44 5 Few momentous historical
events, however, turn out to be unconnected to the events that pre-
cede them, and the end of the 2000 presidential election was no excep-
tion. For even though the rulings in the later contest proceeding were
the most immediate cause of Gore's concession, it was the arguments,
admissions, concessions, and rulings in the first proceeding based on
the recount requests that framed the issues in the second.446 More-
over, the nature of the parties' arguments in the first Florida Supreme
Court proceeding reveals a great deal about the strategy each side had
adopted. For these reasons, the parties' arguments, as well as the
Florida Supreme Court's rulings, will be described below in detail.
A. The Parties' Briefs
In their brief to the Florida Supreme Court, Gore and the Florida
Democratic Party attacked both of Judge Lewis's most significant
holdings: that the Secretary of State had discretion to reject the results
of manual recounts submitted after seven days and that she had not
abused that discretion in rejecting the counties' requests to amend
their initial returns with those results.44 7 With respect to Lewis's deci-
sion that the Secretary had discretion to exclude the manual recount
results, Gore argued that it violated both the "statutory structure" and
the "public policy" of Florida.448 With respect to the Secretary's exer-
cise of her discretion, even assuming she had any, Gore argued that
she abused that discretion by rejecting the recount results even before
444. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.), va-
cated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
445. See, e.g., David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Role Reversals in Filings with
High Court, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at A28 (quoting University of Utah Professor
Michael McConnell) ("'I don't think there is a live controversy left for the Supreme
Court. My guess is, they will dismiss it as moot as soon as the process has played
out."'); Gaylord Shaw, U.S. Supreme Court Says No to TV: C-SPAN Loses Bid to Air
Friday Hearing, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 28, 2000, at A50 ("Some legal experts raised
the possibility that the high court could declare the case moot."); Reynolds Holding,
Justices May Be More Concerned with Reasserting Role of Judiciary, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 30, 2000, at A3 (noting that legal experts say Gore still has right to contest,
which might render case moot). But see John Yoo, The Right Moment for Judicial
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at A19 (editorial) ("If the court rules in favor of
Mr. Bush, then manual recounts will be excluded from the final tally, the state's elec-
toral votes will go to Mr. Bush and the election will be over.").
446. See infra notes 1480-94, 1510-27 and accompanying text.
447. Joint Brief of Petitioners/Appellants Al Gore, Jr. and Florida Democratic
Party at 39-58 (filed Nov. 18, 2000), Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris,
772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.) (No. 00-2346), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
448. Id. at 40-41.
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they arrived, by applying the wrong legal standard in her decision, and
by rejecting the results under the circumstances that had arisen.449
Gore asserted that the legislature never intended that section
102.112 operate to exclude the results of manual recounts conducted
under section 102.166.450 Applying the seven-day deadline to exclude
manual recounts would make "no sense," according to Gore, because
section 102.166 allowed requests for recounts to be made at any point"prior to certification," and the legislature would not have extended
the request deadline for a time-consuming recount all the way up to
the seven-day certification deadline itself, if it had meant for the certi-
fication deadline to apply to recounts.45' This was especially true
given that the recount statute had two phases: an initial one-percent
sample recount and then, possibly, a countywide recount thereafter.452
In Gore's view, "the Legislature surely knew that, where large coun-
ties are concerned, it may be inevitable that it will take more than a
week for a manual recount to be requested, authorized, and com-
pleted." '453 Further, the canvassing boards were permitted to under-
take recounts only when they concluded that there was "an error in
the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election, 454
and the legislature could not possibly have wanted the statewide re-
sults certified knowing from at least one canvassing board's finding
that there might be an error that could affect the outcome. 455
Thus, Gore argued, the only logical reading of sections 102.112 and
102.166 was that "all manually recounted votes be tabulated and that
certification be delayed pending the completion of a manual recount
that was requested on a timely basis. '456 The return deadlines in sec-
tions 102.111 and 102.112 were "meant to apply in the ordinary case
when a recount is not proceeding; read in context, these provisions
appear intended only to penalize unreasonably dilatory county can-
vassing boards and not to disenfranchise the voters in such jurisdic-
tions. ' 457 Section 102.111 itself called for the Elections Canvassing
Commission to certify the "'official results"' of the election, and the
only other Code reference to "'official"' results defined the "official
return" as "[t]he return printed by the automatic tabulating equip-
ment, to which has been added the return of write-in, absentee, and
manually counted votes."
45 8
449. See id. at 49-59.
450. Id. at 42-45.
451. Id. at 42-43.
452. See id.
453. Id. at 42.
454. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001).
455. See Joint Brief of Petitioners/Appellants Al Gore, Jr. and Florida Democratic
Party, supra note 447, at 43.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 44.




Gore also complained that Judge Lewis's decision to afford the Sec-
retary discretion to exclude the results of manual recounts was
"shockingly inconsistent" with the public policy of Florida and "the
essential purpose of the State's election laws: effectuating the will of
the electorate." '459 Gore relied on two Florida Supreme Court cases
eschewing "'unyielding adherence to statutory scripture,'" and
"'hypertechnical compliance with statutes"' when resolving voting
and election disputes.460 He argued that "even the literal terms of a
statute must yield when necessary to effectuate the electorate's will,"
and to allow the Secretary to exclude manually recounted votes for
"the convenience of a quick certification" violated that principle.461
Anticipating Bush's argument that the Secretary of State had dis-
cretion to exclude the manual recount results because a voter or can-
didate would still have the opportunity to raise the issue in a contest
proceeding, Gore responded that votes added during a manual re-
count are valid votes that should be counted in the first place.462
Leaving the resolution to a contest proceeding would place "a sub-
stantial burden on voters or candidates who want those votes to count:
they must initiate suit and pay a filing fee, and also face the possibility
of delay while the other candidate claims to be the victor. ' 463 Further,
any results that would meet the standard for determining whether a
manual recount should take place under section 102.166 ("an error in
the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election"),
would surely also meet the standard for setting aside a certification
during a contest proceeding under section 102.168 ("rejection of a
number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result
of the election"), and the legislature could not have intended to allow
for a certification it knew would immediately be invalidated during a
contest.464
Finally, Gore challenged Lewis's decision that the Secretary did not
abuse the discretion he granted her.465 According to Gore, the Secre-
tary herself had stated that waiving the deadline was inappropriate
"'[w]here there is nothing "more than a mere possibility that the out-
come of the election would have been effected [sic],' .... and yet had
rejected the manual recount results before she even knew how many
votes they revealed.466 The fact that she did so suggested her ulterior
belief that "the county canvassing boards should not have initiated
459. Id.
460. Id. at 46 (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975); State ex
rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007, 1008 (Fla. 1998)).
461. Id. at 46-47.
462. See id. at 47.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 47-48 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.166(5), 102.168(3)(c) (West
Supp. 2001)).
465. Id. at 49-58.
466. Id. at 50 (quoting id. app. 5, ex. H) (alteration in original).
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manual recounts in the first place," a decision committed to the can-
vassing boards and not to her.467 Further, the Secretary's standard for
deciding whether she would waive the deadline-only if there was a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the election did not reflect
the will of the people-was borrowed from contest cases under sec-
tion 102.168 that were applicable only to courts, not elected officials,
and was far too "stringent" to be applied to manual recounts. 468 Gore
argued that the Secretary should have asked only whether the coun-
ties properly found "an error in the vote tabulation which could affect
the outcome of the election," and if she had truly considered the coun-
ties' submissions, she would have concluded that the counties had.46 9
In closing, Gore implored the court to issue an order directing the
Secretary of State and the Elections Canvassing Commission not to
declare the winner until they had received the results of the manual
recounts.470 There was, he said, "an overwhelming interest in ensur-
ing that every vote is counted."4 7 ' There was also another interest,
Gore said, in a paragraph that simply cannot be paraphrased to do it
justice. The passage must be quoted in full here due to the irony it
reflects in the full story of the presidential election and the way it was
ultimately resolved by five members of the Supreme Court. Gore's
brief stated:
There is a similarly weighty interest in avoiding uncertainty or con-
fusion regarding the identity of our President-elect. It is critical that
the Election Canvassing Commission's decision be made on the ba-
sis of the most accurate vote count possible, in order to eliminate
the possibility that the identity of the winner will change-or even
be called into question-by the outcome of the manual recounts.
Not just within our country, but all around the world, that confusion
467. Id. at 51.
468. Id. at 52-54. Gore's argument on this point-that the contest standard was
too stringent for application to manual recounts-was odd, inasmuch as he had just
finished arguing that the legislative standard for setting aside a certification during a
contest proceeding was as easy to meet as the standard for proceeding with a manual
recount. See supra note 464 and accompanying text. Gore might have explained this
inconsistency by pointing out to the court that the cases on which the Secretary had
relied were additionally inapplicable because they predated the newer, more lenient
standard set forth in 102.168. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1255-56 (Fla.)
(rejecting lower court's reliance on a 1982 case and explaining that the legislature had
amended the contest procedure in 1999 to relax considerably the plaintiff's burden of
proof), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). One might
conclude that he did not explain, and tolerated the inconsistency in his own argument,
because he remained uncertain whom would be certified, and wanted to preserve the
ability to argue for a lenient standard if he was not certified and had to contest, but a
more stringent standard in the event he ended up as the certified winner and was
defending in a contest.
469. Joint Brief of Petitioners/Appellants Al Gore, Jr. and Florida Democratic
Party, supra note 447, at 56.




would likely generate considerable instability that, in turn, would
produce irreparable injury.47 2
In his brief to the Florida Supreme Court, Bush argued that the
court had no basis on which to enjoin the Secretary's certification.473
Bush contended that any delay in certifying would violate the text,
statutory structure, and intent of Florida's election laws.474 He argued
that not only had Secretary Harris "faithfully implemented the legisla-
tive design," but it also would have been unlawful for her to extend
the deadline to accept the results of manual recounts.475 Gore was not
entitled to any injunction of certification, Bush said, because Gore
had not established that he would suffer irreparable harm or that the
balance of equities favored him.
476
Bush asserted that neither the Secretary of State nor the courts had
any authority to extend certification beyond the seven-day deadline
set forth in section 102.112. 477 He noted that Gore had raised no rea-
son to believe that the statute violated either the Florida Constitution
or the United States Constitution.478 Bush claimed that by asking the
court to require Harris to accept the results of manual recounts, Gore
was asking the court to rewrite the statute's "plain directive that late-
filed returns 'may be ignored' to read instead that the Secretary 'may
not ignore' late-filed returns if the county board is conducting a man-
ual recount. ' 479 In Bush's view, the legislature "expressly contem-
plated" that there would be manual recounts, and that they might
present logistical difficulties, but chose nonetheless to require counties
to complete such recounts within seven days.480
Bush argued that it "defie[d] common sense" to conclude that the
legislature knew there would be manual recounts, but "silently ex-
cepted" them from the normal statutory deadline, and left no deadline
at all to apply.48' The fact that the deadline was a full seven days from
the election supported this conclusion, because manual recounts are
the only time-consuming method of tallying votes that could take that
long.482 The statute governing the manual recount also made it clear
472. Id. (emphasis added). These words sound remarkably like the words Justice
Scalia would later use to justify the stay that effectively ended Gore's case. See infra
note 1216 and accompanying text.
473. Answer Brief of Intervenor/Respondent George W. Bush at 7-46 (filed Nov.
19, 2000), Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.) (No.
SC00-2346), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70 (2000).
474. Id. at 7-21.
475. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted); id. at 21-44.
476. Id. at 44-46.
477. Id. at 7-8.
478. Id. at 8.
479. Id.
480. Id. at 9.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 9-10.
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that the counties were supposed to find a way to complete them
within seven days.483 Section 102.166 provides that "'[t]he county
canvassing board shall appoint as many counting teams of at least two
electors as is necessary to manually recount the ballots.' ,,484 If the
county decided to conduct a manual recount, and then "violate[d]
both its statutory duty to file returns within seven days and its duty to
appoint enough counting teams to meet the deadline, the legislature
certainly did not expect, much less require, the Secretary to ignore this
dual violation.
485
Bush acknowledged that holding the counties to the seven-day
deadline placed a more substantial burden on the larger counties, who
would have more votes to recount manually.486 He argued, however,
that the larger counties also have more staff, resources and money
with which to get a manual count done.4 87 Further, there was not "a
scintilla of evidence that any of the three counties at issue ... were
unable to meet the Tuesday deadline-as Volusia County did.
488
Responding to the timing argument raised by Gore-that the stat-
ute allowed for recount requests until right before certification, a time
when they would be logistically impossible if the seven-day deadline
applied-Bush pointed out that the canvassing boards had no "duty"
to conduct a manual recount, and the requester no "right" to have one
conducted.489 Under section 102.166(4)(c), the canvassing board's de-
cision to conduct a manual recount was entirely discretionary.49 ° The
legislature merely granted the canvassing boards a "conditional op-
tion" to conduct a manual recount if it could be completed within
seven days, and in exercising their discretion, they would need to take
their timeliness into account.491 Bush emphasized that the deadline
provision in section 102.112 and the recount procedure in section
483. Id. at 11.






489. Id. at 12.
490. Id. Bush was certainly correct in suggesting that the initial one percent man-
ual recount was entirely discretionary, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(c) (West
Supp. 2001), but the situation with respect to a countywide recount is somewhat more
complicated. As described above, once a county decides to undertake a sample re-
count and discovers that there is an error in the vote tabulation that could affect the
outcome of the election, it is then required to pursue one of three paths, two of which
would seem appropriate to a machine breakdown, and the last one of which, the man-
ual recount, would seem appropriate to an undetermined reason for the error. See
supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (describing the provisions of section
102.166(5) in detail).
491. Answer Brief of Intervenor/Respondent George W. Bush, supra note 473, at
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102.166 were enacted "simultaneously," making it extremely unlikely
that there actually was a conflict between the two, as Gore claimed.
4 92
The flaw in Gore's public policy argument, Bush argued, was its
insistence that the legislature regarded manual recounts as the pre-
ferred method of tallying votes.493 According to Bush, "[t]he legisla-
ture did not provide the slightest hint that whatever improved
accuracy might be obtained in a manual recount overrides the values
of finality and uniformity created by an evenhanded deadline.
494 If
that had been what the legislature intended, then it would not have
made manual recounts discretionary, and it would have provided for
them statewide, rather than on a county-by-county basis.49 5 Indeed,
when the legislature addressed what was required to happen when a
margin was one-half percent or less, it chose an automatic, statewide,
machine recount.496
To underscore this point, Bush compared the Florida Legislature's
interest in a firm deadline to the Framers' interests in finality and uni-
formity.497 It is those interests, Bush claimed, that explain "why Con-
gress, pursuant to explicit constitutional authorization, Article II,
Section 1, U.S. Constitution, established a mandatory deadline of De-
cember 18 for Florida and other states electors to meet, on pain of
excluding all presidential votes from the State. '498 For the Florida
Legislature to have acted likewise was hardly irrational, Bush insisted,
particularly given that the consequences of not accepting amendments
to already certified returns are "far less severe than [the consequences
to a state] for missing the electoral college deadline.
'499
Bush noted pointedly that even Gore acknowledged that the re-
counts must conclude at some point "prior to the Inauguration itself,"
and thus was asking the court on "'public policy"' grounds to substi-
tute a judicially-created deadline for the one set by the legislature. °°
Yet even if the court granted such a "revision," Bush argued, the re-
492. Id. (citing Act of July 5, 1989, ch. 89-338, sec. 30, § 102.112, 1989 Fla. Laws ch.
89-338 (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.112 (West Supp. 2002)); Voter Pro-
tection Act, ch. 89-348, sec. 15, § 102.166, 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-348 (current version
at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West Supp. 2002))). Bush's use of the word "simulta-
neously" was an interesting choice because, although they were enacted in the same
year, the provisions derived from two different session laws.
493. Id. at 14.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id. In fact, as addressed above, the "automatic recount" statute does not
make entirely clear that the canvassing board should recount by machine rather than
by hand: it seems to leave even that decision to the discretion of the county canvass-
ing boards. On the other hand, it certainly does not dictate manual recounting. See
supra note 31.
497. Answer Brief of Intervenor/Respondent George W. Bush, supra note 473, at
16.
498. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing 3 U.S.C. § 7 (1994)).
499. Id.
500. Id. at 17.
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suit would not be the "accurate statewide compilation of votes" upon
which Gore's public policy argument claimed to be founded.50 ' The
machine methodology of which Gore complained was used in over
ninety percent of Florida's counties, and yet Gore had requested re-
counts in only four, Democratic, counties.50 2
Turning from the validity of enjoining the certification to the specif-
ics of Harris's actions, Bush asserted that the court had no reason to
question her decisions.50 3 The court had traditionally shown great
deference to elections officials in their implementation and interpreta-
tion of the election laws, Bush said, and at the same time had coun-
seled elections officials to adhere strictly to the law. 50 4 Given that
Harris had done just that-interpreted and applied the law strictly to
require that manual recounts be completed within seven days, as the
legislature intended-and had engaged in reasoned decision-making,
the court could not possibly find she had abused her discretion.50 5
Bush argued that the Secretary had considered all of the facts and
circumstances involved in the counties' requests for a waiver, but was
provided no evidence to suggest that the three counties could not have
completed manual recounts by the seventh day if they had acted with
diligence.
5 6
Indeed, Bush went so far as to say that the Secretary would have
acted unlawfully if she had accepted the "untimely" manual re-
counts. 50 7 Bush pointed out that section 102.111 required the Elec-
tions Canvassing Commission to certify the results of a statewide
election as soon as the official results from all counties were compiled,
and stated, in contrast to section 102.112, that county returns not re-
ceived by 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day "shall" be ignored. Bush then
related a history of proposed and rejected amendments to section
102.111 that in his view demonstrated that the legislature intended
102.112, with its permissive language, to be the statute governing the
county canvassing boards, and 102.111, with its mandatory language,
to be the statute governing the Secretary and the Elections Canvass-
ing Commission.50 8
At the end of this argument that the Secretary was legally bound
not to accept the counties' submission of manual recount results after
seven days-thirty-five pages into his argument and four pages before
501. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).
502. Id. at 18-19.
503. Id. at 21-37.
504. Id. at 22-24.
505. Id. at 24-29.
506. Id. at 29.
507. Id. at 37-44.
508. Id. at 39-42. Bush's reliance on section 102.111 before the Florida Supreme
Court conflicted with his earlier admission in the trial court that section 102.112 was
the governing statute. See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
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the brief ended-Bush raised the issue of federal § 5.5 9 Bush claimed
that § 5 required states to select their electors "'by laws enacted prior
to' election day. '510 Bush insisted that the court would violate this
law if it utilized its equitable power "to disregard both the deadline
and the Secretary's exercise of reasoned discretion."' 51' Bush also
touched briefly-in one and a half paragraphs-on the constitutional
arguments that had been argued and rejected in federal court.512 Ac-
cepting the recounts, Bush said, would violate the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses, and the First Amendment, because the re-
count statute "authorize[s] county boards to engage in arbitrary and
unequal counting of votes, and result in the disparate treatment of
Florida voters based solely on where within the state they happen to
reside."513
509. Answer Brief of Intervenor/Respondent George W. Bush, supra note 473, at
42; supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text (examining the provisions of § 5).
510. Answer Brief of Intervenor/Respondent George W. Bush, supra note 473, at
42 (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (emphasis omitted)).
511. Id. at 43. Bush's characterization of § 5-that it required a state to do any-
thing-and his argument based on it, was demonstrably false. Even though there
were no cases interpreting § 5 at the time, the language of the statute simply is not
susceptible to the interpretation that it requires a state to appoint electors using law in
place on Election Day. As described above, the statute merely advises states on what
they might do to insulate their electors from challenge in Congress in the event they
pass laws providing for the judiciary, rather than the executive, to resolve presidential
election controversies and certify the electors. See supra notes 275-81 and accompa-
nying text (examining the provisions of § 5). There is absolutely nothing in the statute
to suggest, for example, that a state could not hold an election on Election Day, real-
ize that there were controversies arising out of it, pass a law subsequent to Election
Day dictating how the controversy would be resolved, and then have the controversy
resolved that very way. That would not be illegal: it would simply risk that the state's
electors could face a challenge on the floor of Congress. Thus, it would have been
much more truthful if Bush had argued that federal law requires states to utilize law
existing on Election Day if they wished to ensure that any judicially-approved electors
could not be challenged, but that is not what he represented.
512. Answer Brief of Intervenor/Respondent George W. Bush, supra note 473, at
43-44; see also supra notes 331-35, 372-77 and accompanying text (describing the
constitutional arguments Bush made and the district court's rulings on them).
513. Answer Brief of Intervenor/Respondent George W. Bush, supra note 473, at
43. It is unclear whether Bush intended also to make an argument based on the elec-
toral appointments clause in Article II. The clause was mentioned only once, in a
footnote dropped after an argument based on federal § 5. See id. at 43 n.15. And it
seemed to be invoked only to support the idea that § 5 honored state law because the
Constitution conferred on the states the power to establish the method of appointing
electors. The footnote reads:
Indeed, by operation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, U.S. Constitu-
tion, federal law incorporates by reference whatever processes a state estab-
lishes by law for choosing electors. The United States Constitution provides
that the legislatures of the States will prescribe the manner in which presi-
dential electors are chosen, Article I1, Section I U.S. Constitution and Con-
gress has provided in federal law that "[t]he electors of President and Vice
President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the
first Monday in November in an election year." Congress has further pro-
vided that if a State "has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by
law," it falls to the legislature of the State to determine how the electors will
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Finally, Bush opposed Gore's request for an injunction on the
ground that Gore had not shown that he would suffer irreparable
harm or that an injunction would serve the public interest.514 Gore
had an adequate remedy at law, Bush argued, because he could file a
contest action after the certification, and the certification provided
"an adequate and therefore exclusive avenue for relief if Petitioners
are correct that the Secretary of State was legally bound to accept
late-filed returns." '515 Further, an injunction would not serve the pub-
lic interest because "[i]t would be highly inequitable to keep the State
and Nation on hold to finish a manual recount when the responsible
officials failed expeditiously even to begin the process.
516
Apart from Bush's almost passing complaint that the counties' "ar-
bitrary and unequal" methods of counting votes violated the Constitu-
tion, neither Gore's initial brief nor Bush's brief asked the court to
address the way in which the counties were deciding what constituted
a vote. Broward County, however, directly confronted the issue.517 In
its initial brief, Broward advised the court that it had adopted a "fixed
standard" of two detached corners to determine the intent of each
voter.518 The lower court, however, had regarded this standard as
"too restrictive," and had directed the county to consider the "total-
ity" of each ballot in deciding whether to count it as a vote.519 Brow-
ard thus sought "specific direction from this Court as to the validity of
the two-corner rule.
520
be appointed. 3 U.S.C. § 2. In the present case, the day prescribed by law
was Tuesday, November 7, and the state of Florida held an election on that
day subject to the procedures, including reporting procedures and deadlines,
established by state law. It follows, therefore under the relevant federal stat-
utes and the Supremacy Clause that all actors at the state level-including
judges-are bound to respect the choices made by the Florida legislature as
to the process of selecting the state's presidential electors. It would there-
fore violate federal law for the state courts to use equitable doctrines to sup-
plement the legislature's judgment, reflected in the statutes of the state,
regarding the methods and time limits for selecting presidential electors.
Id. (punctuation errors in original).
514. Id. at 45-46.
515. Id. at 45.
516. Id. at 45-46.
517. Petitioner Broward County Canvassing Board's and Broward County Supervi-
sor of Election's Initial Brief on the Merits at 8 (filed Nov. 18, 2000), Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.) (No. SC00-2346), vacated sub
nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
518. Id. at 7. Broward notified the court in its reply brief the next day that the
board had voted, 3-0, based on the lower court's holding, to review each ballot for
whether the "totality of the circumstances" suggested the voter intended to vote. Pe-
titioner Broward County Canvassing Board's Reply Brief at 1 (filed Nov. 19, 2000),
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1220.
519. Petitioner Broward County Canvassing Board's and Broward County Supervi-




In Gore's reply brief, filed the next day, he agreed with Broward
County that the court should address the standard for deciding when a
ballot reflected a vote.52' In light of the "unique and extraordinary
circumstances of the current Presidential election recount, the expe-
dited time frame in which the issue must be addressed, and the funda-
mental public interest in resolving this matter equitably," Gore urged
the court to invoke its "broad authority under the Florida Constitu-
tion" and direct the counties to apply an "objective intent stan-
dard. '5 22 Gore's brief did not actually define what it meant by an
"objective intent standard," but it did argue that detachment of the
chad should not be required, and it cited a number of cases from other
states purportedly suggesting that any mark that might be evidence of
intent should be considered.523
Gore also responded to Bush's claim, however briefly it was
presented, that permitting the recounts would violate the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.5 24 There was no equal protection claim
based on "vote dilution," Gore said, because "the vote of a citizen of
one county is not 'diluted' by a process which ensures that all properly
cast votes in another county are actually included in the total vote
count. ' 525 Nor was the discretion given to canvassing boards "arbi-
trary and capricious," in violation of the Due Process Clause, because
the recount statute included procedures to guard against officials' ex-
ercise of partisanship, and there was the "intent of the voter" standard
to guide the decision-making.526 In fact, Gore argued, it would violate
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses to refuse to accept the
manual recounts and thereby disenfranchise thousands due to ma-
chine error and, under Bush's theory, the dereliction of canvassing
boards over whom the voters had no control.527
B. The Oral Argument
When the case was argued orally on Monday, November 20, the
networks broadcast it live. 28 An attorney representing the Florida
Attorney General, an attorney representing the Palm Beach County
521. Answer Brief of Petitioners/Appellants Al Gore, Jr. and Florida Democratic
Party at v-x (filed Nov. 19, 2000), Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at
1220.
522. Id. at v-vi.
523. See id. at vii-viii (citing Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1996);
Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 439 (S.D. 1993); Hickel v. Thomas, 588 P.2d
273, 274 (Alaska 1978); Fischer v. Stout, 741 P.2d 217, 221 (Alaska 1987); Escalante v.
City of Hermosa Beach, 241 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1987); Wright v. Gettinger, 428 N.E.2d
1212, 1225 (Ind. 1981)).
524. Id. at xxii-xxv.
525. Id. at xxii.
526. Id. at xxii-xxiii.
527. Id. at xxiv-xxv.
528. Todd S. Purdum, No Decision Issued: Lawyers for Both Sides Answer Skeptical
and Pointed Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at Al; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at
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Canvassing Board, an attorney representing the Broward County
Canvassing Board, and David Boies, the attorney representing Gore
and the Democratic Party, argued that the court should require the
Secretary to delay certification until after the manual recounts were
complete.529 Opposing any injunction were Joseph Klock, who was
representing Secretary Harris and the Elections Canvassing Commis-
sion; Michael Carvin and Barry Richard, who split up their time repre-
senting Bush;530 and an attorney representing a voter.
531
Boies began his remarks with a clear and concise argument that the
legislature never intended the seven-day deadline in sections 102.111
or 102.112 even to apply to the results of manual recounts. 532 As
Gore had argued in his brief,5 33 Boies insisted that the seven-day
deadline applied only to initial returns, because the legislature had to
be aware that large counties could not complete a manual recount in
seven days, and had drawn a distinction in section 101.5614 between
results and "official results," the latter of which was defined to include
results of manual recounts.534 Later in the argument, however, Boies
accepted an alternative formulation that could resolve the argument
in Gore's favor. Boies said the court might find that the seven-day
deadline applied, but that the Secretary nonetheless could not exer-
cise her discretion to exclude the later results of manual recounts con-
ducted pursuant to section 102.166. 535
112. The Washington Post has reported that the argument was watched by more
people than any appellate hearing ever. Id.
529. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1-16, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.
v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1.220 (Fla.) (No. SC00-2346) (unofficial transcript), available at
http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/00.2346.htm, vacated sub nom. Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). The Florida Supreme
Court's website advises visitors that they can obtain oral argument transcripts and
documents at the Florida State University website, but the transcript of the Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris argument expressly advises readers that it
is unofficial. Indeed, the transcript contains many errors that can be detected by
watching the videotape of the argument available at the same website. For that rea-
son, this Article will provide page citations to the transcript, but any quotations from
the argument offered here will reflect that transcript only to the extent it has been
corrected by the Author's viewing of the videotape.
530. Interestingly, although they were representing clients aligned with the Repub-
lican Party, Joseph Klock and Barry Richard both consider themselves Democrats.
DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 97, 60.
531. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 16-41.
532. See id. at 10-11.
533. See supra notes 450-58 and accompanying text.
534. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 10-12.
535. See id. at 13. As it turned out, this would be a critical moment in the contro-
versy, because the Florida Supreme Court ultimately adopted this alternative formu-
lation and based its decision to limit the Secretary's discretion on the Florida
Constitution rather than anything in the statutes themselves. See infra notes 621-29
and accompanying text. And that aspect of the Florida court's ruling-the court's
reliance on the Constitution-is precisely what convinced the United States Supreme
Court that the casc presented a constitutional question under the electoral appoint-
ments clause. See infra notes 996-97 and accompanying text.
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During the presentations of several of those supporting an injunc-
tion, the court asked repeatedly about the time frame in which the
case had to be resolved, when it was that Florida's votes would be put
"in jeopardy. '53 6 The attorney for Florida's attorney general re-
sponded that he "understood" that December 12 was the date, but
that there were "constitutional law professors here" who could ad-
dress that point.537 The attorney representing the Palm Beach can-
vassing board likewise deferred, 538 and so the question fell to David
Boies, arguing for Gore. Boies agreed with Chief Justice Wells's sug-
gestion that extending certification out too far would risk eliminating
the contest proceeding from the statutory scheme, because federal § 5
said that "all of the controversies and contests in the state have to be
finally determined by [December 12]." 53 9 For that reason, Boies sug-
gested that the court "tell the county boards that you have got this
amount of time to complete your recount, and at that point, those
votes are . . . subject to being contested by Governor Bush or Vice
President Gore ... in a time frame that allows everything to be com-
pleted by December 12.
5 4 0
When the court asked Boies how it might determine a date by
which the recounts must be completed, and whether it should just
"reach up, from some inspiration, and put it down on paper," Boies
could respond only that the court would have to apply "a lot of judg-
ment."'541 Later in the argument Boies suggested that the court work
back from December 12, and determine how much time would "realis-
tically" be needed for a contest proceeding. Still later, during his re-
buttal (when his opponents would be unable to address the
suggestion), Boies proposed that the court tell the counties that they
536. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 4 (questioning the date by
which all proceedings must be complete); see also id. at 2, 7-8, 11, 15, 18, 28.
537. Id. at 4.
538. See id. at 8.
539. Id. at 11. There is no question that, even though Bush had been flatly incor-
rect on the point in his brief, see supra note 511, Boies accepted his suggestion that
not completing the contest proceeding would jeopardize Florida's participation in the
electoral college. During his rebuttal, he encouraged the court to set a date by which
the recounts must be completed that would "be such that passing that date endangers
the ability of certifying and finalizing any contest that may result, so that the votes of
Florida are not in peril." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 44-45 (em-
phasis added).
540. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 11-12. Strangely, at the end
of this very same colloquy, Boies also suggested that the contest could proceed until
December 18. He said:
So I think it is clearly within the power of this court to say in order to meet
the date of December 12, you have got to have all of your votes manually
counted that are going to be included in this initial certification by a particu-
lar date, and then the contest, if there is one, takes place between that date
and December 18.
Id. at 12. It is hard to know whether this inconsistency reflected ambivalence on
Boies's part or just a slip of the tongue.
541. Id. at 12.
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had seven days, which "would certainly [leave] enough time .. .to
complete a contest.
542
The court also questioned the attorney representing Broward
County, and David Boies, on Broward's request that the court provide
the counties with a standard for counting the ballots.543 After the at-
torney for Broward noted that the board had begun with the "two-
corner" rule and had then changed to a "totality of the ballot" ap-
proach,544 the court asked whether there was something unusual
about "changing the rules in the middle of the game. '545 The attorney
responded that there was not, that the board's decision had
"evolv[ed]" in response to various court rulings, and "[t]he important
thing is that we do what's right in the end.
546
The court asked Boies where it would find the case law from which
it might determine the standard.547 Boies responded that the court
find it "partly from Florida law," but also from the law of other states
that have dealt with these very same questions. 48 The court asked
Boies whether he would contend that any mark on the ballot would be
evidence of intent and should be counted as such, and Boies re-
sponded affirmatively, claiming that cases from Massachusetts and Il-
linois, and the Texas statute, all held that markings on the ballot could
be enough.5 49 The court then addressed the need for uniformity, in a
passage that must be quoted for what it reveals about the proceedings
that followed:
Q. Is the uniformity of how these manual recounts are conducted
essential to the integrity of the process or, also, to the constitution-
ality of the statute?
A. Your honor, I think it is important to the integrity of the pro-
cess. I think if you had very wide variations, you could raise consti-
tutional problems.
550
With this admission, the court asked Boies why it would not likewise
violate the Constitution to allow manual recounts in some counties
but not all. Boies responded that Bush could have requested manual
recounts wherever he had wanted to, and that, in fact, the numbers
542. Id. at 12-13, 45.
543. See id. at 8-10 (Broward County attorney); id. at 13-15 (Boies).
544. Id. at 8-9; see also supra notes 437-38 and accompanying text.
545. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 10.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 13-14.
548. Id. at 14.
549. Id.
550. Id. (emphasis added) This was the very basis on which the United States Su-
preme Court would effectively end the election controversy three weeks later. Seven
justices would agree that the Florida Supreme Court's decision directing a statewide
search for "the intent of the voter" in the undervotes allowed for such disparate treat-
ment of ballots that it violated the equal protection clause, and five would hold that
there was insufficient time before December 12 to cure the constitutional flaw. See
infra notes 1426-44 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8
THE 2000 ELECTION
the Secretary already had certified had the results of manual recounts
within them.551 Boies added, however, that it was within the court's
"equitable power" to open up a "window of opportunity" in which
both sides could request recounts in additional counties, and that
while Gore was not asking for such a remedy, he would accept it.552
It was clear from the presentations of those opposing the injunction
that they had decided to focus on the threat that extending the re-
counts would present to any contest proceeding that might follow. 553
Joseph Klock, representing the Secretary, complained that extending
the recounts would shorten the time in which Governor Bush could
challenge what he regarded as the improper treatment of the overseas
ballots.554 He argued that Gore was improperly "trying to conduct a
contest" prior to that phase not for legal reasons, but for "political
reasons." 555 This was clear, he said, because the court in the contest
proceeding could order the same kind of recounts that Gore was now
seeking prior to the contest.556 Michael Carvin, representing Bush,
agreed that the method of determining whether there were votes re-
jected that should not have been would be the same whether the votes
were addressed by recounts conducted within the seven days or within
the contest proceeding.
557
The court, however, appeared much more interested in how the leg-
islature could have expected recounts to be completed in seven days,
particularly in large counties, at the same time it gave a party seven
days in which to request that a recount begin 8.5 5  Klock insisted that
there was no record evidence that a recount could not be completed in
that time frame.559 When pressed for proof that the legislature did not
simply miss that problem, but instead contemplated the logistical diffi-
culties large counties would face, Klock offered only a somewhat flip
response, reflecting the Republican position that the counties' delay
accounted for the problem: "I am sure that [the legislature] probably
didn't consider the fact that someone would commence a recounting,
whenever they felt like doing it."'5 6° When the court asked why the
551. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 14.
552. Id. at 15.
553. All four attorneys focused on this point. Klock opened his presentation speak-
ing of the need to allow for the contest proceeding. See id. at 17. Carvin opened
along the same lines, and returned to it. See id. at 27, 29, 32, 34. The attorney repre-
senting the voter spent a great deal of time describing why the contest proceeding
would be a much better solution than extending the manual recounts in selected coun-
ties. See id. at 39-40.
554. Id. at 17.
555. Id. at 23.
556. See id. at 26.
557. See id. at 35.
558. See id. at 21-22, 27-28, 31, 36 (questioning the interrelationship between the
recount request deadline and the return deadline).
559. Id. at 21.
560. Id. at 22.
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legislature would have allowed a party the entire seven days even to
request that a recount begin, if it intended the recount to be finished
within the same seven days, Klock suggested that the statute left the
counties to consider the timing of the request: "[T]hat is the same ba-
sic rule that I had in high school, with term papers. You can start the
term paper the night before, if you want to, but it is unlikely that
you'll be able to turn it in the next day when it's due."56 ' A justice
then suggested that, at least for the requesting party, that would make
the right to a recount illusory, and Klock changed the subject to the
fact that Gore had requested recounts in only three counties.562 In the
rapid-fire questioning, Klock evidently forgot the arguments the briefs
had made about the fact that there was no such thing as a "right" to a
recount; the fact that the statute required "as many counting teams...
as is necessary" to count the votes; the fact that the recount provisions
and the seven-day deadline were passed in the same legislative ses-
sion; and the legislature's need to balance finality with permitting
manual recounts.563
The lawyers representing Bush did not fare much better. Michael
Carvin did make the point relatively early in his presentation that
there was no "right" to a recount,564 and later in the argument he
mentioned, albeit almost in passing, the statutory requirement that the
counties appoint as many counting teams as were "necessary" to per-
form the recount.565 In the middle of his argument, however, he hit
on what appeared to be a sore spot with the court: the fact that the
Republicans had brought a constitutional challenge in federal court
rather than allowing the state supreme court to address the constitu-
tional issues. When the court suggested that a uniform seven-day
deadline might be inappropriate because the voting methods in each
county were not uniform throughout the state and the punch card bal-
loting in south Florida had created the problem, Carvin shifted, nearly
muttering, to the lack of uniformity in counting, and a heated ex-
change took place:
Q. So there is not uniformity, even within the state, as to the type
of voting machine that is used or the procedures that are used in
each county?
561. Id.
562. See id. Klock responded:
You have the seven-day period within which to handle all of the counting of
the votes, the initial counting, and have an automatic recount, and if there is
going to be a manual recount, but I think another important thing to note is
we are not talking about a manual recount on a statewide basis. It is three
selected counties.
Id.
563. See supra notes 481-99 and accompanying text.
564. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 28.
565. See id. at 31.
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A. We have complained about the ad hoc nature of the way in
which votes are tallied in differential counties. That is a problem.
Q. You say you have complained about it. Where has that been
complained about?
A. I'm sorry. In federal court, Your Honor, and I am not trying
to introduce that here.
Q. Let me ask you that question. Is there a constitutional attack
on this statute being made?
A. Well, we don't think you need [to] reach the question but yes.
Q. Is that because you are requesting the federal court to reach
it, and you don't think that the state court has it, within its jurisdic-
tion, to decide whether a statute is being constitutionally applied?
A. Oh, no. Clearly the state courts have that power. I'm simply
making the point that there is a much simpler basis for deciding this
case than going all the way to the U.S. Constitution, which is state
law clearly prohibits the relief the petitioners are requesting, be-
cause state law makes it quite clear that they have no right to ignore
the mandatory statutory deadline imposed upon them by state law.
They seek to rewrite the statute, create a scheme that serves their
personal problems or conveniences, but in doing so, they posit a
hypothetical that cannot be found in the statute.
566
As this passage indicates, the court behaved as though it were un-
clear whether it was being asked to address any claims based on fed-
eral law or the Constitution. Bush had argued at the very end of his
brief that permitting the recounting to continue would violate § 5 and
Article II of the Constitution because it would constitute a rewriting
of the legislature's prescribed method for appointing electors.56 7 He
had also claimed briefly that the recounts were unconstitutional be-
cause they were being conducted only in selected counties, because
the counties were arbitrarily deciding what votes were, and because
the counties were using different standards in deciding what a vote
was.568 Further, at the oral argument, Barry Richard made what could
be characterized as a reference to federal § 5 and Article II (although
he did not expressly cite them).5 69
566. Id. at 28.
567. See supra notes 509-11 and accompanying text.
568. See supra notes 512-13 and accompanying text.
569. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 36. When asked whether
or not manual recounts could continue even after the Secretary had certified the re-
turns, Richard said:
[T]he recounts must stop, if the seven-day cutoff occurs, unless the Secretary
of State, in the exercise of the discretion that the Florida Legislature has
given her, determines that there is rational reason for them to continue. It is
the job of the Secretary of State. It has been reposed in her by the Legisla-
ture and two constitutions. The United States Constitution and the Florida
Constitution, in unusually explicit language, have delegated that decision,
not to the State of Florida, not to the courts of the State of Florida, but to
the legislature of the State of Florida, and the legislature of the State of
Florida has reposed that authority in the Secretary of State. Now, in order
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Yet Bush's attorneys otherwise seemed reticent to press the consti-
tutional claims. In the passage above, Carvin stated that a constitu-
tional attack was being made on the statute, but he also stated that the
court did not need to reach the issue and that he was "not trying to
introduce" the constitutional issue of the counties' proceeding in an
ad hoc manner. 7 ° Still later, when the court questioned why Bush
had not requested recounts in other counties, Carvin responded that
the process was "inherently flawed and unconstitutional,' '571 but did
not make clear at all whether Bush was asking for such a ruling, and
essentially refused to say whether Bush would accept an opportunity
to obtain recounts in counties other than the four the Democrats had
selected.572 The only other mention of any constitutional issues came
for us to do anything else, this Court would have to disregard the most fun-
damental principles of separation of powers and . . . step into the shoes of
both the legislative and executive branches to rewrite these statutes ....
Id.
570. See supra text accompanying note 566.
571. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 30.
572. See id. at 29-30. When the court asked why it was not necessary for the county
boards to complete any recounts prior to the contest proceeding, so that the court in
the contest proceeding would know what was in the recounts, id. at 29, Carvin
changed the subject, complained that the recounts were being conducted only in se-
lected counties, and faced intense questioning about Bush's position concerning man-
ual recounts:
A. If you were doing a recount in a municipal proceeding, I don't think
anyone would take seriously the notion that, well, we have had some
problems with our machine, so that what we are going to do is recount, in
three of the 67 precincts here, and then we will know who the winner is. No.
Obviously you have to recount or apply the same standards, throughout all
67 precincts, so you can come to a judgment as to who indeed is the winner.
Q. Was [a recount] requested in the other 64 counties?
A. No. Notwithstanding their devotion to the manual recount as the only
means of assessing voter intent and counting all votes, the Democrats did
not request all 67.
Q. Was there something that prevented your client from requesting re-
counts in the other counties?
A. Yes. They believe that the process is inherently flawed and unconstitu-
tional, but moreover, it doesn't matter if they requested it, because-
Q. Are you asking us to resolve that issue? So even if we said that every-
one has a chance for a window period, to request a recount, in whatever
other counties are in question, are you saying it is the position of-you're
representing Governor Bush?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. The position of Governor Bush that he would not go along with want-
ing recounts in the other counties, because the process is flawed?
A. No, your honor. I think we should follow the process that is set out in
the statute.
Q. But I am asking that question. Is what you are saying that recounts
weren't requested, because there was a belief that the process was flawed?
A. Right.
Q. And isn't that the exact same process that has been represented to us,
as the statutes reveal in Texas law, for this exact process to take place where
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during the exchange with Boies quoted above, 573 and during the argu-
ment of the voter, who claimed that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause when the voters in some counties had their ballots reviewed
for votes that were not counted and the voters in other counties did
not.
574
The picture that emerges is that the attorneys for both sides were
somewhat blinded by what were their most immediate goals. At the
time, the ultimate goal for Gore had to be delaying the certification.
He surely could not afford to have Bush officially declared the winner,
even if a contest proceeding might reverse that result, because of the
powerful psychological effect that would have on the public and mem-
bers of his party. Further, if a myriad of issues had arisen with respect
to the manual recount statute, a similar number of unsettled issues
could be expected to arise in the contest proceeding, conducted under
a statute that had been substantially amended in 1999. And there was
no assurance that a single court hearing his contest would take a view
to the ballots that was as favorable as the one he was already receiving
at least in Broward. It made a great deal more sense to try to find the
votes immediately, in the hope that it would be Bush trying to upend
the result.
As a result, Gore's team focused intently on state law and the state
courts. In doing so, however, they demonstrated a serious unfamiliar-
ity with the electoral appointments clause-and the extraordinarily re-
strictive view of that clause taken by the Court in McPherson v.
Blacker57 -by repeatedly making arguments based on "public pol-
icy'576 and the Florida Constitution,577 and encouraging the court to
exercise "broad[ly]" its "equitable" power. 578 Further, the Gore law-
yers permitted Bush to mischaracterize the statute as "requiring" that
the states resolve contests by December 12,579 never considering that
they might need the time between December 12 and December 18 to
turn the vote around, and setting up Bush's appeal to the Supreme
there's manual recounts, and that those are preferred over the ... machine
recount?
A. I really don't know what Texas law is. I know, in Florida, though,
there is no preference for manual recounts over machine recounts.
Id. at 29-31. Eventually, the court and Carvin spent so much time on exchanges like
these that very little time was left for Carvin's co-counsel, Barry Richard. Compare
id. at 27-35 (Carvin's presentation), with id. at 35-37 (Richard's presentation). See
also id. at 36 ("Mr. Chief Justice: Does Governor Bush have five more minutes for
Mr. Richard?").
573. See supra notes 550-52 and accompanying text.
574. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 529, at 39.
575. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
576. See supra notes 448, 459-61 and accompanying text.
577. See supra notes 459-61, 522, 535 and accompanying text.
578. See supra notes 522, 552 and accompanying text.
579. See supra notes 510-11, 539-40 and accompanying text.
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Court on a "federal" law issue that really never was.58° Finally, the
Gore team appears not to have developed any unified strategy on, or
lent enough credence to, the constitutional claims that Bush was
pressing. Boies actually agreed that variations in applying the "intent
of the voter" standard could create an equal protection problem 581 at
the same time other lawyers defending the recounts were advancing
(and at least one federal court had accepted) several arguments to the
contrary. 82
Conversely, the ultimate goal for the Bush team had to be protect-
ing his lead and reaching certification. Just as Gore must have feared
the psychological impact on the public of Bush being declared the
winner, Bush must have felt that the controversy would be all but over
if Gore had to bring a contest action to have any chance of gaining the
lead. And just as Gore's attorneys had, Bush's attorneys focused so
intently on their goal that they rendered their efforts harder. During
the oral argument, for example, the lawyers lost sight of several solid
arguments that they had included in their briefs and came across as
more frustrated than persuasive.8 3 On several occasions, Michael
Carvin raised constitutional arguments, even though it was clearly the
Bush strategy to mention the constitution in the brief-so as to avoid
any argument that the claims had been waived-but not actually pro-
voke a constitutional analysis by the Florida court.584 More impor-
tantly, Bush's lawyers painted the post-certification contest
proceeding as the procedure that would answer all of the questions
that had been raised about uncounted votes.585 Consequently, once
the results finally were certified and Bush was declared the winner,
580. See infra notes 678, 999-1001 and accompanying text. Once Bush was certified
the winner, Gore's acquiescence in the notion of a December 12 "deadline" made
more sense, because at that point, any slate of electors judicially approved between
December 13 and 18 would be on tenuous ground in Congress. After all, missing
December 12 would cause Gore to lose the presumption available under § 5, and even
if the Senate might approve a slate judicially approved after December 12, the Re-
publican-controlled House would not, and any competing slate would have the edge
under the tiebreaker provision because it presumably would be certified either by the
Elections Canvassing Commission or by Governor Jeb Bush. Thus, it did no real
harm to their case to push December 12 as a "deadline" in the hope that the false
"deadline" would keep the courts moving. At this stage, however-pre-certifica-
tion-there was no reason to accept Bush's mischaracterization of § 5, because Gore
had not yet been reduced to winning only through the courts.
581. See supra note 550 and accompanying text.
582. See supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text (describing the district court's
decision in Siegel v. LePore rejecting Bush's constitutional challenge to the varying
standards for evaluating ballots).
583. See supra notes 481-99 and accompanying text. In particular, the argument
that section 166 required the counties to appoint "as many counting teams ... as is
necessary" to complete the recount was a very difficult point to respond to: what
could "as necessary" mean, if not "as necessary" to complete the recount within seven
days?
584. See infra notes 652-56 and accompanying text.
585. See supra notes 556-57 and accompanying text.
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Gore could claim the right to an open-ended, searching contest proce-
dure and portray the Republicans as having approved of that
approach.
C. The Court's Decision: Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board v. Harris I
Shortly before 10:00 p.m. of the day after the oral argument, on
Tuesday, November 21, 2000,586 the Florida Supreme Court issued its
unanimous decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Har-
ris.587 The court characterized the case as involving two issues:
"Under what circumstances may a [county canvassing board] author-
ize a countywide manual recount pursuant to section 102.166(5)," and
"must the Secretary and Commission accept such recounts when the
returns are certified and submitted by the Board after the seven day
deadline set forth in sections 102.111 and 102.112? ' '588 On the first
issue, the court held that section 102.166 allowed counties to conduct
countywide manual recounts based on finding in the sample count any
error in the tabulation of votes that could affect the outcome, regard-
less of whether the error was attributable to a machine or software
malfunction.58 9 On the second issue, the court held that "the circum-
stances under which the Secretary may exercise her authority to ig-
nore a county's returns filed after the initial statutory date are
limited" to situations where the timing would preclude the ability to
bring a contest action under section 102.168 or prevent Florida from
participating in the federal electoral process. 590 The court wrote:
"[T]o allow the Secretary to summarily disenfranchise innocent elec-
tors in an effort to punish dilatory Board members, as she proposes in
the present case, misses the constitutional mark. The constitution es-
chews punishment by proxy.
591
The court concluded that it must set a deadline for the recounts to
be reported to the Secretary "in order to allow the maximum time for
contests pursuant to section 102.168. "1592 The court directed the Secre-
tary to accept amended certifications from the counties until 5:00 p.m.
on Sunday, November 26, or, if the Secretary's office was not open
that day, until 9:00 a.m. on Monday, November 27. The court left
its interim stay in effect until that time, and ordered the Secretary to
586. See Todd S. Purdum & David Firestone, Florida Court Backs Hand Recounts
and Orders Vote Deadline of Monday, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 2000, at Al.
587. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvass-
ing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
588. Id. at 1228.
589. See id. at 1229-30.
590. Id. at 1237, 1239 (citing 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 (1994)).
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accept the counties' amended returns.594 The court stated that it
"must invoke [its] equitable powers... to fashion a remedy" allowing
a "fair and expeditious" resolution, "[b]ecause of the unique circum-
stances and extraordinary importance of the present case," and "be-
cause of [its] reluctance to rewrite the Florida Election Code.
595
Before it announced its holding, or proceeded to a discussion of the
Election Code, the court introduced what it labeled its "Guiding Prin-
ciples., 596 In this opening portion of the opinion, the court relied on a
twenty-five-year-old case for the proposition that "the will of the peo-
ple, not a hypertechnical reliance upon statutory provisions" must be
its "guiding principle., 597 According to the court, "[o]ur federal and
state constitutions guarantee the right of the people to take an active
part in the process of [the] government, which for most of our citizens
means participation via the election process. '598 The court wrote:
"This fundamental principle, and our traditional rules of statutory
construction, guide our decision today.
'5 99
Explaining its holding on the first issue-that section 102.166 al-
lowed countywide manual recounts in the absence of machine or
software error-the court focused on the language of the statute. The
court noted that the legislature permitted manual recounts whenever
a canvassing board found an "error in the vote tabulation" that could
affect the outcome, and yet elsewhere in the same section used the
terms "vote tabulating system" and "automatic tabulating equipment"
to refer to the machines. 600 The court concluded that the legislature
must have intended "vote tabulation" and "vote tabulation system" to
mean two different things, and thus a recount was authorized even
when there were not problems with the machines.6 °'
On the second issue-whether the Secretary could exercise her dis-
cretion to reject amended returns resulting from manual recounts that
were submitted after seven days-the court focused initially on the
two "deadline" statutes, sections 102.111 and 102.112, and on the
manual recount statute, section 102.166.602 These three statutes, the
court concluded, presented two conflicts. First, section 102.166 con-
flicted with both certification deadlines because it allowed a party to
594. See id.
595. Id.
596. See id. at 1227.
597. Id. at 1227-28 (citing Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975)).
598. Id. at 1228 (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975)).
599. Id.
600. Id. at 1229 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001)); see also
supra note 96 and accompanying text (setting forth section 102.166(5) in full).
601. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1229. The court found addi-
tional support for its conclusion in section 101.5614(5), which directed that no vote
should be declared invalid if the canvassing board-not a machine-found a clear
indication of the voter's intent. See id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West
Supp. 2001)).
602. See id. at 1231-36.
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request a recount at any time up until certification, yet "logic dictates
that the period of time required to complete a full manual recount
may be substantial, particularly in a populous county."6 °3 Second, the
deadline statutes, section 102.111 and 102.112, were themselves in
conflict, because the former stated that late returns "shall" be ignored,
and the latter stated that the returns "may" be ignored.6"4
After noting these conflicts, the court embarked on an analysis of
legislative intent, what it called the "polestar that guides a court's in-
quiry."6 5 The court acknowledged that legislative intent ordinarily
must be drawn from the plain language of the Code.60 6 The ambiguity
created by the conflicts, however, required the court to apply the
"traditional rules of statutory construction.
'60 7
The court found that the traditional rule that a specific statute con-
trols over a general statute militated in favor of the permissive lan-
guage of section 102.112, because 102.112 referred to the "deadline"
and "penalties" for late returns in its title and text, and section 102.111
dealt more generally with the duties of the Elections Canvassing Com-
mission, only "tangentially" including the mandate to ignore late re-
60turns. 08 A second rule, that a later enactment governs over an earlier
one, also supported the permissive language of section 102.112, be-
cause section 102.112 was enacted in 1989, whereas section 102.111
was enacted in 1951.609 A third rule-that a statutory provision not
be interpreted to render another provision meaningless or absurd-
called for section 102.112 to be applied. 610 The court's observation on
this point was that section 102.112 provides for board members to be
fined when returns are submitted late, but if section 102.111's
mandatory exclusion rule applied, the board would simply never sub-
mit the returns-and therefore avoid any fines-because the board
would know the returns would not be accepted in any event.61 In
603. Id. at 1232-33.
604. See id. at 1233; see also supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text (discussing
sections 102.111 and 102.112).
605. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1234.
606. See id.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 1234 (citing State ex rel. Johnson v. Vizzini, 227 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla.
1969)).
609. See id. (citing McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994)).
610. See id. (citing Amente v. Newman, 653 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 1995)).
611. See id. at 1234-35. The premise of the court's analysis here can only be de-
scribed as bizarre. To reach the conclusion that applying 102.111 would render the
fine provision in 102.112 absurd, the court assumed that board members could not be
fined if, instead of submitting returns late, they abdicated entirely their obligation to
file any returns. Section 102.112 provides, however, that "[t]he department shall fine
each board member $200 for each day such returns are late." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.112(2) (West Supp. 2001). Nothing about this language suggests that a board
could avoid fines by submitting no returns. A much more natural conclusion would
be that the fines would simply keep growing, which in turn would be a powerful in-
centive for a board to submit returns late, even if they were not going to be included.
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contrast, if section 102.112's permissive language applied, the fact that
the returns might be included would provide an incentive for the
members to submit the returns even if they would suffer the fine.612
The final rule the court cited requires that related statutory provi-
sions be read as a "cohesive whole," construed as much as possible "in
harmony with [one] another. '6 13 It would violate this rule, the court
found, to apply the mandatory language of section 102.111 to exclude
manual recounts under section 102.166, in situations where a recount
request is filed six days after the election, and the board, "through no
fault of its own," is unable to submit the returns by the seventh day.614
The court wrote that if the mandatory provision in section 102.111
were applied, "the votes of the county would be ignored for the simple
reason that the Board was following the dictates of a different section
of the Code. The Legislature could not have intended to penalize
County Canvassing Boards for following the dictates of the Code.
615
Further, the mandatory language of section 102.111 was enacted at
a time when all absentee ballots were required to arrive by Election
Day.6 16 The consent decree with the federal government changed that
practice, however, and required that overseas ballots be counted
through the tenth day after the election.617 Applying the permissive
language of section 102.112, the court implied, would allow the dead-
line and the practice of counting overseas ballots to coexist.61 8
The court concluded that the legislature intended counties to sub-
mit certified returns by 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day after the election,
but that section 102.112, rather than section 102.111, governed with
respect to the Secretary's authority to accept returns submitted there-
after.6" 9 Thus, "[i]f a Board fails to meet the deadline, the Secretary is
not required to ignore the county's returns but rather is permitted to
ignore the returns within the parameters of this statutory scheme.
620
The court acknowledged that this conclusion-that the Code did not
require the Secretary to ignore returns filed after seven days, but left
the decision to her discretion-did not answer the question the peti-
tioners had raised, whether it was proper for her to exclude the results
of their ongoing recounts. As the last sentence in this section of the
612. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1235.
613. Id. at 1235 (citing Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604
So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. See id.; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
requirement that absentee ballots be received by Election Day).
617. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1235; see also supra
notes 68-74 and accompanying text (discussing the federal lawsuit and the regulation
the Secretary of State adopted in response thereto).
618. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1235-36.




opinion (which was entitled "Legislative Intent"6 21), the court wrote:
"To determine the circumstances under which the Secretary may law-
fully ignore returns filed pursuant to the provisions of section 102.166
for a manual recount, it is necessary to examine the interplay between
our statutory and constitutional law at both the state and federal
levels. 
62 2
The next section of the opinion was entitled "The Right To
Vote., 623 The court began by describing the special significance of the
Declaration of Rights in the Florida Constitution, noting that
"[c]ourts must attend with special vigilance whenever the Declaration
of Rights is in issue. 624 The right to vote, the court said, was "the
preeminent right contained in the Declaration of Rights,' 6 25 and so
"[t]echnical statutory requirements must not be exalted over the sub-
stance of this right.
626
The "preeminent," constitutional nature of the right to vote was
such that the court concluded that it must limit the Secretary's author-
ity to ignore amended returns to situations where the timing would
either preclude an eligible party from contesting the certification
under section 102.168 or prevent Florida from participating in the fed-
eral electoral process.627 The court explained that the purpose of the
deadline statutes was to punish dilatory board members, and while the
fine provision served that purpose, allowing returns to be ignored
would not.628 That remedy for late returns would penalize only the
voters, by effectively disenfranchising them, and would be "unreason-
able, unnecessary, and violate[ ] longstanding law.
629
The court asserted that "allowing the ... recounts to proceed in an
expeditious manner, rather than imposing an arbitrary seven-day
621. Id. at 1234.




626. Id. at 1237 (citing Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 269 (Fla. 1975)).
627. See id. at 1237. It is quite plain from a close reading of the opinion that the
Florida Supreme Court based its decision to limit the Secretary's authority to exclude
returns filed after seven days on the Florida Constitution. The holding that the Secre-
tary's authority was limited appears in the section of the court's opinion entitled, "The
Right To Vote," which deals entirely with the suffrage rights of Florida citizens, see id.
at 1236-38, and, even more telling, the court all but said it was basing its conclusion
on the Florida Constitution: "Based on the foregoing," and the immediate foregoing
was the constitutional discussion described, "we conclude that the authority of the
Florida Secretary of State to ignore amended returns submitted by a County Canvass-
ing Board may be lawfully exercised only under limited circumstances as we set forth
in this opinion." Id. at 1237. Whether or not the court could have reached the same
conclusion employing a pure statutory interpretation analysis is debatable, and of
course, became the significant issue in the subsequent Supreme Court proceeding and
the Florida court's response on remand. See infra notes 980-92, 996-97, 1407-14 and
accompanying text.
628. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1237.
629. Id. at 1237-38.
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deadline, [was] consistent ... with the statutory scheme '630 and with
the Supreme Court's decision in Roudebush v. Hartke,6 31 in which the
Court deemed a recount "'an integral part of Indiana's electoral
[scheme] . .. within the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the
States by Art. I, § 4.' "632 If this comment was not enough to demon-
strate that the Florida Supreme Court squarely approved of manual
recounts, the text that followed left no doubt. The court wrote, "an
accurate vote count is one of the essential foundations of our democ-
racy," and followed with two paragraphs from an Illinois Supreme
Court case, Pullen v. Mulligan,633 that the Florida court described as
"particularly apt":
"The purpose of our election laws is to obtain a correct expression
of the voters. Our courts have repeatedly held that, where the in-
tention of the voter can be ascertained with reasonable certainty
from [the] ballot, that intention will be given effect even though the
ballot is not strictly in conformity with the law ....
The voters here did everything which the Election Code requires
when they punched the appropriate chad with the stylus. These vot-
ers should not be disenfranchised where their intent may be ascer-
tained with reasonable certainty, simply because the chad they
punched did not completely dislodge from the ballot. Such a failure
may be attributable to the fault of the election authorities, for fail-
ing to provide properly perforated paper, or it may be the result of
the voter's disability or inadvertence. Whatever the reason, where
the intention of the voter can be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained,
that intention should be given effect."
634
Although the Florida Supreme Court explained its conclusions on
the two issues it identified at the beginning of its opinion-under what
circumstances a canvassing board could authorize a countywide man-
ual recount and whether the Secretary and Commission must accept
such recounts after the seven-day deadline 63 5-the court did not offer
any explanation of how it arrived at the November 26 deadline for the
counties to complete the recounts.636 Nor did the court address the
constitutionality of the manual recounts or the statute authorizing
them. On this point, the court simply dropped a footnote: "Neither
630. Id. at 1238.
631. 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
632. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1238 (quoting Roudebush,
405 U.S. at 25).
633. 561 N.E.2d 585 (I11. 1990).
634. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1238 (quoting Pullen, 561
N.E.2d at 611 (citations omitted)).
635. See supra note 588 and accompanying text.
636. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1240. The court said
that the date was set "in order to allow maximum time for contests pursuant to sec-
tion 102.168," id., but offered nothing further to explain how the date was computed,
such as estimates by the counties as to how long the recounts would take or assess-
ments of the various stages of a contest proceeding.
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party has raised an issue on appeal as to the constitutionality of Flor-
ida's election laws.
637
III. THE EMERGENCE OF FEDERAL LAW: THE INVOLVEMENT OF
THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT
Given what there might have been, there was comparatively little
talk of federal law during the Florida Supreme Court proceeding. The
parties' failure to focus the court on federal law, however, should not
be taken to suggest that it was irrelevant or extraneous to their ap-
proach to the controversy. To the contrary, when one looks back on
the Republicans' statements in the press, the manner in which they
treated the federal issues before the Florida Supreme Court, and the
way the federal issues assumed great prominence immediately after
the Florida Supreme Court's decision was handed down, it seems
quite clear that the Republicans built federal law into their strategy
from very early on, with great success.
The first aspect of the Republicans' federal strategy was to chal-
lenge the recounts on traditional constitutional grounds. As described
above, they sought an injunction in federal court on Friday, November
10, only four days after the election, alleging that the manual recount
statute and the recounts being conducted violated the Equal Protec-
tion and Due Process Clauses and the First Amendment.63 After los-
ing in the district court, they appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.639
Thus, when the Florida Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Harris, the constitutional case sat pending before the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, and the Republicans moved to expedite its consideration.64 °
The second aspect of the Republicans' federal strategy-to take full
advantage of the federal statutes governing the counting of electoral
votes-emerged quietly the week before the Florida Supreme Court
proceeding. On Wednesday, November 15, Representative Tom De-
Lay of Texas distributed to Republican members of Congress a mem-
637. See id. at 1228 n.10. This statement by the Florida court simply was not true.
The Republicans had buried the constitutional issues in their brief, see supra notes
512-13 and accompanying text, and Michael Carvin had stated during the argument
that he thought the court could find for Bush without ever reaching the constitutional
issues, see supra note 566 and accompanying text, but Bush clearly had raised the
issue.
638. See supra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
639. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir. 2000).
640. See id. at 1171. The Eleventh Circuit had denied the Bush team an injunction
pending appeal of the district court's decision but had expressly refrained from issuing
any opinion on the merits. See Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130, 1133 (11th
Cir. 2000) (denying injunction pending appeal of Middle District of Florida case);
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1162, 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying injunction pending
appeal of Southern District of Florida case for the reasons set forth in Touchston).
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orandum outlining Congress's role in tallying the electoral votes. 641
The memorandum focused on the Electoral Count Act of February 3,
1887,642 i.e., the act containing federal §§ 5 and 15.643 The memoran-
dum observed that the House and Senate could reject a state's elec-
tors if they found fault with the process by which they were
appointed.644 On reflection, the Congressional Democrats' response
proves very telling, and it illustrates how far behind on federal law the
Democrats were falling. House Speaker Richard Gephardt asked the
Parliamentarian to provide the Democrats with any research given to
the Republicans, and Rep. David Price, a North Carolina Democrat,
introduced a resolution to ask the Archivist to provide Congress with
information on Electoral College preparations.645
Four days later, on Saturday, November 18, the Republicans in-
voked the federal statutes again. The briefing in the Florida Supreme
Court was not even complete, and yet Republican state legislators be-
gan speaking publicly about supplanting any electoral slate arrived at
through judicial proceedings with their own legislatively-appointed
slate. 646 The incoming speaker of the Republican-dominated Florida
House,6 47 Representative Tom Feeney, said, "If the courts don't allow
the executive branch to do their [sic] duty, then at some point we
would have to review our constitutional responsibilities .... At this
point, we're just watching and waiting. ' 648 It was not entirely clear to
what "constitutional responsibilities" Feeney was referring, but he was
reported to be relying on 3 U.S.C. § 2,649 which, as discussed above,650
provides: "Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of
appointing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day pre-
641. Alison Mitchell, G.O.P. Begins Jockeying in House on Fate of Election, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 16, 2000, at A29; Eric Pianin & Juliet Eilperin, An Angry GOP on Hill
Would Confront Gore If He Won, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2000, at A8 ("House Major-
ity Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) has circulated a staff memorandum to congressional
Republicans pointing out that the House and Senate can reject a state's electoral
votes if they decide that the votes are tainted.").
642. See Mitchell, supra note 641.
643. See supra notes 257-81 and accompanying text (discussing §§ 5 and 15).
644. Mitchell, supra note 641; see also David Rogers, Hastert-Gephardt Meeting
Aims To Avert Gridlock in a Closely Divided Congress, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2000, at
A18 ("It requires only one member of the House and one from the Senate to raise
objections to electors, and some House Republicans from Florida have already sug-
gested that they might pursue this course if Vice President Al Gore is awarded the
state's 25 electoral votes.").
645. Mitchell, supra note 641.
646. See Somini Sengupta & Dexter Filkins, Republican Lawmakers Think They
Have an Ace in the Hole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2000, at A43.
647. The Florida House was made up of seventy-seven Republicans and forty-three
Democrats, and the Florida Senate was made up of twenty-five Republicans and fif-
teen Democrats. David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Florida Legislators Consider
Options To Aid Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at Al.
648. Sengupta & Filkins, supra note 646.
649. Id.
650. See supra notes 216, 228-30 and accompanying text.
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scribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in
such a manner as the legislature thereof may direct."
651
Of course, even as the Republicans were beginning to rely on the
federal law in the media, they were saying very little about the federal
law to the Florida court. Bush's brief included a short argument based
on federal § 5, but it was buried on page forty-two.652 When the case
was argued orally, Michael Carvin, arguing first for Bush, invoked
neither the electoral appointments clause nor § 5, and Barry Richard
made what can only be described as an oblique reference to federal
restraints on the state judiciary.653 Nowhere was there any mention of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in McPherson v. Blacker,
which had suggested the primacy of state legislative enactments over
state constitutions and, at least arguably by its strong language, over
equitable relief granted by the courts.6 54
What seems obvious now is that the Republican attorneys arguing
the Florida case made a very deliberate choice to mention the electo-
ral appointments clause and federal § 5 just enough times to avoid any
claim that the issues had not been raised, but not often or vigorously
enough that the Florida court would pay them any heed. Plainly, the
Republicans had become familiar with the federal statutes governing
the electoral college: Tom DeLay had issued a memorandum on them
and Florida legislators were invoking them even before Bush's brief
was filed or the case was argued, and the attorneys knew enough
about them to include them in the Florida brief.6 55 The attorneys'
hope would have been that the Florida court would do itself in, by
straying so far from the legislative enactment to rule in Gore's favor
that Bush could argue it committed reversible error.656
651. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
652. See supra notes 509-11 and accompanying text.
653. See supra note 569 and accompanying text.
654. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
655. See supra notes 509-11 and accompanying text. With this said, it does not
appear that even Bush's lawyers were at this point fully versed in the law on the
electoral appointments clause or federal § 5. As will be discussed below, when they
later briefed and argued the electoral appointments clause issue in the United States
Supreme Court, Bush's lawyers did not quote the fateful language from McPherson
stating that a state court reviewing a dispute over presidential electors could not rely
on the state's constitution. See infra notes 939-42, 963-64, 975-76 and accompanying
text. Further, when Theodore Olson was questioned by Justice Scalia on the precise
relationship between federal §§ 5 and 15, it was clear that he did not understand the
relationship well enough to talk about it, and when asked whether § 15 predated the
McPherson case, Olson said he did not know. See infra notes 970-71 and accompany-
ing text.
656. Since the case ended, at least one of Bush's lawyers has indicated that this was
their plan. As Irv Terrell has described it, "The whole Bush strategy was to build a
record in state court and then get the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse
it. Our desire was to get to the [U.S. Supreme Court] with another unbelievable deci-
sion from the Florida Supreme Court." Richard T. Cooper, A Different Florida Vote,
In Hindsight: Gore, Bush Teams Made Quick Decisions in Critical Moments in the
Recount Battle, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2000, at Al.
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Whether the omission in the briefs and the oral argument was delib-
erate or not, it certainly seems that by the next day, when the Florida
Supreme Court handed down its decision, the Republicans had devel-
oped a game plan based on the electoral appointments clause and fed-
eral §§ 2, 5, and 15. First, they would argue that the electoral
appointments clause, as well as federal § 5, required that the judiciary
adhere strictly to the legislative enactments governing the appoint-
ment of electors. Second, they would seize upon the Florida Supreme
Court's decision to enjoin the certification and any other aspect of the
decision they could find, to claim that the judicial outcome was a
change in the law violating the electoral appointments clause and de-
priving any judicially-approved electoral slate of the presumption of
correctness afforded by federal § 5. Third, they would have the Flor-
ida Legislature invoke federal § 2 to appoint a slate of electors to
square off in Congress with any slate of Gore electors the judiciary
might approve. And finally, if it came down to competing slates in
Congress, they could count on at least the Republican-controlled
House of Representatives, 65 7 to accept the claim that the judiciary had
657. At the time the Republicans' reliance on the federal electoral statutes
emerged, the Republicans remained in control of the House of Representatives. See
David Rogers & Jim VandeHei, Democrats Cut into GOP Majorities in Congress,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at A28. It was unclear, however, whether the Senate would
be under Republican control when the electoral votes were counted, because the race
between Democrat Maria Cantwell and incumbent Republican Senator Slade Gorton
in Washington required both counting all of the absentee ballots and a recount to be
decided, and the lead changed several times. See Karen Hucks, Gorton's Lead
Widens: Margin Remains Very Slim, TACOMA NEWS-TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2000, at A14
("The three-term Republican incumbent was 11,458 votes ahead of Cantwell, a for-
mer Democratic state lawmaker and one-term congresswoman ... [with] 2.3 million
ballots counted."); Paul Leavitt, Three Races Still Not Officially Called, USA TODAY,
Nov. 21, 2000, at 9A ("In the only undecided Senate race, incumbent Republican Sen.
Slade Gorton of Washington state leads Democrat Maria Cantwell by 1,182 votes with
99% of the ballots counted."); Elaine S. Povich, Democrat Wins Washington State -
by 2,259, NEWSDAY, Dec. 2, 2000, at A35 (noting that Cantwell "bested Gorton by
2,259 votes"); Seattle Times Staff, Cantwell: I Will Be a Senator for All Washington,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 2, 2000, at Al (providing that after a statewide recount was
completed, "[Cantwell] gained 276 votes, expanding her winning margin to 2,229
votes of the more than 2.5 million cast"). If Cantwell won, the 100 Senate seats would
be split 50-50. Terence Samuel, It Looks Like Gridlock as Usual: Can Lawmakers
Ever Stop Bickering and Get Back to Business?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 20,
2000, at 44 ("[S]hould Democrat Maria Cantwell prevail in an undecided race against
incumbent Republican Slade Gorton in Washington State, the Democrats would get
the 50 slots [Senate Minority Leader] Daschle's been coveting."). And at the time the
electoral votes would be counted, the President of the Senate, who could cast the
tiebreaking vote, would be the still-sitting Vice President Gore. See supra notes
257-58 and accompanying text (describing the opening and counting of the electoral
votes under § 15). On the other hand, even if the House supported one slate of elec-
tors and the Senate supported another, the tiebreaker rule under § 15 would support
whichever slate had been certified by the executive of the state, which would most
likely be Governor Jeb Bush, the Republican candidate's brother. See supra notes
270, 272 and accompanying text (describing § 15's provisions for handling a disagree-
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not properly applied Florida law, and to reject, under federal § 15, any
judicially-approved electors for Gore.
This strategy became clear immediately after the Florida Supreme
Court's decision. Although the court's decision surely did not surprise
the Bush campaign,658 former Secretary of State James Baker, acting
as Bush's spokesperson, emotionally denounced the ruling,. com-
plaining that same night that the court had changed the rules in the
middle of the game and warning, "one should not now be surprised if
the Florida Legislature seeks to affirm the original rules. '659 Florida
Governor Jeb Bush, who had previously assumed a low profile be-
cause of his relationship to the candidate, chimed in: "[The Florida
legislators] clearly have a responsibility under certain circumstances,
or they at least have the right granted to them by the Constitution. I
mean, it's pretty clear that the Legislature has a role in this, should it
get to that. I hope it doesn't. ' '66° Republican state legislators fol-
lowed as if on cue, announcing their plans to either call a special ses-
sion to consider appointing electors themselves, or go into federal
court, to ensure that "the Legislature write[s] the laws of this state.
661
The next day, the emphasis on federal law became even stronger.
The House Majority Leader, Representative Dick Armey of Texas,
stated flatly that the Florida Legislature had a "duty to step in and
restore honesty and the rule of law," and one House Republican
openly threatened to challenge Florida's electors if, as a result of the
Florida court decision, they represented Gore.662 Florida legislators
began speaking of holding a special session the following week to ap-
point electors for Bush.663 Again the Democratic response was weak
at best. Laurence Tribe made clear that Gore would challenge such
action by the Florida Legislature in federal court, but Florida Demo-
crats apparently told reporters that they could "do little more than
slow the Republican [legislators] through a guerilla campaign of pro-
cedural harassment. '664 Beyond Tribe's reaction, the Democrats did
ment between the two houses of Congress on which of two competing electoral slates
should be recognized).
658. The Washington Post has reported that a "knowledgeable source close to the
Florida high court" had alerted the Bush team prior to the oral argument on Monday
morning that the court had already decided the case, that an opinion was already
circulating among the justices, and that six of the seven justices had already approved
of it. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 111. According to the Post, the source revealed that
the court was going to rule in Gore's favor and extend the deadline by five days. Id.
That is, of course, exactly what the court did. See supra notes 586-93 and accompany-
ing text.
659. Frank Bruni, Bush Camp, Outraged, Vows To Seek Recourse to Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at Al.
660. Id.
661. Id. (quoting Republican state senator from Orlando Daniel Webster).
662. Alison Mitchell, G.O.P. Expresses Rancor over Ruling: Lawmaker Threatens
To Challenge Electors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at A33.
663. Barstow & Sengupta, supra note 647.
664. Id.
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not offer the media, or anyone else, any meaningful, substantive dis-
cussion of the federal law.6 65
Simultaneously, Bush petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for writs of certiorari from both the Florida court's decision and the
Eleventh Circuit's decision declining to enjoin the manual recounts
pending Bush's appeal.66 6 The petition addressing the Florida court's
decision presented three questions: (1) whether "post-election" limits
on executive discretion or "post-election" judicial standards for tally-
ing votes violated federal § 5 or the Due Process Clause; (2) whether
the state court's decision, because it could not be reconciled with state
statutes, violated the electoral appointments clause, and (3) whether
the use of "arbitrary, standardless, and selective recounts" violate the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and the First Amend-
ment.667 The petition challenging the Eleventh Circuit's decision
raised only the third question.668
Bush's decision to petition the Supreme Court to review the Florida
court's decision was greeted with great skepticism. The vast majority
of legal commentators voiced the opinion that there was no federal
question properly presented. 669 Laurence Tribe, who had appeared
665. Indeed, even Tribe's response suggested that either he had not yet delved into
the law on the electoral appointments clause and discovered the restrictive language
of McPherson v. Blacker, or at least he did not appreciate the view the United States
Supreme Court would take of the case. The New York Times quoted Tribe as saying,
An attempt by the State Legislature to act like a court, whether clothed in
the garb of legislation or not, would be rejected by federal and state courts at
this point. The very essence of judicial power is to interpret the laws to
make them consistent with one another, and ultimately consistent with state
constitutional principles.
Id. (emphasis added). This reference to the legitimacy of the court's reliance on the
state constitution strongly suggests that as of this point in the controversy, Tribe still
believed the Florida Supreme Court had the power to superimpose state constitu-
tional principles on the state legislative method.
666. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. SCOO-836); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Siegel v.
LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000) (No. SCOO-837).
667. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., supra
note 666, at i.
668. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Siegel, supra note 666.
669. See, e.g., Linda Deutsch, Bush Appeals to U.S. Supreme Court, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 22, 2000, 2000 WL 29581165 ("Most legal experts said it was unlikely the
U.S. Supreme Court would intervene in a state case without compelling evidence of a
federal issue."); Nancy Gibbs, Bush's Contested Lead: Now it Goes to the Courts as
Gore Challenges Sunday Night's Florida Certification, TIME, Dec. 4, 2000, at 31, 32
("[T]he United States Supreme Court surprised just about every legal scholar on the
planet [when it] said it would hear the Bush petition .. "); Michelle Mittelstadt,
Justices Sidestep Divisive Decision: United States Supreme Court's Unanimous Move
Called "A Good Way Out" by Law Experts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 5,2000, at
15A (reporting Georgetown University law professor Mark Tushnet's "surprise" that
the Supreme Court agreed to hear Bush's case); Jeffrey Rosen, Florida's Justices Went
Too Far, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at A43 (editorial by associate professor of law at
George Washington University School of Law) ("the justices ... have no business
second-guessing a state court on the interpretation of state law"); Roger Cossack,
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for Gore in the federal district court, seemed unconcerned: "This ap-
peal will not be hard in the least to defend, because the federal ques-
tions are frivolous.
670
Two days later, however-the Friday after Thanksgiving-the
Court granted Bush's petition on the Florida case, agreeing to hear
the first two questions he had raised in the Florida case, those involv-
ing the electoral appointments clause and § 5, as well as a third raised
by the Court itself: "What would be the consequences of this Court's
finding that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida does not
comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5? ''67 1 The Court denied without prejudice
Bush's petition from the Eleventh Circuit ruling, which left the equal
protection, due process and First Amendment challenges to the re-
counts pending before that court.672 The Court directed the parties to
file briefs on Tuesday, November 28, and Thursday, November 30, and
scheduled the oral argument for Friday, December 1.673
Had the commentators and the Democrats been more fully pre-
pared on federal law, they would not have been so shocked by the
Supreme Court's decision to take the case, at least to the extent of
reviewing the question implicating the electoral appointments
clause. 674 For whether or not Bush was correct when he argued that
Roger Cossack on What-and When-the Courts Might Rule (Nov. 23, 2000), at
http:\\www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/11/23/cossack.debrief/ (copy on file
with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) ("I don't think [the likelihood that the Su-
preme Court will grant the request from Gov. George W. Bush is] strong. You have to
have a federal question in order for the U.S. Supreme Court to accept the case.");
Jessica Reaves, The Legal Road Map: What's Going on in Courts from Tallahassee to
Washington (Nov. 27, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/ll/
27/united.tm/index.html (copy on file with the Texas Wesleyan Law Review) ("Many
legal analysts snickered at the Bush team's attempt to push the case toward the Su-
preme Court, pointing out there was little in the GOP challenge to recommend it to a
federal court.").
670. Todd S. Purdum, In Blow to Gore, Recount Halts in Miami-Dade: Palm Beach
Is Given Discretion on Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2000, at Al.
671. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004, 1005 (2000).
672. See Siegel v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005, 1005 (2000).
673. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 1005.
674. It appears that many members of the profession were willing to jump in and
render definitive opinions about the case even though those lawyers were previously
unaware of the detailed law on the electoral college and had never studied the electo-
ral appointments clause. Cf Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: While Justices
May Not Settle the Dispute Yet, They Could Settle Key Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
2000, at A30 ("most of the lawyers in the case will concede in their candid moments
that they had never heard of [§ 5] until a few weeks ago .... "). On November 21, for
example, just before the Florida Supreme Court handed down its decision, Stephen
Gillers, Vice Dean and Professor of Legal and Judicial Ethics at New York University
School of Law, penned an editorial for the New York Times entitled "The Court
Should Boldly Take Charge." Dean Gillers wrote:
The [Florida] court should set a timetable for the resolution of all election
challenges before the Electoral College meets on Dec. 18. The timetable
must have accelerated procedures for asserting claims and filing appeals.
The court should also provide guidance on issues now before lower courts-
whether a pregnant chad is a vote, which absentee ballots count, whether it
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the Florida court violated the electoral appointments clause by alleg-
edly "rewriting" the Florida Code, the case raised a legitimate, colora-
ble federal question. By its language, McPherson v. Blacker had
conferred extraordinary power upon state legislatures, exclusive of
state constitutions,675 and the Florida Supreme Court very clearly had
relied on the Florida Constitution-not just the Florida Code-to
limit the Secretary of State's discretion to reject the results of manual
recounts.676 Indeed, Gore had asked the Florida court to rely on the
Florida Constitution, and, for that matter, public policy.
677
was proper for Republican workers to complete absentee ballot applications,
and what remedy, if any, there should be for [voter] confusion over the Palm
Beach butterfly ballot. Because United States Supreme Court review of
these issues is remote, the State Supreme Court's answers to them now will
hasten the end of the story.
Stephen Gillers, The Court Should Boldly Take Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at
A25. It is hard to imagine how Dean Gillers could have suggested such a sweeping
decision by the Florida Supreme Court if he was familiar with McPherson v. Blacker's
restrictive approach to the electoral appointments clause. Indeed, Gillers's own sug-
gestion would have made United States Supreme Court review anything but "re-
mote." Similarly, Jeffrey Rosen, an Associate Professor of Law at George
Washington University School of Law, wrote an editorial for the Times in which he
did not appear to be very well-versed in the governing law. Purportedly describing
Bush's petition in the Supreme Court, Professor Rosen wrote:
Bush also charged that the Florida Supreme Court violated federal law,
which allows the state legislature to direct the "manner" in which electors
shall be appointed whenever a state fails to choose them on the day pre-
scribed by law. But the federal law is unclear on this point. Another section
of the same law suggests that state judges have the final word about electoral
disputes that are resolved before Dec. 12 and that the legislature can only
intervene thereafter.
Rosen, supra note 669. This passage is simply rife with mischaracterization. First, it is
true that federal law "allows state legislatures to direct the manner in which electors
are chosen whenever a state fails to choose them" on Election Day. As set forth
above, that is what federal § 2 provides. See supra notes 216, 228-30 and accompany-
ing text. Yet Bush never claimed, as Rosen suggests, that § 2 was the federal law the
Florida court violated; Bush claimed that the court violated § 5. See supra notes
666-68 and accompanying text. Second, no section of any federal law says, as Rosen
claimed, that state judges have the final word about federal electoral disputes; all that
federal law provides is that states can provide for a method of judicial resolution if
they wish. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (Supp. V 1999)). Further, that provision is in federal § 5,
not in "another section of the same law," which would, by Professor Rosen's initial
reference, be § 2. Finally, there is absolutely nothing in federal law that says anything
about the legislature intervening only after December 12. One can make an assump-
tion, if one does nothing more than read the statutes, that § 2, which allows for legisla-
tive action after Election Day, was intended by Congress to take effect only if a
judicial resolution contemplated by § 5 was not completed by December 12. But the
law certainly does not say that. See 3 U.S.C. §§ 2, 5. Further, even that assumption
would be wrong, inasmuch as Congress enacted § 2 a full forty-two years before there
was a § 5, for a completely different reason. See supra notes 228-30 and accompany-
ing text.
675. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
676. See supra notes 591, 622-29 and accompanying text.
677. See supra notes 448, 459-61, 522 and accompanying text.
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With that said, Bush's claim of error based on federal § 5 was frivo-
lous. Bush claimed that the Florida court violated § 5 by not applying
the law as it stood on Election Day, but in reality, § 5 did not require
anything of any state entity. It simply defined a circumstance in which
Congress would afford a presumption of validity to a judicially-ap-
proved slate of electors.678 Hence, there was no way the Florida court
could have violated it in any sense appropriate for the judiciary. The
only consequence of not meeting § 5's conditions was the possibility
that Congress (not the United States Supreme Court) could refuse to
accept a judicially-approved electoral slate.
Gore's attorneys, however, bore some responsibility for the confu-
sion. Bush had affirmatively mischaracterized § 5 in the Florida
court,679 and Gore, apparently devoting little attention to federal law,
had allowed the mischaracterization to go unchecked. Had Gore's
team acted earlier to enlighten the state court on the real meaning of
§ 5, the law likely would never have achieved the prominence it ulti-
mately did.
IV. THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S CERTIFICATION
By the time the Florida Supreme Court handed down its decision
on the night of Tuesday, November 21, three counties were immersed
in countywide manual recounts. Broward County had begun counting
its 588,007 ballots on Wednesday, November 15;680 Palm Beach
County had begun counting its 462,657 ballots on Thursday, Novem-
ber 16;681 and Miami-Dade had begun its counting process on Sunday,
November 19, by beginning to run all of the 653,963 ballots through
the counting machines to separate out the undervotes.8 2 (As de-
scribed above, Volusia County succeeded in completing its recount of
ballots five minutes before Katherine Harris's 5:00 p.m. deadline on
Tuesday, November 14.683)
The effect of the Florida court's decision on the recounting in
Broward and Palm Beach was very favorable to Gore, in two respects.
First, and most obviously, the decision required the Secretary of State
to accept the results of the recounts if they were submitted by Novem-
ber 26. Just as importantly, however, the court's citation of the Illinois
case, Pullen v. Mulligan-with its language stating that ballots could
be counted as votes even when the chads did not completely dis-
678. See supra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
679. See supra note 511 and accompanying text.
680. Thomas C. Tobin, Amid Wrangling, Broward Begins Recount, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at 9A.
681. Rick Bragg, At Long Last, Army of Volunteers Gets Its Orders To Begin Re-
count, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at A29.
682. Don Van Natta, Jr., Fatigue in Florida: Bush's Slim Lead Holds as Rules
Change and Challenges Pile Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at Al.
683. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
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lodge 684-enabled the Gore team to challenge what it saw as Palm
Beach County's overly exclusionary approach to dimpled chads. In-
deed, within twenty-four hours of the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion, the Florida Democratic Party had a decision by Judge Labarga
directing Palm Beach not to per se exclude any ballot, even a ballot
that was merely dimpled, and citing the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion to that effect.685 In Miami-Dade, however, the Florida court's
decision would ultimately prove devastating to Gore.
Immediately after the Miami-Dade board had voted to conduct a
countywide recount, officials there had estimated that beginning on
Monday, November 20, utilizing twenty-five two-person teams,6 86 it
would take them two weeks, including every day other than
Thanksgiving, to complete the recount.687 Elections Supervisor David
Leahy 688 decided that the board would run the ballots through the
counting machines precinct by precinct to cull the undervoted ballots,
and then review the undervoted ballots first.689 Leahy considered this
the most efficient process because it would allow the board to evalu-
ate the undervoted (and most likely to be controversial) ballots while
the counting teams recounted the ballots that did not register as un-
dervotes and created piles of ballots on which the counters could not
agree for the canvassing board to review.6 90
The board developed a process by which it would evaluate the bal-
lots. Leahy would look at the ballot, pronounce it a vote or not, and
then the other board members (and the observers) would evaluate it
684. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1238 (Fla.)
(quoting Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Ill. 1.990) ("These voters should not
be disenfranchised where their intent may be ascertained with reasonable certainty,
simply because the chad they punched did not completely dislodge from the ballot."
(citations omitted))), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 70 (2000).
685. Fla. Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., No. CL-00-
11078AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2000) (order on plaintiff's emergency motion to clar-
ify declaratory order of November 15, 2000).
686. Elections Supervisor David Leahy has explained that the board planned on
only twenty-five counting teams because the nature of the process was such that it
would do no good to bring in more teams. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 137. The law,
after all, required the canvassing board to resolve any disagreements over whether a
ballot should be counted, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(7)(b) (West Supp. 2001), and
a three-member board could only progress through so many ballots at a time.
687. See Bragg, supra note 432. The Elections Supervisor personally set an earlier
goal of December 1, see DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 137, so presumably the public
announcement was intended to be a conservative estimate.
688. David Leahy and another member of the board, Judge Myriam Lehr, were
non-partisan, the latter a registered independent. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 125;
Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, Protest Influenced Miami-Dade's Decision To Stop
Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at A41. The third member and chair of the
board, Judge Lawrence King, was a Democrat. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 125;
Filkins & Canedy, supra.
689. Van Natta, Jr., supra note 355; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 138.
690. Van Natta, Jr., supra note 355; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 137.
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and vote.6 9 ' A court reporter would record the ballot number, and
the observers would make objections to how various of the ballots
were counted.692 Using this process, the board was able to count
about a ballot a minute, or sixty an hour.693 By Tuesday night, No-
vember 21, 139 precincts had been counted manually, and Leahy
thought the board might actually be able to finish by December 1.694
That same night, however, the Florida Supreme Court set a dead-
line of November 26. At 8:00 a.m. the next morning, Leahy told the
board members that they had three options: (1) try to find more
counting teams, and count twenty-four hours a day for four straight
days, but have insufficient time to resolve all of the disputed ballots;
(2) stop the process, or (3) send the counting teams home, and focus
as a board only on the 10,750 undervotes, on the theory that the ma-
chines could properly count the others.695 According to Leahy, if they
could speed up to five ballots a minute, the board could have all the
undervoted ballots counted in thirty-six hours of work.6 96
The board decided on the third option, counting only the un-
dervotes.69 7 Unfortunately, the board members also decided that they
could save time in counting the undervotes if they moved up one
floor, to the "Tabulating Room," to receive the undervotes as soon as
the tabulating machines separated them.6 98 Because the Tabulating
Room had only limited access, this infuriated many observers and the
press alike, and, outside the elections supervisor's office, some thirty
to forty Republican protesters began shouting, "Stop the count! Stop
the fraud! ' 69 9 Several people reported being punched or kicked when
the protesters tried to rush the doors,700 and a Democratic Party law-
yer had to be escorted by police to safety when someone wrongfully
accused him of stealing a ballot. 0
Inside the Tabulating Room, the board could hear the commotion,
but they continued.70 2 It soon became clear, however, that they were
not going to be able to evaluate the ballots at the rate of five per
minute.70 3 So the board members abandoned the process and went to
their respective offices to meet individually with the county attorney
691. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 137.
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id. Gore, at that time, had a net gain of 157 votes. Id.
695. Id. at 138. Leahy proposed that when the board decided an undervoted ballot
constituted a vote, the board would create a fully punched duplicate for that card and,




699. Id. at 138-39.
700. Filkins & Canedy, supra note 688.
701. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 139-40; Filkins & Canedy, supra note 688.
702. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 139.
703. Id. at 140.
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about the possibility of getting an extension from the Florida Supreme
Court."' When they reconvened at 1:30 p.m. in the public meeting
room, they explained that there simply was not enough time to accom-
plish the counting properly, and they voted unanimously to end the
process.70 5 David Leahy has since said that he was less concerned
about the protesters than he was the press's perception that the pro-
cess was not being conducted openly and fairly, joined with the fact
that the deadline was going to be virtually impossible to meet.7 °6
Gore appealed immediately to the district court of appeals to force
the Miami board to resume counting, arguing that once a canvassing
board deemed that a recount should be conducted, it was obligated to
complete it. The court of appeals apparently agreed that the board
should have completed the count, but it refused to mandamus the
board to continue counting given the board's representation that it
could not finish the counting by the Florida Supreme Court's Novem-
ber 26 deadline.70 7 A unanimous Florida Supreme Court likewise re-
fused to intervene.70 8
With Miami-Dade out of the picture, Gore's recount hopes came
down to Broward and Palm Beach. In Broward, Gore's recount strat-
egy worked as planned. The Republicans attempted to raise the ten-
sion level by seating former presidential candidate and Senator Bob
Dole at the Broward board's table while they counted the disputed
ballots, 70 9 but in the end, the board finished a day early, and Gore had
a net gain of 567 votes.710
The counting in Palm Beach, however, went decidedly against
Gore. After breaking for Thanksgiving, the board had nearly 10,000
704. Id. at 142. The board members were concerned that any closed group meeting
with the county attorney would be seen as violating Florida's open meeting law. Id.
705. Id. at 142-43.
706. Id. at 141; Filkins & Canedy, supra note 688. The protesters on the scene
were, for the most part, "young congressional staffers and other volunteers from
Washington" whom the Republican Party had flown and bussed into the state. DEAD-
LOCK, supra note 1, at 139. The networks broadcast footage of their rushing the doors
of the election office shouting, and Democrats spoke often and angrily about the
"mob" having shut down the Miami-Dade count. Id. at 140.
707. Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing
Bd., 773 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). The district court of appeals
wrote: "The results of th[e] sample recount showed 'an error in the vote tabulation
which could effect the outcome of the election[,]' thus triggering the Canvassing
Board's mandatory obligation to recount all of the ballots in the county." Id. (quoting
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001)). Under the circumstances of the
deadline, however, nothing could be done: "'[m]andamus will not lie to compel the
performance of an act that is futile or impossible to perform."' Id. (quoting Agency
for Health Care Admin. v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 690 So. 2d 689, 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)).
708. See Gore v. Miami-Dade Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2370 (Fla. Nov. 23, 2000).
709. Lynette Holloway, Gore Gains in Broward: Count Reaches Midpoint, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at A12.
710. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 136; David Firestone, Bush's Lead Is Halved in
Unofficial Tally as Broward Finishes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at Al.
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disputed ballots to evaluate in the three days remaining before the
November 26 deadline. 7 11 Approximately 2000 ballots were reviewed
on Friday, but the board made it through only 900 on Saturday.
712
Worse yet for Gore, the Palm Beach board did not often count dim-
pled ballots as votes.713 Not only did this mean that Gore did not pick
up a lot of votes, but the observers for Gore felt compelled to object
every time a "dimple for Gore" was not counted, and that in turn led
to Republican counterobjections that "dimples for Bush" were not
counted, so the process bogged down.71 4 On Friday morning, the dis-
pute had become so pointed that the Palm Beach board granted a
Democratic request to put on witnesses as to why the board was pro-
ceeding in the wrong fashion.71 5
By Sunday afternoon, November 26-after working all night7 16 -
the Palm Beach board recognized that it might well not finish.717
Board Chairman Charles Burton faxed a letter to Secretary of State
Harris asking for an extension until 9:00 a.m. the next morning,718 the
alternative deadline the Florida Supreme Court had allowed in the
event the Secretary's office was not open on Sunday.719 Harris faxed
back a letter denying any extension.720
At about 4:25 p.m., it became clear that the board would fall short
of completing the recount by 5:00 p.m., so the board stopped counting
and prepared to fax the Secretary partial results.7 1' The fax machine
jammed, but eventually the fax confirmation showed that it went
through just before 5:00 p.m.722 With about 800 to 1000 disputed bal-
lots left to examine, Palm Beach County's manual recount reflected a
net gain for Gore of 192 votes.7 3 Not knowing whether the results
711. See Firestone, supra note 710.
712. Id.
713. See Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at 71 (Gore expert testifying that Palm
Beach recovered votes from eight percent of the ballots initially not counted and
Broward recovered votes from twenty-six percent of the ballots initially not counted);
DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 147 (noting that Broward found votes on approximately
twenty to twenty-five percent of the undervotes, but Palm Beach found votes on only
about five percent).
714. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 146.
715. See Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at 102-03 (Palm Beach Canvassing Board
Chair Judge Charles Burton testifying about the hearing on November 24).
716. See Don Van Natta, Jr. & Rick Bragg, Palm Beach Count Rejected by State:
County Canvassing Board Says Move Is a "Slap in the Face," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2000, at Al (board members worked thirty-four hours straight from Saturday to Sun-
day afternoon).
717. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 147.
718. Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 716; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 147.
719. See supra note 593 and accompanying text.
720. Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 716; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 147.
721. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 147-48; Todd S. Purdum, Margin Put at 537: Deci-
sive Electoral Votes-"A Lot of Work to Do" Bush Says, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2000, at
Al.
722. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 148; Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 716.
723. Purdum, supra note 721; Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 716.
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would be included, the board members resumed counting.724 When
they had finished looking at every last ballot, at around 7:00 p.m.,
Gore had a net gain of only 174 votes.72 5
As it happened, neither number mattered. The Secretary notified
Palm Beach that she would not include the partial result or any late
result.72 6 Ironically, she justified her decision by citing the very por-
tion of section 102.166 on which the counties had relied to conduct the
manual recounts in the first place. 727 Subsection (5) of section 102.166
authorizes the county canvassing board to "[m]anually recount all bal-
lots, ''7 28 i.e., not the vast majority of them.
Right before 7:30 p.m. that night, Secretary of State Harris ap-
peared with the other two members of the Elections Canvassing Com-
mission at the Florida Capitol.7 29  She announced that the
Commission had certified the results of the statewide vote, and that
Bush had won Florida's 25 electors by 2,912,790 votes to 2,912,253
votes, a margin of 537.73o She and the other members of the Commis-
sion then began signing multiple copies of the certified results.73 I The
next step was to have the Governor sign the certificate of ascertain-
ment, pursuant to federal § 6.732
For the Bush team, this was more than a ceremonial moment.
Gore's attorneys had already announced their intention to contest the
certification.733 If Gore did bring a contest action, and somehow the
contest ended in his favor prior to six days before the electoral college
met, Bush still had an out. At least until the United States Supreme
Court told him he could not, Bush could claim that the judicial result
favoring Gore, in allowing the recounts and denying the Secretary dis-
cretion to enforce the law as written, had strayed so far from the legis-
latively dictated method of appointing electors as to violate the
electoral appointments clause73 4 and lose the presumption of validity
724. Van Natta, Jr. & Bragg, supra note 716; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 148.
725. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 148. This is the number reported by the Washing-
ton Post, months after the election controversy ended, but no one was very sure what
this number was for quite some time after the board completed its manual recount.
During the contest proceeding, Gore's lawyers claimed the number was a net gain of
215 votes, the Chair of the Palm Beach board testified that he was not certain because
he had not seen the final tally, see Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at 106, and Bush's
lawyers claimed that the net gain for Gore was 183 votes, id. at 259.
726. Purdum, supra note 721; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 148.
727. See Purdum, supra note 721.
728. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5)(c) (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
729. Purdum, supra note 721; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 152.
730. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 152.
731. Id. at 153.
732. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
733. See Firestone, supra note 710 (quoting David Boies saying that Gore will con-
test the results "regardless of how the overall statewide votes are").
734. See infra notes 939-42 and accompanying text (relating Bush's arguments on
the electoral appointments clause).
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under federal § 5.735 Indeed, depending on how aggressively the Flor-
ida courts behaved in the contest proceeding, Bush might have addi-
tional claims that the judiciary had acted unconstitutionally and in
"violation" of § 5. For these arguments to work, however, there had
to be a certificate of ascertainment in Washington to compete with
any Gore might obtain from the judicial proceeding. 736 And in that
case, if Congress ended up divided on which slate should be recog-
nized, the certificate submitted by the slate of electors certified by the
state executive would, under § 15, win by default.737
Recognizing this, aides to the Governor picked up the official
documents Sunday night, immediately after they were signed, and
drove them straight to Jeb Bush.738 Once Jeb Bush had signed the
certificate of ascertainment,739 the law required that it be sent to the
Archivist by registered mail.74 ° It was Sunday, however. No post
offices were open, and the Bush team was very fearful that Gore
might subpoena the certificate before it got in the mail. 74' After con-
sidering some extreme measures, like driving the certificate into
Georgia or flying to Washington to avoid the subpoena power of the
Florida courts, Bush's counsel decided to give the certificate to a staff
member so unrelated to the dispute that Gore's lawyers would
never think of serving her with a subpoena.742 The next day, the
certificate went off to Washington by registered mail.743 When it
735. See infra notes 927-30 and accompanying text (relating Bush's arguments on
§ 5).
736. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text (noting that Congress is re-
quired to accept a slate of electors' return if it is the only one submitted from a state).
737. See supra notes 270, 272-73 and accompanying text; see also DEADLOCK, supra
note 1, at 153 (describing the Bush camp's awareness that which slate bore the Gover-
nor's signature could be critical).
738. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 154; see also David Barstow & Somini Sengupta,
Jeb Bush Is Said To Be Willing To Sign Bill Ensuring Republican Victory in Florida,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at A25.
739. It bears special note that simply by signing the certificate of ascertainment, Jeb
Bush committed to the position that the Florida Supreme Court's decision was invalid
and that because of its invalidity, there could no longer be a judicial resolution of the
controversy that would qualify as a final determination under § 5. The federal statute
under which Jeb Bush submitted the certificate states that it is "the duty of the execu-
tive of each State, as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the appointment of
electors in such State by the final ascertainment, under and in pursuance of the laws of
such State providing for such ascertainment," to certify the electors' appointment to
the Archivist of the United States. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, by
submitting the certificate of ascertainment before any contest proceeding authorized
by Florida law-the ordinary method of "final ascertainment"-had even been
brought, Bush was in effect stating that there was no possibility of any legitimate
contest proceeding.
740. See supra note 231 and accompanying text; see also infra note 743.
741. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 153-54.
742. Id. at 154.
743. Id. The story behind the registered mailing of the certificate of ascertainment
is a hilarious illustration of how seemingly minor, logistical details in the practice of
law can have huge consequences. Under the federal electoral statutes, the certificate
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arrived, the certificates from only two other states had been sub-
mitted.744
Under federal law, the fact that Jeb Bush actually signed and sent to
Washington a certificate of ascertainment naming electors for Bush
bears a great deal of significance to evaluating the events that fol-
lowed. The reader will recall that, beginning on Saturday, November
18, Florida state legislators began speaking of calling a special session
in which they would name the electors themselves. 745 During the fol-
lowing week, after the Florida Supreme Court ruled, these voices be-
came louder, and Jeb Bush actually joined the call. 46 The legislators
claimed the right to do so under 3 U.S.C. § 2, and insisted that they
had a "constitutional responsibility" to act to prevent Florida from
being excluded altogether from the electoral college.747
Once Jeb Bush acted, however, and certified to Washington the
Election Day results, the legislators' reliance on § 2 became so far-
fetched as to be frivolous. Section 2 provides that "[w]henever any
State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and
has failed to make a choice on the day subscribed by law, the electors
may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legisla-
ture of such State shall direct. ' 741 Thus, Florida's legislators were
claiming the right to arrogate to themselves the power to appoint that
they had previously given the citizens of Florida, on the ground that
the state had "held an election," but had "failed to make a choice" on
Election Day. Even before Bush signed the certificate of ascertain-
ment, it was a real stretch for the legislature to claim that the ongoing
controversy could qualify as the "fail[ure] to make a choice," because
the legislative history clearly showed that the statute was intended to
cover only situations where state law required a majority winner and
an election had failed to produce one.74 9 One might have tolerated
the argument, however, because no results had been certified, there
was no case law interpreting § 2, and the situation had not come up
before. But after Bush signed the certificate, it was absurd for the
Republican legislators to continue relying on § 2, because the gover-
of ascertainment must be sent to Washington by registered mail. 3 U.S.C. § 6. The
staff member to whom the certificate was given, however, apparently did not know
this, presumably because she was so far removed from the lawyers who were handling
the controversy. So the next morning, after she had taken the certificate to the post
office, one of Bush's lawyers asked her if everything had gone smoothly, and she told
the lawyer that in fact, a nice postal official had advised her that sending the package
by Express Mail would be even better than by registered mail. The lawyers rushed
over to the post office and had to beg postal officials to let them retrieve the package
and relabel it. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 154.
744. Barstow & Sengupta, supra note 738.
745. See supra notes 646-49 and accompanying text.
746. See supra notes 660-61, 663 and accompanying text.
747. See supra notes 648-51 and accompanying .text.
748. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
749. See supra notes 216, 219-30 and accompanying text.
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nor of their state and the leader of their own party had actually certi-
fied that the "choice" had been made.
Likewise, as of the moment that the certificate of ascertainment ar-
rived in Washington, the legislators' insistence that they had a "consti-
tutional responsibility" to prevent Florida from being shut out of the
electoral college was nothing short of misinformation. Florida's elec-
toral college vote was no longer in any kind of "jeopardy," at least in
the sense of Florida not being represented at all. The certificate itself
authorized electors for Bush to vote in the electoral college on De-
cember 18 and transmit an electoral certificate to the Senate.7 50 And
under § 15, if only one electoral certificate is received from a state,
Congress is required to honor the votes of the electors submitting that
certificate.75 The only thing that can happen then is that certain votes
in the certificate can be challenged as not "regularly given"-perhaps
on the ground of fraud in the voting, or an ineligible elector, or an
elector violating an oath to vote for the candidate represented during
the election-but the slate of electors itself cannot be challenged.
7 52
The Democratic Party, however, was left utterly flatfooted. The
Democrats should have been clarifying that the "failure to make a
choice" language in § 2 could not possibly be interpreted to address a
situation where a court was simply resolving precisely which choice
had been made. To do so, they could have pointed out that Congress
never intended § 2 to be triggered just because state courts authorized
under § 5 to act had not yet finished their task, because § 2 was en-
acted forty-two years before § 5 ever came into being. Further, the
legislative history conclusively showed that § 2 was aimed only at al-
lowing legislatures to create a method for addressing elections that did
not produce a majority winner, which was not the problem with the
2000 election. And with respect to the legislators' preposterous claim
that they had a "constitutional duty" to act to somehow protect Flor-
ida, the Democrats could have quashed that notion even more
quickly, simply by pointing to the language of § 15-which actually
seems to contemplate a situation in which a contest authorized by § 5
is not complete-and by acknowledging that the certificate of ascer-
tainment already submitted would ensure Florida's participation if the
contest proceeding were not completed.753
750. No one ever made the Republican electors a party to any lawsuit such that
they could be ordered not to vote on December 18.
751. See supra note 266-68 and accompanying text.
752. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
753. See supra notes 277, 743, 747 and accompanying text. It is possible that the
team litigating on behalf of Gore did not want to emphasize publicly that the Bush-
signed certificate would be controlling if the contest action did not finish, because that
would (1) forfeit a later option of somehow contesting the validity of the electors
appointed pursuant to the certificate of ascertainment, and (2) give the court hearing
the contest action comfort in allowing the contest proceeding to move more slowly.
Moreover, the Gore team might have concluded that it was actually to its benefit to
allow the Florida legislature to appear so undemocratic and power-hungry. Those
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Instead, the Florida Democratic Party and Gore's lawyers re-
sponded with very little substance. It strongly appears that, for
whatever reason, no one had spent enough time reading §§ 2, 5, and
15, and delving into their legislative history, to realize that-or at least
to articulate how-the Republicans were seriously misrepresenting
the law.
V. THE CONTEST TRIAL IN LEON COUNTY
A. Gore's Five Claims
By Thanksgiving, November 23-three days before the Elections
Canvassing Commission declared George W. Bush the winner of Flor-
ida's electoral votes, but the day after Miami-Dade stopped count-
ing-Gore's prospects for picking up enough votes in the manual
recounts appeared dim enough that his lawyers announced publicly
that they planned to file a contest action in Leon County on Mon-
day.754 Over the next few days, Gore's lawyers made quite clear that
the contest would include the undervotes that were never examined in
Miami-Dade, as well as a decision by the Nassau County Canvassing
Board to amend its certification by discarding the tally from the auto-
matic recount and returning to its tally from the evening of Election
Day, a decision that cost Gore fifty-one votes.7 5 The lawyers did not
say, however, whether they would include in any contest action a
claim related to the absentee ballot applications in Seminole and Mar-
tin Counties, a decision with which they apparently were still
wrestling. 6
assessments, however, would have been dangerous in the longer view. For if Gore
had won the contest action, the court might have been able to order Governor Bush
to amend the original certificate of ascertainment, and if the Gore team had acted to
prevent the Florida legislature from sending a slate, there would have been no slate
competing with the amended court-appointed slate for Gore.
754. See David Barstow & Michael Cooper, As Odds Lengthen, Democrats Plan for
Legal Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at Al; Richard L. Berke, Endgame Strat-
egy: Gore Aids Talk of New Legal Fight, But Some Allies Are Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2000, at Al.
755. David Firestone & David Barstow, Florida Legislature Plans To Enter Legal
Fray, Backing Bush's Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2000, at Al. Gore lawyer David
Boies asserted that the Nassau County board acted completely without justification,
going so far as to say: "If I can't win that argument, I'm going to give up the practice
of law." Id.
756. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 159-61. Reportedly, David Boies argued for a
simple case, focusing primarily on undervotes, the "easiest, cleanest contest points."
Id. at 160. William Daley and Warren Christopher, Gore's public spokesmen, agreed,
largely because trying to have the Seminole and Martin absentee ballots thrown out
would conflict with Gore's continuing message that he wanted every vote counted.
Id. Ron Klain, the lawyer coordinating the Florida litigation, see id. at 55, advanced a
different view. Klain thought it might be beneficial to include both the undervote
claims and the absentee ballot claims because Bush would not be able to insist on the
strict letter of the law, the voting instructions, with respect to the undervotes, and yet
argue for a lenient approach ignoring the legal technicalities, with respect to the ab-
sentee ballot applications. Id. at 160-61.
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When Gore filed his complaint contesting the election results on
Monday, November 27, shortly after noon, 57 he did not include any
claim based on the absentee ballot applications. 8 The complaint in-
stead challenged the certification on five grounds relating to the man-
ual recounts: (1) the failure to include in the certified results
approximately 215 net votes resulting from Palm Beach County's
completed manual recount; (2) the failure to include in the certified
results approximately 160 net votes resulting from Miami-Dade
County's partial recount; (3) the failure to include approximately 800
net votes the Palm Beach board should have identified on approxi-
mately 4000 ballots with indentations; (4) the failure to include ap-
proximately 600 net votes from approximately 9000 ballots that the
Miami-Dade board never reviewed; and (5) the exclusion of 50 net
votes for Gore resulting from Nassau County's automatic recount.
759
Gore asked the court to order an immediate hearing on the claims,
enjoin the Elections Canvassing Commission from declaring the win-
ner, 760 and order the Commission to amend its certification to name
Gore the winner.76 In accompanying documents, Gore asked the
court to shorten the defendants' response time,76 2 to hold an emer-
gency hearing that same day,7 63 to place the disputed ballots in the
registry of the court,6 and to appoint special masters who would be-
gin counting the Miami-Dade and Palm Beach ballots immediately. 65
757. Complaint To Contest Election (filed Nov. 27, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL
1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
758. According to the Washington Post's staff, Gore himself made the ultimate de-
cision not to include any claim based on the absentee ballot applications or participate
directly in the actions that were already pending, but to allow his team to work behind
the scenes to get those plaintiffs sufficient funds and top-level lawyers. DEADLOCK,
supra note 1, at 161, 176-78.
759. See Complaint To Contest Election, supra note 757, at 3-4.
760. This request for relief was moot when the Complaint was filed, because the
Commission had declared Bush the winner the night before. See supra note 730 and
accompanying text.
761. See Complaint To Contest Election, supra note 757, at 21-22.
762. Emergency Motion To Shorten Time and Request for an Emergency Hearing
at 1 (filed Nov. 27, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (No. 00-
2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
763. Id. at 3.
764. Motion To Place Disputed Miami-Dade Ballots in the Registry of the Court at
1 (filed Nov. 27, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (No. 00-2808),
rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Motion
to Place Disputed Palm Beach Ballots in the Registry of the Court at 1 (filed Nov. 27,
2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d
1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
765. See Plaintiffs' Motion To Count the Ballots from Miami-Dade County at 1
(filed Nov. 27, 2000), 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d
1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Motion To Appoint
Special Master for the Limited Function of Immediate Counting of Palm Beach Bal-
lots to Allow Expedited Disposition of this Matter at 1 (filed Nov. 27, 2000), Gore v.
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B. The Pretrial Proceedings
To the Gore team's dismay, the court's computer assigned the case
to Judge N. Sanders Sauls.76 6 Judge Sauls was a Democrat, but a very
conservative one who had been appointed to the Leon County bench
by a Republican governor.767 Judge Sauls's reversal rate was substan-
tial,768 and in many cases the appellate courts had found him unrea-
sonably strict in his enforcement of case management orders.7 69
Further, if there was an extent to which the Florida Supreme Court
could be seen as supporting Gore, Judge Sauls would be the last Leon
County judge to show deference to the court's leaning in that respect.
Only two years earlier the supreme court had unanimously demoted
him from his position as chief judge, citing "the continuing disruption
in the administration of justice" under his leadership.77 ° So from the
moment the case was assigned, Gore's lawyers felt they were facing a
double burden. It would be not only difficult to get Judge Sauls to
move the case in an unconventionally quick manner,771 but critical to
do so because he was likely to rule against them on the merits, and so
they would have to get to the Florida Supreme Court to have any
chance.772
To some extent, Gore's concern over Judge Sauls's willingness to
expedite the proceeding was not borne out. The judge set an initial
Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.),
rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
766. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 165.
767. See David Firestone, Florida Judge Is Asked To Declare Gore the Winner, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al; David Barstow & Somini Sengupta, Judge Who Rebuffed
Gore Had Run-Ins with Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at Al; DEADLOCK, supra
note 1, at 165.
768. See Barstow & Sengupta, supra note 767.
769. See, e.g., Bandy v. Sheffield, 751 So. 2d 164, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
("The lower court should not have dismissed the appellant's mandamus petition with-
out clarifying what additional filings were needed to comport with the case manage-
ment order, and without then giving the appellant a reasonable amount of time within
which to comply."); Tooma v. Moore, 743 So. 2d 1189,1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
("[it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a petition for failing to comply with the
requirements of section 57.085 without first affording to the party an opportunity to
correct the deficiencies."); Gosman v. Moore, 745 So. 2d 416, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that the trial court should not have dismissed prisoner's mandamus
petition for failure to comply with case management order when prisoner filed certifi-
cate substantially in compliance with order).
770. Barstow & Sengupta, supra note 767. The incident that reportedly precipi-
tated the Florida court's action was Judge Sauls's decision to dismiss a court adminis-
trator for insubordination. Id. The administrator had complained when Judge Sauls
ignored a search committee's recommendation on filling a court family law position
and hired instead a woman who had less experience but came recommended by a
friend of Judge Sauls. See id. According to one former Supreme Court justice who
voted to demote Judge Sauls, the incident was only one of a number of instances in
which the judge had acted in a highly autocratic manner. See id.
771. Barstow & Sengupta, supra note 767 (quoting Gore lawyer Dexter Douglass).
772. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 165-66 (quoting Gore lawyers David Boies and
Mark Steinberg).
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hearing less than four hours after the complaint was filed,77 3 in which
he required the defendants to answer the complaint three days later,
by Thursday, November 30. Over the next few days, he ordered
Miami-Dade and Palm Beach to transport all of their ballots to Talla-
hassee by Friday, December 1, 7 7 4 and he set the case down for a trial
beginning Saturday, December 2.7 7 5 Even so, the one thing Judge
Sauls would not do-and it was Gore's most important request
776 -
was begin counting the ballots. Although Gore argued that, in light of
the need to finish the case by December 12, refusing to count was
tantamount to denying his claim, Judge Sauls took the position that
Gore should first prove on Saturday whether he was entitled to have
the court look at the ballots.777 Gore immediately appealed the
judge's ruling to the District Court of Appeals,778 with a request to
pass the case to the Florida Supreme Court,779 but the intermediate
appellate court denied the appeal on the ground that Gore lacked a
written order,78° and the Florida Supreme Court declined to
intervene.781
In the meantime, Bush's lawyers injected several issues with the po-
tential to delay the case's resolution. In a motion to dismiss, Bush
argued that Gore's contest action was untimely and improperly failed
to name the Bush electors as parties to the suit.782 In a letter to the
court, Bush's lawyers suggested that they would be issuing subpoenas
for all of the ballots from Broward, Volusia and Pinellas Counties, on
the ground that dimpled ballots from those counties were illegally
773. See Firestone, supra note 767.
774. Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2000) (order requiring the
delivery of certain ballots from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties).
775. See David Firestone, Hearing Is Scheduled for Saturday Despite Demands of
Gore Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at Al.
776. See generally Emergency Motion To Commence Counting of Votes in Miami-
Dade and Palm Beach Counties Pursuant to Beckstrom and Request for Immediate
Hearing (filed Nov. 29, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4)
(No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
777. Firestone, supra note 775.
778. Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal (filed Nov. 29, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL
1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4) (No. 00-2802), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub
nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
779. Appellants' Suggestion That District Court of Appeals Certify the Trial
Court's Order as Requiring Immediate Resolution by the Florida Supreme Court at 1
(filed Nov. 29, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 1)
(No. 1DOO-4688), dismissed, 779 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2000).
780. Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 1) (order dis-
missing appeal of trial court oral ruling due to lack of jurisdiction), dismissed, 779 So.
2d 270 (Fla. 2000).
781. See Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2000).
782. Motion and Memorandum in Support of Defendants George W. Bush and
Dick Cheney's Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Failure To
Name Indispensable Parties, and Failure To State a Claim at 4-5 (filed Nov. 30, 2000),
Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So.
2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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counted as votes.78 3 On Thursday, two days before the trial, Bush
submitted a witness list naming over ninety-seven potential
witnesses.784
C. The Contest Trial
As it turned out, the trial was completed by Sunday night, only six
days after the action had been filed. 785 Gore put into evidence all of
the undervoted ballots from Miami-Dade and the disputed ballots
from Palm Beach County, as well as a number of other documents,786
but called only two witnesses.787 Bush called only eight witnesses,788
and the intervenors only four.7 8 9 Because there were five defendants
and three sets of intervenors, there were nearly as many opening
statements and closings as there were witnesses.79 °
Gore's lawyers used their case primarily to establish three points:
(1) that many legal votes went unrecognized by the counting machines
because either voter error or defects in the machines caused incom-
plete punches on the ballots; (2) that these incomplete punches would
have appeared more frequently on the left side of the ballots, i.e., in
the presidential race, than on the remainder of the ballot; and (3) that
it should be possible to "recover" legal votes from approximately
twenty to twenty-five percent of the undervoted ballots, a percentage
markedly higher than the percentage recovered by the Palm Beach
County board. 9 The first point (and to a certain extent, the third)
seemed aimed to persuade the court to count the undervotes in
Miami-Dade that had never been reviewed. The second and third
points appeared designed to convince the court that Palm Beach had
been too restrictive in its approach by refusing to count ballots that
783. David Firestone, Bush's Lawyers Attack Suit by Gore To Challenge Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at Al; see also Subpoena for Production from Non-Party Pursu-
ant to Rule 1.351(a) (filed Dec. 1, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 4) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
784. See Witness List (filed Nov. 30, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 4) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Bush's list included by name every member of the relevant
canvassing boards and a slew of observers, as well as a variety of experts. See id.
Gore had filed a witness list on Tuesday naming only two witnesses. List of Proposed
Witnesses and Exhibits at 1 (filed Nov. 28, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1770257
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4) (No. 00-2808), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
785. See generally Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at 289.
786. See id. at 17-19.
787. See id. at 19 (Kendall Brace); id. at 66 (Nicholas Hengartner).
788. See id. at 146 (John Ahmann); id. at 174 (William Rohloff); id. at 176 (Thomas
Spencer); id. at 191 (Thomas Spargo); id. at 204 (Mark Lampkin); id. at 214 (Shirley
King).
789. See id. at 232 (Matt Butler); id. at 233 (Keith Temple); id. at 233 (Teresa
Cruce); id. at 235 (Jeanette Seymour).
790. See id. at 3-17 (opening statements); id. at 241-89 (closing arguments).
791. See infra text accompanying notes 793-98, 801-09.
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had so-called "rogue" indentations, i.e., ballots that had indentations
only in the holes for the presidential race and complete punches
elsewhere. 92
To make this case, Gore first called Kendall Brace, the president of
a firm that advised state and local governments on election adminis-
tration.793 Mr. Brace explained how the type of punch card machines
in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties worked,7 94 and identified
four circumstances that might lead to a ballot with indentations, or
hanging chads, rather than clean punches. 795 According to Mr. Brace,
an indentation, or dimple, might occur if the voter placed the ballot on
top of the machine rather than in its "throat"; or if there was a severe
buildup of chads in the box underneath the ballot because the ma-
chine had not regularly been cleaned; or if the rubber strips under the
punch card had become so brittle that they could not allow the voter
to punch all the way through; or if the voter inserted the voting stylus
at an angle. 96 Mr. Brace also testified that when he examined some
of the machines in use in Palm Beach, he noticed that there was more
extensive wear on the left-hand side of the machines' templates than
on the right.797 This was important, in Mr. Brace's view, because it
suggested that the left side of the machines were getting heavier use,
and thus the buildup of chads and the rubber hardening were more
likely to be occurring on the left side of the machine, where the votes
in the presidential race would be cast.79 8
Bush's lawyers were fairly successful in challenging Mr. Brace's tes-
timony. In response to Bush's objections, the judge would not permit
Brace to testify about what election officials in Miami-Dade told him
about their maintenance of the voting machines, nor would the judge
allow Brace to opine as to problems with the particular machines in
question. 799 On cross-examination, Bush's lawyers established that
Brace had essentially no scientific basis for claiming that more fre-
quent use of the left side of the voting machine causes the rubber
792. To make out his claim involving Nassau County, Gore's lawyers submitted a
stipulation reached with Nassau's lawyers. See Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at 89.
793. Id. at 19.
794. See id. at 24-25.
795. Id. at 33-34.
796. Id.
797. See id. at 28, 30. Bush's lawyers objected frequently throughout Mr. Brace's
testimony, particularly when Mr. Brace spoke of problems that arise with punch card
machines, on the ground that he was not a mechanical engineer and was basing his
testimony on hearsay. See, e.g., id. at 25-27. At one point during the cross-examina-
tion, the court required Bush lawyer Phillip Beck to rephrase his question because he
had become especially snide. See id. at 47. Mr. Beck had asked: "because of the more
frequent use, which you think happens, it's your opinion, as a political science major,
that that causes the rubber to get harder on the left-hand column than it does on the
rest of the ballot; isn't that right?" Id.
798. Id. at 30, 34-35.
799. See id. at 27, 30.
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strips on that side to harden more quickly, and that Brace had no
knowledge of the type of rubber used in the Florida machines.0°
On Mr. Brace's redirect examination, however, the Gore team hap-
pened upon a rather dramatic piece of evidence. One of the machines
actually used in Palm Beach County was brought into the courtroom,
and Brace set it up as it would appear at the polls.8"' Even as Brace
was pulling it out of the box, chads began spilling out, 80 2 and when
Brace removed the compartment into which the punched chads are
supposed to fall, it was filled to the brim with chads80 3
Gore then called Nicholas Hengartner, a statistics professor from
Yale. 0 4 Professor Hengartner testified that he had compared the
number of undervotes in Florida counties with punch card voting to
the number of undervotes in Florida counties with optical scan voting,
and found that there were five times as many undervotes in the punch
card counties.80 5 Professor Hengartner further testified that the dis-
parity was so great that it was extremely unlikely to have occurred by
chance, so he undertook to determine if demographic variables such
as income or ethnicity might explain it, but found that they did not.80 6
With respect to the manual recounts, Professor Hengartner made
two additional points. First, although the Broward County board had
found votes on twenty-six percent of the undervoted ballots that it
reviewed, and the Miami-Dade board had found votes on twenty-two
percent of the undervoted ballots it had reviewed, the Palm Beach
board had found votes on only eight percent of the undervoted ballots
it reviewed.80 7 Second, of the votes the Broward board identified for
the first time during the manual recount, the percentages for each can-
didate roughly mirrored the percentages found during the machine
count, but were actually more favorable to Bush.80 8 Specifically, the
distribution of votes in Broward before the manual recount was thirty-
one percent for Bush and sixty-nine percent for Gore, and yet the
distribution of votes identified for the first time during the recount
was thrity-four percent for Bush and sixty-six percent for Gore. 80 9
This was plainly intended to show that the canvassing boards-or at
least Broward's-had not shown partisan favoritism in reviewing the
ballots.
On cross-examination of Professor Hengartner, Bush's lawyers did
not focus extensively on the analysis he offered. Instead, they called
800. See id. at 48-49.
801. See id. at 60-61.
802. Id. at 60.
803. Id. at 61.
804. Id. at 66-67.
805. See id. at 69-70.
806. See id. at 69-70.
807. See id. at 71.




his credibility into question, by confronting him with an affidavit that
had previously been filed as a proffer in Leon County and in the Flor-
ida Supreme Court. 810 In the affidavit, Hengartner had stated that he
had evaluated the votes cast statewide in 1998, and found that in Palm
Beach County, fewer votes were tallied in the Senate race, which ap-
peared in the first, left-hand column, than in the governor's race in the
second column or the comptrollers' race in the fifth column.811 Hen-
gartner stated in the affidavit that this phenomenon, which was unique
to Palm Beach and one other punch card county, suggested that Palm
Beach County's punch card reader was not recording all the votes in
the left-hand column.812 On cross, however, Bush's lawyers presented
the 1998 Palm Beach County ballot and showed that Hengartner's
premise was false, because the governor's race was itself in the left-
hand column.8" 3 Hengartner was forced to admit that he had never
personally examined the 1998 Palm Beach County ballot prior to exe-
cuting the affidavit, and that his conclusion was a mistake.814
During Bush's case-in-chief, his lawyers also aimed to make three
points: (1) that all three canvassing boards had acted reasonably in
their approach to the requested recounts; (2) that citizens intending to
vote do not merely dimple their ballots; and (3) that Miami-Dade's
ballots had been so mishandled that any count by the court would
necessarily be inaccurate. 815 The first point corresponded to Bush's
insistence throughout the proceeding that the court had no authority
to act unless it first found that the canvassing boards had abused their
discretion.816 The second point was designed to respond substantively
to Gore's claims that there were legal votes not counted, and the third
point was intended to stop the court from counting the Miami-Dade
ballots even if the judge otherwise found Gore's evidence compelling.
Bush called as his first witness Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board Chair Judge Charles Burton.817 Judge Burton described the
board's decision-making process with respect to the manual recounts.
The judge testified that with the one percent recount, the members
had begun by using the board's 1990 policy, had switched to the "sun-
shine rule," and had then switched back to the 1990 policy, and that
with the full recount, they had tried to follow Judge Labarga's deci-
sion directing that each ballot should be evaluated for the intent of the
voter without any rules of per se exclusion.818 During the full recount,
810. See id. at 81.
811. See id. at 85-86.
812. Id. at 86.
813. See id. at 87.
814. See id. at 86-87.
815. See infra text accompanying notes 817-35, 843-63.
816. See Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at 8 (opening statement by counsel for
Bush); id. at 252 (closing argument by counsel for Bush).
817. See id. at 90.
818. See id. at 91-94.
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Judge Burton said, the board (as opposed to the counting teams) re-
viewed what he believed to be 14,500 ballots.81 9 Many of these, he
said, had no marks on them whatsoever, and no one objected to
deeming them unvoted, but the vast majority had some form of inden-
tation on them, including some "barely discernable impressions." '82
To decide whether to count these indentations, the board would look
for a pattern of indentations or pinholes, and then count the ballot as
a vote only if that pattern emerged.82' Judge Burton explained that
the board members took this approach because they generally as-
sumed that the voters had read the instructions and knew how to vote
if they wanted to, but at the same time, they saw so many ballots with
patterns of indentations rather than clean punches that he came to
believe many voters were indeed marking the ballot with the card
outside the throat of the machine.822
Bush then called two witnesses to refute the testimony of Gore's
witnesses. Richard Grossman, a chemist with forty years of experi-
ence in the rubber and plastics industry, testified that the natural-syn-
thetic blend of rubber used in the majority of the voting machines
82 3
would not harden over time, as Brace had suggested, unless it were
subject to temperatures of 140 degrees Fahrenheit or struck repeat-
edly at the rate of at least once per second.824 Laurentius Marais, a
statistician and applied mathematician, testified that Hengartner had
improperly lumped all the punch card counties together. According
to Mr. Marais, there was nearly as much statistically significant differ-
ence among the punch card counties as Hengartner had found when
he lumped all the punch card counties together and compared them to
all the optical scan counties lumped together. This suggested that
something other than flawed counting had caused the undervote dis-
819. Id. at 95.
820. Id. at 95-96.
821. See id. at 97, 100.
822. See id. at 96, 99-100. At the end of Judge Burton's testimony, Judge Sauls
"salute[d]" him as a "great American," and suggested that if he "hadn't been tied up
in board hearings or Court," the Palm Beach board might have met the 5:00 p.m.
deadline on November 26. Id. at 108-09. These remarks by Judge Sauls were telling
because they followed Judge Burton's testimony that he had been called to testify
before Judge Labarga on November 22 when the Democrats had complained that the
board was not following Judge Labarga's initial order, id. at 101, and that the board
had interrupted the recount on November 24 to allow the Democrats to put on wit-
nesses suggesting the board was being too restrictive, id. at 102-03.
823. Gore had established during Mr. Brace's testimony that Miami-Dade and
Palm Beach used Votomatic machines and that Palm Beach also used some machines
known as the Pollstar. See id. at 29-30. The court permitted Mr. Grossman to testify
about the rubber blend used in the Votomatic machine because he had conducted
impact tests on that blend, but sustained Gore's objection to any testimony concern-
ing the effect of impact on the rubber in the Pollstar machine because Grossman had
not personally tested that type of rubber. See id. at 114-16.
824. See id. at 113-14.
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parity.825 Mr. Marais also testified that studies had shown that a
method of voting itself-or a difficult ballot, such as the butterfly bal-
lot used in Palm Beach-can cause people who might otherwise vote
not to do so. 26 In Mr. Marais's view, Hengartner's failure to ac-
knowledge and study this phenomenon rendered his association anal-
ysis flawed.82 7
If these two witnesses were somewhat effective in damaging Gore's
case, Bush's next witness most assuredly was not. John Ahmann was
an engineer who had spent many years developing and reworking va-
rious models of the Votomatic punch card machine used in Miami-
Dade and Palm Beach Counties. 2 8 Early on in his direct examina-
tion, he described for the court how the machine worked, and identi-
fied a number of ways other than by voting in which a ballot might
become indented or scratched. 29 He also testified to his "serious[ ]
doubt" that anyone intending to punch a chad through would be una-
ble to do so.
8 30
As Ahmann's testimony progressed, however, it actually began to
favor Gore's case. First, Ahmann testified unequivocally that it was
"simple" to distinguish an indentation made by a voting stylus from an
indentation from some other cause. Second, just as Kendall Brace
had done, Ahmann identified a number of circumstances in which a
person intending to vote might create a ballot that the machine
counter would not read. Even though he was on direct examination
by Bush's lawyers, Ahmann confirmed from his personal experience
at voting sites that voters often fail to follow the instructions about
inserting the card into the machine, and leave patterns of hanging
chads or indentations.831 Ahmann also testified that it was possible,
even when following the instructions, for a voter to punch through but
not completely dislodge the chad. 32 Indeed, Ahmann acknowledged
that one might see patterns of mere indentations from voters "so fee-
ble that they consistently apply just barely enough pressure to form a
dimple, but not enough to knock the chads out. 8s3 3 Finally, when
asked whether it is was possible for chads to build up underneath the
ballot to the point that they would keep someone from punching
through, Ahmann said, "definitely," ' 4 although he went on to sup-
825. Id. at 126.
826. See id. at 127-30.
827. See id. at 130-31.
828. Id. at 147-48.
829. See id. at 149-53.
830. Id. at 154.
831. Id. at 154-55.
832. Id. at 157.
833. Id. at 155.
834. Id. at 158.
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pose that it would take eight to ten years of buildup, with very fre-
quent elections, for that to happen.835
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems very odd that Bush's own
lawyers would have brought forth all this evidence from Ahmann.
Presumably, the lawyers' primary purpose was to support the "pat-
tern" approach that the Palm Beach board had taken to the ballots:
i.e., counting indentations as votes only when a pattern of such inden-
tations was present. Yet in trying to keep the court from reassessing
the 3300 disputed Palm Beach ballots, Bush provided ample evidence
that there must be undetected votes within the 9000 Miami-Dade bal-
lots that had never been evaluated: votes from people who had not
followed the instructions on inserting the ballot, votes from people
who had followed the instructions on inserting the ballot but had
nonetheless left hanging chads, and, most poignant of all, votes from
people who were simply too feeble to consistently push the chads
through. Perhaps even more importantly, Bush actually brought forth
testimony from the machine's developer that it was "simple" to tell
which indentations were made from a voting stylus and which were
not, suggesting that the "intent of the voter" standard was not nearly
as difficult to apply as the Republicans had claimed.
An even stronger moment for Gore, however, came on Mr.
Ahmann's cross-examination. Ahmann flatly admitted, without quali-
fication, that "any voter [can] go to the polling place, and intend to
vote for a candidate, and leave a hanging chad, a swinging chad, or an
indentation." '836 Ahmann also admitted that the ballot manufacturers
specifically contemplated handling when they designed the ballot pa-
per, and thus designed it so that chads would not easily be loosened or
fall out from basic handling.837 Then, in the most dramatic develop-
ment of all, Gore's lawyer referred Ahmann to patent applications
Ahmann had previously filed for improvements to the type of ma-
chines used by Miami-Dade and Palm Beach. In one such application,
Ahmann had stated that the accumulation of punched chads could in-
terfere with the punching process and cause serious counting errors to
occur. 38 In another application, Ahmann had applied to patent a new
flexible stylus, and explained that the flexible stylus was an improve-
ment because the old, rigid one-which was still in use by Miami-
Dade in the 2000 election-would not completely punch the card if
people approached the punch hole at an angle.8 39 As if all these ad-
missions were not enough, Gore's lawyers got Ahmann to admit that
in very close elections, a hand recount of the ballots should be under-
835. Id. at 159-60.
836. Id. at 162.
837. Id. at 164.
838. See id. at 167.
839. See id. at 168-69.
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taken.84 Bush's attorneys then conducted no redirect examination.841
Indeed, they would not even shake the hand Ahmann extended as he
passed by their table.842
Bush next called William Rohloff, a registered voter from Broward
County.843 Mr. Rohloff testified that he had gone to the polls uncer-
tain how he would vote in the presidential race, and so he began the
process at the back of the ballot and moved forward.844 When he fi-
nally came to the presidential race, Mr. Rohloff said, he placed the
stylus beside one candidate's name and pushed down, but then de-
cided not to vote and drew the stylus back.845 He did not know
whether he had "dimpled" the ballot, but he was sure that he did not
want a vote for that candidate attributed to him.8 46
Bush's next three witnesses were all Republican lawyers who had
observed the events in Miami-Dade at different stages of the recount
process. 847 The first lawyer, Thomas Spencer, testified that he was fa-
miliar with Miami-Dade's precinct system from his electoral law expe-
rience, and that the only precincts Miami-Dade officials had ever
counted were those that were predominantly Democratic.848 Mr.
Spencer also testified that he was present on November 22 when the
Miami-Dade board had ended the recount, and that the board had
done so because there was insufficient time left to complete the re-
count properly. 849 At the end of Spencer's testimony, Judge Sauls
asked whether he had observed what standard the Miami-Dade board
members were using to determine whether to count a ballot, and
whether the votes typically were unanimous.850 Mr. Spencer re-
sponded that it appeared to be three different standards-one looking
for any indentations whatsoever, one looking for light coming through
and patterns, and one looking for some separation of the chad-and
that most votes were 2-1.851
The second lawyer, Thomas Spargo, testified that during Miami-
Dade's efforts to cull the undervoted ballots from the others by run-
ning the ballots through the counters, he observed that at least 1,000
new pieces of chad were generated.852 Mr. Spargo also claimed that
there were several occasions on which the counting teams simply
840. Id. at 168.
841. See id. at 173.
842. Gore v. Harris Trial (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 3, 2000) (Author's obser-
vation of televised proceedings).




847. See id. at 176, 191, 204.
848. See id. at 177-83.
849. See id. at 183.
850. Id. at 189-90.
851. See id. at 189-90.
852. Id. at 193.
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counted a dimpled ballot as a vote, and refused to transfer the ballot
to the board for review even though there had been a Republican
objection.853
The third lawyer, Mark Lampkin, testified that he had observed
Miami-Dade officials readying the ballots for transport to Tallahas-
see.854 During this process, Mr. Lampkin said, the officials would
open the envelopes of previously identified undervoted ballots for
each precinct and count them, but in many instances the number of
undervoted ballots in the envelope would not jibe with the number of
undervotes recorded for that precinct on election night.855 To remedy
this situation, Mr. Lampkin testified, either David Leahy and his assis-
tant would examine the ballots and make a call as to whether a given
ballot actually should be deemed an undervote, or the officials would
run the ballot through the counter again to see if it should be deemed
an undervote.85 6 According to Mr. Lampkin, this extensive handling
caused a number of chads to dislodge from the ballots. He testified
that he observed several occasions on which a counting table had been
free of chads, but after the handling to determine the number of un-
dervotes, anywhere from one to four chads had appeared on the
table.857
Bush's final witness was Shirley King, the elections supervisor for
Nassau County.858 Ms. King testified that on Wednesday, November
8, she had conducted the automatic recount of Nassau County's bal-
lots and certified those results to the Secretary of State.85 9 Very soon
thereafter, however, she realized that a mistake had been made, be-
cause the total number of votes cast had decreased by 218 from the
election night returns.86 ° Ms. King believed that she knew how the
mistake had occurred: when the ballots were boxed, some of the red-
striped presidential ballots had been placed in the box upside-down,
and therefore did not get identified and pulled when the automatic
recount was done.861 Ms. King was unable to confirm that cause of
853. See id. at 199. The trial became quite heated when, during Mr. Spargo's cross-
examination, Gore lawyer Kendall Coffey asked Mr. Spargo if he had invoked the
Fifth Amendment nineteen times the last time he had testified in an election law
matter. Id. at 199. Bush's lawyers objected immediately, and Judge Sauls took the
lawyers into chambers. Id. at 199-200. Mr. Coffey revealed that he had information
that, ten or eleven years earlier, Mr. Spargo had been investigated by the Commission
of Government Integrity of the State of New York, had invoked the Fifth Amend-
ment nineteen times, and had been cited for contempt for failing to answer questions.
See id. at 200. Judge Sauls then sustained the objection and threatened Coffey with
contempt if he raised the incident again. See id.
854. Id. at 204.
855. See id. at 205-07.
856. See id. at 208-09.
857. Id. at 209.
858. Id. at 214.
859. See id. at 21.5-16.




the discrepancy, however, because the ballots had been sealed, and
she was unable to get permission to open them.862 When she called
the Elections Division, Ms. King testified, they advised her to convene
a meeting of the canvassing board to address it, and after she did so,
the canvassing board voted unanimously to return to the election
night totals.863
As this summary suggests, there were, by the end of the trial, few
critical facts on which the parties differed. Bush's own witnesses,
Judge Burton and John Ahmann-in addition to Gore's-had made it
quite clear that there were intended votes that the punch card ma-
chines, for a variety of reasons, would not have picked up. And no
one disputed the factual accounts offered by the canvassing board rep-
resentatives, Judge Burton and Ms. King. Indeed, by the time the evi-
dence closed, the only significant factual issue had to do with the
rubber on the left-hand side of the machines, and whether it could
have deteriorated enough that a voter might dimple his vote in the
presidential race but no others.
What the parties continued to differ strenuously on was the law, and
this was very obvious from their closings. Of course, what made the
closings odd was that the tables had turned. This time it would be the
Democrats urging the courts to follow the letter of the statutory lan-
guage, and the Republicans arguing for an interpretation that re-
flected sound public policy.
David Boies, representing Gore, hung very closely to the language
of section 102.168. The statute, Boies argued, did not say anything
about the court reviewing all ballots cast in a race, but only those bal-
lots that the plaintiff had contested.8 64 Nor did the statute anywhere
suggest that the canvassing boards' actions were reviewable only
under an abuse of discretion standard.865 To the contrary, Boies
claimed, both the statute and a long line of Florida cases made it clear
that courts were to conduct a de novo review of contested ballots to
determine whether they reflected an intent to vote.866 Nor did the
statute limit the court's review to cases involving something other
than voter error.867 As recently as the 1999 case of Beckstrom v. Volu-
862. See id. at 217-18.
863. See id. at 218-19. With the close of Bush's case, the intervenors presented four
witnesses. Two testified that they had voted for Bush, but because they lived in Col-
lier County and Duval County, they could not be sure that their votes had been
counted. See id. at 232-33. A third testified that she had voted in Bay County, in the
Panhandle, but that she was concerned because she had heard the networks call the
election for Gore before the polls in her county had closed. See id. 'at 233-34. A
fourth testified that she lived in Santa Rosa County and had been on the way to the
polls when she decided not to vote because the election had already been called. See
id. at 235-36.
864. See id. at 243, 284.
865. See id. at 245, 285.
866. See id. at 244.
867. See id. at 245.
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sia County Canvassing Board,868 Boies noted, the Florida Supreme
Court had approved the inclusion of votes that had not been read be-
cause of voter error.8 69 Under the statute, Boies argued, all Gore had
to do was identify legal votes rejected that were sufficient to place the
outcome in doubt, and Gore had done that, both by the testimony at
trial and the ballots in evidence that awaited counting by the court.87 °
Barry Richard, representing Bush, took a markedly different tack,
focusing on the legislative intent rather than the language of the stat-
ute. Richard relied heavily, almost exclusively, on the argument that
the court must apply an abuse of discretion standard to the canvassing
boards' counts. Richard argued that the legislature could not possibly
have intended to give the canvassing boards discretion to recount the
ballots in section 102.166, and then allow a court under section
102.168 simply to begin that counting process all over again applying a
de novo standard. 87' And if an abuse of discretion standard were ap-
plied, Richard insisted, the evidence showed that the canvassing
boards had acted reasonably. Miami-Dade's board had not abused its
discretion, Richard argued, because it was reasonable to conclude that
it could not count the ballots properly in the amount of time the Flor-
ida Supreme Court had allowed, and because the board had initially
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the
election result would be changed.8 72 Nassau County had not abused
its discretion, because the board made a rational decision, in light of
the circumstances, that the initial count was the correct one.873 Fi-
nally, Palm Beach County had not abused its discretion in evaluating
the ballots, according to Richard, because federal § 5 required the
board to apply the law in effect at the time of the election-i.e., the
1990 policy-and the standard the board ultimately did employ was a
standard even more favorable to Gore that Gore himself had gone to
Judge Labarga to get, and, at the time, accepted.874
Conspicuously absent from the closing arguments of both parties
was any reference to the constitutional issues that had been raised in
the federal proceeding: the claim that it would violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to count some counties and not others, or to approach
the ballots differently from one county to the next. Boies certainly did
not mention the Constitution. He responded to the issue of a state-
wide count only by saying that the contest statute did not allow for
868. 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998).
869. Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at 245.
870. See id. at 244, 247, 250-51, 283-84.
871. See id. at 251-52.
872. See id. at 255-56.
873. See id. at 256-57.
874. See id. at 257, 260. With respect to the votes that Palm Beach found that were
not included in the certification, Richard argued only that the court had no authority
to override the Supreme Court's deadline. See id. at 259.
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such an approach. 75 Neither did Barry Richard invoke the Constitu-
tion. In fact, Richard's argument sounded very much as though Bush
was abandoning any equal protection claims. At one point in his argu-
ment, for example, Richard stated: "There's probably thousands of
voters in the sixty-seven counties that were never manually recounted
that aren't going to be counted either, and that's the way it is, because
we have laws, and we must abide by them." '76 More importantly,
Richard made no suggestion that the "intent of the voter" standard set
forth in the statutes and referred to by the supreme court was insuffi-
ciently specific or subject to varying interpretations. Indeed, in his
effort to defend the Palm Beach board's evaluation of the ballots,
Richard stated that Palm Beach had done "exactly what ... the Flor-
ida Supreme Court ... says you should do," and what "any rational
judgment of a human being suggests you should do." '87 7 Implicit in
this statement was the concept that the "intent of the voter" standard
provided sufficient direction for a county canvassing board to evaluate
ballots in a rational, predictable, and non-arbitrary way.
The Elections Canvassing Commission and the intervenors did sug-
gest that failing to count statewide, and the difficulty of evaluating the
ballots for intent, presented legal problems. Joseph Klock, represent-
ing the Commission, did not invoke the Constitution,878 but claimed
that if the court undertook to count the ballots, it would be impossible
to decide whether a vote was intended: "if you follow through what
they want and you go to Palm Beach County, do you use the Burton
test? And then when you go to Dade County, are you supposed to try
to figure out the combination of the Judge Lehr, Judge King, and
David Leahy test?" '879 The intervenors all complained of the unfair-
ness in manually counting the votes of some counties but not
others,880 and one of them argued expressly that to do so would un-
constitutionally dilute the votes of the citizens of other counties.88 a
D. The Trial Court's Ruling for Bush
Less than eighteen hours after the closing arguments ended,8 2 on
Monday, December 4, Judge Sauls ruled against Gore. Reading his
875. See id. at 243, 284.
876. Id. at 259. It should be noted that Richard was not expressly addressing the
constitutional claim at this point, but rather was bolstering his argument that the
Court was not required to include the votes Palm Beach had identified. See id.
877. Id. at 258 (emphasis added).
878. See id. at 261-67.
879. Id. at 264.
880. See id. at 269-75.
881. See id. at 273-74.
882. See Ruling Transcript at 1, Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1790621 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec.
4) (No. 00-2808) (proceeding commenced at 4:30 p.m.), rev'd, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.),
rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Trial Transcript, supra note 362, at
289 (hearing concluded at 11:18 p.m.).
2002]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
ruling from the bench, Judge Sauls denied all five of Gore's claims and
directed that final judgment be entered for the defendants.883
With respect to the 9000 ballots Gore asked be counted in Miami-
Dade County, the judge cited a 1932 Florida Supreme Court case 884 to
the effect that the court could not order a recount until the plaintiff
had established a legal basis upon which the court might do so.
8 8 5
And the plaintiff in a contest proceeding, Judge Sauls held, was re-
quired to show that "but for the irregularity, or inaccuracy claimed,
the result of the election would have been different, and he or she
would have been the winner. ' 886 In the court's view, Gore had not
carried that burden with "credible statistical evidence" or "other com-
petent substantial evidence." '887 The court acknowledged that "the re-
cord shows voter error, and/or, less than total accuracy, in regard to
the punch card voting devices utilized in Dade and Palm Beach Coun-
ties, which these counties have been aware of for many years," but
held that "these balloting and counting problems cannot support or
effect any recounting necessity with respect to Dade County, absent
the establishment of a reasonable probability that the statewide elec-
tion result would be different, which has not been established in this
case." '888 The court also concluded that the Miami-Dade board did
not abuse its discretion in any of its recount decisions.
889
With respect to the 3300 ballots that the Palm Beach board had
reviewed, but not counted as votes, Judge Sauls held that the canvass-
ing board's action could be reviewed only under an abuse of discretion
standard.89° The opinions Gore cited to the contrary, the court held,
predated the "modern statutory election system" conferring broad
discretion upon the canvassing boards, and the Palm Beach board had
not abused that discretion.891 Rather, the board had acted in full com-
pliance with the order of the local state court, and Gore was estopped
from challenging the counting standard the board had applied (pre-
sumably because Gore had sought that standard and had not appealed
Judge Labarga's order).
8 92
In the course of this discussion, Judge Sauls noted that when the
Palm Beach board changed its counting standard from the 1990 policy
to that directed by the state court, the Palm Beach board might have
883. See Ruling Transcript, supra note 882, at 6, 13.
884. State ex rel. Millinor v. Smith, 144 So. 333 (Fla. 1932).
885. See Ruling Transcript, supra note 882, at 8.
886. Id. at 9 (citing Smith v. Tynes, 412 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
887. Id.
888. Id. at 10.
889. Id.
890. See id.
891. Id. at 10-11.
892. See id. at 1t.
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created a situation in violation of federal § 5.893 Judge Sauls also as-
serted that if the court were to utilize any different counting standard
in the contest action, the benefit provided to voters in the recounted
counties would create a "two-tiered" system that could violate the
United States and Florida Constitutions.894 Indeed, Judge Sauls con-
sidered it his "duty to warn that the final certified total ... includes
figures generated from this two-tier system of differing behavior by
official Canvassing Boards.
895
With respect to the undervoted ballots in Miami-Dade that had al-
ready been reviewed, and which Gore had alleged resulted in a net
gain of approximately 160 votes, the court held that there was no au-
thority under Florida law to certify an incomplete manual recount of a
portion of a county.8 96 With respect to the votes Palm Beach had
identified that were rejected by the Canvassing Commission, the court
held that it had no authority to include returns submitted past the
Florida Supreme Court's deadline.8 97 And with respect to the fifty-
one votes Gore lost when the Nassau County board amended its certi-
fication to return to the election night totals, the court held that the
Nassau board did not abuse its discretion. 898
Finally, Judge Sauls held that Gore's complaint was improper under
section 102.168 because it did not place in issue all of the ballots in all
of the counties where the alleged counting problems would have
taken place.8 99 Judge Sauls indicated that he agreed with Judge
Klein's dissent in Fladell v. Labarga,900 a district court of appeals deci-
sion certifying the challenge to the butterfly ballot to the Florida Su-
preme Court, 901 in which Klein had written that if there was to be a
revote based on the flawed ballot, it would have to be held statewide,
because the presidential election was a statewide race.90 2 In Judge
Sauls's view, Gore likewise should have challenged the statewide re-
sult, at least in every county where punch card voting might have
caused inaccuracy in the result.
90 3
893. See id. At the time of Judge Sauls's ruling, this change in the standard had had
no legal consequence because it had occurred during the full recount, and the results
of that recount were never incorporated into the final certification because the board
did not complete the full recount until after 5:00 p.m. on November 26. See supra
notes 721-26 and accompanying text (describing Harris's rejection of Palm Beach
count); supra note 818 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Burton's testimony).
894. Ruling Transcript, supra note 882, at 11-12.
895. Id. at 12.
896. See id. at 6-7.
897. See id. at 7-8.
898. See id. at 8.
899. See id. at 9.
900. 775 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
901. See id.
902. See id. at 988-89 (Klein, J., dissenting).
903. See Ruling Transcript, supra note 882, at 12-13.
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VI. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PROCEEDING ON
MANUAL RECOUNTS AND CERTIFICATION: BUSH V. PALM
BEACH COUNTY CANVASSING BOARD
During the same week that teams of lawyers for Gore and Bush
were squaring off in front of Judge Sauls in the contest action, sepa-
rate legal teams were handling the proceeding in the United States
Supreme Court.904 The Supreme Court had agreed to consider three
questions arising out of the Florida court's decision that Secretary of
State Harris was required to accept the results of manual recounts
through November 26, two questions raised by Bush and a third iden-
tified by the Court itself: (1) whether the court's "post-election" lim-
its on executive discretion and standards for tallying votes violated
federal § 5 or the Due Process Clause; (2) whether the state court's
decision violated the electoral appointments clause, because the deci-
sion could not be reconciled with state statutes; and (3) what the con-
sequences would be if the Court found that the Florida court's
decision did not comply with federal § 5.905
A. The Justiciability Question Raised by the Florida Legislature
In briefing these issues, neither Bush nor Gore questioned the
Court's jurisdiction to hear the case or the controversy's justiciability.
The Florida Legislature, however, filed an amicus brief the day before
the litigants' briefs were due, urging the Court to find Bush's claims
nonjusticiable. 9°6 The legislature contended that the case presented a
political question, to be determined in the first instance by the Florida
Legislature, and then by Congress, in the event competing electoral
certificates were submitted.9 °7
The legislature based its argument on federal § 2, which, as de-
scribed above, provides that "[w]henever any State has held an elec-
tion for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a
choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on
904. In the contest proceeding before Judge Sauls, David Boies was the lead lawyer
representing Gore, and Barry Richard was the lead lawyer representing Bush. See
supra notes 864-74 and accompanying text (discussing closing arguments delivered by
Boies and Richard). In the Supreme Court proceeding, Professor Laurence Tribe of
Harvard Law School was the counsel of record for Gore, and Theodore Olson was the
counsel of record for Bush. Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Demo-
cratic Party at 1 (filed Nov. 28, 2000), Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. SCOO-836); Brief for Petitioner at 1 (filed Nov. 28, 2000),
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. SCOO-836).
905. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004, 1005 (2000).
906. Brief of the Florida Senate and House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party (filed Nov. 27, 2000), Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvass-
ing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836) [hereinafter Brief of the Florida Senate and
House of Representatives].
907. See id. at 14 ("The Court should rule that Questions 1 and 2 are not justiciable




a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may
direct."9 °8 According to the Florida Legislature, § 2 and § 5 were
both enacted as part of the 1887 Electoral Count Act,90 9 and so Con-
gress intended § 2's reference to a state's "failure to make a choice" to
refer to a state's failure to resolve an election controversy in compli-
ance with § 5. 9'0 When so understood, the legislature argued, § 2
made clear that it should be the Florida Legislature who should decide
whether § 5 had been violated.911 Alternatively, in the event that the
Florida Legislature decided not to invoke § 2, Congress had the power
to make the decision concerning compliance with § 5 under the count-
ing procedures laid out in § 15.912 In either event, the legislature ar-
gued, the Court should not decide the question, because it "would put
this Court in the uncomfortable position of seeking to enjoin how
Congress exercises its constitutional counting authority and how the
state legislatures exercise their constitutional appointment
authority." 913
Bush and Gore responded to this argument in different ways.
Rather predictably (given that the legislature was poised to appoint a
Republican slate of electors), Bush agreed with the legislature's char-
acterization of § 2 as conferring on the legislature the power to act in
the event the Florida courts "violated" § 5.94 Bush did not agree,
however, that the Court was precluded from acting simply because the
Florida Legislature could act to override the decision of the Florida
courts. Bush pointed out that in McPherson v. Blacker, the Court had
rejected the idea that disputes regarding the appointment of electors
were nonjusticiable. 9 5
Gore did not particularly oppose the legislature's claim that the
case presented a political question, at least to the extent that the legis-
908. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1999).
909. See Brief of the Florida Senate and House of Representatives, supra note 906,
at 5 ("Sections 2 and 5 ... were enacted as part of the Electoral Count Act of 1887.").
910. See id. at 3 ("If a State's election 'has failed to make a choice' that is timely
and conforms with pre-existing law [as required by § 5], then 3 U.S.C. § 2 recognizes
that appointment of Electors by the State Legislature is proper.").
911. See id. at 5-6.
Being enacted in a period between this 1.892 opinion [in McPherson] and the
1874 Senate Report quoted above, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 surely
reflected the contemporaneous constitutional understanding that State Leg-
islatures had exclusive authority over their appointment power, and did not
mean [by § 5] to abrogate it.
Id.
912. See id. at 7 ("Such questions should be determined by the State Legislature or,
if it fails to act by December 18 when the Electors cast their votes, by Congress when
it counts those electoral votes on January 6, 2000.") (incorrect date in original).
913. Id.
914. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 904, at 34-35.
915. Id. at 35 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23 (1892)).
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lature argued that the question was more appropriate for Congress.916
Gore vehemently disagreed, however, with the legislature's theory
that § 2 allowed it to decide whether there had been compliance with
§ 5, and appoint its own post-election slate of electors if it felt there
had not been.917 Gore emphasized that the legislature had no basis
whatsoever on which to conclude that § 2's reference to when a state
has "failed to make a choice" addressed non-compliance with § 5,918
and revealed the extraordinary factual error on which the legislature's
theory was based: § 2 was not enacted contemporaneously with § 5,
but four decades before, "most probably" to deal only with situations
where a candidate did not receive a required majority of the votes.919
Gore also argued that it might well violate the Supremacy Clause for
the Florida Legislature to appoint electors in December, because
Congress was empowered to set the date for the election, it had set
the November 7 date, and the date had passed.92 ° Gore did not argue
any of § 2's legislative history, however, which made it quite clear that
the section was not aimed at the situation arising in the 2000 election,
but only at situations where a state requires a majority winner, and no
such winner emerges.921
916. See Reply Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr. and Florida Democratic Party, at
12 n.9 (filed Nov. 30, 2000), Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70
(2000) (No. SCOO-836). It appears that Gore did not want to take a position on the
political question doctrine, perhaps because he was concerned that if he ultimately
achieved a favorable judicial outcome, and Congress chose not to afford that outcome
conclusive effect under § 5, he might want to come before the Supreme Court and
invoke the statute (or at least have available the threat of doing so). See id. Gore
wrote:
Should the State of Florida appoint electors to whom petitioner objects, and
should there then be some dispute about who the lawful electors from the
State of Florida are, or whether the votes cast for the state of Florida in the
electoral college are lawful, 3 U.S.C. § 5 might conceivably be invoked.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, rather than urge the Court to treat the § 5 issue as a
political question, Gore argued that any § 5 analysis was "premature" unless and until
Congress invoked the statute while the votes were being counted. See id. ("It would
plainly be premature for this Court to address compliance with Section 5, because no
one in Congress has purported to rely on its provisions in determining whether the
votes of electors from Florida shall be counted.").
917. See id. at 13.
918. See id.
919. Id.; see also supra notes 216, 219-30 and accompanying text (citing the public
law by which § 2 was enacted and describing the legislative history behind it). If many
of the issues in the case were debatable, this was not one of them; the lawyers arguing
the legislature's position were simply factually wrong. And it defies imagination that
Charles Fried, the legislature's counsel of record-and the Solicitor of the United
States from 1985-1989-would make such an egregious and critical error in a brief
before the United States Supreme Court. No matter what the time constraints, this is
just not the type of fact at which one guesses.
920. See Reply Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr. and Florida Democratic Party,
supra note 916, at 14.
921. See supra notes 219-30 and accompanying text.
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The parties' debate on this issue illuminates how complex the case
had become, both strategically and doctrinally. As a strategic matter,
the legislature's participation in the Supreme Court proceeding was
surely intended to provide Bush with a back-up plan. For if the Court
was uncomfortable finding for Bush on the merits, then it could still
avoid ruling against him by deeming the issue a political question.
That ruling would have been a "no-lose" situation for Bush, inasmuch
as it would free up the Republican-dominated House to reject any
judicially-approved slate for Gore without fear of later Court review,
which in turn would be enough to ensure that a slate approved by
Bush's brother as Governor would win. Conversely, Gore had essen-
tially nothing to gain by arguing that the case presented a political
question. Not only might such a ruling work as the legislature hoped
it would, but even suggesting that the Supreme Court should avoid the
question could have disastrous public relations consequences. Gore
might well be seen as once again selecting his forums. The theme
would be that having achieved a favorable ruling from the overwhelm-
ingly Democratic Florida Supreme Court, he then tried to avoid re-
view by the Republican-dominated court of last resort.
Likewise, as a doctrinal matter-notwithstanding the legislature's
simplistic, factually erroneous analysis-the political question issue
was a very difficult one. Considering each of the attributes of a politi-
cal question case identified in the landmark case of Baker v. Carr,922 a
number of them militated in favor of finding a political question.923
On the other hand, the Court had previously been quite willing to
address disputes concerning state procedures for appointing electors,
summarily dismissing political question arguments not just in McPher-
son v. Blacker,924 but also more recently in Williams v. Rhodes.925
Moreover, the Court had on several occasions drawn a distinction be-
tween interpreting the scope of a constitutional provision, which does
not violate the political question doctrine, and applying a constitu-
tional provision committed to another branch, which would violate
922. See supra note 155 (quoting the passage from Baker setting forth the charac-
teristics of political question cases).
923. It could have been argued that: (1) the Constitution had committed the issue
of resolving electoral disputes to Congress, by conferring upon it in Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment the power to count the votes; (2) there were no judicially discov-
erable standards for deciding whether the Florida Court's decision should be deemed
"interpretation" of the law or "modification" of it; (3) deciding what constituted inter-
pretation and what constituted modification was actually a policy determination; (4)
resolving the dispute demonstrated a lack of respect for Congress inasmuch as it had
indicated by enacting §§ 5 and 15 that it believed it should resolve electoral disputes;
and (5) there was certainly the potential for embarrassment of the country from "mul-
tifarious pronouncements" from different branches if the Court was prepared to sec-
ond-guess Congress's decision under § 15.
924. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
925. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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the doctrine.926 The Court might have drawn a similar distinction with
respect to reviewing the Florida court's decision: i.e., asserted that it
was simply interpreting the meaning of Article II rather than interfer-
ing with Congress's ability to count or reject electoral votes.
Of course, in light of the strategic considerations, neither Bush nor
Gore fully briefed the political question issue, and the Court was left
free to draw its own conclusions on justiciability guided only by a
wholly inadequate, factually false brief filed by the Florida Legislature
and Gore's limited response.
B. The Briefing on the Merits
On the merits, addressing the first question, Bush argued that § 5
required that the dispute concerning the manual recounts be resolved
employing the law as enacted prior to Election Day,927 and yet the
Florida court had changed the law as it stood at that time.9 28 Bush
complained specifically that the court had altered two aspects of ex-
isting Florida law: the court had changed the seven-day statutory
deadline for submitting the results of manual recounts into a twenty-
one-day deadline (which also had the effect of changing the time
available for prosecuting and defending a contest action),9 29 and the
court had transformed the Secretary's complete discretion to reject
returns submitted after the seventh day into a discretion limited to
two circumstances not set forth in the Florida Code.93 0
926. See, e.g., Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 19 (1972) ("Which candidate is
entitled to be seated in the Senate [under the Senate's constitutional power to judge
the qualifications of its members] is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question,"
but "whether an Indiana recount of the votes in the 1970 election is a valid exercise of
the State's power, under Art. I, § 4, to prescribe the times, places, and manner of
holding elections" is justiciable); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969)
(holding that whether congressman should be found qualified to be seated, under
House's constitutional power to judge the qualifications of its members, is a nonjusti-
ciable political question, but the meaning of the term "qualifications" as used in the
Constitution is justiciable).
927. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 904, at 17-19; id. at 17 ("[A]ny judicial
determination of a controversy regarding electors based on a new, post-election rule
of state law would fail to satisfy the requirements of § 5.").
928. See id. at 19-29; id. at 22 ("[T]he Supreme Court of Florida has authorized a
180-degree departure from the established legal requirements set forth by the Florida
legislature that were in place on November 7.").
929. See id. at 22 ("[T]he new rule of law announced by the decision below changes
the effective deadline for submission of election returns from November 14 until No-
vember 26... nearly tripling the statutory seven-day protest period and certification
deadline mandated by the Florida Legislature.").
930. See id. at 22-23. Bush wrote:
In the face of this clear and preexisting legislative directive [in sections
102.111 and 102.112], the Supreme Court of Florida has concluded retroac-
tively that the Elections Canvassing Commission shall not and may not ig-
nore late-filed returns, but... shall include late returns based on selective
manual recounts in individual counties.
Id. (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 8
2002] THE 2000 ELECTION
Bush also argued-in his reply brief-that the Florida court's deci-
sion violated the Due Process Clause.93" ' The thrust of his claim ap-
peared to be that votes that would not have been legal under rules in
place on Election Day were now being counted because the Florida
court's extension of the deadline had the effect of allowing "selective,
subjective, standardless and shifting methods of manual vote recount-
ing."'932 Bush suggested that this violated the Due Process Clause's
"concern for fundamental fairness and adequate notice," '933 but did
not otherwise set forth the nature of the claim.9 34
Responding to the third question-the Court's own inquiry regard-
ing the consequences of a finding that the decision did not comply
with § 5-Bush described the answer as "obvious": the Court should
vacate the Florida court's decision. 935 According to Bush, vacating
the decision would restore the Election Canvassing Commissions'
statutory authority to act in accordance with the deadlines in the law
as of November 7, and ensure that electoral college votes from Florida
could be considered "conclusive" when they were announced on the
floor of Congress.936 It would also "forestall an impending constitu-
tional crisis," by making clear to the Florida courts as they handled
the contest proceeding that they could not exercise their "'equitable
powers' to alter existing statutory standards[,] ' 937 and thus reducing
931. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 18-19 (filed Nov. 30, 2000), Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. SCOO-836).
932. Id. at 19 (citing Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th Cir. 1995)).
933. Id. at 18.
934. The first heading devoted to any due process argument appeared in Bush's
reply brief, and the entire section was a single paragraph long. See id. at 18-19. Bush
had mentioned due process, and his concern that "dimpled" ballots were being
counted, in his opening brief, but this discussion appeared at the end of a section
devoted to arguing the "policy" behind § 5 and seemed aimed solely at supporting his
claim that § 5 prohibited "retroactive rulemaking." See Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 904, at 28. For example, Bush wrote:
[T]he constantly changing and county-to-county variations in the recount
protocols and standards, including consideration by some counties during
the manual recount of simple indentations known as "dimples" as legally
cast votes, clearly marks another departure from prior practice as of Novem-
ber 7, and thus reflects another post-election change in procedures that is
inconsistent with §5.
Id. at 25.
935. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 904, at 29.
936. See id. at 29-30. Bush acknowledged that he had already been certified the
winner but argued that vacating the Florida court's decision would nonetheless have a
significant effect on the contest proceeding then being pursued by Gore. See id. at 32.
As an example, Bush claimed that the 567 votes Gore had netted from Broward
County's manual recount would not be included in the certified total and therefore
would not carry the presumption of validity afforded to certified votes by Florida law.
Id. at 32-33 (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268 (Fla. 1975) ("[R]eturns
certified by election officials are presumed to be correct.")).
937. Id. at 34.
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the likelihood that the Florida Legislature would have to name its own
slate of electors under federal § 2.938
On the second question, Bush asked the Court to nullify the Florida
court's decision because it constituted a usurpation of authority from
the legislature in violation of the electoral appointments clause in Ar-
ticle 11.939 In Bush's view, the electoral appointments clause vested in
the Florida Legislature exclusive authority to fix the method of ap-
pointing electors,940 and the Florida court had failed to respect that
authority by ignoring and materially changing the statutory scheme. 941
The court's "dismissive" attitude toward the legislature's authority
was clear, according to Bush, by its references to avoiding "hyper-
technical reliance" on the election statutes in favor of the state consti-
tutional right to vote, a right that Florida citizens do not even hold in
presidential elections.942
With respect to § 5, Gore took issue with every aspect of Bush's
argument: § 5's applicability, its meaning, and its application to the
Florida court's decision. To Bush's claim that § 5 required the Florida
court to apply the law as it existed prior to Election Day, Gore re-
sponded that § 5 did not require anything of the states, but merely
provided an option states may exercise to ensure that their electoral
votes cannot be challenged when they are counted on the floor of
Congress.94 3 To Bush's claim that § 5 required that every detail of
state electoral law prior to Election Day be followed precisely, Gore
responded that Bush was misrepresenting the very language of § 5.
Gore observed that the law that the section directed be enacted "prior
to" Election Day was merely the law identifying which state institu-
tion was to resolve election controversies.944 Finally, to Bush's claim
that the Florida court "changed" the pre-existing law, Gore responded
that the Florida court did nothing more than engage in "garden-vari-
ety" statutory interpretation.945
Responding to Bush's argument based on the electoral appoint-
ments clause, Gore asserted that the Court could not properly con-
sider any such argument, on the ground that it had not been pressed
938. Id. at 35. Bush sided firmly with the Florida Legislature in asserting that § 2
empowered the legislature to step in if "its pre-election statutory scheme [were] sub-
verted." Id. at 34-35. At no point did he advise the Court that his brother had al-
ready taken the step of sending a certificate of ascertainment to Washington naming
Florida's electors for Bush. See supra notes 743, 748-52 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the frivolousness of the Florida Legislature's claim in light of Jeb Bush's
action).
939. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 904, at 36-50.
940. See id. at 37-43.
941. See id. at 43-48.
942. See id. at 45, 47-48 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892)).
943. See Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, supra
note 904, at 22-31.
944. See id. at 31-34.
945. See id. at 13-21.
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or passed on by the Florida court.94 6 Gore noted that there "appear[s]
to be an exception" to the rule that the Court should not consider a
constitutional issue not raised below, when a state court renders a
construction of a state statute in a way that violates the Constitution
and could not have been anticipated.947 Bush could not claim that
exception, however, because he could have anticipated the Florida
court's ruling, inasmuch as the court ruled as Gore had asked it to,
and in fact, Bush did anticipate having a "change in the law" com-
plaint because he had invoked federal § 5 before the Florida court.948
Substantively, Gore argued that the Florida court's decision did not
reflect any departure from the "Manner" of appointing electors that
the Florida Legislature had adopted. In Gore's view, the legislature
set forth the "manner" of appointing electors in the Florida Election
Code, and then placed that Code within the statutory jurisdiction of
the Florida Supreme Court.949 To the extent that it fell to the Florida
court to interpret the Code under this system, that interpretation
could not be a violation of the electoral appointments clause, because
the clause "neither displaces the state judiciary nor forbids it from
performing its traditional function under state law of construing stat-
utes to fill gaps, clarify ambiguities and harmonize inconsistencies. "950
Section 5, Gore said, was evidence that Congress shared this perspec-
tive, because § 5 expressly contemplates that a state judiciary may be
the branch to resolve election controversies. 95'
"More fundamentally," Gore wrote, Bush was wrong to conclude
that the reference to the state "legislature" in the electoral appoint-
946. See id. at 34 (citing Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992)). Gore
noted that Bush referred to Article II only once during the entire Florida Supreme
Court proceeding, in a footnote doing nothing more than describing the source of
state authority to decide how presidential electors would be chosen. See id. at 35 n.21.
For the full text of the footnote, see supra note 513.
947. See Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, supra
note 904, at 34 n.20 (quoting Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 443-44 (1935)).
948. Id. at 34 n.20.
949. See id. at 35; see also Reply Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr. and Florida
Democratic Party, supra note 916, at 16. In support of this characterization, Gore
cited both statutory and state constitutional provisions empowering the courts to re-
view "general laws" such as the Florida Election Code. See id. (citing FLA. CONST.
art. V, §§ 1, 3, 4, 5; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.02(1) (West 1998)). Gore further argued
that the Florida Legislature consciously chose to delegate the power to resolve presi-
dential election disputes to the courts, because the legislature expressly removed that
power from the courts when disputes arose over the election of state legislators. See
id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.171 (West Supp. 2001) ("The jurisdiction to hear
any contest of the election of a member to either house of the Legislature is vested in
the applicable house. . . .") (emphasis added)).
950. Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, supra note
904, at 35.
951. See id. ("3 U.S.C. § 5 provides strong evidence that Congress itself recognized
the propriety of state judicial review regarding the appointment of electors [for it]
offers a safe harbor to states that use 'judicial or other methods or procedures' to
resolve controversies concerning electors.").
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ments clause vested in that branch an exclusive authority to set forth
the law concerning presidential elections.952 Gore cited several Su-
preme Court cases interpreting and applying Article 1, Section 4,
which, like the electoral appointments clause, confers power on state
"legislatures" to regulate the time, place, and manner of congressional
elections. 953 Because the Court had held in those cases that a gover-
nor, the public, and state courts could participate in regulating con-
gressional elections, Gore argued, there was likewise no cause to
prohibit judicial review in presidential elections.954
For the Court to decide otherwise, and conclude that the electoral
appointments clause either displaced state judiciaries or limited their
decision-making processes, would violate what Gore described as "the
fundamental principle that the federal Constitution takes the arrange-
ment of state governmental branches as it finds them. '9 55 Gore cited
a number of state cases in which state supreme courts had interpreted
election laws in the context of presidential elections, 956 and a like
number of state attorney general opinions, 957 and warned that Bush's
reading of the electoral appointments clause would call all of these
into question. "Petitioner's understanding of Article II," Gore wrote,
"would place federal courts in the business of selecting which, if any,
of these state court decisions are permissible.
'958
Finally, Gore denied that the Florida court's decision violated the
Due Process Clause.959 Gore observed that Bush had failed to make
any due process argument before the Florida court, with the exception
of a single paragraph complaining about the recount standards some
of the counties were using, and noted that the Court had specifically
declined to hear that issue when it rejected Bush's petition for certio-
952. See id. at 36 ("More fundamentally, as this Court has repeatedly held, a grant
of lawmaking power to the 'legislature' of a State imposes no requirement that only
the legislature itself make the law.").
953. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legis-
lature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
954. Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, supra note
904, at 36-37 (citing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (holding that state
courts could redraw congressional districts); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 368 (1932)
(allowing governor to veto congressional reapportionment law); Ohio ex rel. Davis v.
Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (allowing citizens to reject law regulating con-
gressional elections by state constitutionally-authorized referendum)).
955. Id. at 43.
956. Id. at 39 n.28.
957. Id. at 41 n.30. Gore also pointed out that if the Court decided that the legisla-
ture's authority was truly exclusive, then Florida's own Secretary of State acted un-
constitutionally when she directed the counties to accept and count overseas ballots
arriving after the election, inasmuch as that practice "rests only on an administrative
role" and actually conflicts with a Florida statute. Id. at 36 n.22.
958. Id. at 41.
959. Id. at 45-50.
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rari in the federal case.96 ° Moreover, to the extent that Bush was
making some other type of due process claim 961-perhaps a substan-
tive due process claim that the Florida court had retroactively
changed the law-Gore argued that Bush could not establish any of
the elements of such a claim: that the decision constituted a "retroac-
tive change," that Bush had a cognizable liberty or property interest,
or that the Florida court's decision was arbitrary.962
As this summary indicates, Gore and Bush spent most of their
briefs discussing the meaning of federal § 5, the appropriate role of
the judiciary under the electoral appointments clause in Article II, and
whether the Florida court could be deemed to have "changed" the
election law set forth by the Florida Legislature. Conspicuously miss-
ing from the briefs on both sides was any recognition of the passage
from McPherson that had suggested that a legislature acting under the
electoral appointments clause in Article II could not be limited by a
state's own constitution.963 Notwithstanding that with this passage
from McPherson backing it, Bush's argument on the electoral ap-
pointments clause would have been much stronger than any argument
he could have made with respect to § 5, he placed it behind his discus-
sion of § 5, twenty-one pages into his argument. Further, even when
Bush did come around to arguing the electoral appointments clause,
his thrust was simply that the Florida court had usurped power from
the legislature, and he used the Florida court's reliance on the Florida
Constitution simply as evidence of usurpation, not as an independent
basis for finding a violation of the clause.964 It was as though his law-
yers had missed the significance of the passage in McPherson.
960. See id. at 45; see also supra notes 667-68 and accompanying text (describing
the petition for certiorari in the federal case).
961. Gore could fairly say that he did not know the due process theory on which
Bush was proceeding because Bush did not articulate any such theory until his reply
brief. See supra note 931-34 and accompanying text. The expedited briefing schedule
in the case placed Gore at a decided disadvantage in this regard. Although peti-
tioner's and respondent's brief deadlines are ordinarily staggered to allow the respon-
dent to address the arguments raised in the petitioner's brief, the Supreme Court had
ordered both parties to file briefs on Tuesday, November 28 and Thursday, November
30. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004, 1005 (2000). As a
result, in writing his initial brief, Gore had only Bush's petition for certiorari to go on,
and in writing his reply brief, Gore had only Bush's initial brief to go on, and neither
of those documents filed by Bush discussed the Due Process Clause in any way inde-
pendent of § 5. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 904, at 17-19; Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., supra note 666, at 17-18.
Thus, by the time Bush did set forth the nature of his due process claim, in his reply
brief, Gore had no mechanism by which he could respond in writing.
962. See Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, supra
note 904, at 46.
963. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
964. Bush did quote a passage from McPherson stating that the power to establish
the method of appointing electors lay with the legislature, and "cannot be taken from
them or modified by their State constitutions." See Brief for Petitioner, supra note
904, at 47 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (internal quotation
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Gore, likewise, did not mention the passage from McPherson.
From Gore's perspective, of course, this would make sense, because
even if his attorneys were well aware of the danger McPherson posed,
the passage was so unfavorable to Gore's position that the attorneys
would never want to be the ones to raise it. One is therefore left to
wonder whether, after three weeks of litigation, Gore had finally dis-
covered the constitutional law that would later help to do him in.
Two aspects of the Gore briefs suggest that they had. First, Gore's
brief went to great pains to alter the Article II agenda, characterizing
Bush's argument as one concerning the proper role of the judiciary,
not one concerning the sources of authority on which a state court
could rely.965 Second, Gore's statement of the case was very careful in
its description of the Florida court's decision, never admitting that the
Florida court had "relied on" the Florida Constitution, but describing
the decision as one merely "guided by" and made "in light of" the
state constitution.966
C. The Oral Argument
During the oral argument, it quickly became clear that a majority of
the justices were skeptical of Bush's argument based on § 5. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy seemed to agree with Gore that § 5 did not
set forth any requirement of the states such that it was capable of
being "violated." Justice O'Connor suggested that compliance with
marks omitted), without acknowledging that the passage was a quotation). That pas-
sage, however, was not a statement from the Court, but only a quote from a Senate
report that the McPherson Court had cited, a fact that Bush acknowledged in his
reply brief. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 931, at 9 n.5 ("Petitioner notes
that a citation to McPherson in the opening brief (at 47) inadvertently omitted the
fact that the Court was quoting, with approval, from an 1874 Senate Report on the
subject of the Electoral College."). Moreover, because the quote appeared in a por-
tion of McPherson devoted to recounting how the framers had rejected electing the
President by popular vote, it did not sweep nearly as broadly as the passage ten pages
earlier in McPherson, which suggested that a state constitution could not be the
source of "any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power" in regulating the ap-
pointment of electors. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25 (emphasis added).
965. See Brief of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party, supra
note 904, at 35-45 (defending the judiciary's role in making election law); id. at 41
(characterizing Bush's Article II claim as one "that the Florida Supreme Court may
not interpret electoral statutes"); id. at 45 ("[T]he state judiciary's traditional role in
interpretation does not disappear under [the electoral appointments clause].").
966. Id. at 7 ("The court reached this result by applying familiar principles of statu-
tory construction to resolve the textual ambiguities and gaps in the Florida Election
Code, guided by an appreciation of the importance of the right to vote under Florida's
constitution and laws.") (emphasis added); id. at 10 ("Having determined that the
Secretary was permitted to accept returns filed after the deadline, and in light of the
importance of the right to vote under the Florida Constitution . . . the court also
determined the scope of the Secretary's discretion to 'ignore' returns submitted after
the seven-day period.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 15 ("[The Florida court]
concluded, in light of the state constitution and the provisions outlining detailed pro-
cedures for manual recounts, that the Secretary's discretion to ignore the results of
those manual recounts was limited.") (emphasis added).
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§ 5 was only "a factor that the Congress can look at in resolving [an
electoral college] dispute," and stated that she did not "quite under-
stand how [the section] would be independently enforceable" by the
Court.967 Justice Kennedy followed, in effect suggesting to Olson that
if he could argue that the Florida court had relied on § 5 and misinter-
preted it, then there might be a federal question, but otherwise not.9 68
Olson did not pick up on Justice Kennedy's suggestion, however (at
least not until his rebuttal), and in fact stated flatly that the Florida
court did not undertake to rely on or interpret § 5.
QUESTION: But what is there in the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Florida that indicates that it relied on this Federal statute
in the reasoning for its decision and in its judgment?
MR. OLSON: Well, I think the fact is that it did not ....
QUESTION: Well, we are looking for a Federal issue, and I
thought that you might have argued that the Secretary of State was
instructed by the [s]upreme [c]ourt not to jeopardize the state's
chances and then cited 3 U.S.C. Sections 1 through 10. And so if
the, if the state supreme court relied on a Federal issue or a Federal
background principle and got it wrong, then you can be here.
MR. OLSON: Well, I certainly agree that it mentioned those pro-
visions. I'm simple saying that it blew past the important provisions
of Section 5 ....
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter seemed especially con-
cerned that even if the Florida court's decision did not comply with
§ 5, the Court should not be the one to address such noncompliance
because, under § 15, it was Congress's job to do so. Yet at several
points during this questioning, it became clear that Bush's attorneys
had spent so much time focusing on their "change in the rules" argu-
967. Oral Argument Transcript at 4, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 1004 (2000) (No. SCOO-836). The citations provided here are from the offi-
cial transcript available from the United States Supreme Court. However, because
the official transcript does not identify the justices who asked particular questions,
those justices have been identified from a review of the oral argument tape, at http://
oyez.nwu.edu/cases/cases.cgi?case-id=827&command=show.
968. See Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 967, at 5-6.
969. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added). By the time Olson arrived at the podium for his
rebuttal, he had obviously decided that Justice Kennedy's theory was better than the
one he had invoked in his original argument, and so Olson then characterized the
Florida court's decision quite differently:
It also seems to me quite evident in response to what Justice Kennedy was
asking earlier, that there was concern about the Federal statutory provision,
the language to which I think Justice Kennedy was referring is on page 32-A
of the appendix to the petition from the court's decision, and there is a foot-
note there that does refer to 3 U.S.C. 1 through 10, which of course includes
section 5 .... The court was assuming, it seems to me, that it did not, was
not conflict-the decision that it was rendering was not going to cause a
conflict with the Federal statutory scheme, and it was, we submit, in error in
that regard.
See id. at 74.
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ment that they were not prepared to address the relationship between
§ 5 and § 15, or the possibility that the application of § 5 was a politi-
cal question that the Court should not address. When both Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Souter noted that § 15 provided for
Congress to apply § 5, which in turn could be read as precluding judi-
cial review of § 5 compliance (at least before Congress had addressed
the issue), Olson simply could not provide a comprehensible reason
why that was not so.970 Justice Scalia attempted to help Olson out by
asking whether § 15 predated the Court's decision in McPherson-
970. See id. at 8-9 (questioning by Chief Justice Rehnquist); id. at 20-22 (question-
ing by Justice Souter). Olson appeared to be unable to follow the justices' reasoning
because his only response was to keep talking about how the Florida court had
changed the law and invoking the historical context in which § 5 was enacted. These
are the relevant passages:
QUESTION [by Chief Justice Rehnquist]: Mr. Olson, do you think that
Congress when it passed 3 U.S. Code, intended that there would be any judi-
cial involvement? I mean, it seems to me it can just as easily be read as a
direction to Congress, saying what we are gong to do when these electoral
votes are presented to us for counting.
MR. OLSON: I think that it was intend-directed to Congress, but it
seems to me that in the context in which it was adopted and the promise that
it afforded, that the conclusive effect would be given to the state selection of
electors, that is a somewhat empty remedy and it doesn't accomplish Con-
gress' objectives if it cannot be enforced when an agency of the state govern-
ment steps in as the Florida Supreme Court did here and overturn the plan
by which the Florida legislature carefully set forth a program so that disputes
could be resolved ....
See id. at 8-9.
QUESTION [by Justice Souter]: All right. Mr. Olson, let's assume that
[the Florida Supreme Court changed the law], for the sake of argument ....
... In Section 15, it sets out in fact an elaborate set of contingencies about
what the Congress is supposed to do and can do if there is a dispute as to
whether a given set of procedures in the state have conformed to Section 5
It looks to me at this stage of the game, the statute has committed the
determination of the issues that you raise and the consequences to follow
from them to the Congress. Why should the Court, why should the Federal
judiciary be interfering in what seems to be a very carefully thought out
scheme for determining what happens if you are right?
MR. OLSON: Because I submit that that writes Section 5 essentially out
of existence if an agency of state government, if a state legislature-
QUESTION [by Justice Souter]: No. It doesn't write it out of existence.
It provides in Section 15 what happens if the state agency does what you say
it did.
MR. OLSON: If the state agency, if the state legislature empowered by
Article II of the Constitution, does what it is invited to do by Section 5, and
then another agency of state government, in this case the state supreme
court, comes along and upsets that scheme, yes, you have ultimate resort to
the resolution of the dispute under Section 15 of Title 3, but that's pre-
cisely-
QUESTION [by Justice Souter]: Well, you say you have the ultimate re-
sort. But that begs the question, that seems to be precisely the resort that
Congress has provided.
MR. OLSON: Well, I'm not making myself clear, I think, is that the im-
portance of Section 5 was to invite the state to do things that would avoid
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which also dealt with electoral college issues and which the Court had
decided did not present a nonjusticiable political question. The ques-
tion was plainly aimed at an argument that if the McPherson Court
knew of § 15 but nonetheless reached the electoral college issue, then
the current Court should do likewise. Olson, however, not only failed
to grasp the significance of the question, but admitted that he did not
know when § 15 was enacted.97'
Finally, three of the justices seemed unwilling to hold that the Flor-
ida court had "changed the law." Justice Stevens asked Olson
whether it was "not arguable, at least, that all they did was fill gaps
that had not been addressed before." 972 Justice Breyer suggested that
all the court had done was engage in the rather routine exercise of
deciding when a state official has reasonably exercised his or her dis-
cretion.973 And Justice Ginsburg focused on the "conflict" the Florida
court described between the seven-day deadline and the fact that one
could ask for a manual recount, even in a very populous county, up to
the seventh day, questioning whether the court's action had merely
"reconcile[d]" the conflicting provisions.974
Even in the face of this skepticism about his § 5 argument, it was
not Olson, but Justice Scalia, who turned Olson's argument to the
electoral appointments clause. After Olson agreed that the Florida
court had recited four canons of statutory construction, but had not
been "reasonable" in applying them, Justice Scalia corrected Olson's
characterization, insisting that in the portion of the opinion where the
Florida court had limited the Secretary's discretion, it had based its
holding squarely on the state constitution.
MR. OLSON: They recited four canons of statutory construction,
Justice Stevens, but when they said they use those construction-
canons of statutory construction to say that the words may and shall
mean shall not, that is not a reasonable exercise of statutory con-
struction. I think what the-it's relatively obvious that what the su-
the chaos and the conflict and the controversy and the unsettled situation
that this country faced in 1876, and-.
Id. at 20-22.
971. See id. at 22. Justice Scalia interrupted Olson's efforts to answer Justice Souter
and asked: "Mr. Olson, did Section 15 exist when McPherson was decided?" Id. Ol-
son responded: "I don't know, Justice Scalia. I don't know the answer to that, when it
was adopted. I can't recall whether it was a part of the 1887 electoral count statute or
not." Id. Under the time constraints, it ordinarily would not be so surprising that a
lawyer might not know when a statute was enacted. The lack of preparation is more
shocking, however, when one realizes that the two statutes were enacted at the same
time, and that § 15 refers expressly to § 5, and that this was a lawyer who was vehe-
mently urging the Court to consider the legislative intent and historical context be-
hind § 5.
972. Id. at 9.
973. See id. at 12 ("Isn't the law of Florida like as in most states, and in the Federal
government, that when an official has discretion, may accept or may not accept, that
has to be exercised within the limits of reason?").
974. Id. at 13.
2002]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
preme court did is exactly what Article-Section 5 of Article [sic]
III intends not to happen. Change the rules.
QUESTION [by Justice Scalia]: I don't read their opinion that
way, Mr. Olson. It seems to me that the portion of their opinion
dealing with statutory construction ends with a conclusion that the
Secretary has discretion. The portion of the opinion employing the
canons of construction does not place any limits upon the Secre-
tary's discretion.
MR. OLSON: Well, yes, I agree with that up to a point, but then
it says that she must accept these returns that are after the deadline.
QUESTION [by Justice Scalia]: That was not on the basis of any
canons of statutory construction. That was on the basis of the
state's constitution.
MR. OLSON: That's right, but so there was both going on .... 975
From this passage, it was quite clear where Scalia was going: he was
prepared to hold that the Florida court had violated the electoral ap-
pointments clause by relying on the state's constitution, based on the
passage in McPherson suggesting that state legislatures could not be
limited by state constitutions. It was equally clear that Scalia was pre-
pared to do so even though Bush's own lawyers were not relying on
such an argument, and appeared not to know that it existed.
Indeed, Olson once again did not catch on. Rather than immedi-
ately affirm Scalia's point, and launch headlong into how the Florida
decision violated the principle set forth in McPherson, Olson actually
asserted that the Florida court relied on both statutory construction
and the state constitution, thus providing the basis for a remand for
clarification. Olson apparently was so unfamiliar with McPherson
that he actually resisted pinning the decision on the state constitution,
as if the Court would be more likely to uphold the Florida court's
decision if it found that the court relied on the state's constitution
than if it found that the court's decision was simply an unreasonable
exercise of statutory construction. Moments later, when Laurence
Tribe began to argue for Gore, it must have become quite clear to
Olson how mistaken he had been.976
975. Id. at 17-18.
976. In fact, just as he had done with his § 5 argument, see supra note 969 and
accompanying text, Olson altered his position between his opening and rebuttal argu-
ments. Having earlier placed no emphasis whatsoever on the fact that the Florida
court relied on the state constitution, Olson was a convert by the time he reached his
rebuttal:
It seems to me that it's very difficult to read the Florida Supreme Court
decision as saying anything else other than the Florida Constitution in their
view, in that court's view, is trumping everything else. The second paragraph
of the conclusion says because the right to vote is the preeminent right in the
declaration of rights of the Florida Constitution and so forth, this opinion is
full of language-
Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 967, at 72.
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The Court began by questioning Tribe on his assertion that § 5
presented a question for Congress, not the Court. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist asked Tribe whether § 5 could ever be addressed by the Court,
perhaps after Congress had acted. Tribe indicated that he favored the
conclusion that the question was nonjusticiable, but hedged: "No, I
don't think so, Mr. Chief Justice, it's just that I don't trust my own
imagination to have exhausted all possibilities." '977 Justice Kennedy
pushed further, invoking the Florida Legislature's threat to intervene,
and Tribe's own assertion that the legislature would be acting uncon-
stitutionally if it did so, to suggest the importance of the Court's in-
volvement. 978 Tribe did not back down. He continued to argue that,
at least initially, Congress was the proper institution to address § 5,
and he insisted that the validity of the legislature's threat was not
properly before the Court.979
With that, the Court's focus on § 5 essentially ended. The Court
spent virtually the entire remainder of Tribe's time debating the issue
raised by McPherson, but not even mentioned in Bush's brief or O1-
son's remarks: whether the Florida court had unconstitutionally relied
on the Florida Constitution when it limited the Secretary's decision. 980
And it quickly became obvious that the justices were not of one mind
as to McPherson's application.
As soon as Chief Justice Rehnquist raised the McPherson issue,
Tribe argued that the Florida court did not use the state constitution
as an independent basis for its decision, but only as a "tiebreaker" or
"a way of shedding light" on the statutory provisions that were in con-
flict. 91 Chief Justice Scalia, however, refused to accept Tribe's char-
acterization, and launched into an extended discussion of the way the
Florida decision was organized and written, pointing out that the first
portion of the decision involved statutory interpretation but the por-
tion addressing the Secretary's discretion did not.982 At one point
977. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 967, at 47.
978. See id. at 48-49 (Justice Kennedy) ("[M]y point is that [the legislature's threat]
puts hydraulic pressure on your nonjusticiability argument and makes it a very, very
important argument and a critical argument in this case.").
979. See id. at 48-49. Those who would take a cynical view of the Court's decision-
making processes-arguing that the majority, which in the end included Rehnquist
and Kennedy, merely found a way to anoint their chosen candidate-might well see
some support for their view in this line of questioning. The theory would be that
Rehnquist and Kennedy knew they were in a win-win situation for Bush on jus-
ticiability. If Tribe conceded justiciability, it would be hard to criticize the Court's
taking action to resolve the case. Better yet, if Tribe committed Gore to nonjusticia-
bility, that would prevent Gore from going to court if he won the contest action but
Congress refused to recognize it as a § 5 determination, and instead recognized Jeb
Bush's initial certification or the Florida Legislature's slate of electors.
980. See id. at 52-72. There was a short return to § 5 later in the argument, in
response to a question by Justice Kennedy, but Justice O'Connor quickly brought the
discussion back to the electoral appointments clause. See id. at 63-65.
981. See id. at 54.
982. See id. at 54-56.
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during the sparring, Scalia insisted that the Florida court had decided
that the manual recounts should be accepted and simply could not
reconcile that decision with the statutory scheme.
QUESTION [by Justice Scalia]: Professor Tribe, I would feel
much better about the resolution if you could give me one sentence
in the opinion that supports the second of these supposed alterna-
tive readings, that supports the proposition that the Florida Su-
preme Court was using the constitutional right to vote provisions as
an interpretive tool to determine what the statute meant. I can't
find a single sentence for that.
MR. TRIBE: Justice Scalia, I can do a little better than find a
sentence. The entire structure of that part of the opinion, as Justice
Stevens points out, would be incoherent if the constitution was deci-
sive. That is the highest law in Florida. Why bother with all the rest
if that is anything more than an interpretive guide.
QUESTION [by Justice Scalia]: You would bother with it because
having decided very clearly what the statute requires and finding no
way to get around the firm dates set, you say the reason it's bad is
because of the state constitution. That's how it's written.
98 3
Facing Scalia's heated resistance to his interpretation of the Florida
court's opinion as one of statutory interpretation, Tribe shifted his ar-
gument to justifying the court's action even in the event that it did rely
on the state constitution. Tribe argued that McPherson explicitly
stated that a legislature could, if it wished to, delegate its full electoral
appointment power to the judiciary. 984 That being so, Tribe posited, a
legislature could certainly delegate to the judiciary less than the full
power of appointing electors: the power to exercise its ordinary role in
adjudicating electoral disputes, which would include looking to the
state constitution. 98 5 Interpreting the legislature's action in Florida
this way was especially appropriate, Tribe claimed, because the Flor-
ida Legislature had expressly removed the judiciary's power to review
the legislature's own elections, but had taken no action to remove ju-
dicial review from presidential elections. Further, the legislature could
not have objected to the constitutional law the court applied because,
in Florida, the legislature itself repromulgates the constitution every
few years.986
Few of the justices seemed particularly persuaded by Tribe's less-
than-full delegation argument, but several jumped in nonetheless to
offer alternatives that might avoid McPherson. Justice Breyer sug-
gested that the court's discussion of the state's constitution should be
considered no different from relying on Blackstone, and should not be
deemed to violate McPherson, unless the Florida court consciously
983. See id. at 61.
984. See id. at 56.
985. See id.
986. See id. at 56, 67.
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chose to contravene the legislature's choices.98 7 Justice Stevens made
a related point, noting that the Florida court had discussed the Florida
Constitution but had also mentioned earlier Florida cases, an Illinois
case, and a federal case.988 And Justice Souter suggested that the de-
cision could be read as applying the principle of "constitutional
doubt," under which a court honors a statute but interprets it in such a
way as to avoid any potential constitutional violation. 989 To support
this approach, Souter pointed out that even in the portion of the opin-
ion where the Florida court had discussed the state constitution, it had
also stated that the Secretary's exercise of her discretion conflicted
with the statutory provision that would allow recounts to begin as late
as the sixth day after the election. 990
In the end, however, it was Justice Ginsburg who offered the middle
course that would allow for Gore's escape from McPherson. During
Olson's argument, Justice Ginsburg had objected strenuously to what
she took as Bush's attack on the Florida court's integrity, and had
repeatedly invoked the principle that federal courts should read state
court decisions in the light most favorable to upholding them.99' So
when Justice Souter brought out that the Florida court had invoked
both the state constitution and the statutory conflict, Ginsburg sug-
gested that the justices give the court the benefit of the doubt and
remand the case for clarification as to the court's ground.99 2 Three
days later, that is what the Court did.
D. The Supreme Court's Decision
On Monday, December 4, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.9 9 3 In a unanimous,
per curiam opinion, the Court declined to review the federal questions
raised by Bush, but nonetheless vacated the Florida court's judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 994 The Court ex-
987. See id. at 58.
988. See id. at 59-60.
989. See id. at 56-57.
990. See id. at 60.
991. See, e.g., id. at 15 ("I do not know of any case where we have impugned a state
supreme court the way you are doing in this case.... [I]n case after case, we have said
we owe the highest respect to what the state says, [the] state supreme court says, is the
state's law."); id. at 18 ("[W]ould you agree that when we read a state court decision,
we should read it in the light most favorable to the integrity of the state supreme
court[?I").
992. See id. at 60. Justice Ginsburg stated:
They said that [that they were bothered by the statutory conflict] twice, and I
think that's critical if you add to that that we read a decision of a state court
in the light most favorable to that court and not in the light least favorable. I
suppose there would be a possibility for this Court to remand for clarifica-
tion ....
Id.
993. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
994. See id. at 78.
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plained that it could not reach the merits of Bush's claims because it
was "unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw
the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority"
under the electoral appointments clause, and was "also unclear as to
the consideration the Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C.
§ 5.''995 The Court made no mention of Bush's due process claim.
With respect to the electoral appointments clause issue, the Court
certainly identified the issue for the Florida Supreme Court, but spoke
in indefinite terms. The Court quoted the passage from McPherson
suggesting that a state legislature's power could not be limited by a
state's constitution.996 Then it quoted two passages from the Florida
court's decision that "may be read to indicate that [the Florida court]
construed the Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to
which the Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2,
'circumscribe the legislative power.' 9 7 At the same time, the Court
acknowledged that McPherson did not raise "the same question
[P]etitioner raises here.
998
With respect to § 5, the Court was somewhat more forthcoming.
After quoting the statute, the Court wrote that § 5 "contains a princi-
ple of federal law that would assure finality of [a] State's determina-
tion if made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election." 999
Thus, a legislative desire to take advantage of that finality "would
counsel against any construction of the Election Code that Congress
might deem to be a change in the law."'"0" The Court did not go
further, however, and explain what it expected of the Florida court in
this regard: whether the Florida court should assume that the legisla-
ture hoped to satisfy § 5 or should explore that possibility as a matter
of legislative intent. The Court noted only that the Florida court had
not made clear what role § 5 played in its decision.10'°
The Supreme Court's decision was regarded in many quarters as a
setback for Gore. 1002 That was true only to the extent that it was not a
pure Gore victory: i.e., a ruling that the Florida court did not violate
the electoral appointments clause or § 5. In reality, under the circum-
stances, it was perhaps the best outcome Gore could have hoped for.
995. Id. at 78.
996. See id. at 76 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
997. Id. at 77 (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25).
998. Id. at 76.
999. Id. at 78.
1000. Id. at 77-78.
1001. Id. at 78.
1002. See, e.g., Gil Klein, Two Strikes Against Gore: U.S. and State Courts Deliver
Setback in Florida, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 2000, at Al ("Vice President
Al Gore's presidential hopes suffered two legal blows yesterday as both the U.S. Su-
preme Court and a Florida court ruled against his bid to wrest the state's 25 electoral
votes from Texas Gov. George W. Bush.").
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First, notwithstanding the claims of some that the case was moot by
the time it was argued, °°3 a straight victory for Bush would have seri-
ously complicated the contest proceeding. It would have erased the
567-vote gain Gore had picked up from Broward County.10 0 4 It would
also have weakened Gore's claims to the 350 or so votes identified by
the Palm Beach and Miami-Dade canvassing boards. To "re-find"
these 900-plus votes, Gore would have had to rely on a truly de novo
review in the contest action by a judge who had already made clear his
reluctance to look at the ballots.100 5
Second, had the Court adopted the Florida Legislature's position,
and decided that the case presented a political question, Gore might
not have been safe even if he had achieved a victory in the contest
action before December 12. With the Supreme Court out of the pic-
ture, unwilling to hear the case, House Republicans would have been
free to deprive a Gore slate of the conclusiveness afforded by § 5, on
the ground that they, like Bush, believed that the courts had not fol-
lowed the law as it existed on Election Day. And even if the Senate
did not agree, § 15's tiebreaker provision would have required that
Congress honor the slate certified back on November 26 by Bush's
brother Jeb.1
00 6
1003. See supra note 445 and accompanying text.
1004. See supra note 710 and accompanying text.
1005. See supra notes 759, 777 and accompanying text (describing Gore's claims to
the votes identified in Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties, and Judge Sauls's deci-
sion to make Gore prove his entitlement to have the ballots reviewed). The one thing
that a Bush victory would not have done, contrary to the claims of some, was render
Gore's contest action untimely. Under Florida law, the deadline for bringing a con-
test action was "within 10 days after midnight of the date the last county canvassing
board empowered to canvass the returns certifies the results of the election being
contested." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(2) (West Supp. 2001). Even assuming that
the Supreme Court fully overturned the Florida Supreme Court, and restored the
status quo as of November 14, the last county certification would have occurred on
November 18, due to the regulation requiring acceptance of overseas ballots. See
supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. Ten days from that date would have been
November 28, and yet Gore's contest action was filed on November 27.
1006. It is possible that a Florida court finding for Gore in the contest action could
have ordered Jeb Bush to amend his earlier certificate of ascertainment and instead
certify a Democratic slate of electors. This would have placed the Florida executive
and the Florida judiciary squarely at odds. Jeb Bush would have had to choose be-
tween defying an order of his state's highest court or obeying the order but certifying
a slate of electors he believed were appointed in violation of Florida law. Had he
chosen to defy the courts, the only slate before Congress that would have been certi-
fied by the state executive would have been the slate he certified on November 26,
and even if the Senate disagreed with the House on the application of § 5, the Senate
would have been bound by the tiebreaker provision of § 15 to accept the executive-
certified Bush slate. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text. It is worth not-
ing, in this regard, that Jeb Bush is reported to have said that "no judicial power
exist[ed]" to compel him to certify a Gore slate of electors. DAVID A. KAPLAN, THE
ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT: How 413 LAWYERS, 9 SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND
5,963,110 (GIVE OR TAKE A FEW) FLORIDIANS LANDED GEORGE W. BUSH IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 230 (2001). Had Jeb Bush chosen to comply with the court's decision
under protest, there truly might have been the "constitutional crisis" about which
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Third, and most importantly, the undeniable truth was that the Flor-
ida court really had relied on the Florida Constitution, and it was
Gore who had led it to do so. Gore had expressly urged the Florida
court to invoke the Florida Constitution, and even public policy, to
disapprove of the Secretary's decision. Given that fact, and given the
organization of the Florida court's opinion, the Supreme Court was
more than generous to deem it "unclear" whether the Florida court
had relied on the Florida Constitution. And by placing the decision
back in the hands of the Florida court, the Supreme Court actually
gave the court the opportunity to correct the McPherson error.
100 7
With that said, and even to the extent that the Supreme Court's
decision allowed Gore to dodge a bullet, the ambiguity in the Su-
preme Court's decision concerning McPherson would ultimately play
a decisive role in Gore's loss. The Supreme Court left the distinct
impression that it would not hesitate to invoke McPherson, and find a
violation of the electoral appointments clause, if the Florida courts
subsequently deviated in any way from the Florida Legislature's statu-
tory scheme for resolving election controversies. Thus, the Florida
courts thenceforth could not risk invoking the Florida Constitution,
and they would be treading on very dangerous ground if they did not
follow the letter of the Florida Election Code. This in turn would
make it very difficult to "repair" the open-ended "intent of the voter"
standard that had already led different canvassing boards to evaluate
ballots using different standards.'0018
some have spoken. The House presumably would still have challenged the Gore
slate, and the Senate the Bush slate. And the tiebreaker provision would not necessa-
rily have solved the problem because the House could contend that only Jeb Bush's
initial certification was valid because he had improperly been forced to recertify by
the same court that had violated § 5. If the two houses had deadlocked on this issue,
there is simply no telling how it might have been resolved.
1007. On the same day the Supreme Court's decision came down, the Florida Su-
preme Court issued an order stating that the parties would be allowed to file supple-
mental briefs addressing implementation of the Supreme Court's mandate through
3:00 p.m. the next day, December 5. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Har-
ris, No. SC00-2346 (Fla. Dec. 4, 2000) (order setting period during which court would
accept supplemental briefs from the parties). Gore then filed a short, simple brief,
encouraging the court to reinstate its original order with an explanation that its deci-
sion was not founded on the state constitution and was intended to honor § 5. Ap-
pellants'/Petitioners' Brief on Remand (filed Dec. 5, 2000), Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000) (No. SC00-2346). Bush filed a
rather lengthy brief arguing that the Florida court clearly had relied improperly on
the state constitution and violated § 5, and encouraging the court to put the entire
controversy to rest by affirming the trial court's decision upholding the Secretary's
exercise of discretion. Supplemental Brief of George W. Bush (filed Dec. 5, 2000),
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000) (No. SCOO-
2346). The court did not issue its decision on remand until Monday, December 11,
after Justice O'Connor had complained during the nationally broadcast oral argument
that the Florida court had not responded. See infra notes 1371, 1398 and accompany-
ing text.
1008. The reader will recall that the open-ended nature of the "intent of the voter"
standard had enabled Gore to go into court whenever a canvassing board had applied
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VII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RULING ON THE FEDERAL CLAIMS
When Bush initially petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, he
asked the Court to hold that Florida's manual recount statute and the
manual recounts that had already been conducted violated the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. He presented these
claims to the Court both in his petition from the Eleventh Circuit's
decisions in Siegel v. LePore, and as question three of his petition
from the Florida Supreme Court's decision.'00 9 The procedural pos-
ture of neither case, however, lent the claims to Supreme Court re-
view.' 010 The Eleventh Circuit had not yet addressed the merits of the
claims, and had not even decided whether it would affirm the district
court's decision to deny Bush an injunction. The only decision that
the Eleventh Circuit had made was to deny Bush an emergency in-
junction pending the consideration of his appeal."1 ' Similarly, the
Florida Supreme Court had never addressed the merits of the claims.
That court had rendered a final judgment with respect to the recounts,
but had stated in its opinion that Bush had failed to raise any constitu-
tional challenge.10 2
So it was surely not terribly disappointing to Bush when the Su-
preme Court declined to consider his equal protection and due pro-
cess challenges to the recounts. 0 3 He had lost nothing. He had
alerted the Supreme Court to the issues, could still litigate them
before the Eleventh Circuit, and, because the Court had denied his
a per se rule of excluding certain types of ballots. See supra notes 435-37, 685 and
accompanying text. In each instance, the courts told the canvassing boards that the
"intent of the voter" should be judged by the totality of the circumstances and that
per se exclusion rules were not compatible with such an approach. See supra notes
437, 685 and accompanying text. The courts' decisions, however, did not result in
uniform approaches by the canvassing boards. According to the testimony at the con-
test trial, the Palm Beach Board did cease its per se exclusion of dimpled ballots, but
it also adopted what was effectively a rule that a dimpled ballot could not be counted
as bearing a vote if the only dimple appearing was in the presidential race. See supra
note 821 and accompanying text. In Miami-Dade, on the other hand, the board an-
nounced no rule more specific than the intent of the voter, and the members appeared
(to one GOP witness) to be applying their own individual, and different, criteria for
counting a ballot. See supra notes 850-51 and accompanying text.
1009. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Siegel v. LePore, supra note 666; Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., supra note 666,
at i.
1010. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 41 (1992) (holding that Court
could not consider issues that had not been passed on by a court below); Stevens v.
Dep't of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 8 (1991) (same).
1011. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1162, 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying emergency
petition for injunction pending appeal on grounds recited in the related case of Touch-
ston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2000)).
1012. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228 n.10
(Fla.), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70
(2000) ("Neither party has raised... an issue on appeal [as to] the constitutionality of
Florida's election laws.").
1013. See Siegel v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005, 1005 (2000); Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004 (2000).
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Siegel petition "without prejudice,"' 1 4 could return to the Court in
the event the Eleventh Circuit's final decision went against him.
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Ruling: No Irreparable Harm, No
Decision on the Merits
As it happened, the Eleventh Circuit acted almost immediately af-
ter the Supreme Court's first decision was handed down. On Wednes-
day, December 6, only two days after the Supreme Court's decision,
the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's deci-
sion denying Bush an injunction.' 0t The court's opinion, however,
did not address the merits of Bush's claims. 0 16 Because the case had
come before it on the denial of a preliminary injunction, the court
held that, irrespective of the merits, it must consider the district
court's holding that Bush had not shown that he would suffer irrepara-
ble injury in the absence of an injunction.0 7 And in the view of the
majority, that holding was clearly correct: "Because Plaintiffs still
have not shown irreparable injury, let alone that the district court
clearly abused its discretion in finding no irreparable injury on the
record then before it, the denial of the preliminary injunction must be
affirmed on that basis alone."'0' 8
1014. Siegel, 531 U.S. at 1005.
1015. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1179. Before addressing the district court's decision, the
court went through a lengthy analysis of its subject-matter jurisdiction and various
abstention doctrines. In the course of that discussion, the court concluded that its
jurisdiction was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see id. at 1172 (citing
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker
v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)), that abstention was not warranted
under the Burford doctrine, see id. at 1173 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943)), and that abstention was not required under the Pullman doctrine, see id. at
1174 (citing R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
1016. See id. at 1179 ("The Court does not at this time decide the merits of Plaintiffs'
constitutional arguments.").
1017. See id. at 1176 ("Significantly, even if Plaintiffs establish a likelihood of success
on the merits, the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would,
standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper.") (citing Snook v. Trust
Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, 909 F.2d 480, 486 (11th Cir. 1990); Northeastern Fla.
Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d
1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990); Flowers Indus. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 551, 552 (11th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 540 (11th Cir. 1983)). The court recognized
that the Supreme Court's decision in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755-56 (1986), allowed appellate courts to de-
cide the merits of a case in connection with reviewing the denial of a preliminary
injunction when "'a district court's ruling rests solely on a premise as to the applicable
rule of law, and the facts are established or of no controlling relevance.'" Siegel, 234
F.3d at 1171 n.4 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757). The court nonetheless de-
clined to apply Thornburgh as an independent basis for reaching the merits, because
the factual record was "largely incomplete and vigorously disputed." Id.
1018. Id. at 1175-76 (emphasis added) (citing Carillon Importers, Ltd. v. Frank
Pesce Int'l Group, Ltd., 112 F.3d 1125, 11.26 (11th Cir. 1997); Revette v. Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 740 F.2d 892, 893 (11th Cir. 1984);
Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir.
1982)).
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The court provided a number of reasons why it could not conclude
that Bush was suffering, or stood to suffer, irreparable injury. First,
Bush had been certified as the winner of the election.'0 19 Second,
even if manual recounts were to resume, it was "wholly speculative as
to whether the results of those recounts may eventually place Vice
President Gore ahead."'0 20 Third, it was also "speculative" as to
whether any court might order such recounts, because the trial court
hearing the contest action had denied Gore's claims, and the United
States Supreme Court had vacated the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion. 10 21 Finally, the court could not agree that Bush would suffer ir-
reparable injury if recounts were allowed to proceed, Gore were
named the winner, and then the recounts ultimately were overturned:
The candidate Plaintiffs contend that if the manual recounts are al-
lowed to proceed, simply rejecting the results of those recounts after
the conclusion of this case will not repair the damage to the legiti-
macy of the Bush Presidency caused by "broadcasting" the flawed
results of a recount that put Vice President Gore ahead. But the
pertinent manual recounts have already been concluded, and the
results from those recounts widely publicized. Moreover, we reject
the contention that merely counting ballots gives rise to cognizable
injury. 1022
B. The Separate Opinions on the Constitutional Merits
Importantly, notwithstanding the court's decision not to reach the
merits, several of the additional opinions in the case did reach the
merits, and they revealed a significant rift among the judges on the
constitutionality of the recounts. Eight of the twelve appellate judges
joined the court's opinion,' °23 but four dissented and filed separate
opinions. 0 24 Three of these dissents were quite lengthy, and each
reached the merits, concluding that the district court should have en-




1023. See id. at 1168 (indicating that Chief Judge Lanier Anderson and Judges J.L.
Edmondson, Emmett Cox, Susan Black, Rosemary Barkett, Frank Hull, Stanley Mar-
cus, and Charles Wilson joined the majority opinion).
1024. See id. at 1190 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting, for the reasons expressed in his dissent in
the companion case of Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1134-58 (11th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1061 (2001)); id. (Birch, J., dissenting); id. at 1193 (Du-
bina, J., dissenting); id. at 11.94 (Carnes, J., dissenting). The dissenters in the two
cases before the Eleventh Circuit took different approaches to filing their dissents.
Judge Carnes filed his dissent in the Siegel case, and in the Touchston case referenced
his dissent in Siegel. Compare id. (Carnes, J., dissenting), with Touchston, 234 F.3d at
1161 (Carnes, J., dissenting). Judges Birch and Dubina filed duplicate dissents in
Siegel and Touchston. Compare Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1190 (Birch, J., dissenting), and id.
at 1193 (Dubina, J., dissenting), with Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1158 (Birch, J., dissent-
ing), and id. at 1161 (Dubina, J., dissenting). Judge Tjoflat filed his dissent in Touch-
ston, and in the Siegel case referenced his dissent in Touchston. Compare Touchston,
2002]
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joined the manual recounts because they were in various respects un-
constitutional. 0 2 5 And the fact that the dissents reached the merits
triggered a specially concurring opinion by Chief Judge Lanier Ander-
son, in which he explained in detail why he believed the recounts were
constitutional. 1026
Judge Carnes's dissent, joined by three others, focused on the fact
that the recounts had been, and might yet be, conducted in selected
counties. 10 27 Citing the Democrats' original requests for recounts and
a variety of their court filings, Judge Carnes pointed out that the Dem-
ocrats' "unwavering refrain" had been that "punch card systems nec-
essarily and invariably undercount votes which can only be recaptured
and considered by manual recounts."'' 028 Thus, the problem identified
by the Democrats was common to all twenty-four Florida counties us-
ing punch-card systems,'0 29 yet the Democrats had requested recounts
only in three. 0 30 To the extent that only those requests were granted
(or stood to be granted) by the state, this meant that, under the Dem-
ocrats' own theory of punch card undercounting, "thousands of simi-
larly situated Florida citizens who intended to vote for President were
thwarted in their efforts by defective technology, perhaps combined
with a bit of personal carelessness, and whether their intended votes
count has been made to depend solely upon the county in which they
live." '0 31 In Judge Carnes's view, this situation could not be squared
with the Supreme Court's equal protection analysis in Reynolds v.
234 F.3d at 1134 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting), with Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1190 (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting).
1025. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1190 (Birch, J., dissenting); id. at 1194 (Carnes, J., dis-
senting); Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1.134 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
1026. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1179 (Anderson, C.J., concurring specially) ("Although
I agree that judicial restraint cautions against the court's addressing constitutional
issues unless necessary, it does not seem inappropriate for me in light of the extensive
dissents, to discuss my own views about the likelihood of success on the merits of
Plaintiffs' constitutional issues.").
1027. See id. at 1194 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
1028. Id. at 1196; id. at 1196-97 (recounting the Democrats' position before the Flor-
ida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court); id. at 1201 (citing the
reasons given by the Democrats in the original requests).
1029. See id. at 1198 (naming the twenty-four punch-card voting counties); id. at
1201 ("The problem with machine tabulating of punch card ballots is common to
counties that use the punch card system.").
1030. See id. at 1202.
1031. Id. at 1198-99.
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Sims1 °32 and Moore v. Ogilvie,"33 both of which prohibited vote dilu-
tion on the basis of residence.'0
34
Judge Carnes found unpersuasive the Democrats' argument that
there could be no equal protection violation because it was not the
state's action, but only Bush's decision not to seek recounts, that
caused the recounts to occur in only three of the punch-card counties.
The judge noted that the statutory scheme itself discriminated against
rural, less populated counties, because one of section 102.166's criteria
for granting a manual recount was whether there has been an error
"'which could affect the outcome,"' and the likelihood of an outcome-
affecting error is markedly reduced in a county where there are fewer
total votes 0 3 5 Further, to the extent that in requesting recounts in
only a few counties, the Florida Democratic Party was acting pursuant
to authority given it by the state, Judge Carnes thought the Party itself
should be seen as a state actor.'0 36 And whether the Republican Party
did or did not request recounts was essentially irrelevant, because the
constitutional rights that selected recounts violated were those of the
voters, not Bush.
10 37
Judge Birch's dissent, joined by two others, focused on "the lack of
standards or guiding principles in the Florida manual recount stat-
1032. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds, the Court disapproved three different ap-
portionment schemes for seats in the Alabama legislature on the ground that they
unconstitutionally diluted the votes of Alabama's urban voters. See id. at 568-70.
1033. 394 U.S. 814 (1969). In Moore v. Ogilvie, the Court disapproved an Illinois
law that required a political party seeking access to the ballot to submit a petition with
at least 200 signatures from residents of at least fifty counties on the ground that it
unconstitutionally diluted the votes of urban voters. See id. at 819. This effectively
made it impossible for a political party to gain access even if it had the support of the
93.4% of the electorate living in forty-nine Illinois counties, while a party that had the
support of only 6.6% of the electorate, a portion spread over fifty rural counties,
could gain access. See id.
1034. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1199-1200 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
1035. Id. at 1204 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.1.66(5) (West Supp. 2001)).
1036. See id. at 1205 ("When a political party uses state machinery and exercises
prerogatives it is given under state law to influence the counting or alter the effect of
votes, it is a state actor subject to the same constitutional constraints that protect the
citizens from the state and its officials.") (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 481
(1953)).
1037. See id. at 1209-10 ("There is no loophole in the Constitution that permits what
would otherwise be an unconstitutional action to occur simply because a third party
could have, but did not, prevent it from occurring."). Carnes also rejected the Demo-
crats' assertion that recounts in selected counties could not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause when the state allowed different counties to use different voting systems,
which necessarily brought with them varying rates of error. See id. at 1211-12.
Carnes concluded that the two situations-a state allowing variances in voting accu-
racy and a state allowing variances in correcting inaccuracies-were not at all analo-
gous, because "[t]here is no reason to believe that any county would ... choose for
itself a voting system with a high rate of error in order to disadvantage its citizens
compared to those of other counties," while "[t]here is every reason to believe that
political parties or candidates will selectively choose the counties in which to initiate
the process of manual recounts based upon how those counties voted and their popu-
lation." Id. at 1212.
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ute."'' 0 38 According to Judge Birch, the Florida Legislature had "abdi-
cated its responsibility to prescribe meaningful guidelines for ensuring
that any such manual recounts would be conducted fairly, accurately,
and uniformly."'' 1 39 This left "[t]he well-intended and responsible
county canvassing boards across the state" to "discern the voter's in-
tent without any objective statutory instructions to accomplish that
laudable goal."10 '40 The standardless nature of the review, combined
with the fact that it was to be conducted by canvassing boards elected
in partisan voting, unconstitutionally abridged the "voters' constitu-
tional right to vote."'
1 4 1
Judge Tjoflat's dissent, joined by two others, 0 42 argued that the re-
counts approved by the Florida Supreme Court reflected four differ-
ent constitutional violations.,0 43 First, by allowing the canvassing
boards to count ballots that had not been read by the counting ma-
chines, the Florida Supreme Court had changed the definition of a
"vote" from what it had meant before the election, a "fundamentally
unfair" approach in violation of the due process clause. 10 44 Judge
Tjoflat acknowledged that the Florida Code did not define a
"vote,"1045 but concluded based on "past practice, interpretations of
state officials prior to Harris, and the legislative history" that "votes"
prior to the election were those that were cast in such a way as to be
readable by the machines. 0 46 Second, the manual counting of ballots
1038. Id. at 1191 (Birch, J., dissenting).
1039. Id.
1040. Id.
1041. Id. At no point in his dissent did Judge Birch identify the specific provision of
the Constitution he believed the manual recounts violated. By his reference to "an
abridgement to the voters' constitutional right to vote," id., and his reference to that
right as "fundamental," it appears he was invoking the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the provision most commonly associated with "fundamental
rights," but one cannot be certain, because there is also a "fundamental rights" strand
of doctrine associated with the Equal Protection Clause, see id. at 1192. NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 195, § 11.5, at 426 ("If a law substantially impairs the exercise
of a fundamental right by all persons the law will be reviewed under the due process
clause. If the law restricts the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right by only a
class of individuals, the law will be reviewed under the equal protection clause.").
1042. Judges Birch and Dubina joined Judge Tjoflat's dissent in toto. Touchston v.
McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1134 (11th Cir.) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1061 (2000). Judge Carnes joined only Part V of Judge Tjoflat's dissent, id.,
which was the portion of the dissent addressing irreparable injury rather than the
merits, see id. at 1155-58.
1043. See id. at 1145-55.
1044. Id. at 1145-49 (citing Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404, 407-08 (11th Cir. 1995);
Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995)).
1045. See id. at 1.141 ("Perhaps the most important part of the statutory system left
open to interpretation is what constitutes a valid vote.").
1046. Id. at 1149. Under the "machine model" in place before the election, "voters
were required to indicate their voting intent unequivocally by marking their ballots in
such a way that the vote tabulating machine, with its pre-programmed evaluation
standard, could read it." Id. at 1141. The "past practice" to which Judge Tjoflat re-
ferred was the counties' regular certification of only machine-read votes, without any
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only from selected counties unconstitutionally burdened the rights of
voters outside those counties to have their votes counted, in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. 047 Third, the Florida Supreme
Court's action in approving manual recounts in counties purposefully
selected by Democrats for the extent of their Democratic party affilia-
tion was discriminatory state action in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 0 48 Fourth, by allowing "dimpled" votes to be counted in
some Florida counties and not others, the Florida Supreme Court
burdened the fundamental right of association of those voters whose
ballots were not reviewed, and had set forth no compelling reason for
doing SO.
1 0 4 9
Chief Judge Anderson responded to these dissents by emphasizing
the standard of review appropriate to state election law. Judge An-
derson acknowledged that states may not exercise their power under
the electoral appointments clause in a way that violates other constitu-
tional provisions.'05 0 He went on to observe, however, that the Su-
preme Court had adopted a relatively deferential view when
addressing state election laws, on the ground that it would be impossi-
effort to discern voter intent from ballots that had not been counted. Id. at 1147.
According to Judge Tjoflat, if a "vote" was something more than a mark which could
be read by a machine, "then the election officials in each county should have ex-
amined all undervoted ballots on the night of the election. That they did not do so is
evidence that either the Florida Supreme Court changed the election law or that
county election officials were shirking their duties." Id. The "interpretations of state
officials," id. at 1149, to which Judge Tjoflat referred were three advisory opinion
letters issued after the election but before the Florida Supreme Court's opinion by the
State Department's Division of Elections. In each, the Division of Elections stated
that a machine's inability to read an improperly punched ballot was not an "'error in
the vote tabulation'" that would justify a recount under section 102.166. See id. at
1147. Judge Tjoflat noted that the Florida Attorney General had disagreed with the
Division of Elections, id. at 1147-48, but seemed to rely on the fact that the Secretary
of State is the state's chief election officer, id. at 1147. The "legislative history" to
which Judge Tjoflat referred was a purported committee statement on the Voter Pro-
tection Act of 1989, of which the manual recount provision was a part. According to
Judge Tjoflat, the statement "indicated that [the legislation] was enacted, in part, in
response to a problem in a prior election in which 'an apparent software "glitch" or
error was responsible for an incident in Ft. Pierce when a machine would count the
Democratic votes, but would not accept Republican ones."' Id. at 1148 (quoting Re-
sponse of Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, Laurence C.
Roberts, and Bob Crawford, as Members of the Florida Elections Canvassing Com-
mission, to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 n.10, Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004 (2000) (No. SC00-836)). Surprisingly, Judge Tjoflat
offered no citation for this assertion other than footnote 10 of Secretary Harris's brief
responding to Bush's petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See
id.
1047. Id. at 1151.
1048. Id. at 1152-54.
1049. Id. at 1154-55.
1050. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1180 (11th Cir. 2000) (Anderson, C.J.,
concurring specially) (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 n.18 (1983);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 699
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981)).
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ble for a state to regulate elections without placing some burden on a
citizen's right to vote.' 0 5 1 Quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, °52 Judge
Anderson asserted that "a state's interest in conducting an orderly
and fair election is 'generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondis-
criminatory restrictions.' "1053 It was only when a state placed a "'se-
vere restriction[ ]"' on the right to vote-a burden rising to the level
of "'patent and fundamental unfairness' "-that its law should be
deemed unconstitutional.105 4 With this set forth as his governing
framework, Chief Judge Anderson proceeded to analyze what he
identified as Bush's equal protection and substantive due process
claims.
According to Judge Anderson, Bush's equal protection claim
"boiled down" to the idea that voters in counties not being manually
recounted had a lesser certainty of having their votes counted, be-
cause the machine counters in their counties might have missed their
votes just as the counters in the manually counted counties had missed
votes. 0 55 This possibility-what Judge Anderson called "the mere
availability of manual recounts in some counties, but not in others"-
did not, in his view, constitute an inequitable burden on the voters in
the counties without manual recounts. 1 56 To decide that it did create
such a burden "would lead to the untenable position that the method
of casting and counting votes would have to be identical in all states
and in every county of the state.'
0 57
Judge Anderson acknowledged the plaintiffs' argument that it was
not just any manual recounting that was the problem, but the poten-
tial for partisan influence inherent in Florida's system: specifically, the
ability of one party to select only counties highly favorable to it and
the lack of statutory standards to guide the counting itself. 10 58 These
aspects of Florida's system, however, were not enough to persuade
Judge Anderson that the burden on the plaintiffs was severe, because
several aspects of the system guarded against partisanship in manual
counting. First, it was not as though the parties had a right to any
1051. See id. at 1180 ("[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that a state's regulations
governing the electoral process will inevitably impact, in a manner that may burden or
restrict, its citizens' exercise of their right to vote."); id. at 1181 (referring to the
Court's "deference to state regulation of elections").
1052. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). For a discussion of Anderson v. Celebrezze, see supra
notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
1053. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1180 (Anderson, C.J., concurring specially) (quoting Ander-
son, 460 U.S. at 788)).
1054. Id. at 1180 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)); id. at 1181
(quoting Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995)).
1055. Id. at 1181-82.
1056. Id. at 1182, 1185.
1057. Id. at 1182; see also id. at 1185.
1058. See id. at 1182-83 ("The Plaintiffs attempt to bolster their treat-every-ballot-
alike argument by suggesting that partisan influences have tainted the operation of
Florida's manual recount procedures in this case.").
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manual recount; the decision was in the hands of three-member can-
vassing boards, none of whom could be an active participant in either
candidate's campaign. 10 59 Second, the canvassing boards' discretion
was not "standardless," as the Republicans had claimed, but was in-
stead guided by the statutory purpose of determining the intent of the
voter and correcting errors that could affect the outcome of the elec-
tion. 1060 Third, the manual recounts were open to the public.
0 61
Fourth, the canvassing boards' decisions were not absolute, but were
subject to judicial review.10 62 Finally, manual recounts were available
to both parties, and in this case itself, Bush had received sufficient
notice of recounts requested by Gore to have requested recounts of
his own.'
°63
Having thus determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish the
"severe burden" that would warrant strict scrutiny, Judge Anderson
went on to decide that Florida's provision for recounts was sufficiently
reasonable and non-discriminatory to pass constitutional muster
under the Equal Protection Clause. In Judge Anderson's view, utiliz-
ing manual recounts as a "supplement" to machine counting was a
valid way to serve Florida's strong interest in ensuring an accurate
vote.0 6 4 Conducting the recounts on a decentralized basis, with each
county deciding whether a recount was warranted, was a valid delega-
tion of the state's power under the electoral appointments clause, fol-
lowing precisely "the same pattern of federalism reflected in the
Constitution itself." 1 65 Further, "[a] statewide requirement would
impose a very significant administrative burden, and an often unnec-
essary one, as there are innumerable circumstances in which a manual
recount would be warranted only in a single county."'
01 66
1059. Id. at 1183 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141 (West Supp. 2001)).
1060. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001)).
1061. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(1) (West Supp. 2001)).
1062. Id. (citing Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
1063. See id. at 1183 & n.6 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(a) (West Supp.
2001)). Judge Anderson also observed that the plaintiffs had not brought forth evi-
dence that the system had actually operated in a partisan manner. The plaintiffs ar-
gued on appeal that the canvassing board members had a "strong personal interest in
the outcome," but Judge Anderson wrote that "such a vague allegation of possible
manipulative or discriminatory motive does not rise to the level of severity required
to merit strict scrutiny of the Plaintiffs' equal protection claims." Id. at 1183-84. Pre-
sumably, the Eleventh Circuit's record did not include the evidence brought out dur-
ing the contest trial that, at least in Broward County, Bush had actually gained a
higher percentage of the manually recounted votes than the percentage he had re-
ceived from the machine-counted votes, suggesting that at least that board had not
approached the ballots in a partisan manner. See supra notes 808-09 and accompany-
ing text.
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Judge Anderson concluded his discussion of Bush's equal protec-
tion claim by rebutting the dissenters' reliance on the strict scrutiny
the Supreme Court had applied in Reynolds v. Sims and Moore v.
Ogilvie.1 °67 Those "one-person, one-vote" cases were inapposite,
Judge Anderson argued, because they involved voting systems that
"arbitrarily and systematically" weighted votes based on the voters'
geographic location.1068 In Florida, Judge Anderson said, it was not as
though the ballots in the recounted counties were receiving greater
weight, because the recounts did not weigh the votes in any way. The
recounts merely verified the count, and there was "no automatic, inev-
itable, or systematic granting of greater weight to the choices of any
voter or class of voter."'
'0 69
Turning to what he characterized as Bush's substantive due process
claim-the allegation that the counties were using different standards
to evaluate the ballots and were even changing their own standards
midway through the counting-Judge Anderson was similarly defer-
ential to the state. His opinion focused almost entirely on Eleventh
Circuit precedent distinguishing claims that elections were "funda-
mentally unfair," which were constitutionally cognizable, and "gar-
den-variety" election disputes, which were not. 070 Bush's claims fell
into the latter category, Judge Anderson claimed, because the can-
vassing boards had followed the statutory scheme for conducting the
recounts, and even if there were differences in applying that standard
among the boards or by a single board, "the Plaintiffs have not alleged
that any board has departed from a good-faith attempt to determine
the voters' intent," as the statutes required.10 7' Further, in contrast to
previous situations in which state officials unconstitutionally changed
their procedures or past practices, 10 72 there was no plausible claim in
1067. See id. at 1185 (citing Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964)); see also supra notes 1032-33 and accompanying text
(discussing the dissenters' arguments based on these cases).
1068. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1185 (Anderson, C.J., concurring specially).
1069. Id.
1070. Id. at 1186-89 (citing Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1315 (11th Cir. 1986); Roe
v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 581 (11 th Cir. 1995)). Judge Anderson also cited a variety of
cases from other circuits reaching similar conclusions. See id. at 1187 (citing Gold v.
Feinberg, 101 F.3d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1996); Bodine v. Elkhart County Election Bd.,
788 F.2d 1270, t272 (7th Cir. 1986); Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 454 (5th Cir.
1980); Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1975); Pettengill v. Putnam
County R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1973); Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84,
88 (2d Cir. 1970)).
1071. Id. at 1188.
1072. Judge Anderson's focus was very much on Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574 (11th
Cir. 1995), in which the Eleventh Circuit had found fundamental unfairness, and ap-
plied substantive due process to invalidate a post-election change in election prac-
tices. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1187-88 (Anderson, C.J., concurring specially). In Roe,
Alabama election officials had decided to count a number of ballots that did not meet
the technical requirements of Alabama's absentee balloting statute, in violation of
both the statute itself and past practice. See Roe, 43 F.3d at 578. The plaintiffs com-
plained that there were many voters who relied to their detriment on the require-
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Florida that voters relied to their detriment on the procedures in place
prior to the election. It could not reasonably be argued that voters in
uncounted counties chose to mark their ballots in ways that could not
be read by the machines on the thought that similar markings in other
counties would also not be read.
10 73
Finally, Judge Anderson found no error in the district court's con-
clusion that the plaintiffs had shown no purposeful, systematic dis-
crimination.10 74  On this point, he again recited the safeguards
provided in the manual recount statute-the public nature of the
counting, the requirement that the counting teams include one mem-
ber from each party, and the availability of judicial review in a contest
proceeding-as well as the fact that Republican and Democratic ob-
servers were present.10 75 And he noted the district court's finding that
"'no evidence has been demonstrated that these recounts have gener-
ated erroneous tabulations.' 
10 76
C. The Significance of the Eleventh Circuit's Action
In an ordinary case, the concurring and dissenting opinions of mem-
bers of the court would be worth noting only in an academic sense.
The additional opinions in Siegel were remarkable, however, for a va-
riety of reasons.
First, the additional opinions reflected the first time prior to the
Supreme Court's final hearing on the election controversy (after it
had stayed any further counting and effectively ended the election),
that any court had engaged in a meaningful debate over the constitu-
tionality of what was going on in Florida. One of the district courts
hearing the constitutional challenges had issued a substantial opinion
discussing the constitutional merits,'0 77 but that opinion had fully sup-
ported Gore's position, and that decision had been rendered in a mat-
ter of hours,'0 78 without the three weeks the judges on the Eleventh
ments for voting set forth in the statute. In other words, many did not vote because
they would have had to send in an affidavit either notarized or witnessed by two
people, but they might well have voted had they known the statute was not going to
be enforced. See id. at 580-81.
1073. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1188.
1074. Id.
1075. Id. at 1188-89 & n.13.
1076. Id. at 1189 (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053 (S.D. Fla.),
affd, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000)).
1077. See Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047-54 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 234 F.3d
1163 (11th Cir. 2000); supra notes 372-79 and accompanying text (reviewing the dis-
trict court's holding). The other district court adopted the reasoning of the Siegel
court and simply added a few points focusing on the lack of evidence. Touchston v.
McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058-60 (M.D. Fla.), affd, 234 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1061 (2001). In a moment of candor, the Touchston court
admitted that "the late filing of this action has resulted in an Order perhaps too brief
to give the issues raised therein the dignity they deserve." Id. at 1056.
1078. See supra notes 369-70 and accompanying text.
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Circuit had taken to research and contemplate the law." 7 9 Judge
Sauls had alluded to the Equal Protection Clause, but he had not re-
ally attempted any meaningful analysis. l0 80 The Florida Supreme
Court had remained completely silent on constitutionality in its first
opinion, claiming disingenuously that the issue had not been
raised."0 s And the United States Supreme Court, having denied cer-
tiorari in Siegel v. LePore, addressed the constitutional issues neither
in its Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board decision nor in
the oral argument leading up to that decision. Indeed, the Eleventh
Circuit seemed keenly aware of the unusual role it was playing. Judge
Birch wrote:
I would hope that a careful and thoughtful review of the opinions
of my brothers and sisters would dispel any suggestion that their
views on the important issues before us are anything but the result
of days of careful study and thoughtful analysis-because these
opinions are nothing less ....
... I am confident that we have given these matters the attention
they justly deserve and trust that, at least, we have laid the ground-
work for an informed decision by the justices of the United States
Supreme Court should they exercise their judgment to hear this
case. It is my hope that they do. We have done our best so that
they can do their best.1
0 8 2
Second, whatever has been suggested since about the merits of the
Supreme Court's decision on Bush's equal protection claim' 0 83 -
which was, after all, 7-2' 4-the Eleventh Circuit's additional opin-
ions are a powerful testament to the fact that, on the law as it existed
at the time, the legal call was a close one, with plenty of room for
argument. The Eleventh Circuit dissenters focused squarely on the
1079. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1192-93 (Birch, J., dissenting). In an unusually re-
vealing passage clearly aimed at the lay public, Judge Birch explained the process by
which the Eleventh Circuit had proceeded:
Aware of the importance of these cases and the urgency attendant to the
issues presented, we decided to take these disputes en banc-that is, before
the entire court of twelve judges. Moreover, utilizing a procedure that we
normally employ in death penalty cases, we arranged through the clerks of
the district courts involved to have copies of all filings there "lodged" (i.e.,
copies provided) with us contemporaneously. Hence, we have been able to
review and study the progress of the factual and legal matters presented in
these cases from their inception. Accordingly, long before the anticipated
notices of appeal were filed, formally bringing them to us, we were about the
study and review of the legal issues to be resolved. Thus, the reader of our
opinions in this case should understand that our time for consideration has
been considerably longer than it might appear at first blush.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
1080. See supra note 894 and accompanying text.
1081. See supra note 637 and accompanying text.
1082. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1193 (Birch, J., dissenting).
1083. See infra note 1543 and accompanying text.
1084. See infra notes 1426-37, 1444 and accompanying text.
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pure fairness of the recounts, and were able to summon some case law
to support their positions, and the best response the concurrence
could muster was to draw a distinction between strict scrutiny and a
more deferential standard of review.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit's decision, and the extraordinary sepa-
rate opinions, issued on Wednesday, December 6, the day before the
lawyers walked into the Florida Supreme Court to argue the trial
court's decision not to overturn the Secretary of State's certification
and not to engage in any further manual evaluation of ballots. As-
suming that any of the lawyers for Gore involved in the Florida court
proceeding had time to read the opinions-and one has to recognize
how difficult that would have been-they might have recognized that
a hurricane was brewing just off shore. Yet in the face of the storm,
no one said a word.
VIII. THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT PROCEEDING ON
THE CONTEST
Immediately after Gore lost the contest action before Judge Sauls,
on Monday, December 4, he asked the First District Court of Appeals
to certify the case to the Florida Supreme Court.'0 85 The intermediate
court did so, and by Tuesday morning, the Florida Supreme Court had
agreed to hear the case. 1086 The court ordered the parties to file briefs
by noon on Wednesday, December 6, and scheduled the argument for
the morning of Thursday, December 7.1o87
A. The Parties' Briefs
The parties' briefs to the court were essentially a restatement of the
closing arguments they had made to Judge Sauls.1 °88 As he had done
at trial, Gore emphasized the language of section 102.168, the statu-
tory basis for his contest action. He pointed out at every turn that the
statute expressly authorized contests brought on the sole ground that
there were enough illegal votes included, or legal votes excluded, "to
1085. See Gore v. Harris, No. 1DOO-4745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2000) (order
certifying the case to the Florida Supreme Court).
1086. Gore v. Harris, No. SCOO-2431 (Fla. Dec. 5, 2000) (order setting oral argument
and setting briefing schedule).
1087. Id.
1088. Compare Brief for Appellants, or in the Alternative, Petition for Writ of Man-
damus or Other Writs at 18-35 (filed Dec. 6, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243
(Fla.) (No. SC00-2431), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and Brief of
Appellees George W. Bush and Dick Cheney at 31-50 (filed Dec. 6, 2000), Gore v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.) (No. 00-2431), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), with supra text accompanying notes 864-74 (relating the closing arguments in
the contest trial). It bears noting here that Gore's brief, the Brief for Appellants, was
apparently filed in such a rush that the document does not include page numbers.
Thus, the page citations used in this Article have been arrived at by numbering the
first page of text in the brief as page one and counting forward from there.
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change or place in doubt" the outcome of the election. 08 9 Further,
Gore argued, the statute contained no language whatsoever to justify
the three limitations Judge Sauls had placed on his case: the statute
did not (1) require Gore to seek review of all the ballots in the elec-
tion rather than ballots he chose, 1 90 (2) impose upon Gore the bur-
den of showing that the canvassing boards abused their discretion, 10 91
or (3) require Gore to show a "reasonable probability" of a different
outcome before the contested ballots could be reviewed. 10 92 Gore
1089. See Brief for Appellants, or in the Alternative, Petition for Writ of Mandamus
or Other Writs, supra note 1088, at 20, 22-24, 27 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.168(3)(c) (West Supp. 2001)) (emphasis omitted).
1090. See id. at 22-24. Gore argued that neither the statute nor the existing case law
afforded any basis on which to conclude that a contest plaintiff was required to seek
review of all the ballots. Id. at 23 ("[N]either the Circuit Court nor Defendants have
cited any authority for that proposition."). He also argued that the courts in "numer-
ous Florida cases" reviewed only the contested ballots. Id. (citing Beckstrom v. Volu-
sia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998); Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So.
2d 259 (Fla. 1975); In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in the Nov.
4, 1997 Election for City of Miami, 707 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Spradley v. Bailey, 292 So. 2d 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)).
1091. See id. at 22, 24-26. To support this argument, Gore cited four cases from the
1920s to 1940s in which the Florida Supreme Court had referred to the evaluation of
ballots to see whether they contained uncounted votes as a pure judicial question. Id.
at 24-25 (citing State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940); State ex rel.
Millinor v. Smith, 144 So. 333, 336 (Fla. 1932); Wiggins v. State ex rel. Drane, 144 So.
62, 63-64 (Fla. 1932); State ex rel. Nuccio v. Williams, 120 So. 310, 314 (Fla. 1929)).
Gore acknowledged that Judge Sauls had rejected those cases on the ground that they
predated the modern statutory scheme for elections provided in chapter 102, but set
forth four reasons why the enactment of chapter 102 did not reflect any legislative
intent to limit judicial review to a standard of abuse of discretion. First, two of the
grounds for a contest action enumerated in section 102.168 referred to challenging a
canvassing board's actions for misconduct, but the other three grounds-including
subsection (c), under which Gore was proceeding-did not. Id. at 24. Second, section
102.168 expressly conferred on the court extremely broad power to evaluate a plain-
tiff's claim that legal votes had been excluded: subsection (8) of the statute authorized
the court "to 'fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each
allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or cor-
rect any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under such circum-
stances."' Id. at 26 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001), but
incorrectly identifying the subsection as subsection (11)). Third, the legislative history
of the 1999 act creating the current version of the contest statute stated that the new
statute was not intended to reduce, either directly or indirectly, the courts' authority
to adjudicate disputes, which included the power in election contests to order a re-
count of ballots cast. Id. Finally, in Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Board,
707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998), a case handed down in 1998 after most of chapter 102 was
in place, the Florida Supreme Court had given no indication that the de novo ap-
proach taken in the earlier cases was no longer valid, and had in fact approved the
circuit court's manual review of the ballots. Brief for Appellants, or in the Alterna-
tive, Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Other Writs, supra note 1088, at 25.
1092. Brief for Appellants, or in the Alternative, Petition for Writ of Mandamus or
Other Writs, supra note 1088, at 22, 26-28. Gore insisted that "plaintiffs are not re-
quired to prove their case before the evidence (i.e., the ballots) are [sic] considered."
Id. at 27. According to Gore, there were numerous cases in which the courts had
reviewed ballots prior to any finding that the plaintiff was entitled to prevail, see id.
(citing Hornsby v. Hilliard, 189 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1966)), and in fact many in which the
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also complained that the ballots themselves had been admitted into
evidence, and were in fact the best evidence of his claim that there
were legal votes excluded from the Secretary's certification, and yet
Judge Sauls had refused ever to look at them. 0 93 Finally, in an almost
comical turnabout on Bush's prior argument, Gore asserted that if the
Florida court upheld Judge Sauls's decision, then that might well be a
change in the law as it stood on Election Day that would violate fed-
eral § 5.1094
There was hardly any disputing Gore's characterization of the statu-
tory language. As set forth above, 10 95 subsection (3) of section
102.168 includes five grounds for contesting a certification. Taken to-
gether, those grounds read as if the legislature intended to authorize a
contest action to proceed on every conceivable basis a candidate
might have for complaining about an election's outcome. Subsection
(3)(a) addresses misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of elec-
tion officials; subsection (b) the ineligibility of a candidate; subsection
(c) the inclusion of illegal votes or the exclusion of legal votes; subsec-
tion (d) the possibility that a voter, election official or canvassing
board member has been bribed; and then, in subsection (e), the stat-
ute allows for an action based on "[a]ny other cause or allegation"
that "would show that a person other than the successful candidate
was the person duly nominated or elected to the office in ques-
tion., 1 °9 6 And apart from whether Judge Sauls made the wisest deci-
sion as a matter of policy, the reality is that several aspects of his
decision could not have come from the language in section 102.168
itself. The statute simply does not say anything about contesting all
ballots, reviewing canvassing board decisions only for abuse of discre-
court had reviewed ballots but then ultimately found from that review that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to prevail. See id. (citing Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvass-
ing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998); Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975)).
1093. See id. at 19, 26-28. To make this point, Gore posited a situation where there
has been an election in which the initial certification reflected that one candidate won
by 500 votes, but after the certification election officials discovered a still-sealed box
of 1000 ballots. Under Judge Sauls's theory that a contest plaintiff had to show a
reasonable probability of a different outcome, Gore reasoned, no one would ever
look at those ballots because the plaintiff would never be able to demonstrate a rea-
sonable probability that the ballots would yield him or her the net gain of 500 votes
required to take the lead. See id. at 27-28.
1094. See id. at 31-32. Gore wrote:
[G]iven that these holdings represent a radical departure from the scheme in
place on election day, acceptance by this Court of these holdings could result
in this state's electors being stripped of the protection found in 3 U.S.C. §5,
because the method for resolving disputes surrounding the appointment of
those electors may turn out NOT to have been resolved "by laws enacted
prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors."
Id. (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994)).
1095. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
1096. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3) (West Supp. 2001).
2002]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
tion, or requiring a showing of reasonable probability before the court
investigates further.
Presumably realizing that Gore had the upper hand with respect to
the language of the statute, Bush stressed what he called the "statu-
tory scheme." 1097 In Bush's view, reading the contest statute against
section 102.166, which conferred on the canvassing boards the discre-
tion to grant or deny a manual recount of ballots, required that courts
hearing contest actions presume certifications correct and recount bal-
lots only when a canvassing board has abused its discretion in refusing
to do so.10 98 Bush argued that Gore had not overcome that presump-
tion: there was no reason to conclude from the record that the can-
vassing boards had abused the discretion granted them.1 99
The arguments reflected an ironic reversal from the parties' first
appearance before the Florida Supreme Court. In that proceeding,
addressing whether the Secretary must accept the results of manual
recounts submitted after the statutory deadline, Bush had sought rig-
orous enforcement of the language in the statutes setting the seven-
day deadline. 100 And it was Gore who had relied on the statutory
scheme, arguing that the only way to read the entire statutory scheme
harmoniously was to permit acceptance of the recount results after
the seventh day." 0"
Even more notable, however, were the decisions by both parties not
to address certain issues. Bush, for example, did not include any sig-
nificant discussion of the electoral appointments, Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses, 110 2 or the potential that a decision reversing
the trial court and allowing a recount to proceed might violate those
1097. Brief of Appellees George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, supra note 1088, at
34-35.
1098. Id. at 32 (citing Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268 (Fla. 1975); Broward
County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508, 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992);
Quinn v. Stone, 259,So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. 1972)). To support this argument, Bush
relied heavily on the holding of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in the Hogan
case. See id. at 35-36. In Hogan, the Broward County Canvassing Board had de-
clined to conduct a manual recount in an election where, after a machine recount, the
plaintiff had lost by only five votes and there were still forty-two undervotes. Brow-
ard County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
The court held that the plaintiff was required to show that the canvassing board had
abused its discretion-i.e., had failed in some way to comply with mandatory statutory
duties or engaged in some other impropriety-and that the canvassing board had not
abused its discretion in deciding that it would not grant a manual recount based on
allegations of voter error. Id. at 510.
1099. Brief of Appellees George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, supra note 1088, at
36-46; see also supra notes 872-74 and accompanying text (describing Bush's argu-
ments that the Miami-Dade, Palm Beach and Nassau canvassing boards did not abuse
their discretion).
1100. See supra notes 477-88, 507-08 and accompanying text.
1101. See supra notes 450-58 and accompanying text.
1102. It should be noted that the parties had filed briefs only the day before in con-
nection with the United States Supreme Court remand, and Bush, certainly, had gone
to great lengths addressing McPherson and the way in which the Florida court's first
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provisions. As he had done in the first Florida Supreme Court pro-
ceeding,110 3 Bush simply mentioned those provisions at the very end
of his brief, in a passage that barely articulated any complaint and
included no analysis.'
10 4
Gore also declined to discuss any constitutional issues. To a certain
extent, this was understandable, on the conventional wisdom that a
litigator does not usually undertake to defeat an argument that has
not been properly raised by, or is not being pressed by, his or her
opponent. Even so, Judge Sauls had made a critical point about fair-
ness-and the "count every vote" theme upon which Gore had long
depended-to which Gore offered no response whatsoever.
Specifically, Judge Sauls had held that Gore had not brought a
proper contest action because he had sought review only of selected
ballots from selected counties. In his brief to the Florida Supreme
Court, Gore broad-brushed this aspect of Judge Sauls's ruling, char-
acterizing it as though it were simply a ruling that Gore had to ask for
a recount of all ballots statewide, and summarily dismissing it as unau-
thorized by the statutory language. In fact, Judge Sauls's ruling had
two elements. It is true that, as Gore suggested, Sauls had seemed to
believe that any contest action seeking a recount in a presidential elec-
tion would have to ask for a statewide recount, because no single
county elected the electors. Yet Judge Sauls had also observed that a
proper contest must place in issue "all of the counties in this state with
respect to the particular alleged irregularities or inaccuracies in the
balloting or counting processes alleged to have occurred." In other
words, Sauls was disturbed that Gore had alleged what was essentially
a systematic error made by punch card counting machines, and yet
decision had violated it. See Supplemental Brief of George W. Bush, supra note 1007;
Appellant/Petitioner's Brief on Remand, supra note 1007.
1103. See supra notes 512-13 and accompanying text.
1104. See Brief of Appellees George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, supra note 1088, at
49-50. The entire constitutional discussion in Bush's brief was as follows:
[F]or a court in a contest proceeding to now apply a standard that counts
dimples as votes in selective counties would be directly contrary to 3 U.S.C.
§ 5, and it would also violate Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.
In addition, a change in the deadline for certification for election returns,
along with a change in the time period for contesting an election, would
likewise violate Article II, [s]ection 1 of the U.S. Constitution and 3 U.S.C.
§ 5. Finally, the application of counting standards in different counties as
well as the occurrence of manual recounts in only selected counties or selec-
tive portions of counties violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the U.S. Constitution. As Florida's Attorney General recently
opined, "[a]s the State's chief legal officer, I feel a duty to warn that [if] the
final certified total for balloting in the State of Florida includes figures gen-
erated from this two-tier system of differing behavior by official Canvassing
Boards, the State will incur a legal jeopardy under both the United States
and the state constitutions."
Id. at 49-50 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Ruling Transcript,
supra note 882, at 11 (quoting opinion of Florida Attorney General Robert
Butterworth)).
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Gore had challenged that error only in selected counties, not in all of
the counties where the error might have infected the vote-counting.
About this inequity, Gore said absolutely nothing.
B. The Oral Argument
From the moment the oral argument began, it was clear that Gore
was not going to receive quite the reception he had during the first
proceeding.'10 5 David Boies had barely spoken his name when Chief
Justice Wells chastised the parties for not alerting the court in the first
proceeding to McPherson v. Blacker, and asked Boies how, consistent
with McPherson, the Florida Supreme Court could have jurisdiction
to be hearing the case."0°6 The Chief Justice stated that his reading of
McPherson was that the legislature had plenary power to appoint
presidential electors, and that the court could not invoke the state
constitution to erode that power in any way." 7 How then, the Chief
Justice asked, could the Florida Supreme Court hear the case, if the
Florida Legislature had not expressly provided for appellate judicial
review of a contest proceeding, and the only basis for such appellate
jurisdiction was the Florida Constitution?1 08 It was a telling indicator
that the United States Supreme Court's decision had left at least some
members of the court very tentative about deviating in any particular
from the Florida Code.
Boies appeared taken aback by the question, and his response sug-
gested that he either did not understand the Chief Justice's point, or
simply did not have a persuasive response and wanted to sidestep the
issue. First Boies addressed whether the district court of appeals or
the Florida Supreme Court was the proper forum, and the Chief Jus-
tice made it clear that that was not the issue. 09 Then Boies observed
that the district court of appeals had certified the question and that
Gore had, alternatively, asked for a writ of mandamus."1 0 This time
Justice Harding jumped in as well, insisting on an answer to the pre-
cise question posed: "Where do we get our right to review, to appel-
1105. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Gore v. Harris, No. SCOO-2431 (Fla. Dec. 7,
2000) (unofficial transcript), available at http://www.wfsu.org/gavel2gavel(old)/tran-
script/00.2349.htm. The Florida Supreme Court's website advises visitors that they
can obtain oral argument transcripts and documents at the Florida State University
website, but the transcript of the Gore v. Harris argument expressly advises readers
that it is unofficial. Indeed, the transcript contains many errors that can be detected
by watching the videotape of the argument available at the same website. For that
reason, this Article will provide page citations to the transcript, but any quotations
from the argument offered here will reflect that transcript only to the extent it has
been corrected by the Author's viewing of the videotape.
1106. See id. at 1-2.
1107. Id. at 1.
1108. Id. at 1-2.




late review? From the rules and from the Constitution, and doesn't
that create a federal question?"'111
At this point, Boies finally began addressing the substance of the
Chief Justice's question. Boies insisted that the electoral appoint-
ments clause could not possibly mean that a legislature must sit as
both a legislative and judicial body with respect to presidential elec-
tors, and that when the legislature passed section 102.168 and did not
prohibit judicial review, it knew that the courts would have jurisdic-
tion to interpret it at both the trial and appellate levels." 12 Boies also
claimed that the only power the electoral appointments clause con-
ferred on the legislature was the power to establish the method of ap-
pointing electors, and thus the legislature's choice was effectuated on
November 7 when the people voted.
1 1 3
Justice Lewis then changed the subject, and went immediately to
the issue Gore had declined to address in his brief: why a court hear-
ing a challenge to a statewide certification based on a systematic prob-
lem with punch card machines should not address the problem in any
county in which it arose. 1 4 When Boies took some time reaching the
issue, Justice Harding interrupted, and again asked Boies why un-
dervotes should not be counted statewide. And Harding cast the
problem in federal constitutional terms.
Boies's response was remarkably non-substantive. In essence, it
was that Gore was entitled under the statute to select the counties he
was contesting, and the court should not be troubled by that because
selective recounts had already been included in the vote total.
Q. [by Justice Harding] Why does [counting undervotes] not have
statewide application?
A. Your honor, I think that it does have statewide application, if
anybody contests ballots, other than in the particular categories that
we have contested ballots.
1111. Id.
1112. Id. at 2-3.
1113. Id. at 3. This comment by Boies suggests that he had not put a lot of thought
into the ramifications of the electoral appointments clause or the United States Su-
preme Court's opinion. Plainly, the Supreme Court had not interpreted the electoral
appointments clause as narrowly as Boies was suggesting-as if it conferred on the
states only the power to choose between legislative appointment and popular election
or some variation thereof-but rather considered it to extend to all regulation of pres-
idential elections. Otherwise, there would never have been a remand of the first pro-
ceeding; the Court would not have regarded the clause as reaching the issue of how
Florida handled requests for manual recounts. Indeed, the interpretation of the
clause that Boies asserted was never suggested by Laurence Tribe, when he argued
before the Court in the first proceeding. Tribe had never argued that the clause was
not even applicable to Florida's regulation of post-election procedures, but rather that
the Florida Supreme Court had acted consistently with the power conferred upon the
legislature. See supra notes 981-86 and accompanying text.
1114. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1105, at 3.
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Q. [by Justice Harding] But Judge Sauls, in his order, referred to
the opinion of the Attorney General that indicated that if, this type
of result happened, that there would be serious or potential federal
and state constitutional questions, and that the vote would be in
jeopardy.
A. Your honor, I think-there are two points to that. First, if
merely having a manual recount in some areas and not in others
would make the election defective, then this election would already
be defective, because there were manual recounts in a number of
counties that were included in the certified results of the secretary
of state. Second, with respect to the attorney general's opinion, I
think that opinion was pointed to the point that, if a manual recount
was requested and received in one place and requested and not re-
ceived, pursuant to state law, in another case, that would involve a
disparity. I don't think that opinion addresses the situation where
you have a request in certain counties but no request in other coun-
ties. There has never been a suggestion, under the state law, that
you should have a recount where it was not requested.
11 15
This issue arose several more times during the argument, and each
time it came up, Boies offered the same simple response: irrespective
of whether the punch card problem affected other counties, a court
hearing a contest should consider only those ballots that a party has
specifically contested. 1 6 At no point did he ever attempt to explain
why interpreting the statute that way should not be seen as unfair or
unconstitutional, and at no point did he ever try to justify why the
counties at issue were chosen.
Several of the justices also seemed to be searching for limits on
Gore's broad interpretation of the contest statute, but Boies neither
identified any limits nor offered any meaningful reason why the legis-
lature would have conferred upon the courts the power to count bal-
lots anew. Justice Quince asked whether a party contesting a
certification should be required to have first brought a protest, 11 7 and
Boies responded that he thought not, that protests and contests were
simply alternative, optional remedies for a candidate." ' 8 Chief Justice
Wells pointed out that the contest statute required that canvassing
boards be named as defendants, and asked why that should not be
read to suggest that the courts were only supposed to review the can-
vassing boards' actions. Boies simply invoked the statutory language
again, which directed courts to decide only whether there were legal
1115. Id. at 4.
1116. See id. at 5 (colloquy with Justice Anstead); id. at 6 (colloquy with Justice
Pariente).
1117. Id. at 6. In context, it was apparent that Justice Quince was actually referring
to a request for a recount, as opposed to a true "protest," because in her question she
described Gore as having already brought what she called a "protest," and yet Gore
actually never did invoke the "protest" procedure. See id.
1118. Id. at 6.
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votes that had been rejected. 1119 Finally, Justice Anstead asked why
the legislature would set up two procedures-one at the canvassing
board level and one at the judicial level-to perform essentially the
same task. Boies's response was almost amusing.
A .... With respect to the reason for 166 and 168, we believe that
168 [sic] 1120 was intended, by the legislature, to promote the certifi-
cation process, to get that process done, and that is the responsibil-
ity of the canvassing boards. As this court held, in Harris, once that
certification is done, the responsibility shifts, from the canvassing
boards to the courts. Now, there aren't very many contests. Usually
people accept the results of the canvassing boards. You have a con-
test, only when some party believes they have got a legitimate rea-
son for it .... 1121
In effect, Boies was saying that the legislature would have allowed the
courts hearing contests to disregard the actions of the canvassing
boards simply because contests would not happen very often.
Barry Richard, arguing for Bush, did not fare much better. Early in
the argument, Richard committed a major gaffe. As he had done with
Boies, Chief Justice Wells turned Richard immediately to the McPher-
son case, noting that Bush had never mentioned the case in the first
proceeding before the Florida court, and yet had argued the case
forcefully before the United States Supreme Court.'1 22 Then Justice
Harding asked the same question that had been put to Boies: did the
Florida Supreme Court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, given that
the contest statute expressly provided only for a circuit court ac-
tion?1 23 Inexplicably, Richard said, "Indeed."'
1 24
One might have thought that Richard had simply misunderstood
the question, but Justice Anstead, no doubt surprised at Richard's an-
swer, repeated it, and Richard unmistakably took the position that
McPherson had no effect on the court's appellate jurisdiction.
Q. [by Justice Anstead] The bottom line, if I understand it, of
your answer to the chief justice's question, is that this court does
have appellate jurisdiction over the trial court's ruling. Do I under-
stand that to be your answer?
A. I think that this court has limited appellate jurisdiction over-
Q. [by Justice Anstead] And that the McPherson case, the federal
McPherson case, not this court's McPherson case, it does not affect
that appellate jurisdiction?
1119. Id.
1120. It seems most likely that Boies misspoke here, and intended to refer to section
166 rather than section 168, inasmuch as 168 does nothing to "promote the certifica-
tion process." Id. at 20.
1121. Id. (emphasis added).
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A. No sir. I certainly believe that this court has the ability to
review what a circuit court did, to determine whether the circuit
court violated the traditional rules of-
Q. [by Justice Anstead] Much in the way we would be reviewing
it, if was another, county commissioner or an election for some
other office, a member of Congress, and a contest was brought.
A. Precisely, your honor .... 5
It was as though Richard did not even grasp the significance of the
question, that the justices were giving him the opportunity to argue
that McPherson precluded them from relying on the jurisdiction con-
ferred by the state constitution. Richard's failure to appreciate the
argument was especially strange because the justices had actually
spelled out the theory at the very beginning of Boies's argument only
moments earlier.
1 12 6
Indeed, Richard's mistake was so egregious that Bush's lawyers
filed a "Clarification" the next morning.' 127 The "Clarification" did
not expressly retract Richard's answer, but did emphasize, coinciden-
tally, that the Florida court was dependent on the Florida Constitution
for its jurisdiction and that McPherson precluded reliance on the state
constitution.' 128 Bush also argued in the "Clarification," for the first
time, that section 102.168 did not even apply to presidential elections,
and so Gore's entire action was without a legal basis.
1 29
During the remainder of Richard's argument, it became clear that
many of the justices were not persuaded by Bush's contention that a
court hearing a contest action was limited to reviewing the actions of
the canvassing boards for abuse of discretion.' 130 Instead, several jus-
tices honed in tightly on the language of the contest statute itself, and
the fact that Judge Sauls had imposed on Gore the burden of showing
a reasonable probability of a different outcome before Judge Sauls
would even look at the ballots. Justice Lewis asked Richard what evi-
dence it would take to satisfy the statutory element of placing the
election outcome "in doubt." 113' Justices Quince and Pariente like-
wise focused on the statutory ground, "changing or placing in doubt"
the outcome, and observed that Judge Sauls's "reasonable
1125. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added).
1126. See supra notes 1106-13 and accompanying text.
1127. Clarification of Argument for Appellees George W. Bush and Dick Cheney,
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.) (No. SCOO-2431), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
1128. See id. at 2 n.1, 5-6.
1129. See id. at 6-8.
1130. Justice Lewis pointed out, for example, that Bush's insistence on an abuse of
discretion standard would mean that any circumstances that came to light after the
canvassing board had certified the vote totals-perhaps a lost ballot box-could not
be the subject of a contest proceeding. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1105,
at 10. Richard essentially sidestepped Justice Lewis's observation, saying simply,
"We don't find ourselves in that posture." Id.
1131. Id. at 10-13.
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probability" standard did not appear in the contest statute. 132 Justice
Pariente recited subsection 8 of section 102.168,133 which directs a
contest court to "ensure that each allegation in the complaint is inves-
tigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged
wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under such circum-
stances."' 134 This was "rather unusual language," Justice Pariente
said, that was specifically added in 1999, and she found it hard to un-
derstand how Judge Sauls could have complied with it if he refused
even to look at the ballots.
135
Apart from the discussions already described-those regarding Mc-
Pherson's effect on the court's jurisdiction and Justice Harding's con-
cern that counting only selected undervotes seemed at best unfair and
at worst constitutionally questionable-the court did not question the
attorneys for Gore and Bush on any federal law issues. Joseph Klock,
however, the attorney for Katherine Harris and the state Elections
Canvassing Commission, took it upon himself to delve more deeply
into the federal issues. Seizing upon the Chief Justice's comments
about McPherson, Klock cited the United States Supreme Court's
opinion, and warned the court that it must not do anything that might
be construed as changing the law enacted by the legislature: "what
you need to do, is you need to be careful in terms of construing stat-
utes or remedies to not do anything that would constitute a change in
the law, because if that is done, then that places in jeopardy ... , the
safe harbor [of § 5]. ' ' 1136
Justice Lewis questioned Klock further on the point, and wondered
aloud how merely interpreting and applying section 102.168 could end
up being characterized as "changing the law."" 3 7 And Klock was not
hesitant in telling the court where it might go wrong:
[T]he problem is that you have to create a pile of law to [apply the
contest statute here]. You have to do a number of things. You have
to, first, find that, in a presidential race where you are electing 27
electors, that you can do it on a county by county basis, then you
have to figure out a way of having the contest statute used to estab-
lish a standard, when the only standard that applied anywhere for a
manual recount ... was limited to the situation in [section] 166,...
and that calls for finding the voters' intent, but it, also, adds three
specific people that are in a uniform basis throughout the state, the
combination of whatever the voters' intent is plus the three people
is what is done there. We go from there to a circuit judge in Leon
County who then, I suppose, has to come up with a standard that is
not articulated in the law, and as your honor pointed out, each time
1132. Id. at 14-16.
1133. Id. at 9-10.
1134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001).
1135. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1105, at 9-10.
1136. Id. at 16-17.
1137. Id. at 18.
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you asked the question, you talked about legislation in other states.
That is where it has to come from. There is no indication that the
Florida legislature intended, by acknowledging and respecting the
power of the state judiciary to interpret laws, that the judiciary
would be in a position of having to create the standards that would
be applied in this kind of situation. That is the problem we
have.
138
The response could have been more eloquent, but it no doubt left its
mark. The court was officially on notice that there could be a federal
law problem, under either § 5 or the electoral appointments clause, if
it went outside the legislature's own words to set a more precise stan-
dard for evaluating the ballots.
C. The Court's Decision: Gore v. Harris
Not much more than twenty-four hours after the oral argument, on
Friday, December 8, the Florida Supreme Court handed down its rul-
ing in Gore v. Harris.1139 The decision was split, 4-3, in favor of re-
versing Judge Sauls.' 140 The opinion for the court was issued per
curiam; the Chief Justice and Justice Harding wrote dissents, the for-
mer flatly predicting reversal by the United States Supreme Court."
141
In many respects, the court's decision was not surprising, because it
reflected many of the doubts about Judge Sauls's ruling that the jus-
tices had expressed at oral argument. The majority, as well as two of
the three dissenters, saw no basis in the contest statute for Judge Sauls
to have limited Gore to proving that the canvassing boards had
abused their discretion. 142 The same six justices also concluded that
Judge Sauls had improperly required Gore to demonstrate a "reasona-
ble probability" of a different outcome. 143 All six noted that Judge
Sauls had relied on a 1982 case, Smith v. Tynes,1 14 4 that predated the
1999 amendment to section 102.168, which significantly expanded the
grounds upon which a candidate could base a contest action and al-
lowed a plaintiff to show only that there were legal votes rejected suf-
ficient to "change or place in doubt the result of the election."
' 1 45
Finally, and most importantly, all seven members of the court re-
1138. Id.
1139. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
1140. See id. at 1260-62.
1141. See id. at 1247; id. at 1262-63 (Wells, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1270 (Harding, J.,
dissenting). Justice Shaw joined Justice Harding's dissent. Id. at 1262. Chief Justice
Wells also joined Justice Harding's dissent except for the portion in which Justice
Harding found that Judge Sauls erred in certain respects and the portion in which
Justice Harding agreed with Gore that sections 102.166 and 102.168 provided inde-
pendent remedies. Id. at 1262-63.
1142. See id. at 1252; id. at 1270-71 (Harding, J., dissenting).
1143. See id. at 1255-56; id. at 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting).
1144. 412 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1145. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1.255 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168
(West Supp. 2001)); id. at 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting) (quoting same).
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mained as troubled as they had seemed at oral argument that Gore
had proved a systemic problem with undervotes and yet sought man-
ual counts of only two of Florida's sixty-seven counties.
146
Of course, if these substantive conclusions were no surprise, the
same could not be said of the majority's remedy of the problem of
recounting only in selected counties. Rather than conclude, as Judge
Sauls and the three dissenters did, that Gore's focus on the undervotes
of only two counties was fatal to his cause of action, 147 the majority
decided that Gore had successfully placed the category of undervotes
in issue, and at that point it became the court's responsibility to ex-
pand the action statewide.'
148
The majority began by parsing the statutory ground Gore had in-
voked: "'rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or
place in doubt the result of the election.'" 1149 To determine what con-
stituted a "legal vote" under the statute, the majority turned to the
Florida Code. Section 101.5614(5), the court pointed out, stated that
"'[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a clear indica-
tion of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing
board,"' and section 101.5614(6) provided that a ballot should be dis-
carded if the canvassing board could not determine the intent of the
voter. ' 50 Further, section 102.166, the statute governing manual re-
1146. See id. at 1252-55; id. at 1265 (Wells, C.J. dissenting); id. at 1271-72 (Harding,
J., dissenting). The reader will recall that Gore's contest action sought to have in-
cluded in the certification 215 net votes identified by the Palm Beach Board from
undervoted ballots; 160 net votes identified by the Miami-Dade Board from un-
dervoted ballots before the board halted its recount; however many net votes could
be identified from 3300 ballots Gore claimed that Palm Beach had improperly failed
to count as votes; and however many net votes could be identified from 9000 ballots
that Miami-Dade never manually reviewed. See supra note 759 and accompanying
text. The results of manual recounts from two counties-Volusia (which used an opti-
cal scanning method of voting) and Broward (which used punch card voting)-had
already been included in the certification that was the subject of the contest action.
See supra notes 408, 710 and accompanying text. Early in the contest action, Bush
had threatened to cross-contest the inclusion of these results, but ultimately he did
not do so. See supra note 783 and accompanying text.
1147. See supra note 903 and accompanying text (describing Judge Sauls's ruling on
this point); Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1265-66 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (concluding
that Gore needed to have proven that there were enough votes for him in the un-
dervotes statewide to change the outcome of the election and the trial court properly
concluded that he did not); id. at 1271-72 (Harding, J., dissenting) (concluding the
same).
1148. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1254-55.
1149. Id. at 1253 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West Supp. 2001)).
1150. Id. at 1256 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5), (6) (West Supp. 2001)).
Chief Justice Wells objected strenuously to the -majority's willingness to cite section
101.5614(5) for the "voter's intent" definition of a legal vote because section 101.5614
addresses situations where a ballot cannot be read by a machine because it is "dam-
aged or defective," not ballots generally. Id. at 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Supp. 2001)). The Chief Justice's observation
about subsection (5) was correct. On the other hand, the other subsection of section
101.5614 cited by the majority-subsection (6)-does appear to address ballots gener-
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counts, cast the issue in terms of discerning "voter intent": "'[i]f a
counting team is unable to determine a voter's intent in casting a bal-
lot, the ballot shall be presented to the county canvassing board for it
to determine the voter's intent.' '1151 From these references, sup-
ported by Florida case law and case law from other states, the court
concluded that a "legal vote" was any ballot on which there was a
"'clear indication of the intent of the voter.' "1152
To determine what constituted "rejection" of a "legal vote," the ma-
jority turned to Florida common law. It did so because the Florida
House had indicated when it enacted the current version of section
102.168 that its intent was to codify the common law grounds for con-
testing an election, one of which was the ground now being invoked
by Gore. 1 53 Having justified its resort to common law, the majority
cited a 1935 case in which the court had considered a candidate's
claim that there was a group of ballots that had gone uncounted.' 
54
In that case, the court had held that the mere rejection of votes, unac-
companied by fraud, was not a sufficient basis on which to overturn an
election, unless the number of uncounted votes was enough to change
the outcome." 55 From this the majority concluded that the "rejec-
tion" of votes referred to in section 102.168 could include failure to
count votes, even in the absence of any fraud, so long as the number
of votes uncounted was high enough to change the outcome.1 156
With "legal votes" defined as any ballots from which a clear indica-
tion of the voter's intent could be drawn, and "rejection" defined as a
failure to count a number of votes sufficient to change the outcome,
the majority found that Gore had satisfied his burden of proof by
showing that there were thousands of undervoted ballots and that
hundreds of legal votes had been recovered from them."1 57 Thus,
ally, and calls for discarding of ballots when "it is impossible to determine the elec-
tor's choice." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(6) (West Supp. 2001).
1151. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1256 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(7)(b)).
1152. See id. at 1256-57 (citing McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla.
1944) (en banc); State ex rel. Peacock v. Latham, 169 So. 597, 598 (Fla. 1936); Board-
man v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975); Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241
(Mass. 1996); Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1993); Pullen v. Mulligan,
561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Il1. 1990)).
1153. See id. at 1257 (citing H.R. 281, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 7 (Fla. 1999)).
1154. Id. (citing State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 163 So. 704 (Fla. 1935)).
1155. See id. (quoting State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 163 So. 704, 705 (Fla.
1935)).
1156. See id.
1157. See id. at 1256-57. The court never seriously questioned whether the number
of undervotes Gore had shown was sufficient to "change or place in doubt" the out-
come; it was enough that the margin between Gore and Bush was in the hundreds and
the number of undervotes in the thousands. See id. at 1261 ("The votes for each
candidate that have been counted are separated by no more than approximately 500
votes and may be separated by as little as approximately 100 votes. Thousands of
uncounted votes could obviously make a difference."). Justice Harding, joined in his
dissent by Justice Shaw and Chief Justice Wells, took a very different view. The dis-
senters would have required Gore to demonstrate that he could reasonably be ex-
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Gore was entitled to all of the votes that the Miami-Dade and Palm
Beach boards had already identified during their respective re-
counts.1 a58 Further, he was entitled to have the court review the 9000
ballots from Miami-Dade that did not register as votes to determine if
any of those ballots reflected a "clear indication of the voter's intent"
such that they must be considered "legal votes."'1 5 9
The majority did not feel, however, that Gore's showing was
enough to end the court's inquiry. The legislature had directed courts
hearing contests "to provide any relief appropriate under [the] cir-
cumstances," ' 160 and granting Gore's requested relief "would not be
'appropriate under such circumstances' if it failed to address the 'oth-
erwise valid exercise of the right of a citizen to vote' of all those citi-
zens of this State who, being similarly situated, have had their legal
votes rejected."'1 6 A compromise-acknowledging the legal votes al-
ready identified by the two counties where Gore had requested re-
pected to net from the undervotes statewide a gain sufficient to place the outcome in
doubt, and Gore's showing was deficient because it focused only on Miami-Dade and
Palm Beach (two highly Democratic counties that presumably might be canceled out
by undervote gains for Bush in other counties). See id. at 1272 ("Appellants failed,
however, to provide any meaningful statistical evidence that the outcome of the Flor-
ida election would be different if the 'no-vote' in other counties had been counted;
their proof that the outcome of the vote in two counties would likely change the
results of the election was insufficient.").
1158. See id. at 1260 ("Because the county canvassing boards identified legal votes
and these votes could change the outcome of the election, we hold that the trial court
erred in rejecting the legal votes identified in the Miami-Dade and Palm Beach
County manual recounts."). The court rejected the trial court's ruling that the votes
identified by Palm Beach should not be included because the recount was not com-
pleted by the November 26 deadline on the ground that the deadline was established
only "in order to allow maximum time for contests pursuant to section 102.168" not to
exclude legal votes identified later. Id. There was some question, however, as to how
many net votes had been identified-Gore claimed he had gained 215, and Bush
claimed Gore had gained only 176-and the court directed the trial court to resolve
that issue. Id. at 1248 n.6. With respect to the votes identified by Miami-Dade in its
partial recount, the court found it proper to include those because, under its ruling,
the recount would encompass the entire county's undervotes. See id. at 1260.
1159. See id. at 1260-61 ("On this record there can be no question that there are
legal votes within the 9000 uncounted votes sufficient to place the results of this elec-
tion in doubt. We know this not only by evidence of statistical analysis but also by the
actual experience of recounts conducted.") (emphasis in original). The court did not
reverse the trial court's decisions not to amend Nassau County's certification by re-
turning to the results of the automatic recount and not to reevaluate the 3300 ballots
on which the Palm Beach board did not find a vote. With respect to the Nassau
board's decision, the court held simply that "appellants did not establish that the Nas-
sau County Canvassing Board acted improperly." Id. at 1260. With respect to the
Palm Beach ballots, the court held that even though a trial court in a contest action
should make a de novo determination of whether contested ballots should have been
counted as votes, evidence of a proper count by the canvassing board could be evi-
dence used to conclude that legal votes were not rejected. See id.
1160. Id. at 1254-55, 1261 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001)).
1161. Id. at 1254-55 (alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8)
(West Supp. 2001), and unidentified source).
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counts, but also the possibility that there were uncounted legal votes
in the undervoted ballots in other counties-was necessary, and it re-
quired that the court remand the case for the circuit court to conduct a
review of all undervoted ballots statewide:
162
While we recognize that time is desperately short, we cannot in
good faith ignore the appellants' right to relief as to their claims
concerning the uncounted votes in Miami-Dade County, nor can we
ignore the correctness of the assertions that any analysis and ulti-
mate remedy should be made on a statewide basis.'1
63
To accomplish this, the court instructed the circuit court of Leon
County "to order the Supervisor of Elections and the Canvassing
Boards, as well as the necessary public officials, in all counties that
have not conducted a manual recount or tabulation of the undervotes
in this election to do so forthwith,.... in the individual counties where
the ballots are located."" 164 The court acknowledged that such an or-
der would require that county officials all over the state work over the
weekend, but expressed its confidence that with cooperation, the un-
dervotes statewide could be counted within the "required time
frame."' 165 At the time the court issued its decision, the county can-
vassing boards had reported that there were at least 44,559 un-
dervoted ballots to be reviewed.
1166
However confident the court may have been that the counting of
undervotes could be completed quickly, it did not offer the county
canvassing boards any specific rules on evaluating the three-corner
chads, two-corner chads, pattern dimples, rogue dimples and pin-
pricked ballots that at least the punch card counties were likely to
encounter. The only guidance the court provided was a single sen-
tence, what was literally the final sentence of the court's opinion. In
determining what constitutes a "legal" vote, the court wrote, "the
standard to be employed is that established by the Legislature in our
Election Code[,] which is that the vote shall be counted as a 'legal'
vote if there is 'clear indication of the intent of the voter."' 
1 167
Both of the dissents warned that the majority's decision would bring
the election to a chaotic end. 1 68 To Chief Justice Wells, the majority's
1162. See id. at 1262.
1163. Id. at 1261.
1164. Id. at 1262.
1165. Id. at 1262 n.22.
1166. NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 311, at 285 (providing a chart drawn from re-
ports as of December 9, 2000 by the fifty canvassing boards, out of sixty-seven, who
had tallied the number of undervoted ballots in their counties). The number in the
text is the total number of reported undervoted ballots (62,327) reduced by the 17,768
undervoted ballots that had already been counted in Palm Beach, Broward and Volu-
sia Counties. See id.
1167. Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1262.
1168. See id. at 1269 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (extraordinary relief cannot be granted
to complainant even when he would ordinarily be entitled to it if it will result in
"'confusion and disorder and will produce an injury to the public which outweighs the
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decision "propel[led] this country and this state into an unprecedented
and unnecessary constitutional crisis," largely because allowing
"county-by-county decisions regarding how a dimpled chad is counted
is fraught-with equal protection concerns which will eventually cause
the election results in Florida to be stricken by the federal courts or
Congress."' 1 69 Justice Harding spoke somewhat more softly, declining
to expressly indict the decision as unconstitutional, but he fully agreed
that the recounts would be unreliable: "Even if such a recount were
possible, speed would come at the expense of accuracy, and it would
be difficult to put any faith or credibility in a vote total achieved under
such chaotic conditions."'
1 70
The dissents further agreed that it was impossible to have a final
outcome by December 12, as they believed federal § 5 required, to
avoid endangering Florida's vote in the electoral college. Chief Jus-
tice Wells wrote:
Assuming the majority recognizes a need to protect the votes of
Florida's presidential electors, the entire contest must be completed
"at least six days before" December 18, 2000, the day the presiden-
tial electors meet to vote. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) ....
... I respectfully submit this cannot be completed without taking
Florida's presidential electors outside the safe harbor provision, cre-
ating the very real possibility of disenfranchising those nearly six
million voters who were able to correctly cast their ballots on elec-
tion day.1171
Justice Harding expressed much the same thought, if in a somewhat
less indignant tone: "Even if by some miracle a portion of the state-
wide recount is completed by December 12, a partial recount is not
acceptable . . . . The circumstances . . . call to mind a quote from
football coaching legend Vince Lombardi: 'We didn't lose the game,
we just ran out of time.'"1
172
The majority devoted little discussion to the dissents' complaints.
In its statement of the "applicable law," the majority acknowledged its
duty to hew closely to the Election Code enacted by the legisla-
ture, 1 73 and stated that it was "cognizant of the federal grant of au-
thority derived from the United States Constitution and derived from
3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994)," even quoting § 5 in its entirety. 1174 But the jus-
individual right of the complainant'") (quoting State ex rel. Pooser v. Wester, 170 So.
736, 738-39 (Fla. 1936)); id. at 1273 (Harding, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority is de-
parting from the essential requirements of the law by providing a remedy which is
impossible to achieve and which will ultimately lead to chaos.").
1169. Id. at 1263, 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
11.70. Id. at 1273 (Harding, J., dissenting).
1171. Id. at 1268-69 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
1172. See id. at 1273 (Harding, J., dissenting).
1173. See id. at 1248-49 ("These statutes established by the Legislature govern our
decision today.").
1174. Id. at 1248.
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tices did not discuss the meaning of the electoral appointments clause
or federal § 5, and they refused to let the calendar or the extraordi-
nary logistical issues govern the outcome:
The dissents would have us throw up our hands and say that be-
cause of looming deadlines and practical difficulties we should give
up any attempt to have the election of the presidential electors rest
upon the vote of Florida citizens as mandated by the Legislature.
While we agree that practical difficulties may well end up control-
ling the outcome of the election we vigorously disagree that we
should therefore abandon our responsibility to resolve this election
dispute under the rule of law. We can only do the best we can to
carry out our sworn duties to the justice system and its role in this
process. We, and our dissenting colleagues, have simply done the
best we can, and remain confident that others charged with similar
heavy responsibilities will also do the best they can to fulfill their
responsibilities as they see them.
1 75
D. The Remand
The Florida court's order to begin counting "forthwith" set in mo-
tion a remarkable chain of events. By 6:50 that evening, Judge Sauls
had recused himself from the case and requested its reassignment, in a
written order offering no explanation. 1 76 The case was then assigned
to Judge Terry Lewis, the same judge who had handled Gore's request
to force Katherine Harris to accept recount results after the seven-day
deadline,' 177 and the same judge who had ruled for Bush earlier the
same day in the Martin County absentee ballot case. 1 78 Judge Lewis
held a hearing that evening on the content of his order to the counties,
a hearing convened so quickly that the court reporter transcribed the
proceedings by watching them on C-Span rather than coming to the
courthouse. 
179
At the hearing, Bush's lawyers pressed Judge Lewis to establish a
more specific, and uniform, standard for the counties to use in evalu-
ating their ballots."' 80 Lewis declined to do so." 81 Of course, under
the circumstances, Lewis's decision was actually exactly what the
Republicans were hoping for. As he left the courthouse, Bush lawyer
1175. Id. at 1.261 n.21.
1176. Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000) (order by which Judge
Sauls recused himself).
1177. See supra notes 386-99 and accompanying text.
1178. See Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2850 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec.
8) (final judgment for defendants), affd, 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000); see also supra
note 439 and accompanying text (describing the absentee ballot cases involving Semi-
nole and Martin Counties).
1179. David Firestone, A 4-to-3 Decision: Statewide Tally Set for Uncounted Votes-
Deadline Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2000, at Al.
1180. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 209.




Ben Ginsberg chided David Boies: "This is so bad it's good."' 18 2 And
Bush co-counsel George Terwilliger told reporters, "It's exactly the
kind of chaotic, confusing, standardless situation that we had warned
the U.S. Supreme Court about."
' 11 83
By the next morning, Saturday, December 9, Judge Lewis had sent
each of the Florida counties a written order to begin reviewing any
undervoted ballots.1184 Judge Lewis told the counties that they should
bring in as many counting teams as necessary, preferably using county
judges, to complete the count by 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, December
10.1185 The counties were also directed to fax Judge Lewis a report of
their planned "protocol" for counting the votes by 10:00 a.m. Saturday
morning, and include in the report an estimate of the time it would
take to complete the count and any anticipated difficulties. 86 In
evaluating the ballots, the counties were to decide only whether there
was a "clear indication of the intent of the voter."'' 18 7 Until each
county's count was complete, there was to be no reporting, formal or
informal, of partial results.' 
1 88
IX. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT PROCEEDING ON THE
STATEWIDE COUNT: BUSH V. GORE
Bush responded to the Florida court's order for a statewide recount
with immediate filings in both the Eleventh Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court. In the Eleventh Circuit, Bush asked the court
both to stay Florida's counting of undervotes pending the resolution
of his Supreme Court petition for writ of certiorari"18 9 and to rehear
his appeal from the district court's order denying him an injunc-
tion. 1 9° The full court of appeals quickly denied both requests, but
did enjoin Florida from certifying the results of the counting until the
1182. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 210.
1183. Id.
1184. See Gore v. Harris, No. 00-2808, at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 2000) (order on
remand).
1185. Id. at 1-3.
1186. Id. at 3.
1187. Id. at 2 (counting the Miami-Dade ballots, "[i]n determining if a legal vote has
been cast, the standard to be applied is: if there is a 'clear indication of the intent of
the voter' then the vote should be counted"); id. at 3 (counting other than Miami-
Dade ballots, "[t]he standard to be applied in determining what is a legal vote ...
shall be the same as noted above for the counting of the Miami-Dade County votes").
The judge expressly refused to give the counties any specific criteria by which they
might apply the "intent of the voter" standard, noting that some of the parties had
requested that he set forth such criteria, but "[t]he Florida Supreme Court has been
asked at least twice recently to do so and has specifically declined." Id. at 2 n.1.
1188. Id. at 2 (counting the Miami-Dade ballots, "[n]o partial recounts will be done
or reported, formally or informally"); id. at 3 (counting other than Miami-Dade bal-
lots, "the method of reporting shall be the same as noted above for the counting of
the Miami-Dade County votes").
1189. Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1116, 1162 (11th Cir. 2000).
1190. See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1218, 1219 (11th Cir. 2000).
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Supreme Court had acted on Bush's petition.1 91 In the Supreme
Court, Bush filed an emergency application for a stay with Justice
Kennedy, the circuit justice for the Eleventh Circuit, asking for the
relief pending his filing and the disposition of a petition for writ of
certiorari.' 1
92
A. Bush's Emergency Application for a Stay
In his Supreme Court stay application, filed Friday night, December
8, Bush claimed that the Florida Supreme Court had violated the elec-
toral appointments clause, federal § 5, and the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses. 93 The Florida decision violated the electoral ap-
pointments clause, Bush argued, because (1) the state legislature had
not conferred on the Florida Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over contest proceedings; (2) the legislature had not authorized con-
test proceedings in the context of presidential elections; (3) the legisla-
ture had not authorized partial manual recounts like the count the
court had set in motion (of undervotes only); (4) the Florida court had
relied on its earlier decision, which the Supreme Court had vacated;
and (5) the Florida court had permitted court officials to decide that
dimpled ballots could be votes, in conflict with the legislature's direc-
tive that the only ballots to be treated as votes were those that can-
vassing boards decided reflected a "clear indication" of the intent of
the voter.' 194 The Florida court had violated federal § 5, according to
Bush, because the law as it stood on Election Day (1) conferred on
only the canvassing boards the discretion to order manual recounts;
(2) did not permit dimpled ballots to be counted as votes; (3) did not
allow for manual recounts of ballots that went uncounted due to voter
error, rather than machine error; and (4) did not authorize the stan-
dard by which Palm Beach County had identified votes the Florida
court included. 1 95 Finally, the Florida court had violated the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses because it had ordered the count
without establishing any uniform standard for evaluating the ballots,
thus ensuring that ballots would be evaluated differently from one
county to the next and even within counties (such as Miami-Dade,
where the canvassing board evaluated the first set of undervotes and a
panel of Leon County judges would be evaluating the remainder)." 96
1191. Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1162; Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1219.
1192. Emergency Application for a Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment Below
Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Su-
preme Court of Florida (filed Dec. 8, 2000), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (No.
SC00-949 (00A504)) [hereinafter Emergency Application for a Stay, Bush v. Gore].
1193. See id. at 29-30, 34-39.
1194. Id. at 23-27; see supra notes 1162-65 and accompanying text (discussing
undervotes).
1195. See id. at 30-31 & n.8, 32-33.
1196. Id. at 36-38. Bush's equal protection theory was based on Supreme Court
cases, particularly O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377
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Bush contended that he would suffer irreparable injury if the count-
ing continued,' 197 because Gore might be declared the winner right on
the eve of December 12 and Bush would then have insufficient time to
have the decision reversed in time for his slate of electors to be pro-
tected by the safe harbor of § 5.198 As Bush put it:
The Florida Supreme Court's decision raises a reasonable possibility
that the November 26 certification of Governor Bush as the winner
of Florida's electoral votes will be called into doubt-or purport to
be withdrawn-at a time when the December 12 deadline for nam-
ing Florida's electors could preclude Applicants' ability to seek
meaningful review by this Court. 
11
99
The State of Florida, according to Bush, would suffer much the same
harm, because it too would be denied the conclusive effect of a pro-
ceeding completed by December 12.1200 Finally, the "integrity of th[e]
presidential election could be seriously undermined," because the
vote totals resulting from the counting would be "incurable in the
public consciousness and, once announced, cannot be retracted.' 120
Responding to Bush's application, Gore argued that Bush's claim of
irreparable harm in the absence of a stay-because the counting
risked his ability to claim the safe harbor of § 5-was "manifestly
wrong. '' 120 2 Gore acknowledged that Bush could lose the benefit of
the safe harbor if the case were not resolved by December 12,1203 but
pointed out that the counting had nothing to do with that risk.
Even if Governor Bush is correct in all of his assertions-and in his
further argument that the election contest is somehow "tainted by
U.S. 533, 554 (1964), that Bush said prohibited "governmental officials from imple-
menting an electoral system that operates to give the votes of similarly situated voters
different effect based on the happenstance of the county or district in which those
voters live." Id. at 34-35 (citing Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 712 (1964); WMCA,
Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 653 (1964)). Bush's due process claim focused on what
he called the "arbitrary, capricious, and standardless manual recount being used,"
which would likely be "influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the officials' de-
sire for a particular result," and could not possibly be accurate. See id. at 38-39.
1197. For a federal court to issue a stay of a lower court order, a court must consider
whether the applicant has shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of the
appeal, whether the applicant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay,
whether a stay would substantially injure the non-applicant, and whether granting or
denying the stay will serve the public interest. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987).
1198. See Emergency Application for a Stay, Bush v. Gore, supra note 1192, at 39.
1199. Id.
1200. See id. at 40-41.
1201. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Emergency Application for a Stay
of Enforcement of the Judgment Below Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida at 5-6 (filed Dec. 9,
2000), Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (SCOO-949 (00A504)).
1202. Opposition of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr. to Emergency Motion for a Stay
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the Florida Supreme Court's unauthorized and unlawful rewrite of
the legislative structure," a point that we address below-a stay
would be completely irrelevant to his claimed injury. Governor
Bush can achieve his objective of a conclusive resolution to this dis-
pute by December 12 in only one of two ways: (1) the count can go
forward and the courts can enter a final judgment [in Bush's favor]
by December 12, or (2) this Court can grant review and determine
that Governor Bush is entitled to prevail in the contest by that date.
A stay of the count obviously does nothing to advance either of
these goals, and thus does literally nothing to avoid the irreparable
injury of which Governor Bush complains.'
20 4
The reality, Gore argued, was that denying the stay would do nothing
to Bush's ability to claim the safe harbor of § 5, while granting the
stay-thus stopping the counting Gore needed to have completed to
have any chance of winning by December 12-would ensure that Gore
could not claim the safe harbor.1
2 0 5
B. The Stay Ruling and the Justices' Different Views on the
"Cloud of Illegitimacy"
As it happened, Gore's worst fears came to pass. Shortly before
3:00 in the afternoon on Saturday, December 9, as county officials
across Florida were in the midst of efforts to count the undervotes, the
Supreme Court granted Bush's application. 20 6 Split five justices to
four, the Court stayed the Florida order, treated Bush's application as
a petition for writ of certiorari and granted it, ordered briefs to be
filed the next day by 4:00 p.m., and set the case down for oral argu-
ment on Monday, December 11.1207 The majority did not reveal its
reasoning.
Justice Stevens wrote an opinion for the four dissenting justices.
120 8
Its tone was civil: the majority has "acted unwisely," it said.120 9 To
Justice Stevens, however, it was quite clear that Bush had not shown
irreparable harm and that the stay might well cause irreparable harm
to Gore. "Counting every legally cast vote," Justice Stevens wrote,
"cannot constitute irreparable harm.' ' 1210 Rather, "there is a danger
that a stay may cause irreparable harm to respondents-and, more
1204. Id. at 8 (citation omitted) (quoting Emergency Application for a Stay, supra
note 1192, at 40).
1205. Id. at 9; see also id. at 2 ("Gov. Bush proposes a grossly inequitable asymme-
try: granting a stay of the vote count would have no bearing on his ability to benefit
from the safe harbor, but would substantially undercut Vice President Gore's hope of
invoking the provision.").
1206. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, Split 5-4, Halts Florida Count in Blow to
Gore: Bush Had Sought Stay-Hearing Is Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at
Al.
1207. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046-47 (2000).
1208. Id. at 1047-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




importantly, the public at large-because of the risk that 'the entry of
the stay would be tantamount to a decision on the merits in favor of
the applicants. '"1211 Stevens added that it was "certainly not clear"
that the Florida decision violated federal law, because the Florida
Code stated that "'[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there
is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the
canvassing board,"' and the Florida Supreme Court "gave weight to
that legislative command.'
' 212
Justice Stevens's dissent apparently compelled Justice Scalia to ex-
plain the decision to the American public.1 21 3 Concurring in the stay,
Justice Scalia took issue with Justice Stevens's reference to "counting
every legally cast vote., 1214 The issues, Scalia said, were whether the
votes being counted could even be considered "legal votes," and the
constitutionality of letting the standard for determining a legal vote
vary from county to county. 121 5 With that understood-that Florida
was counting votes of questionable legality-Scalia concluded that
Bush would suffer irreparable harm if the Court permitted the count
to continue: it would "cast ... a cloud upon what he claims to be the
legitimacy of his election."'
1216
Presumably because this conclusion on irreparable harm depended
on the premise that the counting was invalid, which was inescapably
an evaluation of the merits, Justice Scalia left no doubt about the ma-
jority's view of Bush's claims. "It suffices to say," Scalia wrote, "that
the issuance of the stay suggests that a majority of the Court, while
not deciding the issues presented, believe that petitioners have a sub-
stantial probability of success. 12 1 7 The statement should not have
been surprising, because a significant probability of reversal is always
required for a litigant to obtain a stay.121 8 But it was surely painful to
Gore to face a weekend of briefing and oral argument preparation
after such a stark declaration that the case was all but over.
The stay order stunned virtually everyone who had been following
the case. Justice Stevens included in his dissent a caustic retort to
Scalia's formulation of irreparable harm: "Preventing the recount
from being completed will inevitably cast a cloud on the legitimacy of
1211. Id. at 1047-48 (quoting Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 434
U.S. 1327, 1328 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1977)).
1212. See id. at 1048 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.5614(5), 102.166 (West Supp.
2001)).
1213. See id. at 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Though it is not customary for the
Court to issue an opinion in connection with its grant of a stay, I believe a brief
response is necessary to Justice Stevens' dissent.").
1214. Id. ("The issue is not, as the dissent puts it, whether '[c]ounting every legally
cast vote ca[n] constitute irreparable harm."').
1215. Id. at 1046-47.
1216. Id. at 1047.
1217. Id. at 1046.
1218. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895 (1983); Packwood v. Senate
Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1994).
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the election."1 219 Law professors were almost unanimously aston-
ished.1 22 0 Former Michigan Dean Terrance Sandalow, known for his
conservative judicial philosophy, has been quoted as saying the "bal-
ance of harms so unmistakably were on the side of Gore" that grant-
ing the stay was "incomprehensible.' 1 21 Indeed, Bush's own lawyers
have since indicated to media representatives that they were not at all
certain they could make the showing of irreparable harm necessary to
obtain a stay.
12 22
In fact, it was not really Bush at all who came up with the theory of
irreparable harm upon which Justice Scalia, and ostensibly the major-
ity, relied. In his stay application, for his personal showing of irrepara-
ble harm, Bush had relied entirely on the threat the counting
supposedly posed to his ability to invoke § 5's safe harbor. But Gore's
response to this theory was undeniably correct. Merely counting
would not make it impossible for Bush to win by December 12. The
only thing that would make it impossible would be the failure to finish
the case by that date, and an expedited Supreme Court ruling in favor
of Bush on the merits would have prevented any such failure.
No doubt Justice Scalia and the rest of the majority recognized this,
and so they converted into personal irreparable harm the argument
Bush had made with respect to the public interest: Bush's statement
that if the public heard the numbers shift in favor of Gore, the effect
on the "public consciousness" would be "incurable."' 1223 One has to
1219. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1048 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1220. See, e.g., Joe Battenfeld, Presidential Race Courting Chaos, BOSTON HERALD,
Dec. 10, 2000, at 2 ("'It is quite surprising for the court to have issued the stay in the
current time frame .... It's really not for the court to protect the Bush administration
from political embarrassment."' (quoting Gil Kujovich, Professor of Law, Vermont
Law School)); William E. Gibson, 5-4 Decision Orders Stay of Undervote Hand Count.
Gore, Bush to File Legal Briefs Today, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 2000, at Al
("'Nobody can figure out why the court is acting the way it is, so we can't predict what
it will do. But by the time they get to review these issues for whatever purpose, the
mere fact that they entered a stay may render the relief impossible.'" (quoting Don-
ald Jones, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law)); Bob Liff, High
Court's Deeply Divided: Justices Take Extraordinary Stance, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec.
10, 2000, at 4 ("'It's extraordinary.... This decision by the five justices will be talked
about for decades.'" (quoting Vikram Amar, Professor of Law, Hastings College of
the Law)); id. ("'What's particularly shocking ... is that this is a court that professes
again and again to be an opponent of judicial activism and to be a supporter of states'
rights."' (quoting Jeffrey Shaman, Professor of Law, DePaul University)); Terri
Somers, Courts Weave Tangled Web: U.S. Top Court's Ruling Sends Both Sides Back
to the Drawing Board, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 10, 2000, at Al ("'There was no
need to issue a stay .... If the Supreme Court wants to hear arguments on Monday
and decides the Florida Supreme Court was wrong, then it could order the Florida
Supreme Court not to include the ballots that were counted [during the recount]."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Steve Wermiel, Professor of Law, American Univer-
sity Washington College of Law)).
1221. Linda Greenhouse, Collision with Politics Risks Court's Legal Credibility, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at Al (quoting Sandalow).
1222. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 237, 245.
1223. See supra note 1201 and accompanying text.
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wonder, however, whether it was truly the public consciousness to-
ward the new president about which the Court was concerned. As one
commentator has aptly suggested:
No, the "irreparable harm" that filled the majority with dread was
the possibility that it might have to confront a vote count with Al
Gore in the lead.... Assuming the Bush-leaning Court was going to
invalidate the process by which Gore pulled ahead, that would put
the justices in the embarrassing position of snatching away a
victory.
1224
In other words, the case might not have purely satisfied the legal re-
quirement of irreparable harm to Bush, but knowing its plans to re-
verse, the majority feared irreparable harm to its own reputation.
In any event, the stay ruling brought the counts across Florida to an
abrupt halt. In nine of the counties, the counting was complete, and in
four others, the work was almost done.122 5 In Leon County, for exam-
ple, workers estimated that they had thirty minutes worth of work left,
and the Leon County judges counting the Miami-Dade ballots had
reviewed approximately half of the 9000.1226 On the basis of these
counties, Gore's attorneys claimed that Gore had picked up fifty-eight
votes. 227
In other counties, however, the counting had not even begun. In
Bradford County, this was because officials did not have the computer
software necessary to cull the undervoted ballots from the remain-
der.1228 In Clay County, officials were having trouble finding counting
teams. 229 In Bay County, the canvassing board had not decided what
to do, and had written Judge Lewis stating that it might ignore his
order.1230 Indeed, by the time the stay issued, only about half of the
counties had sent in the plan he had ordered them to submit four
hours earlier. 23'
The great irony, of course, is that it was in precisely those counties
in which the count was proceeding most smoothly that Bush's equal
protection argument was gaining the most steam, because the boards
were adopting bright-line rules that conflicted with one another. In
Hillsborough County, for example, the canvassing board decided to
count only "hanging chads," and so informed Judge Lewis. 232 In Pi-
1224. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 242-43.
1225. Id. at 243; Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling Stops
Florida's Election Workers in Their Tracks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at A43.
1226. Filkins & Canedy, supra note 1225.
1227. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 213; Filkins & Canedy, supra note 1225.
1228. Filkins & Canedy, supra note 1225.
1229. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 243 ("[A]s the Florida Times-Union of Jackson-
ville put it, 'most were at the grand opening of the BJ's Wholesale Club in Orange
Park.'").
1230. Id.; Filkins & Canedy, supra note 1225.
1231. Filkins & Canedy, supra note 1225.
1232. Id.
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nellas County, the board agreed to count some dimples, as long as
they appeared in a pattern on the ballot.1233 And in Suwannee
County, the board decided that it would not count any ballots as votes
unless all three members agreed, in contrast to the other boards who
would count based on a majority vote. 1234 Thus, in the end, the cost to
Gore of getting the votes counted quickly was strengthening Bush's
argument that similarly situated ballots were being treated differently.
One is left only to wonder how much of this "evidence" the nine jus-
tices heard.
C. The Parties' Briefs
With the stay, and particularly Justice Scalia's remarks that the ma-
jority expected to reverse, the case became Bush's to lose. So he held
fast to what was obviously a winning strategy, emphasizing the same
errors he had identified in his application for the stay.
12 35
Bush claimed that the Florida Supreme Court violated the electoral
appointments clause by "overriding" numerous provisions of Florida
law. 1236 Bush insisted that the Florida law did not allow for de novo
review of ballots by courts (rather than canvassing boards), recounts
of only part of a given county's ballots (the undervotes as opposed to
all of the ballots), or the counting of ballots that were merely dimpled,
rather than properly punched or marked, when such a practice had
been neither uniform throughout the state nor approved by the Secre-
tary of State. 237 To Bush, it was obvious that the legislature had
never empowered the judiciary to order such extraordinary relief: if
one could ask a court to do all these things by bringing a contest ac-
1233. Id.
1234. Id.
1235. Bush made only three changes in his argument from the stay application to the
brief on the merits. First, he essentially dropped his claim that the Florida court vio-
lated the electoral appointments clause by applying section 168 to a presidential elec-
tion. Compare Emergency Application for a Stay, Bush v. Gore, supra note 1192, at
25 (arguing that it violated the electoral appointments clause to apply section 168 to a
presidential election), with Brief for Petitioners at 19-33, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000) (No. 00-949) (mentioning nothing of the argument other than "assuming argu-
endo that the contest statute even applies to presidential elections," id. at 21). Sec-
ond, he expanded his list of § 5 violations from four in the stay application, see
Emergency Application for Stay, Bush v. Gore, supra note 1192, at 29-34; supra note
1195 and accompanying text (describing the § 5 claims in Bush's stay petition), to
nine in his brief on the merits, see Brief for Petitioners, Bush v. Gore, supra, at 19-40;
infra note 1245 and accompanying text (describing Bush's § 5 claims in his brief on
the merits). Finally, Bush added to his due process claim a complaint that he was
being denied meaningful opportunity to object to the counting of individual ballots.
Compare Emergency Application for a Stay, Bush v. Gore, supra note 1192, at 34-39,
and supra note 1196 and accompanying text (describing the equal protection and due
process claims in Bush's stay petition), with Brief for Petitioners, supra, at 49, and
infra notes 1251-59 and accompanying text (describing the same claims in Bush's
brief on the merits).
1236. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1235, at 21.
1237. See id. at 22-28.
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tion under section 168, why would anyone ever bother with the can-
vassing boards under section 166?1238
The Florida court had further defied the legislature's mandate,
Bush argued, by hearing the case at all.1239 Under Bush's reading of
McPherson, the Florida court was not permitted to rely in any way
upon the state constitution, and yet it had expressly invoked appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to the Florida Constitution. 1240 The contest stat-
ute, Bush pointed out, referred only to the circuit court's ability to
resolve election disputes, indicating that the legislature had not in-
tended to confer jurisdiction on the Florida appellate courts., 24'
Bush also claimed that the Florida court violated the electoral ap-
pointments clause by relying on its earlier decision in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v. Harris, which had been vacated six days
before, and to the remand of which the Florida court had not yet re-
sponded.12 42 The thrust of Bush's complaint was that the Florida
court had violated the clause in its initial decision to extend the dead-
line for certification, and unless the Supreme Court ultimately af-
firmed that initial decision, any vote totals pursuant to the extended
deadline were still in question.1 243 Thus, when the Florida court or-
dered the trial court to include votes counted after the deadline at
issue in the first case, it "extend[ed] the error of the November 21
decision," committed an "ongoing violation of McPherson and its re-
quirement that the legislature alone may define the method of ap-
pointing electors," and "flouted the mandate of [the Supreme]
Court."1
244
Having identified these "changes in the law" as constitutional viola-
tions, Bush complained of nine more respects in which the court had
deviated from the "laws enacted prior to" Election Day in "conflict[ ]
with" federal § 5. Bush objected that the existing law (1) did not au-
thorize the court's order of a statewide manual recount; (2) provided
for recounts by canvassing boards, and thus was rendered "superflu-
ous" by the court's interpretation of the contest statute; (3) did not
allow recounts of only the undervoted ballots; (4) did not allow courts
rather than canvassing boards to determine the validity of a ballot; (5)
did not authorize courts to determine the circumstances under which
manual recounts should be conducted; (6) did not allow "dimpled"
ballots to be counted as votes; (7) did not allow courts to review some
1238. See id. at 25.
1239. See id. at 28-31.
1240. Id. at 29 (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892)).
1241. Id. at 28 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(1) (West Supp. 2001)).
1242. Id. at 32 (citing Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78
(Fla. 2000), and referring to the disposition in Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262
(Fla. 2000), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)).
1243. See id. (votes identified after November 14 "could only possibly count if the
court's November 21, 2000, holding were still binding").
1244. Id. at 31-32.
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ballots de novo and others not at all; (8) did not allow votes submitted
after the seven-day deadline to be certified; and (9) dictated, in Palm
Beach County, that only ballots with detached chads could be
counted. 1245
If these errors appear here much like a laundry list, it is because
they appeared in much the same "listing" fashion, without elabora-
tion, in Bush's brief. 1246 Indeed, to the extent that Bush's brief con-
tained any § 5 legal argument at all, it was devoted to explaining how
the non-mandatory language of § 5 could be applied to invalidate the
Florida court's decision: i.e., why it was the Supreme Court's business
if a state simply chose not to take advantage of an alleged "safe har-
bor" provided by a federal law. 247 This was of course the issue that
had puzzled the United States Supreme Court in the first case and
remained unresolved. 248 Bush apparently had two theories. First,
Bush claimed that the Court should reverse because the Florida Legis-
lature had intended to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided
by § 5, by "enacting laws prior to Election Day that seek to resolve
potential controversies or contests concerning presidential electors,"
and had been thwarted by the Florida Supreme Court. 1249 Second,
Bush asserted a kind of "constitutional crisis" theory: "Reversal of the
decision below is essential to preserve the protections that Congress
sought to confer upon the States through § 5, to secure the certainty
and finality of Florida's electoral process, and to ensure that Florida's
electoral votes are accorded proper consideration in Congress."'
' 250
Bush's final arguments with respect to the Florida court's decision
were based on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and
they were simply put. 125' Bush argued that "[t]he Equal Protection
Clause prohibits government officials from implementing an electoral
system that gives the votes of similarly situated voters different effect
based on the happenstance of the county or district in which those
1245. See id. at 36-39. Throughout the proceeding, Bush never articulated any the-
ory by which one might distinguish a violation of the electoral appointments clause
from a violation of § 5. He seemed to argue that any "change in the law" by the
judiciary would violate either provision. So it is puzzling why he did not allege that all
of the "changes" he alleged with respect to § 5 did not also violate the electoral ap-
pointments clause.
1246. See id. at 36-38.
1247. See id. at 33-35.
1248. See id. at 35 & n.15; supra notes 967-69 and accompanying text (describing the
justices' skepticism that a state could violate § 5).
1249. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1235, at 34. Bush did not offer any evi-
dence other than the existence of section 168 that the Florida Legislature had intended
to take advantage of the "safe harbor" extended by federal § 5. The claim was there-
fore quite a stretch, inasmuch as section 168 was not even specific to presidential
elections.
1250. Id. at 35.
1251. See id. at 40-49. As he had done throughout the entire controversy, Bush
placed these constitutional arguments last in his brief.
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voters live," and claimed that the Florida court had done just that.1252
Under the Florida decision, Bush observed, "where there is a partial
punch or stray mark on a ballot, that ballot may be counted as a 'vote'
in some counties but not others.' 1 253 Further, while approximately
twenty percent of Miami-Dade voters had had their ballots reviewed
and counted even if their ballots were not within the "undervote" cat-
egory, the other eighty percent of Miami voters would now have their
ballots reviewed only if their ballots were considered undervotes.
1254
Worse yet, Bush claimed, there were ballots in Miami-Dade that
might have been counted as votes in the first run through the machine
and yet identified as undervotes in the second run. Thus, with the
court's manual review, these ballots might end up being counted
twice, unconstitutionally diluting the votes of those whose ballots
were counted only once.'
2 55
The Florida decision violated the Due Process Clause, Bush wrote,
in three respects. First, the court had radically departed from the law
as it stood on Election Day, as Bush had already explained at
length. 256 Second, the court had failed to provide "clear and consis-
tent guidelines" for the counties conducting the recounts. 2 57 By leav-
ing "crucial decisions to the unbridled discretion and arbitrary
decision-making of local election officials and as-yet unspecified other
individuals," the court created "a very substantial risk that the method
for determining how to count a vote will be influenced, consciously or
unconsciously, by individual desire for a particular result.' 2 58 Third,
the "chaotic and unfair procedures" set in motion by the Florida court
deprived Bush of any meaningful opportunity to object to decisions
on individual ballots and made it impossible for the trial court to re-
view those decisions.
1259
If Bush's brief reflected his position as the all-but-anointed winner,
Gore's brief reflected how much ground he had to cover to pull at
least one of the majority justices off course. It appears that to do so,
Gore's attorneys adopted three major objectives. First, they sought to
reconstruct the majority's view of the McPherson case, which Gore
had not even briefed, and yet had been stung by, in the first proceed-
ing. 26° Second, they repeatedly cast Bush's objections as a mere disa-
1252. Id. at 41-42 (citing O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529-31 (1974); Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 707-12 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 653
(1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964)).
1253. Id. at 42.
1254. Id. at 43 (citing Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1264 n.26 (Fla. 2000) (Wells,
C.J., dissenting)).
1255. Id. at 44.
1256. Id. at 45.
1257. Id. (citing Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 581 (11th Cir. 1995)).
1258. Id. at 48.
1259. Id. at 49 (citing Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678-79
(1930)).
1260. See infra notes 1268-78 and accompanying text.
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greement with the Florida court's interpretation of state law, which
would of course be an inappropriate basis for reversing. 1261 Finally,
they warned the Court in no uncertain terms that if it found an equal
protection or due process violation, the constitutional sky would fall
on election law all across the country.1262
Gore began by attacking what he called Bush's "radical new pro-
position" that the Florida Supreme Court violated the electoral ap-
pointments clause even by hearing the case, because its appellate
jurisdiction was based on the state constitution and not a legislative
statute.1263 The brief's tone was more than a little indignant. Never
before, Gore said-not before the Florida Supreme Court and not
before the United States Supreme Court in the first proceeding-had
Bush suggested that the Florida court could not exercise appellate ju-
risdiction over the election cases, even though the court's jurisdiction
had in every instance been founded on the state constitution.
1264
Rather, even as Bush was arguing that the court could not engage in
"judicial lawmaking," he had expressly acknowledged the court's
power to interpret the law.
1265
Gore insisted that there was no reason to believe that the Florida
Legislature meant to deprive the Florida Supreme Court of its appel-
late jurisdiction. The legislature had enacted section 168, after all,
"against the settled background rule that decisions of circuit courts in
contest actions are subject to appellate review," and legislative provi-
sions granting jurisdiction to the circuit courts in Florida had long
been taken to include appellate review. 1266 Just as importantly, the
constitutional provision conferring appellate jurisdiction was itself a
legislative product: it was part of a constitutional revision proposed by
a joint resolution of the Florida Legislature and ratified by Florida's
citizenry in 1980.1267 In Gore's view, to treat the constitutional provi-
sion as anything else-and deny the Florida Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction solely on the fact that the legislature's intent was ex-
pressed in a constitution rather than a statute-"would run afoul of
1261. See infra notes 1279-88 and accompanying text.
1262. See infra notes 1300-01, 1311-13, 1319-21 and accompanying text.
1263. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr. at 13 (filed Dec. 10, 2000), Bush v. Gore,
513 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. SCOO-949).
1264. See id. at 11-12.
1265. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners, supra note 904, at 48; Reply Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra note 931, at 9 n.6).
1266. Id. at 14 (citing State v. Sullivan, 116 So. 255 (Fla. 1928); Cote v. State, 760 So.
2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). Gore added that the Florida Legislature itself
surely understood this to be the case, inasmuch as it had expressly acknowledged the
Florida Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in the first United States Supreme
Court proceeding. Id. "Florida has in place an election code for the resolution of
disputes and a court system, including a Supreme Court, with the usual judicial powers
of such courts." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of the Florida Senate and
House of Representatives, supra note 906, at 9).
1267. Id. at 15.
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[Bush's] own reading of Article II, under which legislatures have carte
blanche in determining the manner of appointment. Article II cannot
be read to swallow itself.'
'1268
With that rhetorical flourish, Gore's lawyers began in earnest their
assault on the theory that the electoral appointments clause prevented
state courts from relying on their state constitutions. That theory,
Gore wrote, was "based on misreadings of Article II and of this
Court's precedents., 1269 The only source for the theory was the single
passage in McPherson v. Blacker, and that passage was itself a dic-
tum. 127 ° Moreover, two other passages in McPherson made clear that
once a state legislature passed laws establishing the manner of ap-
pointing electors, "the state courts may interpret those laws precisely
as they would any other state legislative enactment.'
' 27'
1268. Id. at 18.
1269. Id. at 19-20.
1270. Id. at 20.
1271. Id. (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23, 39 (1892)). Gore's argu-
ment in this regard was a serious mischaracterization. He relied on two passages from
McPherson for support. In the first, according to Gore, McPherson "explains that
state statutes and the state constitution may be used by state courts in determining the
precise scope of the right to vote" when the Court writes: "'Whenever presidential
electors are appointed by popular election ... [tjhe right to vote [granted thereby]...
refers to the right to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the State."' Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23, 39 (1892)).
Gore took this passage entirely out of context, however, and, properly understood, it
does not in any way relate to the issue raised by the earlier McPherson passage stating
that state constitutions cannot limit state legislative power to appoint presidential
electors. When one reads the entire McPherson case, one realizes that the plaintiffs
were claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment conferred on them as individuals a
right to vote for presidential electors, see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23, 38-39
(1892), and that the passage Gore quoted was simply the Court's rejecting that argu-
ment, and not in any way addressing the role state constitutions could play vis-A-vis
the state legislatures. The Court's sole point was that the Fourteenth Amendment did
not itself confer on anyone any right to vote; rather, any right to vote came from
"state laws and constitutions," and the Fourteenth Amendment merely penalizes de-
nials of a state-given right. Id. at 39. Were it not for the language that Gore conspicu-
ously omitted from the passage, the passage might have been taken to mean that
there is some state constitutional aspect to the right to vote in a presidential election,
but the full language makes quite clear that the Court was addressing the right to vote
generally, in all kinds of elections, so that no conclusion whatever can be drawn on the
point. In full, the passage reads:
Whenever presidential electors are appointed by popular election, then the
right to vote cannot be denied or abridged without invoking the penalty, and
so of the right to vote for representatives in Congress, the executive, and judi-
cial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof. The right to
vote intended to be protected refers to the right to vote as established by the
laws and constitution of the [s]tate. There is no color for the contention that
under the amendments every male inhabitant of the [s]tate, being a citizen of
the United States has from the time of his majority a right to vote for presi-
dential electors.
Id. (emphasis added). Gore's second citation from McPherson was similarly mislead-
ing. Gore pointed out that in McPherson the state court "had measured the statute
providing for the appointment of electors for conformity with 'the state constitution
and laws,'" and then the Supreme Court "concluded that it was 'not authorized to
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
Further, Gore argued, there was no sound conceptual reason to
conclude that the electoral appointments clause created a "'state-con-
stitution-free' zone in a state's law."'' 272 The state constitutions, after
all, "determine[d] the very nature and composition of the state legis-
lature[s]" on whom the electoral appointments clause conferred
power.1273 Because these state constitutions typically established the
legislatures' quorum requirements, voting rules, and member qualifi-
cations, Gore wrote, "any attempt to isolate one from the other would
give rise to a host of unforeseen practical and legal problems.
1 12 74
As Gore characterized the case, when the McPherson Court stated
that the legislative authority could not be "circumscrib[ed]" by a state
constitution, it meant only that state constitutions could not be in-
voked in ways that would conflict with the legislature's directives. 275
"[T]he principle set forth in McPherson is not implicated at all," Gore
wrote, when a constitutional provision "merely supplements the Leg-
islature's scheme-much like judicial rules of procedure or evidence
or principles of statutory construction-and does not invalidate a
choice made by the Legislature.' ' 1276 Similarly, a court does not un-
dertake a "legislative" rather than "judicial" act simply because it in-
terprets a statute in a way that extends, but does not conflict with,
prior law.'2 77 If that were what the electoral appointments clause ac-
complished simply by conferring power on the state legislatures, Gore
argued, one would also have to conclude that the Supreme Court
could not interpret federal statutes, because the Constitution likewise
conferred "legislative power" only on Congress.
127 8
After this effort to recast McPherson and the meaning of the electo-
ral appointments clause, Gore turned to the specific holdings of the
Florida court to which Bush objected, which Gore contended did not
qualify even as "extensions" of Florida law, much less conflicts there-
with. 2 79 Bush complained that the Florida court had undertaken its
own recount, and had allowed a recount of less than all of the ballots
revise the conclusions of the state court on these matters of local law.'" Brief of
Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 20-21 (quoting McPherson, 146
U.S. at 23). Gore's clear implication was that the Supreme Court had approved of the
state court evaluating the state legislation under its constitution. Once again, how-
ever, the context demonstrates how meaningless Gore's observations were. Because
the state court in McPherson had upheld the state legislative act against state constitu-
tional challenge, see McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23, there was no occasion for the Court
to address the propriety of applying a state constitution, and the Supreme Court's
statement was nothing more than an unremarkable acknowledgment that it had no
reason to address state law issues.
1272. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 21.
1273. Id.
1274. Id.
1275. See id. at 21-22.
1276. Id. at 22.
1277. See id. at 23.
1278. Id. at 22 n.8.
1279. Id. at 23-24.
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cast, but that complaint, Gore said, was founded on section 166's di-
rectives to the canvassing boards, and the Florida court had fairly con-
cluded that section 168's broad language empowered the courts to
order a remedy different from that available through section 166.1280
Bush also complained that the Florida court relied on the opinion the
Supreme Court had earlier vacated, but Gore saw no such "reliance"
in the Florida court's opinion, only an explanation of why the court
felt it acceptable to include the Palm Beach votes identified even if
they were not reported before the court's earlier deadline. 128 1 Finally,
Bush objected that the Florida court had permitted the counting of
"dimpled" ballots, but Gore argued that the Florida court had done
nothing but adhere strictly to the legislative standard in characterizing
a "legal vote" as any ballot reflecting the "clear intent of the
voter."1
28 2
To Gore, the Florida court's decision was nothing more than "a rou-
tine example of statutory construction ... entirely consistent with Ar-
ticle II," and Bush's arguments "nothing more than an impermissible
attempt to persuade th[e] Court to redetermine these state-law is-
sues." 1283 In contrast to the Florida court's decision in the first pro-
ceeding, Gore maintained, there was no reason whatsoever to believe
that the Florida court had relied on the state constitution or any other
source outside the Florida Code.1284 Thus, Bush's argument was little
more than a claim "either that the Florida Supreme Court deliberately
misrepresented the basis for its decision by saying it was interpreting
Florida statutory law when it was actually doing something else en-
tirely-or that Florida's highest court seriously erred in interpreting
Florida law. 1 21 85 Acting on either contention, Gore wrote, would vio-
1280. See id. at 25 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.02.168(8) (West Supp. 2001)).
1281. See id.
1282. Id. at 25-26. Gore appears to have engaged in some deliberate muddling with
respect to Bush's arguments that the Florida court had improperly relied on its earlier
decision and approved of the inclusion of dimpled ballots. Although these arguments
were not articulated particularly well in Bush's papers, it was relatively clear that they
were based on the Florida court's willingness to acknowledge counting that went on
after the seven-day deadline pursuant to the Florida court's earlier, vacated decision,
and included some dimpled ballots. See supra notes 436-38, 680, 710 and accompany-
ing text (describing Broward counting). Gore's response did not really meet the mer-
its of this contention but pretended that it was a different part of the Florida court's
opinion, and the court's ordering of counting prospectively, about which Bush was
complaining.
1283. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 24. Gore pointed
out, in this regard, that whatever differences the justices had about the appropriate
remedy, six of the seven agreed on the statutory interpretation issues. Id.; see also
supra notes 1143-45 and accompanying text (describing the consensus among the
Florida justices on the interpretation of section 168).
1284. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 26.
1285. Id. at 26-27.
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late the "'general rule'" that the Court "'defers to a state court's in-
terpretation of state statute.' "1286
With respect to Bush's § 5 objections, which were largely duplica-
tive and/or subsidiary of those he had lodged under the electoral ap-
pointments clause,28 7 Gore took much the same approach. Gore
claimed that the decision was in all respects consistent with "long-
standing Florida election law," and reflected nothing more than the
ordinary "post-election statutory interpretation" in which all state
courts, including Florida's, routinely engaged. 1288 Bush's challenge to
the statewide nature of the recount was "entirely disingenuous," Gore
argued, because "it was [Bush] who argued that a statewide recount
would be required in the event that [Gore's] contest of the 9000 un-
counted Miami-Dade ballots was sustained.'
21 89
Of course, Gore did not agree that Bush's § 5 claims were even
properly before the Court. As he had in the first proceeding, Gore
argued that Bush could not claim any judicial remedy based on § 5
because the statute "is focused exclusively on Congress and provides
only an option" for the states.12 90 He claimed that Bush had even
acknowledged as much, eventually, in his brief in the first proceed-
ing. 1  He noted further that Florida's own legislature, appearing in
the first proceeding before the Supreme Court, had rejected the read-
ing of § 5 that Bush was now again urging the Court to adopt. 1292
1286. Id. at 27 (quoting Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76
(2000)).
1287. Bush argued that it violated both the electoral appointments clause and § 5 for
the Florida court to allow ballots to be recounted by a court rather than a canvassing
board; to allow partial recounts; and to permit dimpled ballots to be counted. See
supra notes 1236-37, 1245 and accompanying text. In his § 5 argument, however, he
broke these objections down even further, complaining additionally of the statewide
nature of the recount ordered and the facts that a court, rather than a canvassing
board would be determining the validity of a ballot and the circumstances under
which a recount could be conducted. See supra note 1245 and accompanying text.
Beyond these objections, which were essentially sub-issues of the claims he had made
under the electoral appointments clause, Bush added three additional respects in
which he believed the court's decision conflicted with § 5: by allowing some un-
dervoted ballots to be reviewed by the court de novo and some not at all; by allowing
votes submitted after the seven-day deadline to be certified; and by allowing merely
dimpled votes in Palm Beach County to be counted even though they would not have
been pursuant to the 1990 policy that recognized only ballots with "hanging chads."
See supra note 1245 and accompanying text.
1288. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 31, 34 (citing Beck-
strom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998); Boardman v.
Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975); State ex rel. Peacock v. Latham, 170 So. 819 (Fla.
1940), 170 So. 472 (Fla. 1936), 170 So. 309 (Fla. 1936); State ex rel. Nuccio v. Williams,
120 So. 310 (Fla. 1929); Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917);
State ex rel. Knott v. Haskell, 72 So. 651 (Fla. 1916); State ex rel. Drew v. McLin, 16
Fla. 17 (1876)).
1289. Id. at 33.
1290. Id. at 28-29.
1291. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 904, at 17-19, 27-29).
1292. Id. at 29.
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In any event, Gore argued, the Florida court "was attentive to Sec-
tion 5's requirements, consistent with this Court's directive that 'a leg-
islative wish to take advantage of the "safe harbor" would counsel
against any construction of the Election Code that Congress might
deem to be a change in the law.' ' ' 12 93 The court had acknowledged
the federal statute, quoting it in full, and had hewn closely to the stat-
utes enacted prior to the 2000 election.
294
Importantly, even as he claimed that the Florida court had taken
proper notice of § 5, Gore did not concede that the Florida Legisla-
ture intended the courts to take advantage of the statute's "safe har-
bor." Nor did Gore suggest that the Florida court had recognized
such legislative intent. To the contrary, Gore strongly implied that
there was no evidence that the Florida Legislature had taken § 5 into
account, and while the Florida court could have assumed that the leg-
islature wanted the benefit of the safe harbor by providing for a con-
test action, the court had no choice but to simply apply the contest
statute as written. Specifically, Gore wrote: "There is no question, for
example, that a state legislature can intend to take a State out of the
safe harbor to achieve some other objective and a state court's over-
riding obligation remains to interpret the terms of the statute as the
State Legislature enacted it.'
295
The final pages of Gore's brief responded to Bush's equal protec-
tion and due process arguments. As an initial matter, Gore noted that
neither constitutional claim had been properly addressed below. In
the Florida Supreme Court, Gore said, Bush had devoted "only one
throwaway line" to the constitutional issues, and that line said only
that "'the application of counting standards in different counties as
well as the occurrence of manual recounts in only selected counties or
selective portions of counties violates the equal protection and due
process clauses of the U.S. Constitution."' 1 296 As to his complaint
that Florida's counties were applying disparate standards in evaluating
the ballots, Bush had "failed to develop any record evidence ... and
can offer only unconfirmed rumors and untested accusations."
' 297
Turning then to the merits, Gore asserted that Bush's equal protec-
tion claim had "no support in the law" and "sweeping implications for
the conduct of elections.' ' 2 98 Gore pointed out that the Florida Su-
preme Court had indeed pronounced a single, uniform counting stan-
1293. Id. at 28 (quoting Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,
77-78 (2000)).
1294. Id.
1295. Id. at 30.
1296. Id. at 35 (quoting Amended Brief of Appellees George W. Bush and Dick
Cheney at 45 (filed Dec. 8, 2000), Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla.) (No. SC00-
2431), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)).
1297. Id. at 47.
1298. Id. at 36.
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dard: that "the intent of the voter" must control. 299 And while that
standard would "undeniably" result in "some degree of inconsistency
in the treatment of individual ballots," the same could be said of any
standard within the law, such as "negligence" or "public forum;" of
any manual recount anywhere; of any state that allows some counties
to use both optical scan voting and punch cards; and of all the other
states where the "intent of the voter" standard was in place. 1300 For
that reason, Gore said, "[slimilar arguments regarding the conduct of
elections uniformly have been rejected by the courts," although he
offered no citations.
130 1
The recount ordered by the court, Gore argued, sought to "place
the voters whose votes were not tabulated by the machine on the
same footing as those whose votes were so tabulated," so that in the
end, all persons intending to vote would be treated equally. 302 By
targeting for counting the ballots that initially had not registered any
vote, the court had ordered a "narrowly tailored remedy authorized
under state law," and by ordering the counting of such votes state-
wide, rather than in just the counties Gore had identified, the court
had actually granted Bush's request. 130 3 In Gore's view, there would
be tabulation differences from county to county as long as there were
different tabulation systems used from county to county, and that very
disparity "demonstrate[d] the value in having statutory checks and
balances such as a manual recount process. "1304 Moreover, all of the
ordinary grounds for federal intervention in state election procedures
were absent: "petitioners do not claim that the Florida Supreme
Court's order is discriminatory in any invidious manner; they do not
claim that any citizens of Florida were improperly denied their right to
vote; and there is no claim of any fraudulent interference with the
right of anyone to vote.'
130 5
Bush was wrong, Gore said, to claim that the standard for evaluat-
ing the ballots varied from county to county.130 6 The Florida court
had directed all of the counties to apply the statutory standard and
recognize votes only when there was a "'clear indication of the intent
of the voter.' ",1307 In Harris, its earlier decision, the court had indi-
cated that "[a]rbitrary exclusions would violate the Florida statutory
scheme," and that each ballot must be reviewed individually "to deter-
1299. Id.
1300. See id.
1301. Id. To support this argument, Gore noted that Florida's optical scan counties
had only a 0.3% undervote rate, or only four ballots out of 1000 that registered no
vote with the machine, whereas the counties using a punch card system had a 1.5%
undervote rate, or fifteen ballots out of 1000 that registered no vote. Id. at 43 n.24.
1302. Id. at 38.
1303. Id. at 38-39.
1304. Id. at 42-43.
1305. Id. at 41.
1306. Id. at 44.
1307. Id. (citation omitted).
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mine the voter's intent in the context of the entire ballot.' 130 8 Be-
tween this direction and the circuit court's guidelines for ensuring that
the count proceeded in a uniform fashion, Gore argued, there was
nothing unconstitutional about the standard for evaluating ballots. 30 9
Indeed, according to Gore, Bush's complaint about the lack of stan-
dards to guide the counting was in reality a claim that any recounts at
all would be unconstitutional. 310 Yet "[m]anual counting and re-
counting of ballots under the intent of the voter standard has been the
rule, not the exception, in this country for generations-indeed, for
most of the period since its founding. '131' Twenty-two states, includ-
ing Texas, had statutes allowing manual recounts as a check on punch
card tabulation systems, and most of those made no attempt to define
what specific appearance was required before a ballot could be
counted as a vote.1312 And even in those states that had enacted more
detailed statutes, again like Texas, there was usually a "catch-all [pro-
vision allowing] the counting of any ballot that 'otherwise reflects the
intent of the voter.'"1
313
If Bush had a problem with the counting of any particular ballot,
Gore said, then his remedy lay with the judicial review of the counting
and any disputed ballots. 3'4 To end the counting altogether, how-
ever, would be an "absurd and unprecedented response to an asserted
flaw in the process for tabulating votes," and one that was not re-
quired by the equal protection clause. 315 "In fact," Gore wrote, "if
there is anything to petitioners' equal protection claim, the remedy is
not to end the counting of votes; it is, instead, to articulate the proper
1308. Id.
1309. See id. at 43-44.
1310. See id. at 44.
1311. Id. at 44-45 (citing eleven state and federal cases approving the counting of
votes on ballots from which the voter's intent could be determined).
1312. Id. at 46 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 3-12-1-1 (West 1997); TEX. ELEC. CODE
ANN. § 127.130 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2000)).
1313. Id. Gore was correct that Texas law would have applied no standard more
specific than that ordered by Florida's Supreme Court. Texas law provides as follows:
(d) Subject to Subsection (e), in any manual recount conducted under this
code, a vote on a ballot on which a voter indicates a vote by punching a
hole in the ballot may not be counted unless:
(1) at least two corners of the chad are detached;
(2) light is visible through the hole;
(3) an indentation on the chad from the stylus or other object is present
and indicates a clearly ascertainable intent of the voter to vote; or
(4) the chad reflects by other means a clearly ascertainable intent of the
voter to vote.
(e) Subsection (d) does not supersede any clearly ascertainable intent of the
voter.
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 127.130(d)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
1314. Brief for Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 47.
1315. See id.
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standard and-as required by state law-to have the counting go for-
ward under that standard."'
' 316
Because Bush's due process arguments were largely reformulations
of his electoral appointments clause and equal protection contentions,
Gore essentially reiterated the arguments he had already made. To
Bush's claim that the recounts were proceeding in a standardless fash-
ion subject to partisan influence, Gore reminded the Court that the
Florida court had adopted a standard, and that Bush had no factual
basis or evidence on which to suggest that the recounts were being
improperly conducted. To Bush's claim that the Florida court had ret-
roactively changed the law, Gore referred to his earlier arguments and
responded that "the law enunciated in the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion is the law as it existed on election day and long before it."
1317
Further, to make out a due process claim on this basis, Bush would
have to show that any change in the law arbitrarily deprived him of a
"cognizable liberty or property interest," and yet "[t]he only due pro-
cess right even arguably implicated" ran to the voters whose un-
dervoted ballots had never been reviewed.
13t8
"At bottom," Gore wrote, "all petitioners can really claim is that, in
their view, the Florida Supreme Court got Florida law wrong. 1319 To
act on his contention, and reverse the Florida court, would "do vio-
lence both to principles of federalism and to the independence of the
judiciary throughout the United States. 1 320 It would also have the
"unthinkable consequences" of invalidating Florida's entire election
and "calling into question numerous other results nationwide in a host
of local, state, and national elections."'
' 321
With such words, Gore threw the gauntlet down before the justices
who had agreed to stay the counting. They would have to choose be-
tween permitting the imperfect counting in Florida and abandoning
their previous commitment to states' rights. The language most likely
came from Laurence Tribe.
Tribe appeared on Gore's brief on the merits as the "counsel of
record,"1322 the designation given to the lead counsel on a case.1323
He had learned of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in the middle
of a make-up class at Harvard on Friday, and he had begun working
on the brief immediately, only to travel to Washington on Saturday
afternoon after the Court had stayed the Florida order and scheduled
1316. Id.
1317. Id. at 48.
1318. See id. at 48-49 (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 537 (1998)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
1319. Id. at 50.
1320. Id.
1321. Id. at 48.
1322. E.g., id. at 51.
1323. SuP. CT. R. 9, 34.
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oral argument for Monday. 324 The case would mark at least his
twenty-first appearance before the Supreme Court.
132 5
On Saturday night, however, Warren Christopher visited Tribe at
his hotel and informed him that Gore had decided he wanted David
Boies to argue the case.1326 As Tribe has told the story, Christopher
said that Gore felt the argument needed someone intimately familiar
with Florida law, and Boies had better qualifications in that regard. 327
Tribe says he disagreed, feeling that the Supreme Court would not
have taken the case unless they were concerned about the constitu-
tional implications, but he quickly concluded that the decision had
been irrevocably made.
1328
Although he was disappointed by the Vice President's decision,
Tribe continued working on the brief. 1329 After the brief was filed, at
4:00 Sunday afternoon, Tribe worked with Boies until 7:00 p.m. dis-
cussing the questions that were likely to arise. 1330 But he did not at-
tend the oral argument. He had asked not to, he said, because he
thought it would be too difficult to maintain his silence as the justices
leveled questions at Boies.
1331
D. The Oral Argument
The oral argument in Bush v. Gore began promptly at 11:00 a.m. on
Monday, December 11.1332 From the first questions, it became clear
that the case would not turn on Florida law.
Justice Kennedy opened the questioning of Ted Olson by expressing
concern that Bush's theory of the electoral appointments clause would
1324. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 246-47, 253.
1325. See Neil A. Lewis, Old Hands at Arguing Before Supreme Court: For Demo-
crats, a Legal Scholar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A31. But see KAPLAN, supra note
1006, at 246 (reporting that Tribe had argued thirty cases before the Court). A com-
puter search through Westlaw reveals that, before the election cases, Tribe played
some role as counsel in thirty-three reported cases before the Court, appearing as
lead counsel for the parties in twenty-six of them.
1326. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 248; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 218.
1327. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 218; KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 248. David
Boies had argued before the Court once previously, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1 (1987), and lost to Laurence Tribe. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 250;
Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 3, 18.
1328. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 249-50; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 218-19.
1329. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 250-52; DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 219.
1330. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 219; KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 251-52.
1331. DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 221; KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 252. Ironically,
Tribe had boarded a plane to south Florida, where he and his wife had a second home.
DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 221.
1332. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. SCOO-
949), available at 2000 WL 1804429. The citations provided here are from the official
transcript available from the United States Supreme Court. However, because the
official transcript does not identify the justices who asked particular questions, those
justices have been identified from a review of the oral argument tape, at http://
oyez.nwu.edu/cases/cases.cgi?case-id=766&command=show.
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leave state legislatures "unmoored" to their state constitutions. 1333
Justice O'Connor and he were particularly troubled by Bush's sugges-
tion that the Florida court had no jurisdiction over the case simply
because it had founded its jurisdiction on the state constitution. 334
Justice O'Connor preferred to think that Article II "create[d] a pre-
sumption that the scheme the legislature has set out will be followed
even by judicial review in election matters," and she noted that the
Florida Legislature had not enacted special contest provisions with re-
spect to presidential elections, which ordinarily would leave those
contests subject to appellate review the way any other election contest
would be.
1335
Initially, Olson refused to budge on the point. He noted that au-
thority was "explicitly vested in the circuit court," and that the legisla-
ture was not required to provide for appellate review. 13 36 Facing
resistance from his own majority, however, Olson apparently decided
to move on. "It may not be the most powerful argument we bring to
this Court," Olson said, and, almost under his breath, Justice Kennedy
responded, "I think that's right.' 1 337 The gallery laughed out loud.
With the state jurisdictional issue all but dismissed, the justices
turned to Bush's contention that the Florida court had "changed the
law" in violation of the electoral appointments clause and § 5. Justice
Souter was especially skeptical of Bush's position that the Florida
court had defied the legislative power conferred by those provisions,
noting that "subsection 8 [of the contest statute, section 168] gives at
least to the circuit court, leaving aside the question of appellate juris-
diction, about as broad a grant to fashion orders as I can imagine go-
ing into a statute.' 1 338 Olson acknowledged that subsection 8 was
written broadly, but contended that to interpret it to permit the Flor-
ida court's action would violate the larger "statutory framework," in-
cluding section 166, that had vested recount authority in elections
officials, not the courts. 1339 Justice Souter, at least, was not persuaded:
It may well be and I'll grant you for the sake of argument that there
would be a sound interpretive theory that in effect would coordi-
nate these two statutes, 166 and 168, in a way that the Florida Su-
preme Court has not done. But that's a question of Florida
Supreme Court statutory construction and unless you can convince
us, it seems to me, that in construing [section] 168, which is what we
are concerned with now, the Florida Supreme Court has simply
1333. Id. at 4.
1334. See id. at 7 ("I have the same problem Justice Kennedy does, apparently
1335. See id. at 5, 7.
1336. Id. at 5.
1337. Id. at 6.
1338. Id. at 13.
1339. Id. at 13-14.
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passed the bounds of legitimate statutory construction, then I don't
see how we can find an article II violation here. 340
After this exchange, Olson shifted his focus from the electoral ap-
pointments clause to the "timetable" established by § 5, and articu-
lated a § 5 theory that had appeared nowhere in Bush's brief. The
Florida court, Olson argued, had engaged in an "utter revision of the
timetables" in the Florida Code.134' When Justice Souter responded
that there were no "timetables" for contests under the Florida Code,
Olson invoked § 5, and claimed that the Florida court "incorrectly in-
terpreted and construed federal law ... because what they have inevi-
tably done is provide a process whereby it is virtually impossible, if
not completely impossible ... to have these issues resolved and the
controversies resolved in time for that federal statutory deadline."
'1 342
Souter continued to press. "[I]f your concern was with impossibil-
ity," he said, "why didn't you let the process run instead of asking for
a stay? ' 1343 Olson's response was telling. He complained that the
process "already had violated Article II of the Constitution," and was
"already throwing in jeopardy compliance with [§] 5," but did not
even mention the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
1344
That "task" fell to Justice Kennedy: "Oh, and I thought your point
was that the process is being conducted in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and it is standardless.' 13 45 It would not be the only
time that the justices who had ordered the stay would rescue Olson.
With equal protection now the issue, Justice Breyer observed that
Bush had complained about the Florida court's "intent of the voter"
standard and asked that Olson advise the Court what a "fair" standard
would be.'13 46 Olson was understandably hesitant to articulate one, not
wanting to help the Court "cure" the equal protection problem, but
Justice Breyer insisted. 347 Finally, Olson answered that, at a mini-
mum, "penetration of the ballot card would be required."
'1 348
Justice Souter then joined the exchange, asking whether it would be
feasible for the Court to remand the case and ask the Secretary of
State to advise what the standard should be. 34 9 Surprisingly, Olson
responded that that would be a "feasible" outcome.1350 Olson's next
response, however, was even more remarkable.
1340. Id. at 14-15.
1341. Id.
1342. Id. at 14-17.
1343. Id. at 17.
1344. Id.
1345. Id.
1346. See id. at 17-18.
1347. See id. at 18.
1348. Id.
1349. Id. at 20.
1350. Id.
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QUESTION [by Justice Souter]: Is it your position that if any
official, judicial or executive, at this point were to purport to lay
down a statewide standard which went to a lower level, a more spe-
cific level than intent of the voter, and said, for example, count dim-
pled chads or don't count dimpled chads. In your judgment, would
that be a violation of Article II?
MR. OLSON: I don't think it would be a violation of Article I1
provided that [dimpled chads were not counted].
1351
This was an extraordinary concession. In one breath, Olson appeared
to have eliminated the constitutional conundrum in which the Florida
Supreme Court had found itself: the fact that the broad statutory stan-
dard might be insufficient for equal protection purposes, but a more
specific one could not be announced without intruding on legislative
prerogative under the electoral appointments clause.
Justice Scalia simply could not sit quiet. Plainly, Olson had to be
reminded to argue that a more specific standard was already in place:
namely, that a vote should be counted when the voter followed the
instructions given at the polls. "Mr. Olson," Scalia said, "[iut is also
part of your case, is it not,... that there is no wrong when a machine
does not count those ballots that it's not supposed to count?' 1 352 With
that, Olson was jolted back to his case: "That's absolutely correct, Jus-
tice Scalia.' ' 135 3 Presumably for emphasis, Scalia restated the conten-
tion: "The voters are instructed to detach the chads entirely, and
[when] the machine, as predicted, does not count those chads where




Joseph Klock, arguing next, for the Secretary of State and the Can-
vassing Commission, took Justice Scalia's cue. When Justice Breyer
pressed him as to what the "fair" standard would be, Klock said it
should be that dictated by the instructions given the voters: "if the
ballot is not properly executed, it's not a legal vote."' 13 55 It did not
matter, Klock asserted, that this would leave uncounted at least some
ballots that clearly reflected the voters' intent. 356 Under the legisla-
tive scheme, the only entities empowered to recognize votes were can-
vassing boards, and under the constraints of the electoral
appointments clause, the courts could not travel outside that scheme
and themselves define a "legal vote."
' '3 57
Justice Stevens accepted Klock's position for the sake of argument
but asked him how he thought ballots should be counted in the event
of a machine malfunction. 358 In that situation, Justice Stevens asked,
1351. Id. at 23-24.
1352. Id. at 24.
1353. Id.
1354. Id.
1355. Id. at 30-31.
1356. See id. at 31.
1357. Id. at 34-35.
1358. Id. at 33, 35.
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would it not be acceptable for a court to employ the "intent of the
voter" standard, which the legislature had expressly chosen at least in
the context of damaged or defective ballots? 359 Plainly, Justice Ste-
vens was trying to establish that the legislature itself considered the
"intent of the voter" a standard sufficiently specific to evaluate bal-
lots. Klock saw the point coming, however, and sidestepped it:
"[T]here could be problems under [that statutory standard]," Klock
said, and in any event, it "was designed for a very limited situation
where there was a problem with the mechanism of voting."'' 360 Before
Justice Stevens had the chance to push further, Klock's time was
up.
13 6 1
The irony of Gore's choosing David Boies for the oral argument
emerged as soon as Boies walked to the podium. "Let me begin by
addressing what happened in the Beckstrom case," Boies said, refer-
ring to a 1998 Florida Supreme Court decision.1362 The justices, how-
ever, apparently had little interest in Florida law. Justice Kennedy
interrupted and asked Boies to address the Court's federal
jurisdiction. 363
The exchange that followed focused extensively on the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to address § 5 and the nature of the Florida
court's reference to the federal law. Observing that the Florida court
had said it was "cognizant" of § 5, Justice Kennedy suggested that that
statement indicated that the Florida court had interpreted the federal
statute. 364 Boies was noncommittal on the point: it looked to him as
though the court was simply saying it wanted the state to be able to
take advantage of § 5's "safe harbor.' 1 365 Apparently seeking a more
definite basis for the Court's jurisdiction, Kennedy continued: "it
seems to me that if the Florida court, and presumably the Florida Leg-
islature have acted with reference to 3 U.S.C. § 5 that it presents now
a federal question for us to determine whether or not there is or is not
a new law by reason of the . . . two Florida Supreme Court deci-
sions.' 1 366 Boies, however, held fast to his "non-jurisdictional" posi-
tion: he acknowledged that the Florida court "desire[d]" to fit within
§ 5, especially its "deadline," but he did not concede that the Florida
court had "interpreted" the federal statute.1367
Although Boies refused to characterize the Florida court's decision
in a way that would ensure federal jurisdiction under § 5, he was will-
ing to debate the substantive core of the statute and defend the Flor-
1359. Id.
1360. Id. at 36.
1361. See id.
1362. Id.
1363. Id. at 36-37.
1364. Id. at 37.
1365. Id,
1366. Id. at 38.
1367. See id. at 39.
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ida court against the charge that it had "changed the law." The Court
might legitimately find such a "change," Boies argued, if it concluded
that the Florida court's interpretation were "either a sham or it is so
misguided that it is simply untenable in any sense. ' 1368 Otherwise,
Boies said, the standard ought be the one the Court had "generally
applied in giving deference to state supreme court decisions," and the
Florida court was certainly worthy of that deference. 369
Justice O'Connor responded that Boies's standard did not suffi-
ciently account for the special role conferred on state legislatures by
the electoral appointments clause: "[I]n this one context, not when
courts review laws generally for general elections, but in the context
of selection of presidential electors, isn't there a big red flag up there,
watch out?" 1 37 ° Put so generally, this was a hard proposition with
which to argue, and Boies did not even try. His candor, however, led
perfectly into a direct reprimand of the Florida Supreme Court.
MR. BOLES: I think there is [a red flag] in a sense, Your Honor,
and I think the Florida Supreme Court was grappling with that.
QUESTION [by Justice O'Connor]: And you think it did it
properly?
MR. BOLES: I think it did do it properly.
QUESTION [by Justice O'Connor]: That's, I think, a concern
that we have, and I did not find really a response by the Florida
Supreme Court to this Court's remand in the case a week ago. It
just seemed to kind of bypass it and assume that all those changes
and deadlines were just fine and they would go ahead and adhere to
them, and I found that troublesome.'
371
Justice Scalia went further, complaining that the Florida court had
"contravene[d] our vacating of their prior order" by ordering the "cer-
tification" of the votes identified by the Palm Beach and Miami-Dade
boards. 1372
1368. Id. at 42-43.
1369. See id. at 43.
1370. Id. at 43-44.
1371. Id. at 44.
1372. See id. at 46. Boies was mystified by Justice Scalia's complaint in this regard
and began trying to convince the justice that amending a certification was always the
remedy in a contest action. See id. at 46-48 (extending exchange between Justice
Scalia and Boies with respect to the Florida court's remedy). It was the appellate
litigator's communications nightmare: Justice Scalia never really articulated why the
Florida court behaved scandalously in ordering the Secretary of State to amend her
"certification" to add the Palm Beach and Miami-Dade votes, and Boies wasted pre-
cious minutes of his argument unsuccessfully trying to figure out the nature of Scalia's
objection. It may be that Scalia objected to the fact that the Florida court thought
there was any "certification" in place to amend-the only "certification" in existence
might be invalid unless the Florida court responded to the Supreme Court with an
opinion that would satisfy the concerns it had raised in the first proceeding-but it
remains hard to say. See id. at 47 ("[W]hat the Florida Supreme Court said is that
there shall be added to the certification these additional numbers .... It's not added
to the certification."). A cynic might alternatively conclude-particularly given Jus-
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With the scolding out of the way, approximately one-third of the
way into Boies's argument, the Court turned with full force to what
would become the basis for the Republican victory: Bush's claim that
the counting ordered by the Florida court violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Justice Kennedy cut directly to the issue: "Do you think
that in the contest phase, there must be a uniform standard for count-
ing the ballots?"1373 Boies said yes, and in fact there was one: whether
the intent of the voter was reflected on the ballot.
1374
Justice Kennedy appeared loaded for bear. "That's very general,"
he said, and "[i]t runs throughout the law," but "[e]ven a dog knows
the difference in being stumbled over and being kicked.' 1 375 The dif-
ference between a general intent standard and the one in this case, he
continued, was the focus on "this little piece of paper called a bal-
lot. ' 1376 Under these circumstances, Justice Kennedy wanted to
know, "could each county give their own interpretation to what intent
means, so long as they are in good faith and with some reasonable
basis finding intent? ... Could that vary from county to county?
1' 377
Without a moment's thought, Boies responded, "I think it can vary
from individual to individual. ' 13 78 The answer was apparently so ab-
rupt that Justice Kennedy asked another version of the same question:
"so that even in one county [it] can vary from table to table on count-
ing these ballots? 1' 379 Boies then began to explain. Some variation
"on the margin," as Boies put it, would be there any time the law
employed an "intent" standard, whether it be in criminal law or ad-
ministrative practice or elsewhere.1 380 And while "intent" was "sus-
ceptible of a more specific standard," virtually every state that had
attempted a more specific standard, including Texas, had also adopted
a general provision allowing a ballot to be counted whenever the
voter's intent could be discerned. 38'
Justice Souter then joined the questioning, and it became clear that
the justices who had issued the stay order were not the only ones left
wanting by Gore's position.
QUESTION [by Justice Souter]: .. .[I]n jury to jury cases, we
assume that there is not an overall objective standard that answers
tice Scalia's uncharacteristically repetitive and cryptic responses to Boies, and the fact
that it was Justice Breyer who put a stop to the bickering-that Scalia was deliber-
ately eating up Boies's time at the podium. See id. at 46-48; see also id. at 55-58
(Justices Scalia and O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist asking Boies to do nothing
more than clarify aspects of the Florida court's decision).




1377. Id. at 49-50.
1378. Id. at 50.
1379. Id.
1380. Id.
1381. See id. at 50-51.
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all questions definitively. We are assuming that there is detail that
cannot be captured by an objective rule. [But t]he assumption of
this question, and . . . I think, it's behind what's bothering Justice
Kennedy, Justice Breyer, me and others, is, we're assuming there's a
category in which there just is no other-there is no subjective ap-
peal. All we have are certain physical characteristics. Those physi-
cal characteristics we are told are being treated differently from
county to county. In that case, where there is no subjective counter
indication, isn't it a denial of equal protection to allow that
variation?
1382
Boies attempted to respond to this by claiming that the counties were
not actually applying different "objective standards" to the same phys-
ical characteristics. 383 Justice Souter, however, would not accept that
contention, and because "[w]e can't send this thing back for more fact
finding," asked Boies to assume that the counties were in fact apply-
ing different objective standards. 1384 "On that assumption," Souter
asked, "what would you tell them to do about it?"' 3 85
The moment of reckoning had come for Gore. On the one hand, he
could stand on the ground that there was nothing wrong with the "in-
tent of the voter" standard and that more objective criteria would be
inappropriate, risking what appeared to be the consensus that the in-
tent standard was insufficient under the Equal Protection Clause. On
the other, he could accept that the "intent of the voter" standard was
constitutionally unsound, and commit to some form of uniform, objec-
tive rule, but several justices might decide that the Court could an-
nounce no new rule without violating the electoral appointments
clause, and in any event, a remand for a more specific standard would
consume virtually all the time remaining before midnight on Decem-
ber 13.
Facing these risks, Boies paused for a very long while, and then all
but acknowledged that he was out of choices: "that's a very hard ques-
tion."' 138 6 By the time that he decided to hedge, and urge the use of
the Texas standard-the one that combined objective criteria with a
"voter's intent" rule1387-his equivocation was clear, and several of
the justices had grown impatient. Justice Scalia delivered an exasper-
ated barb-"you would tell them to count every vote"-to guffaws
from the gallery.1388 And Justice O'Connor no longer concealed her
1382. Id. at 52.
1383. Id. at 52-53 ("Maybe I'm quarreling with a premise that says there are these
objective criteria. Maybe if you had specific objective criteria in one county that says
we're going to count indented ballots and another county that said we're only going to
count the ballot if it is punched through.").
1384. Id. at 53.
1385. Id.
1386. Id.
1387. See id. at 54; see also supra note 1.381 and accompanying text.
1388. See id. at 53.
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disgust: "why isn't the standard the one that voters are instructed to
follow, for goodness sakes?'
'1 38 9
Much as the justices in favor of the stay had jumped in to save Ted
Olson, the justices dissenting from the stay did their best to help Boies
recover. Justice Stevens asked whether the fact that a single judge
reviewed the counts for uniformity solved the problem, and Boies
heartily agreed: "Yes, that's what I was going to say, Your Honor, that
what you have here is you have a series of decisions that people get a
right to object to .... They submit written objections, and then that's
going to be reviewed by a court.' 1 391 Justice Souter followed up on
this alternative approach, asking whether the trial judge could ap-
prove the counting even if the counties followed different rules, as
long as he concluded that those rules were all aimed at discerning the
"intent of the voter." 1391 This gave Boies the chance to emphasize
that any variations in the counting pursuant to the voter's intent rule
would pale in comparison to the variations caused by the fact that the
counties all had different voting and tabulation systems. 1392 Indeed,
during Olson's rebuttal, Justice Ginsburg returned to that point, ques-
tioning the very idea of a single standard: "how can you have one
standard when there are so many varieties of ballots?"'393
The case was inevitably complicated, however, by the specter of De-
cember 12. Justice Kennedy, who now appeared Gore's only hope for
switching sides (after O'Connor's revealing comment), observed that
the contest period required "the setting of standards," and judicial re-
view, and yet the Florida Supreme Court had rendered that impossi-
ble when it "truncated" the contest period "by 19 days. '1394 Boies
responded simply that the counting might still be completed in the
"time available."'' 395 He did not assert that the "time available" might
extend beyond December 12. Indeed, he actually suggested the De-
1389. Id. at 58.
1390. Id. at 54.
1391. Id. at 71.
1392. Id. at 72.
1393. Id. at 74.
1394. See id. at 65-66. Justice Kennedy's reference to "truncating" the contest pe-
riod by nineteen days made little sense. He was clearly referring to the Florida court's
decision to extend the deadline for certification, but that extension was for at most
twelve days-from November 14, the seven-day deadline always accepted by Bush, to
November 26-and more accurately, for only eight days-from November 18, the first
day certification became possible due to the need to count overseas absentee ballots,
to November 26. The contest statute required, after all, that a candidate contest "cer-
tification," and a candidate would not have wanted to risk bringing a contest action
prior to announcement of the final results, so the contest period could never have
begun until one of those two dates. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.1.68 (West Supp.
2001). Further, even assuming Justice Kennedy misspoke, and meant to say that the
Florida court reduced the contest period to nineteen days, his reference still would
have been wrong. If December 12 were considered the deadline, the Florida court's
extension to November 26 reduced the contest period to sixteen, not nineteen, days.
1395. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1332, at 66.
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cember 12 deadline could be met if the Court told Florida it was not
really necessary to count the undervotes in counties other than those
Boies had contested.
1396
E. The Florida Court's Decision on Remand: Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board v. Harris II
By 12:30 on Monday afternoon, December 11, the argument was
over, and the case was in the Supreme Court's hands. 1397 There would
be no more briefing, but there was one final document still bearing
potential to influence the outcome. On Monday evening, hours after
the nation had heard it reprimanded by the highest court in the land,
the Florida Supreme Court issued its opinion 1398 responding to the
remand of Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. Six of the
seven justices joined the opinion; Chief Justice Wells issued a single-
sentence dissent.
1399
An early footnote in the opinion was aimed at explaining why the
court had not responded earlier to the Supreme Court's remand. The
court explained that, in the week since the case was remanded, it had
allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing implementa-
tion of the Supreme Court's mandate, and had considered briefs and
heard oral argument in the contest action, "which also required imme-
diate attention.' ' 40 0 The majority disagreed with Chief Justice Wells's
position that the opinion should not issue while Bush v. Gore was
pending, and quietly jabbed back at the Court: "we have issued this
opinion as expeditiously as possible in order to timely respond to the
questions presented by the Supreme Court.'
140 1
In an opening section of the opinion entitled "The Applicable
Law," the court introduced the federal and state law that governed its
decision. 1412 Calling it "[a] fundamental principle governing presiden-
tial election law in the United States," the court quoted the electoral
appointments clause in full, and then quoted the by now well-known
passage from McPherson v. Blacker interpreting the clause. 40 3 Sec-
tion 5 was also quoted in full. 140 4 The court then wrote:
Consistent with the above provisions of federal law and with long-
standing principles of state law, the Florida Legislature in 1951 en-
1396. See id. at 68-69.
1397. Id. at 78.
1398. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla.
2000) [hereinafter Palm Beach II].
1399. Id. at 1292. Chief Justice Wells did not agree that the opinion should be re-
leased while Bush v. Gore was pending and did not concur in the merits of the opin-
ion. Id. (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
1400. Id. at 1279 n.2.
1401. Id. (emphasis added).
1402. Id. at 1281-82.
1403. Id. at 1281.
1404. Id. at 1282 (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994)).
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acted the Florida Election Code .... which sets forth uniform criteria
regulating elections in this state and which provides methods and
procedures, including judicial methods and procedures, for the final
determination of any controversy or contest concerning the ap-
pointment of all or any of the electors of this state.
1405
After acknowledging the federal law, the court sought to erase any
impression that its earlier decision had been based on the Florida
Constitution. Its decision on the first issue-whether manual recounts
could be conducted only when there was some form of machine mal-
function-remained the same.140 6 Its decision on the second issue,
however-the circumstances under which the Secretary of State and
the Canvassing Commission should accept the results of manual re-
counts submitted after the seven-day deadline in sections 102.111 and
102.112-read quite differently. 1407 As it had done in the first opin-
ion, the court noted that the recount provisions of section 102.166, in
particular the provision allowing a candidate to request a recount at
any time prior to certification, conflicted with the seven-day deadlines
for certification, because virtually any recount would take more than a
single day to complete. 140 8 The court's resolution of the conflict,
though, became unambiguously a matter of statutory interpretation:
"if the seven-day limit were to be strictly enforced, the manual re-
count provision would be eviscerated and rendered meaningless. The
Legislature could not have intended such a result.
'140 9
The court also modified its analysis of the Secretary of State's dis-
cretion to accept returns after the seven-day deadline. The court rein-
stated its holdings that the Secretary had discretion to accept
amended returns after the seven-day deadline had passed and that she
could only refuse such amended returns if accepting the returns would
preclude the losing party from pursuing a contest action or would re-
sult in Florida's losing its participation in the electoral college, "as
provided in section 5."11' 0 It added language, however, designed to
limit its constraints on the Secretary's discretion to presidential elec-
tions where a county has "proceed[ed] in good faith with a manual
recount under section 102.166. "1411
The earlier references to the Florida Constitution1 412 no longer ap-
peared. The court asserted, in its conclusion, that its earlier opinion
1405. Id.
1406. Compare id. at 1282-84, with Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris,
772 So. 2d 1220, 1228-30 (Fla.), vacated sub nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) [hereinafter Palm Beach 1].
1407. Compare Palm Beach 11, 772 So. 2d at 1284-90, with Palm Beach 1, 772 So. 2d
at 1230-40.
1408. Compare Palm Beach H, 772 So. 2d at 1284, with Palm Beach 1, 772 So. 2d at
1232-33.
1409. Palm Beach II, 772 So. 2d at 1287.
1410. Id. at 1289-91; see also Palm Beach 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237, 1239.
1411. Palm Beach H, 772 So. 2d at 1289.
1412. See Palm Beach I, 772 So. 2d at 1236-38.
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had "identified the right of Florida's citizens to vote and to have elec-
tions determined by the will of the Florida's voters as important policy
concerns of the Florida Legislature in enacting Florida's election
code."' 4 13 Yet the limits on the Secretary's discretion were based on
the court's "perception of legislative intent," and reflected the court's
"view that the Legislature would not wish to endanger Florida's vote
being counted in a presidential election.' '1 414
Finally, the court sought to justify its earlier decision to extend cer-
tification of the election results until November 26.1415 The court ex-
plained that Palm Beach County, and potentially other counties, were
"thwarted in their efforts" to complete manual recounts by the No-
vember 13 Division of Elections opinion that the court had since ruled
was legally erroneous. 1416 Had the counties not been thrown off by
that opinion, the court wrote, they might have completed their manual
recounts by November 18, the earliest date on which the Secretary
could have certified the final election results (i.e., the day after the last
overseas ballots could arrive). 1 4 17 Thus, by selecting November 26,
five days after the issuance of its opinion, the court simply restored
the five days the counties lost because of the erroneous Division of
Elections opinion: "[t]he November 26, 2000 date was not a new
'deadline' and has no effect in future elections."
' 141 8
F. The Supreme Court's Decision
After the Florida Supreme Court weighed in on December 11, there
was no more news to cover. The nation sat waiting for the Supreme
Court to rule, and the media was reduced to broadcasting stills of the
Court building. One half expected smoke to rise from the roof, either
anointing a president or signaling that the controversy would
continue.
The smoke never rose, but at 10:00 on Tuesday night, December 12,
the Court issued its decision 1419 in Bush v. Gore.1420 The decision was
not read from the bench, as is customary-the justices had all gone
home. The pressroom staff simply handed out copies 1421 of the six
opinions: the five-member majority's per curiam opinion, a concur-
rence by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by Justices Scalia and
1413. Palm Beach 11, 772 So. 2d at 1290 (emphasis added).
1414. Id. at 1291.
1415. See Palm Beach I, 772 So. 2d at 1240.
1416. Palm Beach 11, 772 So. 2d at 1290.
1417. Id. at 1290; see also id. at 1288.
1418. Id. at 1290.
1419. Linda Greenhouse, By Single Vote, Justices End Recount, Blocking Gore After
5-Week Struggle: An Awareness of Hazards, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al.
1420. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
1421. Greenhouse, supra note 1419.
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Thomas, and four dissents, by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer, each joined to different extents by the other dissenters.
14 22
The majority flatly reversed the Florida Supreme Court and re-
manded "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opin-
ion.' 1 4 23  There would be no meaningful "further proceedings,"
however. The Court found that the recounts ordered by the lower
court violated the Equal Protection Clause, and that the equal protec-
tion problem could not be cured in time to comport with the Florida
Legislature's intent that any contest action be completed by Decem-
ber 12.1424 The majority did not address Bush's claims that the Florida
court had violated the electoral appointments clause and § 5, although
the three justices on Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence concluded
that it had. 425
The majority began by observing that the electoral appointments
clause does not confer upon any citizen the right to vote for the presi-
dential electors, vesting that power instead in the state legislatures.
14 26
When the state legislatures choose to delegate that right, however,
"the [individual's] right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is
fundamental,"'14 27 and "the State may not, by later arbitrary and dispa-
1422. Bush, 531 U.S. at 100; id. at Ill (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 123 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 135 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1423. See id. at 111.
1424. See id. at 109-10.
1425. See id. at 112-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1426. Id. at 104 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35
(1892)).
1427. Id. (emphasis added). The majority's decision to label as "fundamental" the
right to vote in a presidential election (once the legislature conferred it) seemed to
bear serious ramifications, because traditionally, rights that the Court deems "funda-
mental" cannot be burdened by state action without triggering "strict scrutiny" by the
Court. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) ("Since the classifica-
tion here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutional-
ity must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state
interest."); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) ("We have long
been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the
Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined."). One would thus have thought that the
conclusion warranted an extensive discussion, but the Court devoted only one sen-
tence to it: "One source of [the vote's] fundamental nature lies in the equal weight
accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter." Bush, 531 U.S. at
104. And even this explanation was odd, because the very principle that votes must
be accorded equal weight followed upon the holding that the right to vote was funda-
mental, not the other way around. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55
(1964) ("Since the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter... any alleged infringe-
ment of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized,"
and "an individual's right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired
when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with citizens living
in other parts of the state."). Further, there was a special oddity about deeming the
right to vote in a presidential election "fundamental," because, as the Bush v. Gore
Court itself acknowledged, the legislature could under the electoral appointments
clause choose to do away with the right completely. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.
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rate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.' 1 428 Ac-
cording to the majority, the Florida court had done just that, by
allowing the counting to go forward under the "intent of the voter"
standard in the absence of more specific rules to ensure that the "in-
tent of the voter" standard was equally applied.
1429
The majority noted that Gore's counsel had acknowledged during
argument that "the standards for accepting or rejecting contested bal-
lots might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a
single county from one recount team to another.' ' 430 The majority
also cited examples from the record suggesting that the standards for
finding a legal vote had already diverged: testimony that the three
Miami-Dade officials seemed to be applying three different criteria
and testimony that the Palm Beach board had begun with a "hanging-
chad" rule, had switched to a "sunshine" rule, had returned to a
"hanging-chad" rule, and then abandoned any bright-line rule, "only
to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads le-
gal." 1431' By ordering the inclusion of votes identified under differing
standards, the majority wrote, the Florida court "ratified th[e] uneven
treatment" of Florida voters. 432
The Court seemed to suggest that these variations in the standard
for evaluating ballots would be sufficient to find an equal protection
violation, but it did not stop there. The order to count only un-
dervotes also reflected differential treatment, the majority said, be-
So it was a bit of an anomaly, one that might at least merit some discussion, to say
that the state could fully eliminate a right but could not burden it.
With this said, it is also odd that having deemed the right to vote in a presidential
election "fundamental," the majority did not go on to suggest that the Florida count-
ing should undergo "strict scrutiny." To the contrary, the majority stated only that the
state must refrain from engaging in "arbitrary and disparate treatment" of its citizens'
votes, id. at 104-05, which suggested a much more lenient evaluation than strict scru-
tiny usually involves. It may be that the majority deemed it unnecessary to apply
strict scrutiny because it felt the state's action could not survive even a lower form of
review, but if that were the case, then it would seem that labeling the right "funda-
mental" was unnecessary as well. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-26 (1996)
(holding that Colorado law violated equal protection rights of homosexuals even
under rational basis review and declining to decide whether classifications based on
sexual orientation should be subject to strict scrutiny).
1428. Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
665 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
1429. Id. at 105-06.
1430. Id. at 106.
1431. See id. at 106-07 (citing Trial Transcript at 497, 499, Gore v. Harris, No. 00-
2808 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2-3, 2000), available in unofficial version at 2000 WL
1802941). The majority offered a record citation for the first testimony referenced but
not for the second. And the reality was that the Court's rendition of what had hap-
pened in Palm Beach-the second piece of "evidence"-was inaccurate. Judge Bur-
ton did not testify that a court told the board to "consider dimpled chads legal." He
testified that Judge Labarga ordered that no ballots should be excluded on the basis
of a per se rule, such as "all dimpled ballots are excluded." See Trial Transcript, supra
note 362, at 91-94 (relating Judge Burton's testimony on the point).
1432. Bush, 531 U.S. at 107.
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cause the citizen who "undervoted" would have his ballot evaluated
for intent, but the estimated 110,000 voters who "overvoted" would
not, "even if a manual examination of the ballot would reveal the req-
uisite indicia of intent. ' 1433 Further, because the Florida court had
been willing to let a partial count from Miami-Dade be certified, the
majority had "no assurance" that the Florida court would require that
all the recounts be complete. In fact, Gore's counsel had encouraged
that course, and stated that the Florida decision would allow for it.
1434
Finally, because the Florida court's order did not specify who would
do the counting, the canvassing boards "were forced to pull together
ad hoc teams of judges ... who had no previous training in handling
and interpreting ballots," and even those allowed to observe had been
prohibited from objecting during the counting.4 5
The Court concluded that these "features" of the count ordered in
Florida were "inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to
protect the fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a
statewide recount under the authority of a single state judicial of-
ficer."'14 36 The majority emphasized, however, that its holding could
not readily be transferred to other cases or other circumstances.
"Our consideration," the majority wrote, "is limited to the present cir-
cumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities."'
' 437
Having decided that the count as ordered violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Court had only to determine the nature of its re-
mand. "[I]t is obvious," the majority wrote, "that the recount cannot
be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection
and due process without substantial additional work."14 38 The Florida
court would have to adopt adequate statewide standards for evaluat-
ing the ballots, put in place "practicable procedures" for implement-
ing those standards, and provide for judicial review. 4 39 Florida would
have to deal with the fact that the election equipment was not de-
signed to sort out undervotes and overvotes, and the Secretary of
State would have to oversee this process for accuracy.
144 0
At the same time, the majority wrote, the Florida Supreme Court
had said that "the legislature intended the State's electors to 'par-
ticipat[e] fully in the federal electoral process,' as provided in 3 U.S.C.
§ 5. '1441 Section 5, in turn, required that "any controversy or contest
1433. Id. at 107-08.
1434. See id. at 108.
1435. Id. at 109.
1436. Id.
1437. Id.
1438. See id. at 110.
1439. Id.
1440. See id.
1441. Id. (quoting Palm Beach II, 772 So. 2d at 1289). In truth, the Florida Supreme
Court had said no such thing at any point in the process. Notwithstanding the many
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that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors be com-
pleted by December 12," and that date was "upon US."' 14 4 2 Thus, in
the majority's view, there was no possibility of a remand for a new
count: "Because it is evident that any recount seeking to meet the
December 12 date will be unconstitutional for the reasons we have
discussed, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida
ordering a recount to proceed."'
1443
The § 5 theory that Ted Olson had spun for the first time during the
oral argument, under pressure from Justice Souter, had in effect won
the day. There would be no more recounts, no more court actions, no
more doubt. The election was finally over, and it had gone to Bush.
The dissenters could not have disagreed more strenuously with the
result. Two of them-Justices Souter and Breyer-were prepared to
agree that the count as ordered by the Florida court would probably
violate the Equal Protection Clause, 1444 but even they were adamant
that preventing any count from taking place, on the ground that it was
already December 12, was wrong.1 445 Much of the time lost, the dis-
senters argued, was attributable to the Court's precipitous vote to stay
the counting. 1446 More importantly, as Justice Ginsburg (joined by
Justice Stevens) pointed out,
opportunities that it had to discuss § 5, the Florida court had never acknowledged that
the Florida Legislature even knew that § 5 existed, much less that the legislature had
expressly intended to invoke it. See supra notes 590, 1173-75, 1404-05 and accompa-
nying text. Indeed, the Supreme Court majority's own quotation comes not from any
passage discussing the Florida Legislature's intent with respect to § 5, but from a pas-
sage in which the Florida court enumerated the two reasons why the Secretary of
State could refuse amended returns. That passage reads:
the reasoned basis for the exercise of the Department's discretion to ignore
amended returns is limited to those instances where failure to ignore the
amended returns will: ... (2) in the case of a federal election, will result in
Florida voters not participating fully in the federal electoral process, as pro-
vided in 3 U.S.C. § 5.
Palm Beach H, 772 So. 2d at 1289. It was therefore entirely disingenuous for the
Court to suggest from this limited statement (or any other) that the Florida court
would contravene the intent of the legislature if the contest action extended beyond
December 12.
1442. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.
1443. Id.
1444. See id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer actually stopped short of stating definitively that the count would vio-
late the equal protection clause, because the majority's remedy made it unnecessary,
but he certainly suggested that it would be unconstitutional as ordered:
I agree that, in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness
should have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the
problem. In light of the majority's disposition, I need not decide whether, or
the extent to which, as a remedial matter, the Constitution would place lim-
its upon the content of the uniform standard.
Id. at 146.
1445. See id. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1446. See id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("To recount these [ballots] manually
would be a tall order, but before this Court stayed the effort to do that the courts of
Florida were ready to do their best to get the job done."); id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J.,
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[T]he December 12 date for bringing Florida's electoral votes into 3
U.S.C. § 5's safe harbor lacks the significance the Court assigns it.
Were that date to pass, Florida would still be entitled to deliver
electoral votes Congress must count unless both Houses find that
the votes "had not been ... regularly given."'
1447
And whether a constitutionally-corrected count could be completed
by December 18-the date on which the electors were actually sup-
posed to vote-was a matter for Florida, not the United States Su-
preme Court, to decide.'
448
Three of the four wrote, with the agreement of the fourth, that the
Supreme Court should never have taken the case because it did not
present a "substantial" federal question. 1 449 All of the dissenters felt
that the electoral appointments clause claim was meritless, because
there was a sound interpretive basis for all of the Florida court's deci-
sions,'1 45 0 and that the § 5 claim was not even "serious," because § 5
did not require anything of the states.1 451 As for the equal protection
claim, two of the justices acknowledged that the counts would be im-
perfect-it would be impossible to craft a perfect process under the
circumstances-but did not believe those imperfections rose to the
level of an equal protection violation, especially in light of the
thousands of intended votes that would go uncounted in the absence
of the Florida court's order. 452 And even the other two dissenters,
who likely would have found an equal protection violation, felt that
the Florida court should have been left to address the equal protection
issue on its own, and possibly correct any violation, before the Su-
preme Court intervened. 4 53 Justice Breyer even noted that the Court
had probably contributed to the problem, because its comments on
the electoral appointments clause in the first decision rendered the
Florida judges overly cautious about elaborating on the "intent of the
voter" found in the Florida Code. 45 4
dissenting) ("Time is short in part because of the Court's entry of a stay on December
9, several hours after an able circuit judge in Leon County had begun to superintend
the recount process.").
1447. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994)); see also id.
at 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If, for example, a state submits a single slate of elec-
tors, Congress must count those votes unless both Houses agree that the votes 'have
not been .. .regularly given."') (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994)).
1448. Id. at 146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1449. See id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1450. See id. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 130-33 (Souter, J., dissenting);
id. at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 147-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1451. Id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
148-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1452. See id. at 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1453. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1454. Id. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In light of our previous remand, the Florida
Supreme Court may have been reluctant to adopt a more specific standard than that
provided for by the legislature for fear of exceeding its authority under Article II.").
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But perhaps even more important than the merits of the dissenters'
objections was the undeniable bitterness in their voices. Justice Ste-
vens stated flatly that the only explanation for the majority's decision
was its unspoken conclusion that the Florida courts were incapable of
being impartial, a position that "can only lend credence to the most
cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land.""145 Jus-
tice Ginsburg appeared equally skeptical of the majority's motives.
After a long exposition of the Court's ordinary deference to state
courts, she wrote: "Were the other Members of this Court as mindful
as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty, they would
affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.' 1 456 Justice
Breyer, having concurred in both of the above statements, focused not
on the majority's motive, but on what he plainly thought the horror of
the Court's intervention: "Justice Brandeis once said of the Court, 'the
most important thing we can do is not doing'.... What it does today,
the Court should have left undone. I would repair the damage as best
we now can, by permitting the Florida recount to continue under uni-
form standards.' 1 457 Whether one agreed with the dissenters' posi-
tions or not, these were emotional words, and they revealed a
polarization on the Court that may have run stronger even than the
electorate's.
Within twenty-four hours of the Court's decision, Vice President
Gore appeared on national television and conceded the election to
Governor Bush. "Now that the United States Supreme Court has
spoken," Gore said, "[l]et there be no doubt. While I strongly disa-
gree with the outcome, I accept it.'
1458
PART THREE: THE LAWYERS' EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME-
MISTAKES REAL AND IMAGINED
As complex as the 2000 election was, there is a certain foolhardiness
in trying to isolate what caused it to end with the Supreme Court call-
ing time and Gore conceding. At least in some measure, the result
was the product of incredible happenstance, from the premature calls
by the media, to the butterfly ballot design in Palm Beach County, to
the fact that many of those who voted in Florida were new to the
polls, to the Republican effort to turn out absentee voters, to the time
the Miami-Dade canvassing board took just to decide to count ballots,
even to the Palm Beach board's decision to take Thanksgiving off.
Whether the outcome would have been different without any one of
1455. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1456. Id. at 142-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1457. Id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 71 (1962) (quoting Justice Louis D. Brandeis)).
1458. Richard L. Berke & Katherine Q. Seelye, An End to a Quest. Vice President
Offers To Aid Bush But Admits Disappointment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at Al.
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these events, it is (impossible to say, but their cumulative effect is
unmistakable.
Skeptics would surely say that partisanship on the part of the mem-
bers of the highest state and federal courts played an enormous role.
There is certainly some circumstantial evidence in support of that con-
clusion. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, frequently took po-
sitions almost completely aligned with Gore's. There were several
points at which that alignment seemed to morph into advocacy. The
court originally enjoined Secretary Harris's certification, for example,
even though Gore had not even sought that relief. 459 The court also
claimed, in the first proceeding, that Bush had not asked it to address
any constitutional issues, when that just was not factually so. 14 60 Fi-
nally, the court refused to admit on the Supreme Court's remand that
it had relied on the Florida Constitution, although it plainly had,
claiming instead that the constitution had been invoked only to reflect
the "policy concerns" behind the legislative enactment.
1 461
The same charge, of course, may be levied at the United States Su-
preme Court. Its willingness even to consider Bush's § 5 claim a sub-
stantial federal question,1462 and its decision to base its first decision
on a single Court dictum from an 1892 decision, without any discus-
sion,1463 strongly suggest that the justices were reaching for a particu-
lar result. Indeed, the oral arguments are literally rife with instances
in which the justices jumped in to remind the attorneys of their best
arguments and prevent them froh conceding too much.1 464 Further,
in issuing its stay of the Florida count, the majority essentially manu-
factured the "irreparable harm" Bush stood to suffer, converting his
claim with respect to the public interest into a full-blown entitlement
he personally stood to lose. 1465 And the Court's explanation of its
decision n6t to let any recounts proceed-that the Florida Supreme
Court had concluded that the Florida legislature intended its scheme
to satisfy the December 12 deadline of § 5-was flatly dishonest.
1466
On the other hand, when one takes a larger view of the events,
there are a variety of reasons not to conclude that the courts' deci-
sions were politically motivated. The Florida Supreme Court, for ex-
1459. See supra notes 427-28 and accompanying text.
1460. Compare Palm Beach 1, 772 So. 2d at 1228 n.10, with supra notes 566-69 and
accompanying text (summarizing constitutional arguments in briefs and oral
argument).
1461. Compare Palm Beach II, 772 So. 2d at 1290, with supra notes 623-29 and ac-
companying text (discussing portion of Palm Beach I based on Florida Constitution).
1462. See supra notes 671-78 and accompanying text.
1463. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (quoting the McPherson passage
and describing the passage as a dictum); supra notes 996-98 and accompanying text
(describing the Court's decision).
1464. See supra notes 969, 971, 975, 987-90, 1343-45, 1352-54, 1390-93 and accom-
panying text.
1465. See supra notes 1201, 1216, 1223 and accompanying text.
1466. See supra note 1441 and accompanying text.
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ample, decided the primary cases in Gore's favor, but it also affirmed
the rulings against Gore in the butterfly ballot case and the absentee
ballot cases and refused to order the Miami-Dade canvassing board to
resume its manual recount at a time when Gore really needed to find
more votes. 1467 Likewise, notwithstanding all the consternation over
the Supreme Court's equal protection holding, the reality is that fully
seven of the nine justices agreed that the count would have violated
the Equal Protection Clause,4 68 just as four of the twelve judges on
the Eleventh Circuit had concluded a few days earlier. 14 69 The further
reality is that the case presented an entirely new equal protection
question and a situation that could never be perfectly fair. There were
no prior equal protection cases like it, and the Court came into the
case with sparse precedent addressing the appointment of presidential
electors, precedent that itself had not settled the level of scrutiny to be
applied to state election laws.
1470
Indeed, that is why the lawyering was so critical. Lawyers all know
that judges have partisan leanings from which it is difficult to extricate
themselves, and they learn from early on to work that much harder
when facing a judge with an opposing proclivity. Their very job is to
extricate judges from their preconceptions. At a minimum, this must
include learning the law cold, honestly evaluating the weaknesses in
one's case, anticipating the opposing arguments that will be most per-
suasive, and convincing the court that neither existing law nor wise
policy counsel an opposing decision. And put most simply, these were
the tasks at which Gore's lawyers,' 47' in particular, did not succeed.
This is not to say that Gore's lawyers performed poorly throughout
the case. They did not. David Boies was almost always clear and per-
1467. See Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000)
(butterfly ballot case); Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla.
2000) (absentee ballot case); supra note 707-08 and accompanying text (describing
the Miami-Dade case).
1468. See supra note 1424 and accompanying text (discussing majority holding);
supra note 1444 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Souter's and Justice
Breyer's agreement).
1469. See supra notes 1024-25, 1038-41 and accompanying text.
1470. See supra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
1471. At the outset of this discussion, a very important point is in order: there were
two different teams of lawyers working for Gore, one handling the case coming up
through Florida, and one handling the federal case once the initial district court pro-
ceeding was over and Gore had won. The latter team of lawyers, who were associated
largely with the Atlanta law firm of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, was responsible
for all of the Eleventh Circuit proceedings, and it is quite plain that they took their
work very seriously and prepared fully their response to Bush's equal protection and
due process claims. So this discussion does not in any way implicate them, and hence-
forth, the term "Gore's lawyers" should be taken to mean the lawyers responsible for
the Florida and United States Supreme Court proceedings. Indeed, Gore's federal-
court lawyers are relevant to this discussion only inasmuch as Gore's state-court law-
yers should have relied more heavily on their work, and Gore should have considered




suasive with the points he made, 1472 Laurence Tribe confirmed his rep-
utation as one of the few lawyers capable of true dialogue with
Supreme Court justices,1473 and the team of attorneys working in Flor-
ida pulled off unparalleled feats racking up victories all across the
state.
1 474
Nor is it to say that Gore's lawyers were overmatched. They were
not. Bush's lawyers must be given full credit for developing a solid
long-term strategy aimed at using federal law to their advantage,
1475
but their performance at trial and during oral arguments was at best
very weak. Michael Carvin came across as contemptuous of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court. 14 76 The Republican contest trial team put on as
much evidence to favor Gore as Gore's own team did. 1477 Barry Rich-
ard and Ted Olson appeared woefully inept at understanding the is-
sues during oral argument, even when the various judges threw out
arguments to help them.
1478
These observations notwithstanding, lawyers take cases as they find
them, and Gore's case, from the beginning, was a more difficult one to
win. In contrast to Bush, he sought to upset the status quo, and to do
so on an unprecedented scale. Hence, there was far less room for er-
ror than there was for the Republicans, and the Democrats' mistakes
had much more meaningful consequences than the failings of their
counterparts.
Indeed, this Article argues that critical mistakes by the Gore legal
team had as much to do with the outcome as any other circumstance.
It does not claim that the outcome necessarily would have been differ-
ent had Gore's attorneys not committed the errors. As acknowledged
earlier, the controversy was too complex to attribute causation to any
single aspect of it. Further, the most that Gore's team could have ac-
complished was saving some form of recount, and no one can know
what result that might have brought. 1479 But one thing is for certain:
1472. See, e.g., supra notes 532-34 and accompanying text.
1473. See, e.g., supra notes 981-83 and accompanying text.
1474. See supra notes 324, 326, 371, 387, 401, 406, 415-16, 427, 432, 589-90, 685 and
accompanying text.
1475. See supra notes 638-57 and accompanying text.
1476. See supra notes 566, 572 and accompanying text.
1477. See supra notes 828-42 and accompanying text.
1478. See supra notes 968-76, 1343-54 and accompanying text (relating Olson's ar-
guments); supra notes 1122-29 (relating Richard's argument).
1479. After the controversy ended, two different consortia of media organizations
obtained the Florida ballots and concluded that Bush would likely have won the elec-
tion if the Supreme Court had permitted the recount to go forward as the Florida
court ordered. MARTIN MERZER, THE MIAMI HERALD, THE MIAMI HERALD RE-
PORT: DEMOCRACY HELD HOSTAGE 167 (2001); Jackie Calmes & Edward P.
Foldessy, Florida Revisited: In Election Review, Bush Wins Without Supreme Court
Help, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2001, at Al. To reach that conclusion, the consortia used
slightly different methodology. The first consortium, comprised of representatives
from The Miami Herald, its parent company Knight Ridder, and USA Today, looked
at all of the undervoted ballots in counties that did not complete their recounts to
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he could never have won without the recounts, and there is reason to
determine whether they bore any markings that might reflect intent. MERZER, supra,
at 170-72. To this was added the numbers from Miami-Dade and Palm Beach that the
Florida Supreme Court ordered included, as well as the numbers from the counties
that completed the recount before the stay issued. Id. at 171-72. The second consor-
tium, made up of the Wall Street Journal and seven other media organizations, sur-
veyed all of the county canvassing boards to find out "what standards they planned to
use to evaluate their ballots," then "accepted all the completed recounts and applied
each county's recounting plans and standards to that county's ballots." Calmes &
Foldessy, supra. As "a statistical check of variations between observers," both con-
sortia employed independent research firms who recorded the number of ballots fall-
ing in a number of objective categories. MERZER, supra, at 170; Calmes & Foldessy,
supra.
If these analyses were sound, one might argue that the lawyering had no effect
whatsoever on the outcome of the election controversy. There are, however, signifi-
cant problems with the consortia's approaches. The Miami Herald consortium, for
example, seems to have made no effort similar to the Wall Street Journal's to account
for actual decisions by individual counties to adopt or not adopt bright-line objective
criteria, and simply based its conclusion on a tally of votes bearing any conceivable
indicia of intent. MERZER, supra, at 170-72. This itself could cause the consortium's
conclusion to be inaccurate, if, for example, a county with a large number of un-
dervotes used a very strict standard, either formally or informally. Conversely, the
Wall Street Journal consortium attempted to factor in the various counties' plans, but
it ran into four counties that claimed that they simply would not have counted any
ballots, and nine other counties that claimed they would have counted both un-
dervotes and overvotes, and apparently the consortium accepted these claims, even
though the counties might well have run into contempt problems with the Leon
County judge overseeing the process. See Calmes & Foldessy, supra. Further, the
Wall Street Journal admitted that
[wihile every effort was made to ensure precision, the consortium was una-
ble to segregate with certainty all of the ballots that went uncounted in the
certified result. As a result, [the consortium's independent research firm,
National Opinion Research Center] said Friday that margins of a few hun-
dred votes or less would be, in his professional opinion, too close to call.
Id. Yet the Journal declined to exercise the caution the independent firm urged and
unabashedly relied on precisely such a "margin[ ] of a few hundred votes or less." If
the Supreme Court had not intervened, the Journal wrote, "Bush still would have won
the election by 493 votes." Id.
Just as importantly, one cannot appropriately gauge the effect of the lawyering by
addressing only the total affirmance scenario, when there were so many other alterna-
tives available. It is entirely possible, for example, that the Supreme Court would
have permitted some counting to continue had Gore's lawyers not mishandled their
arguments concerning the effect of the December 12 'date in § 5. See infra notes
1480-1509 and accompanying text. Had the Court done so, it might well have di-
rected Florida to count overvotes as well as undervotes. See supra note 1433 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's focus on the failure to count overvotes as
part of the equal protection violation). And under that scenario, the two consortiums
agree that Gore quite likely would have won. See Calmes & Foldessy, supra ("In
several scenarios, overvote ballots from which voter intent could be discerned netted
Mr. Gore hundreds of votes, enough to edge out Mr. Bush."); MERZER, supra, at 189
("If [there had been] a manual examination of all machine-rejected ballots between
Election Day and official certification of the election, thousands of additional votes
would have been salvaged and the outcome of the election might have been differ-
ent."). In short, any causation analysis has to end with the Supreme Court decision,
because it simply cannot be predicted what the Supreme Court, the Florida courts,




believe that three particular failings of his lawyers contributed signifi-
cantly to the Supreme Court's decision not to let those recounts
happen.
The Article also identifies some prevailing misconceptions about
the performance of Gore's lawyers. As it will show, much of the ex-
isting commentary-which has focused on the attorneys' decision to
seek recounts before bringing a contest action, and to do so in only
four Florida counties rather than statewide-reflects either an incom-
plete understanding of the law and the events, or a willingness to en-
gage in second-guessing judgment calls that any lawyer might
rightfully have made.
I. DISTINGUISHING JUDGMENT CALLS, UNDERSTANDABLE
MISTAKES, AND HARMLESS ERROR
To undertake a fair and constructive assessment of a lawyer's per-
formance, one must at the outset acknowledge three important dis-
tinctions. The first is the distinction between a judgment call and a
mistake. The second is the distinction between a reasonable mistake
and one that should not have been made. The third is the distinction
between harmless and critical error.
At its best, litigation is an art, not a science. At various points in a
given case, lawyers must evaluate the likelihood of competing scena-
rios and then take calculated risks, not knowing every circumstance
that will develop in the future. To come behind them later, with the
benefit of knowing how the case evolved, and criticize only their
choice is nothing more than Monday-morning quarterbacking. In
short, pure judgment calls, unless they are utterly unsound, ought not
to be the focus of second-guessing.
Not every decision a lawyer makes, however, involves this type of
judgment call. There are some aspects of a lawyer's performance with
respect to which the expectations are fixed. Fully understanding all
the applicable law is one such fixed expectation. Lawyers across the
country will attest that it is this expectation that fuels them in the wee
hours of the morning. Their singular nightmare is learning in court
the next morning of the controlling case they missed.
Another fixed expectation is anticipating the weaknesses that one's
opponents will exploit and preparing to respond. This requires a law-
yer to be brutally honest, both internally and with the client. It re-
quires developing responsive arguments, and strategy to mitigate the
harm, in the event an opponent's case begins to take hold, even
though it sometimes happens that the responsive arguments never be-
come necessary. It does not require, or even counsel, foregoing ag-
gressive strategies beneficial to one's client, but it does require one
not to be blind to the obstacles a more aggressive strategy will en-
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counter. In short, ignoring a case's weaknesses will not make them
disappear.
A lawyer's failure to meet these threshold, fixed expectations can
only be deemed a mistake, not a judgment call. There may be expla-
nations for the mistake, not the least of which is the press of time.
Lawyers are human beings, and human beings have limits on how
much information they can absorb, and how well they can work with
it, in short spaces of time. This observation, however, does not change
the nature of the failing. It is still a mistake, not a judgment call, and
recognizing it as such is important if the profession is to represent its
clients well in the future.
With that said, it would be folly to suggest that lawyers must be
deemed fully culpable for every mistake they make. Even with the
distinction between mistakes and judgment calls in mind, practicing
lawyers would no doubt agree that it is extraordinarily difficult to
make no mistakes, particularly in complex litigation. Some margin of
error must exist. For this reason, a fair analysis requires a second dis-
tinction, between a mistake that might understandably have been
committed under the circumstances and one that simply should not
have been made.
Finally, not every mistake, even if understandable under the cir-
cumstances, bears causative significance. Some of the mistakes that
inevitably will be made will carry no consequences. Thus, to the ex-
tent one wants to measure the impact of a lawyer's performance on a
given outcome, one has to draw a distinction between harmless and
critical error. One must ask: realistically, how would the court have
reacted to a different course? And when a case involves multiple is-
sues, one must ask, would the court's different reaction on one issue
have mattered in light of the others?
This distinction is of course difficult to apply with precision, because
there is no way to be certain how a court (made up of humans) would
have reacted to a different course. Yet it is certainly possible to iden-
tify the decisive issues in a case, and conclude that a lawyer's case
would have been much stronger on those issues in the absence of the
mistake. Indeed, whatever fallibilities such estimations involve, law-
yers engage in them every day as they develop strategies. And if
those same lawyers refuse to evaluate the effects of mistakes on their
cases on the ground that outcomes are not precisely-as opposed to
generally-predictable, they are simply being hypocritical.
In the analysis that follows, these distinctions have been sharply
drawn. Whenever it is charged that Gore's lawyers should have han-
dled the case differently, the analysis examines whether the lawyers'
performance realistically made any difference, and addresses any cir-
cumstances, strategic or otherwise, that might account for their ac-
tions. The results are nonetheless disturbing. Even allowing for
judgment calls, understandable mistakes, and harmless error, it is
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clear that Gore's legal team may have played a substantial role in his
loss.
II. THE DEMOCRATS' CRITICAL ERRORS
The first task in litigating any dispute is to determine the legal
framework applicable to the case. Some disputes are inevitably more
complicated than others, but there is no point in proceeding at all
without mastering the applicable law. In the election controversy, as
Part One sets forth, this meant that the attorneys needed to master
not only the Florida Election Code, and any cases interpreting it, but
also a body of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the electoral ap-
pointments clause and a title of the United States Code addressing
presidential elections in considerable detail. To do so, to reach a full
understanding of the law, would have involved more than just reading
the relevant provisions and cases. It would also have required consid-
ering the constitutional validity of the laws and the interrelationship
between them.
What seems to have happened is that Gore's legal team never fin-
ished this process. To be sure, the Democrat's lawyers became inti-
mately familiar with Florida law. David Boies frequently astonished
his audience by citing the exact pages of Florida cases off the top of
his head. But federal law was an entirely different matter. Looking
back over the entire record, it becomes clear that Gore's lawyers (1)
never reached a correct understanding of federal § 5, (2) failed to ap-
preciate the ramifications of the electoral appointments clause until
after the Republicans had wreaked avoidable havoc with their case,
and (3) did not prepare adequately to defend the equal protection
challenge that their own instinct alerted them would become a major
issue.
All of these were critical errors in the lawyers' representation. They
cost not just Gore, but the Florida and United States Supreme Courts,
who, without accurate and complete arguments before them, issued
opinions that in some respects were demonstrably incorrect.
A. The Consistent Mischaracterization of § 5
To the extent one can ever be idealistic about the law-and believe,
albeit on rare occasions, that the meaning of a law is clear-the most
irksome aspect of the election controversy has to be the fretting by the
Florida and United States Supreme Courts that Florida's electoral
votes would be "in jeopardy" if the litigation did not conclude before
December 12.1480 All of the anxiety along that line was based on 3
U.S.C. § 5, which provides that if a state reaches a final determination
1480. See supra notes 590, 1414 and accompanying text (relating the Florida court
references); supra notes 999, 1441 and accompanying text (relating the Supreme
Court references).
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of its electors by six days prior to the electoral college, according to a
dispute-resolution method put in place prior to Election Day, that de-
termination "shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of
the electoral votes." '148 The courts took this to mean that if there was
no final determination according to the pre-existing dispute-resolution
method by December 12-i.e., if the election litigation did not end by
December 12-then the results from Florida would be "inconclusive,"
i.e., any electoral votes submitted by Florida would be subject to chal-
lenge on the floor of Congress. 482 Yet that interpretation is demon-
strably wrong.
As set forth in detail in Part One, federal § 15 directs Congress on
how to handle virtually every permutation of electoral vote submis-
sions that might arise. 483 First, it provides that in the event only one
slate of electors is submitted, Congress must honor that slate. 484 Sec-
ond, it provides meticulously for the universe of scenarios in the event
more than one electoral slate is submitted, including a situation in
which a state does not submit electors pursuant to a § 5 determina-
tion. If a slate has been determined pursuant to a method complying
with § 5, that slate wins; if there is a dispute over which is the true § 5
slate, Congress has to evaluate state law and anoint one slate the legit-
imate § 5 claimant; and if there is no slate able to claim the presump-
tion afforded by § 5, Congress again has to evaluate state law and
choose one. Finally, if the two houses of Congress cannot agree in
their application of § 15, the statute itself provides a tiebreaker: the
slate certified by the state's executive wins.14
85
Neither the statute nor its legislative history leaves room for the
notion that if a state does not comply with § 5, any electoral vote the
state ever submits is at risk of disqualification. If the votes of only one
slate are submitted, Congress is required in no uncertain terms to ac-
cept the votes from that slate, and § 5 does not even come into play.
If the votes of more than one slate are submitted, and none of the
slates qualify for the § 5 presumption, then § 15 expressly addresses
what happens, and the options do not include entirely disregarding a
1481. See supra text accompanying note 275 (quoting § 5 in full).
1482. See supra notes 590, 1414 and accompanying text (relating Florida court refer-
ences); supra notes 999, 1441 and accompanying text (relating Supreme Court refer-
ences). Indeed, the courts eventually became so sure of that interpretation that they
even adopted the "safe harbor" euphemism to describe § 5, and referred to Florida's
need to take advantage of the "safe harbor" so that its vote would not be excluded.
See, e.g., Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) ("The
parties before us agree that whatever else may be the effect of this section, it creates a
"safe harbor" for a State insofar as congressional consideration of its electoral votes is
concerned.").
1483. See supra notes 265-81 and accompanying text.
1484. See supra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. Certain of the votes by mem-
bers of the slate can be challenged, but even those can be disregarded only if both
houses of Congress agree. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
1485. See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
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state's vote.'14 86 All that happens is that the houses of Congress under-
take their own evaluation of state law in order to choose a slate, and
even the disagreement of the houses is provided for, because the stat-
ute includes a way to break the tie. 487
Thus, any "conclusiveness," or "safe harbor," that § 5 offers is only
to electors chosen by a state's judiciary, or whatever other institution
might resolve a controversy. If there are electors otherwise chosen
and certified to Congress, a state has no need of a "safe harbor." Sec-
tion 15 makes quite clear that, as long as Congress has at least one
certified slate of electors before it, whether by way of § 5 or not, the
state will have a vote in the electoral college. Thus, as of November
27, when Bush transmitted to Washington the certificate of ascertain-
ment naming the Republican electors, 1488 Florida was going to have
some vote in the electoral college. It did not matter whether the court
battles did not finish by December 12-that would simply render "in-
conclusive" the slate the judiciary ultimately chose-because there
was already in place at least one electoral slate that Congress would
be required to honor under § 15.
The failure of Gore's lawyers to educate the courts on this point-
and dispense early on with the idea that Florida's electoral votes
would be "in jeopardy" after December 12-proved directly fatal to
his case. In two different decisions, the Florida Supreme Court char-
acterized § 5's deadline as threatening Florida's participation in the
electoral college, and in the second, the court expressed its "view that
the Legislature would not wish to endanger Florida's vote being
counted in a presidential election." 489 Then, drawing directly from
this completely mistaken interpretation of § 5, the United States Su-
preme Court concluded that it could not permit the count to go for-
ward because that would violate the "legislative intent" that the
contest finish by December 12.1490 All of these decisions proceeded
from an incorrect premise that Gore's lawyers allowed to remain in
place throughout the controversy.' 4 9'
In fact, Gore's lawyers not only failed to present the correct inter-
pretation of § 5, but they consistently promoted the incorrect one. In
the first Florida Supreme Court argument, for example, David Boies
1486. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (quoting the relevant portions of
§ 15 in full).
1487. See supra notes 270, 272 and accompanying text.
1488. See supra note 743 and accompanying text.
1489. See supra notes 590 (Palm Beach 1), 1414 (Palm Beach II) and accompanying
text.
1490. See supra notes 1441-43 and accompanying text.
1491. Of course, the consequence to Gore of the consistent mischaracterization of
§ 5 was not limited to his court battles. Had it been understood from the beginning
that Florida's votes were never "in jeopardy," the public surely would have been less
tolerant of the Florida Legislature's threat to step in and appoint the electors itself.
See supra notes 646-51, 661, 663 and accompanying text (describing the Florida Legis-
lature's threats).
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advised that the contest must be completed by December 12 "so that
the votes of Florida are not in peril."149 2 In Gore's initial brief to the
Supreme Court, his lawyers actually coined the term "safe harbor,"
and represented that § 5 offered a way for states to protect themselves
from disqualification in the electoral college. 1493 And in Gore's final
brief to the United States Supreme Court, his lawyers wrote: "the stat-
ute's only purpose and effect is to provide each State with a way to
guarantee that its electors will not be subject to challenge in Congress
at the time the electors' votes are tabulated pursuant to the Twelfth
Amendment." 1494 This just was not true. Section 5 does not really do
anything for a "state" qua state: the statute's only "purpose and ef-
fect" is to provide a method of selecting which of two or more slates
from the same state must be accepted.
It is so unimaginable that lawyers of the caliber Gore had could
have made this error, that one wants to believe that they had some
good reason to mischaracterize § 5 as they did, but there does not ap-
pear to be any such reason. One can certainly understand why, once
Bush was certified and Gore's only chance for winning was through
the Florida judiciary, Gore's lawyers might have encouraged the
courts to treat December 12 as a "deadline." At that point, December
12 had indeed become a "deadline" of sorts for Gore. He desperately
needed the presumption a pre-December 12 determination would
have afforded him under § 5. If it happened that two slates of electors
ended up before Congress on January 6-one slate for Bush certified
by Florida's governor on November 26 and one slate installed by the
judiciary at the end of the contest proceeding-congressional Repub-
licans would almost certainly favor the Bush slate, and without the § 5
presumption, Gore's slate would lose in the House, which was major-
ity Republican. The fact that he might win in the Senate-because
Gore himself could cast the decisive vote-would not have made any
difference: in the event the houses disagreed, the slate certified by the
state's executive, Jeb Bush, would win. 14 95 And if the courts thought
of December 12 as a "deadline," Gore might have reasoned, they
might actually finish.
This does not explain, however, why the lawyers promoted the idea
that failure to meet the "deadline" would place the state's entire elec-
toral vote in jeopardy, when all it actually would do is cause the judi-
cially-appointed slate to lose its presumption of validity. 14 96 Nor does
1492. See supra note 539.
1493. See supra note 951.
1494. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 29-30.
1495. See supra notes 270-72, 580, 657 and accompanying text. One of Gore's law-
yers, Dexter Douglass, has confirmed that this was a major worry: "You had to have
certification in by the 12th, or ... you threw it into Congress. It's Republican. They
would elect Mickey Mouse if he was a Republican." Cooper, supra note 656.
1496. Indeed, some commentators have criticized Gore's lawyers for speaking of
December 12 as a "deadline," but they have not taken the interpretation of §§ 5 and
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it explain why, when squarely facing a loss in the final Supreme Court
argument, Gore's lawyers did not then correct the misimpression
under which the courts had so long been operating. At that point,
Gore had no choice but to seek counting out beyond December 18,
and hope that with Supreme Court approval of the judicial recount, he
would not need the presumption of § 5 to survive Congress. The only
way to get there was to scuttle the notion once and for all that count-
ing after December 12 would jeopardize the whole of Florida's vote.
Instead, with a single day left to do any counting and complete the
inevitable appeals, David Boies offered only that he thought the count
could still be completed, or the appalling alternative that the Court
just tell Florida that counting statewide was not really necessary.
1497
This strongly suggests that Gore's lawyers never actually reached a
full understanding of § 5 and its relationship to § 15. The question
thus becomes whether their failure to do so was understandable under
the circumstances: specifically, the time constraints. There are several
reasons to conclude that it was not.
First, it seems fair to say that Gore's legal team should have famil-
iarized itself with §§ 5 and 15 from the beginning, as soon as they
knew they were going to challenge the initial election results, simply
because those sections are part of the basic law governing presidential
elections. Plainly, the Republicans focused on those laws from very
early on. Tom DeLay issued a memo summarizing the statutes within
days of the election, 1498 and the Florida Legislature issued its first
threat to step in under federal § 2 even before Gore filed his brief in
the Florida Supreme Court.
14 9 9
Second, understanding §§ 5 and 15 did not require extensive re-
search. There were no cases interpreting the statutes to read. Under-
standing how they worked required only a close, thoughtful reading.
In fact, the Supreme Court dissenters finally arrived at the correct in-
terpretation of § 5 without any help from Gore's legal team.
50 0
15 far enough. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?,
in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 184, 188, 191-93 (Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001). Not only was December 12 not a deadline
for anything other than the presumption, but Florida's vote was never in jeopardy.
This is a critical distinction, because a theoretical possibility that the counting could
have continued after December 12 would not have been particularly appealing to the
Florida courts, if they thought they would have to endanger the entire state's vote to
take advantage of it. See supra notes 1442-43 and accompanying text.
1497. See supra notes 1395-96 and accompanying text.
1498. See supra notes 641-43 and accompanying text.
1499. See supra notes 646-51 and accompanying text. This is not meant to suggest
that the Republican lawyers trying the election case were entirely schooled on the
interrelationship between §§ 5 and 15. In the first argument before the Supreme
Court, Ted Olson seemed completely incapable of discussing the intersection of the
two statutes. See supra notes 970-71 and accompanying text.
1500. See supra note 1447 and accompanying text.
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Third, even if Gore's lawyers made the mistake of not focusing on
§§ 5 and 15 initially, it is not as though the meaning of § 5 remained an
obscure question. It was one of only two issues before the United
States Supreme Court on Bush's first petition, and the Court asked
the parties to address specifically "the consequences" if the Court
found that the Florida decision did not comply with § 5.15o1 One
would have thought that this would trigger scrutiny of the statutes suf-
ficient to understand them fully.
Finally, as mentioned above, Gore desperately needed the correct
interpretation of § 5 in the final moments. On December 9, the count-
ing was stayed, and oral argument was to take place on December
11.1502 From field operatives (or even the media), the lawyers had to
know that the count was running into trouble from several resistant
canvassing boards, and thus there probably would not have been
enough time to complete the count, allow the trial court to hear objec-
tions and issue a decision, and hear the ensuing appeals by the original
deadline, much less in the single day that would be remaining after the
Supreme Court heard argument. So as of the very moment the count
was stayed, a Plan B with respect to § 5 became critically important.
Yet even in the face of this life-or-death need, Gore's lawyers failed to
find it.
This is not to say that Gore's legal team could have predicted pre-
cisely the way in which the Supreme Court majority used § 5 against
Gore. The justices' claim that the Florida court had found that the
legislature had intended to satisfy § 5, and its December 12 deadline,
was an intellectually dishonest holding. 150 3 The issue of the deadline,
however, was of paramount importance even if the majority had not
chosen the course it did. After all, what was going to happen if the
Supreme Court affirmed the Florida court? Would the Florida court
have tolerated missing December 12 if, as it mistakenly believed, that
would endanger Florida's entire vote?
Of course, the Supreme Court majority's very willingness to con-
trive the § 5 portion of its holding raises one final issue: whether the
majority would have found some other way to end the case irrespec-
tive of the lawyers' failing to correct their consistent mischaracteriza-
tion of § 5. Indeed, the very fact that the majority placed the incorrect
interpretation of § 5 at the feet of the Florida court, rather than them-
selves, suggests that the justices knew the prevailing interpretation
was wrong, but were looking for a way to do Gore in. But there are
two substantial reasons to believe that if Gore's lawyers had charac-
terized § 5 correctly, the result might have been different.
1501. See supra note 671 and accompanying text.
1502. See supra notes 1206-07 and accompanying text.
1503. See supra note 1441 and accompanying text.
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First, if the correct interpretation had been offered from the begin-
ning, the Florida Supreme Court would never have made any refer-
ence to jeopardizing Florida's vote, and the Supreme Court therefore
would not have had any material with which to reach its ultimate con-
clusion. Second, if the correct interpretation had been set squarely
before the Supreme Court justices, even in the final argument, Justice
Kennedy might have allowed the counting to continue.
During the oral argument, Justice Kennedy asked whether there
was any "place in the Florida scheme for [the Secretary of State] to
[set a uniform standard] in the contest period,' 5 °4 suggesting that he
might be amenable to a remand under that condition. Justice Souter
latched onto Kennedy's suggestion, 150 5 presumably with an eye to-
ward building a majority around it. But Justice Kennedy continued to
be bothered specifically by the timing, and it was bothering him to the
point that he was the first justice to raise it.
150 6
There is no way to be sure, of course, but this suggests that had the
timing issue been mitigated, Justice Kennedy might have reached a
different conclusion about a remand. Two different media sources,
who appear to have had off-the-record conversations with Supreme
Court insiders, 50 7 confirm that Justices Souter and Breyer were seek-
ing a compromise that would have sent the case back for the articula-
tion of a uniform standard.150 8 And one of those sources quotes
Justice Souter as lamenting months later that he might have per-
suaded Justice Kennedy if he had more time. 150 9 Souter's statement as
to why he was unable to convince the justice is supremely ironic, an
unintended double entendre, given the circumstances. "One more
day," Souter said, "one more day.
1510
1504. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1332, at 19-20.
1505. See supra note 1349 and accompanying text.
1506. See supra note 1394 and accompanying text.
1507. See Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al (reporting that "[t]he justices who became the dissenters
• * .were startled to learn from a memorandum that circulated shortly before the
justices met on the day after Thanksgiving to discuss the appeals that the votes were
there to take the case," information that only Supreme Court insiders would know);
KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 306-07 (stating that the author interviewed fourteen
people who would not permit themselves to be identified and noting that some of
these were critical to the portions of the book addressing the Supreme Court).
1508. Greenhouse, supra note 1507; KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 284.
1509. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 284.
1510. Id. In fairness to the media sources relied upon here, both suggest that Justice
Kennedy was not receptive to the compromise position offered. It is not clear, how-
ever, from where the sources drew their conclusions, whether their conclusions were
drawn from conversations with reliable sources or were solely their own reading of
what the oral argument and the decision revealed. Indeed, the two reporters claim
Kennedy was not receptive to the compromise for two somewhat incompatible rea-
sons. Linda Greenhouse says "[tihe question was whether the Florida Supreme Court
could be trusted to supervise a recount under any circumstances," and that Justice
Kennedy came "slowly and ambivalently" to the conclusion that it could not. Linda
Greenhouse, supra note 1507. David Kaplan reports that Kennedy "thought the
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B. Finding and Defeating McPherson Too Late
When all was said and done, the United States Supreme Court
handed down a decision that said nothing whatsoever about the elec-
toral appointments clause.' 51' Three justices signed on to a concur-
rence offering the clause as an additional basis for reversing the
Florida Supreme Court,1 51 2 but they could not persuade any others to
join. Neither the clause, nor the McPherson v. Blacker case interpret-
ing it, which was the linchpin of the Court's first decision, 513 played
any role in the majority's decision. And yet one could argue that
more than any other single case, McPherson is responsible for the fi-
nal outcome. Indeed, a single passage from that single case could be
deemed responsible for the outcome.
As discussed at length in Part One, the electoral appointments
clause confers on state legislatures the power to decide the "manner"
in which their state's presidential electors will be appointed. 514 Mc-
Pherson was the second Supreme Court decision ever to address the
substance of the electoral appointments clause. 515 It was handed
down in 1892, at a time when the Court still adhered to the notion that
the Equal Protection Clause's sole effect was to protect African-
Americans from race discrimination. 51 6 In it, the plaintiffs com-
plained that the Michigan Legislature had adopted a method of ap-
pointing presidential electors that violated the Federal
Constitution.1 517 On the way to rejecting that claim, the Supreme
Court made one remarkable observation that it surely could not have
imagined would acquire such historical significance. The Court stated
that when the federal constitution conferred on the state legislatures
the power to appoint electors in the "manner" they chose, that power
could not be "circumscribed" by a state's own constitution.
51 8
Acting on this single passage from McPherson, the 2000 Supreme
Court vacated the Florida Supreme Court's first decision.
1 51 9 Of
trauma of more recounts, more fighting-more politics, as it were-was too much for
the country to endure." KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 285. In the end, it seems diffi-
cult to say with any certainty precisely what Kennedy thought about the compromise
proposed, much less what he would have thought had the timing circumstances been
presented differently and Justice Souter been given the opportunity to factor that into
his efforts to persuade him.
1511. See supra note 1425 and accompanying text.
1512. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1513. See supra notes 996-98 and accompanying text.
1514. See supra notes 134-207 and accompanying text.
1515. See supra notes 139-65 and accompanying text.
1516. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83 (1873) ("[The Court]
doubt[s] very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimina-
tion against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to
come within the purview of this provision.").
1517. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
1518. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
1519. See supra notes 996-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8
THE 2000 ELECTION
course, the Court did not explain exactly what the passage meant.
The Court did not discuss what it might mean to "circumscribe" the
legislature's power. Nor did the Court discuss what it might mean to
circumscribe the legislature's choice with respect to the "manner" of
appointing electors. In fact, the Court did not even hold that the Flor-
ida court's decision had improperly relied upon the constitution to cir-
cumscribe the Florida Legislature's power. The Court simply dropped
the single passage from McPherson, cited the portions of the Florida
court's decision that referred extensively on the state constitution, and
asked the Florida court whether it had acted "without regard to the
extent to which the Florida Constitution could . 'circumscribe the
legislative power.'
°15 20
The Court did acknowledge that McPherson dealt with a question
"different" from that involved in the election case,'5 2 ' but the Florida
Supreme Court probably paid little attention to that qualification.
The much more important message was that if the Florida court relied
on anything but pure legislative enactments, it would risk violating the
electoral appointments clause. For this reason, all of the subsequent
Florida Supreme Court decisions emphasized that they were based
only on the Florida Code. 5 22 Two of the Florida justices even became
so nervous about deviating from the Code that they suggested during
oral argument that the Florida court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the appeal of the contest action because its only jurisidictional source
was the Florida Constitution. 523 This was an argument that Bush had
not even made (although his attorneys ultimately adopted it when the
case went to the Supreme Court).
1524
Had the Florida Code been a finely tuned, precise instrument with
which to work, the Florida court's exaggerated reaction to the Su-
preme Court's reliance on McPherson might have made little differ-
ence. But the Code was not artfully drafted. 52 5 Most importantly,
the Code included no definition of a "legal vote." The closest thing
was some scattered references to ballots bearing a "clear indication"
of the "intent of the voter."'' 52 6 So that sole legislative reference be-
came the standard, and the only standard, that the Florida courts
would allow the counties to use when counting ballots. 52 7 This in
1520. See supra note 997 and accompanying text.
1521. See supra note 998 and accompanying text.
1522. See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla.) ("This case today is con-
trolled by the language set forth by the Legislature in section 102.168, Florida Statutes
2000."), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Palm Beach I1, 772 So. 2d at
1291 ("[O]ur construction of the above statutes results in the formation of no new
rules of state law but rather results simply in a narrow reading and clarification of...
statutes, which were enacted long before the present election took place.").
1523. See supra notes 1106-11 and accompanying text.
1524. See supra notes 1125, 1128, 1239-41, 1336 and accompanying text.
1525. See, e.g., supra notes 92, 95.
1526. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.5614(5), (6), 102.166(7)(b) (West Supp. 2001).
1527. See supra notes 1150-52, 1167 and accompanying text.
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turn allowed the United States Supreme Court to hold that the "in-
tent" standard allowed too much variation to be constitutional. 1528
This odd sequence of events-which might be called the "whipsaw"
of the Florida Supreme Court-was directly attributable to Al Gore's
lawyers.
It strongly appears that in the early stages of the case, either none
of Gore's lawyers had read McPherson closely enough to be aware of
the passage limiting state courts' reliance on state constitutions, or the
lawyers did not take it seriously. In the first Florida Supreme Court
proceeding, David Boies offered a cogent and reasonable interpreta-
tion of the Florida Code based entirely on statutory construction, 529
but he (and the brief) also offered the court alternative ways to decide
the case on state constitutional, or even public policy, grounds. 530 In
effect, Boies and his co-counsel led the Florida Supreme Court di-
rectly into a constitutional trap.
Then, when the electoral appointments clause had been directly
placed in issue, before the United States Supreme Court, Gore's law-
yers did nothing to repair their error. It does appear that, by this time,
someone on the legal team had found the passage from McPherson
(notwithstanding the failure of Bush's lawyers to cite it), because
Gore's brief studiously avoided any admission that the Florida Su-
preme Court had based its decision on the Florida Constitution and
any notion that the source of the Florida court's decision was even at
issue. 153' Even more tellingly, when Chief Justice Rehnquist dropped
the bombshell passage at oral argument (Bush's lawyers apparently
still had not found it), Laurence Tribe clearly was familiar with it.
1532
Thus, by this point, legal research was no longer the problem, but
judging from Tribe's performance, preparation was. Rather than
make even the first attempt to dissuade the Court from applying the
McPherson passage to the Florida court's opinion, Tribe simply ac-
cepted it as a governing principle and tried to fit the Florida decision
within it. First, Tribe claimed that the Florida court did not use the
Florida Constitution as an independent basis for its decision, but Jus-
tice Scalia-who had read the Florida opinion closely enough to know
that the court had-would have none of that.15 33 So Tribe launched
into a convoluted, highly theoretical argument. By providing for judi-
cial review, Tribe mused, the Florida Legislature had delegated its
power to regulate presidential elections to the judiciary, and in doing
1528. See supra notes 1429-32 and accompanying text.
1529. See supra notes 532-34 and accompanying text.
1530. See supra notes 459-61, 535 and accompanying text.
1531. See supra notes 965-66 and accompanying text.
1532. See supra notes 981-86 and accompanying text.
1533. See supra notes 981-82 and accompanying text.
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so the legislature knew that the judiciary would look to the state
constitution.1
534
Tribe's limited response makes no sense under the circumstances.
Gore stood to lose if the Court ruled that the Florida court unconstitu-
tionally invoked the state constitution. So there was no reason what-
soever to avoid a direct attack on the applicability of the McPherson
passage, and thereby prevent it from constraining the Florida courts as
they considered Gore's contest action. And there was an array of
powerful arguments with which to do so.
First and foremost, a close reading of McPherson reveals that the
passage upon which the Supreme Court relied was a dictum.153s Sec-
ond, the situation addressed in McPherson was fundamentally differ-
ent in kind from the one presented by Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board. In McPherson, the plaintiff electors had lodged a
challenge to the method of appointment the Michigan Legislature had
chosen (the "Manner" to which the electoral appointments clause ex-
pressly referred), and the Court had held that the state constitution
could not interfere with that chosen method.'536 Bush, however, was
complaining not about a change in the method, but only about a
change in how the state should handle controversies arising out of that
method. Finally, there were a variety of constitutional policy reasons
to limit the electoral appointments clause to the method chosen by the
legislature, rather than every aspect of a state's law on presidential
elections. Chief among them was that resolving questions about
whether the courts had altered the method of appointing electors
would be a manageable judicial task for the federal courts, but at-
tempting to decide whether a judicial decision "changed" some re-
mote aspect of a state's election code would not. The federal courts
could end up acting as the final arbiter in every disputed presidential
election, essentially supplanting the role of the state courts in inter-
preting state election law.
Indeed, when Gore's lawyers appeared before the Supreme Court
only ten days later, with their case now all but lost, they presented
some of these arguments on the electoral appointments clause and
McPherson for the very first time.' 537 Apparently they were persua-
sive, because only three members of the Court concluded that there
had been an electoral appointments clause violation, and even those
three did not mention the restrictive McPherson passage. 1538 By this
1534. See supra notes 984-86 and accompanying text.
1535. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
1536. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. This was surely the "differ-
ence" between the questions in McPherson and the election case to which the Court
referred in its decision. See supra notes 997-98 and accompanying text; supra text
accompanying note 1520.
1537. See supra notes 1268-78 and accompanying text.
1538. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (2000) (Rehnquist, C., concurring).
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point, however, it was far too late. The Florida court had already
been whipsawed into an equal protection violation by an 1892 dictum.
As with Gore's lawyers' failure to reach a full understanding of § 5,
there is no good explanation for their mishandling of the electoral ap-
pointments clause and McPherson. Again, the electoral appointments
clause was basic governing law in the context of presidential election
litigation. The clause should have been one of the earliest research
topics. Moreover, the case law interpreting the clause was not exten-
sive. There were less than fifteen cases addressing it in substance.
1539
Finally, even if it were understandable that Gore's lawyers did not
initially find the McPherson passage-it was written rather awk-
wardly, and Bush's lawyers did not find it either 154 0-that does not
explain how ill-prepared Gore's lawyers were to address it when the
electoral appointments clause was one of only two issues before the
United States Supreme Court. Not only should all of the electoral
appointments clause cases have been read very closely in handling
that proceeding, but by then at least Laurence Tribe knew about the
passage, and yet the lawyers appear to have developed no comprehen-
sive or meaningful strategy to address it.
C. Avoiding the Merits of Bush's Equal Protection Claims
The first two errors described here seem to have resulted from the
lawyers' early failures to understand the ramifications of § 5 and the
electoral appointments clause. The error discussed here, however, is
of a different nature altogether. It does not involve being caught by
surprise, by law that required research and contemplation. It involves
adopting a strategy that had certain weaknesses-albeit not necessa-
rily fatal ones-and ignoring one's own intuition that those weak-
nesses could become meaningful. Specifically, Gore's lawyers knew
from early on that Bush had some colorable equal protection claims,
and yet the lawyers handling the Florida and Supreme Court pro-
ceedings refused to take them seriously and prepare to address their
merits.
This refusal to do so cost Gore dearly. With virtually no assistance
whatsoever from the lawyers, the contest trial judge developed his
own ideas about the Constitution and found Gore's case deficient for
failing to seek a statewide remedy.' 54' The Florida Supreme Court,
again without the benefit of any meaningful briefing or oral argument
on the equal protection issues, shocked everyone by expanding the
1539. See supra notes 135-207 and accompanying text.
1540. See supra notes 963-64, 975-76 and accompanying text.
1541. See supra notes 899-903 and accompanying text. Notably, Judge Sauls's ruling
about Gore's failure to seek a statewide remedy was statutorily, not constitutionally,
based. See supra note 899 and accompanying text. He mentioned the Constitution
only in observing that it might violate the Constitution if he were to allow counties to
employ different standards. See supra note 894 and accompanying text.
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counting from the two counties Gore had requested to sixty-four. 1542
This was a move certain to suggest that the election had spiraled out
of control and thus prompt the United States Supreme Court to act.
Just as importantly, the lawyers' failure to contend earlier with the
equal protection issues really hurt when the Supreme Court finally
forced the issues upon them. As will be discussed below, there were
numerous ways to argue that the recount did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, and yet the lawyers offered only two or three of the
weakest. 1543 It seems that they had wished the issue away for so long
that the key arguments were not readily in mind. And if there was at
that point any chance of derailing the Supreme Court's equal protec-
tion holding, the lawyers let it slip away.
This analysis assumes, of course, that there was at least some merit
to the various equal protection claims Bush made throughout the pro-
ceeding, and to the equal protection reasoning adopted by seven of
the Supreme Court justices. After all, if Bush's arguments were ab-
surd from the beginning, Gore's lawyers can be forgiven for not taking
them more seriously. Many of those who have ridiculed the Supreme
Court's decision might take this position.
To do so, however, would be silly. It may be that the Supreme
Court's analysis was unwise, ill-advised, and in conflict with holdings
on the Equal Protection Clause in other contexts. 544 Yet Bush's
equal protection arguments were never even close to being frivolous.
Anyone watching the canvassing boards peer so intently at ballots,
hoping to divine the voter's true intent, had to feel that a certain arbi-
trariness had crept into the process, however well-intentioned those
implementing it were. And the idea that one county might have
counted any dimple as a vote, while another county counted only
hanging chads, while another counted only machine-readable ballots,
had to give any candid lawyer pause. From the beginning, the nagging
unfairness of these circumstances made Bush's equal protection
claims at least arguable, 545 particularly given the absence of prece-
dent holding that an arbitrary vote-counting process could not be
1542. See supra notes 1160-66 and accompanying text.
1543. See infra notes 1571-1601 and accompanying text.
1544. See BUGLIOSI, supra note 28, at 42-50, 65-66; DERSHOWITZ, supra note 19, at
87-81; Sunstein, supra note 23, at 212-15; Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through
the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1727-28 (2001).
1545. The Court had very recently held, in an eight-justice per curiam opinion, that
state action could be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause solely on the ground
that it was "irrational and wholly arbitrary," irrespective of whether the state set out
to harm the person acted upon. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,
564-65 (2000) (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445
(1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336
(1989)). Justice Breyer concurred only in the judgment, plainly because he believed
some form of subjective intent to harm in addition to arbitrariness was required. See
id. at 565-66 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
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deemed an equal protection violation. 546 And litigators (who often
stand in contrast to academics in this regard) know that one should
not treat any opposing argument lightly, unless there is binding prece-
dent squarely on point.
Indeed, on this much-that Bush's equal protection arguments
were far from frivolous-every court connected to the case agreed.
The federal district court who first heard Bush's equal protection
claims rejected them, but before he did so, he acknowledged that the
decentralized nature of counting would result in discrepancies be-
tween the counties' treatment of ballots, and undertook an extensive
look at existing presidential election cases just to determine the level
of scrutiny appropriate to Bush's claims.' 547 The next time Bush com-
plained (albeit very quietly) that the recounting violated the Equal
Protection Clause was in the Florida Supreme Court, 1548 and judging
from that court's reaction during oral argument, several justices were
concerned at least with the fact that only selected counties were
recounting. 1
549
In the Eleventh Circuit, on Bush's appeal from the district court's
decision, the court did not reach the merits of Bush's equal protection
claims, because it found that Bush's request for an injunction was
lacking in the requisite allegation of irreparable harm.1550 Four of the
twelve judges dissented, however, and they issued three opinions un-
equivocally concluding that the recounts being allowed in Florida vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause in a variety of respects, most
importantly that they were not being undertaken statewide and were
being conducted without sufficient standards to guide the counters.
1551
Chief Judge Lanier Anderson wrote a special concurrence responding
to these dissents and defending the recounts, but even he had to
devote several pages to the argument, and adopt the same deferential
standard the district court had, to do so. 15 5 2 In sum, not one of the
courts familiar with the case thought Bush's equal protection argu-
ments beyond the pale.
1546. Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in THE
VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 98, 105 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
A. Epstein eds., 2001) (prior to Bush v. Gore, the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses had "never been applied in the context of a presidential election before, nor
ha[d] the Supreme Court addressed the problem of differ[ent] voting systems and
methods of vote counting").
1547. See supra notes 370-79 and accompanying text.
1548. See supra notes 512-13, 566 and accompanying text.
1549. See supra notes 550-51, 571-72 and accompanying text.
1550. See supra notes 1015-22 and accompanying text.
1551. See supra notes 1027-49 and accompanying text.
1552. See supra notes 1026, 1050-76 and accompanying text. Whether the seven re-
maining members of the majority agreed with Chief Judge Anderson, or shared con-
cerns similar to the dissents, is unknown due to the procedural posture of the case.
See supra note 1.017 and accompanying text.
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Much more importantly, there is reason to believe that Gore's law-
yers themselves knew, all along, that the Equal Protection Clause
presented a meaningful risk. In the very first oral argument before
the Florida Supreme Court, David Boies represented that Gore would
accept a statewide count, even though Gore was not requesting such a
process. 1553 This was obviously designed to address any concerns the
Florida court had about basic fairness or the equal protection argu-
ment Bush had made based on the fact that only selected counties
were recounting. Even more significantly, Boies acknowledged that
uniformity in the way the canvassing boards evaluated the ballots was
essential to the "integrity" of the process, and that "very wide varia-
tions" in the way the boards looked at ballots might be unconstitu-
tional.55 4 Plainly, Gore's lawyers had concerns even then that the
counting had to be guided in such a way that it would not become
arbitrary.
Yet consistently, in the state case, Gore's lawyers threw out minimal
arguments on the merits of Bush's equal protection claims. In the first
Florida Supreme Court proceeding, Gore offered only three responses
to Bush's constitutional claims: that trying to reach a full count in one
county could not possibly be deemed "dilution" of the votes in an-
other; that the "intent of the voter" standard was sufficient to guide
the canvassing boards; and that Bush had not asked for any recounts
even though Florida law permitted him to. 1555 None of these argu-
ments went to the reality, or the fairness to the voters, of what was
going on in Florida, and just as importantly, they did not address the
quandary that the federal courts had already discovered lay at the
heart of the case: to what level of scrutiny should Florida's recounts be
subjected?
In the second Florida Supreme Court proceeding, Gore's lawyers
were even more casual. In their brief, they included no constitutional
argument whatsoever, and they dismissed Judge Sauls's ruling that a
request for a recount must be sought statewide in the contest of a
statewide election, solely on the ground that the contest statute did
not require that.1556 When the Florida justices raised Judge Sauls's
point during oral argument, David Boies said only that the statute en-
titled Gore to select the counties he wanted to contest, and the court
should not be troubled by that because, after all, selective recounts
had already been included in the vote total.1557 Wholly apart from the
insufficiency of this approach, the last point was truly bizarre. Given
that it was the Florida Supreme Court itself that had allowed those
first selective recounts, Boies was effectively arguing that the court
1553. See supra note 552 and accompanying text.
1554. See supra note 550 and accompanying text.
1555. See supra notes 524-27 and accompanying text.
1556. See supra note 1090 and accompanying text.
1557. See supra notes 1114-16 and accompanying text.
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could not possibly find an equal protection violation because it would
impeach itself in doing so. This certainly was not material the United
States Supreme Court would find persuasive, and the Florida court did
not either.
In sum, the lawyers might have guided the Florida courts to the
conclusion that even though the recounting was imperfect, it required
neither a statewide count nor bright-line rules to be constitutional, but
they chose not to try. When the Florida Supreme Court finally ex-
tended the count statewide, they should not have been surprised.
They had given the court almost nothing with which it could have cho-
sen not to do so.
There is an argument that the decision not to address the equal pro-
tection issues more forthrightly was nothing more than a judgment
call, which would put it beyond the range of fair criticism. Through-
out the Florida proceedings, Bush downplayed the equal protection
issue. In the first Florida Supreme Court proceeding, Bush buried his
constitutional claims forty-plus pages into his brief, really did nothing
more than simply state them, without analysis, and then did not em-
phasize them at all during the oral argument.1 55 8 During the contest
trial, Bush all but abandoned the equal protection argument, leaving it
to be advanced by the lawyers representing voters. 1559 In the second
Florida Supreme Court proceeding, Bush's approach was precisely the
same as it had been in the first. The claims were there, but Bush did
not elaborate on them or particularly press them during the oral
argument. 
560
The conventional wisdom thus might have suggested to the lawyers
that Gore let sleeping dogs lie. To have taken up the sword and ad-
dressed the merits of the equal protection problems would only have
called the court's attention to them and lent legitimacy to Bush's
claims. The specific circumstances, however, plainly called for an ex-
ception to the conventional wisdom.
Gore's lawyers had to know, for example, that Bush was pressing
the equal protection issue hard. His lawyers were just pressing it hard
some place else, over in the federal courts.1561 So clearly their plan
was not to forsake any reliance on the constitutional claims. It was
just to do whatever they could to get to the judges most likely to be
receptive and conclusive: the five conservative justices of the United
States Supreme Court. 1562 Bush would try the Eleventh Circuit first,
which was in all events more likely to side with him than the Florida
Supreme Court, but as a precaution, his lawyers would drop sufficient
references to the Equal Protection Clause in their Florida arguments
1558. See supra notes 512-13, 566-72 and accompanying text.
1559. See supra notes 876-77, 880-81 and accompanying text.
1560. See supra notes 1102-04, 1.122-29 and accompanying text.
1561. See supra notes 330-35, 430-31, 1009-14, 1027-49 and accompanying text.
1562. See supra note 656.
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so that the issue would be preserved if it went up from the state sys-
tem. 1 563 This was of course basic lawyering, and the safe bet is that
Gore's lawyers fully understood it to be Bush's strategy. But if that is
so, it is hard to understand why they would not at least try to help the
Florida Supreme Court reach an intelligent, well-reasoned analysis of
the equal protection issues rather than simply hand the United States
Supreme Court a clean slate on which to write.
It may be that Gore's lawyers simply miscalculated the likelihood
that Bush could be successful in the Supreme Court. Bush's argu-
ments were based on a novel interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause, and he was aiming them at five justices who, whatever their
political background, were not amenable to finding equal protection
violations unless precedent forced them to. 15 6 4 Further, the five con-
servative members of the Court tended to be highly deferential to
state courts, 565 and the lawyers may have believed that they would be
unwilling to consider equal protection issues arising out of a state pro-
ceeding if the state court itself had not first addressed them. 566 If this
was their thinking-that the novelty of Bush's claims and the state
court's avoidance of them counseled leaving them alone-the lawyers'
decision makes more sense, because it partakes more of a judgment
call gone awry than a pure error.
There is a problem with this theory, however, stemming from Judge
Sauls's decision against Gore in the contest action. Judge Sauls had
held that Gore's contest action was deficient because he had not
sought a statewide recount, or at least a recount in "all of the counties
in this state with respect to the particular alleged irregularities or inac-
curacies in the balloting or counting processes alleged to have oc-
curred," i.e., all of the counties where punch card systems had the
effect of excluding intended votes. 1 5 6 7 So to reverse Judge Sauls, the
Florida Supreme Court was going to have to address the issue of ex-
tending statewide the count of punch card undervotes: if Gore had
1563. See supra text accompanying notes 655-56.
1564. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 149 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in judgment, joined by Justice Rehnquist) (disagreeing with Court's "extension of
vote dilution claims to mainstream political groups"); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 179 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.) (noting that "the Court in cases
involving social and economic benefits has consistently refused to invalidate on equal
protection grounds legislation which it simply deemed unwise or unartfully drawn,"
and that such laws "do[ ] not offend the Constitution simply because the classification
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some ine-
quality,'" and holding that as long as "there are plausible reasons" for a law, it should
be upheld) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
1565. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 135-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (cataloguing the views
expressed by the majority justices on the need to show deference to state court
decisions).
1566. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 533 (1992) (O'Connor, J.)
(holding that the Court would not consider a due process claim not pressed in or
passed on first by state court).
1567. See Ruling Transcript, supra note 882, at 12-13.
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proved punch card systems were the problem, how could it be equita-
ble to correct that problem only in three overwhelmingly Democratic
counties chosen by Gore and none of the twenty-one other punch card
counties? And while Judge Sauls had not cast his ruling in constitu-
tional terms, his statement did dovetail with precisely the constitu-
tional arguments Bush had been making. 156 8 In fact, the day before
the Florida oral argument, Eleventh Circuit Judge Carnes, with three
other judges concurring, had made this very point and deemed it a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.156 9
Thus, assuming that Gore could persuade the Florida Supreme
Court to reinstate the count, it was not very likely that he could do so
without the court addressing at least the "statewide" aspect of Bush's
equal protection argument. So at this point, it might still have made
sense for Gore to omit the constitutional issues from his Florida brief,
because Bush was barely pressing the claim,1570 but to offer so little on
oral argument, once the Florida justices themselves questioned the
fairness of recounting only some of the counties that had been af-
flicted with the punch card problem, could not be considered a judg-
ment call. At that point it was lack of preparation, pure and simple:
the failure to develop a body of arguments to address a weakness that
the lawyers knew had been there from the very beginning.
One would have hoped that the Supreme Court's stay, issued the
day after the Florida court's decision, would jolt Gore's lawyers into
rethinking their strategy on Bush's equal protection claims. One of
those claims-the unfairness of counting only selected counties-was
now gone, but there remained the issue of the standard to be used in
counting, and it had suddenly grown gargantuan. 57 1 Perhaps some
new approach was in order.
Yet the lawyers' Supreme Court performance made their failure to
prepare throughout only that much more glaring. Justice Scalia, at
least, had based the stay in part on the "constitutionality" of "letting
the standard ...vary from county to county," indicating that the
Court was prepared to address the constitutional issue and had al-
ready decided that the counties were in fact treating ballots differ-
ently. 1572 Yet Gore's lawyers opened their brief by quarreling with the
basis of Bush's claims: Bush had not properly raised the issue below;
he had no record evidence that the counties actually were applying
disparate standards in evaluating the ballots; and the Florida court
had in fact imposed a uniform standard for counting a vote, a "clear
1568. See supra note 1541 and accompanying text.
1569. See supra notes 1027-37 and accompanying text.
1570. See supra notes 1558-60 and accompanying text.
1571. See supra notes 1176-88 and accompanying text (describing what happened on
remand and Bush's lawyers' delight when the judge hearing the case refused to elabo-
rate on the standard for finding legal votes).
1572. See supra note 1215 and accompanying text.
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indication of the intent of the voter.1 573 From there, the brief de-
fended primarily on the ground that many laws are unfair. Gore's
lawyers admitted that "the intent of the voter" standard would result
in "some degree of inconsistency" but charged that all sorts of ac-
cepted legal practices were susceptible to inconsistency. 157 4 If the
Court were going to overturn this standard on the basis of inconsis-
tency, the lawyers complained, juries would no longer be able to find
"negligence," states could no longer allow different voting systems to
be used, and laws all over the country allowing for manual recounts
under an "intent of the voter" standard, including those in Texas,
would fall.157 5 With the inconsistency seen in this light, the brief
claimed, it would be an "absurd and unprecedented response" to in-
validate the counting altogether, particularly when there was a judge
who would be overseeing the process.1576
There was nothing per se wrong with any of these arguments, but
they were truly inadequate given the complexity of the case. The brief
did not even discuss, for example, whether a strict or deferential level
of scrutiny should be applied, even though a deferential approach to
nondiscriminatory state election laws had been the linchpin of all the
federal court opinions that had upheld the recounting, and presiden-
tial election precedent appeared to require that approach. 1577 Indeed,
at one point the brief actually suggested that strict scrutiny might be
appropriate, inasmuch as the lawyers wrote that the Florida court's
decision was "narrowly tailored" to serve the state's interest in ensur-
ing that all persons intending to vote were treated equally. 1578 Like-
wise, the brief made virtually no reference to the absence of
discriminatory intent on Florida's part, even though the Court had
often indicated that such intent was the evil at which the Equal Pro-
tection Clause was aimed. 579 That concept was reduced to a single
clause in a single sentence: "petitioners do not claim that the Florida
Supreme Court's order is discriminatory in any invidious manner.
1580
1573. See supra notes 1297, 1307 and accompanying text.
1574. See supra notes 1300-01, 1304 and accompanying text.
1575. See Brief for Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., supra note 1263, at 36, 46.
1576. See supra notes 1314-15 and accompanying text.
1577. See supra notes 200-07, 370-79, 1050-76 and accompanying text.
1578. See supra note 1303 and accompanying text.
1579. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) ("[W]hen there is no 'reason
to infer antipathy,' it is presumed that 'even improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic process ....') (citation omitted); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (requiring criminal defendant charging equal protection vio-
lation to show that state acted "'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse ef-
fects upon an identifiable group." (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279)); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976) (referring to the "constitutional rule" that plaintiff
must show discriminatory purpose to make out equal protection violation); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (plurality opinion) (reciting in voting dis-
crimination case "the basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can
there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
1580. See supra note 1305 and accompanying text.
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These arguments would have been much more to the point, and per-
suasive, than claiming that the law in place everywhere was an imper-
fect beast, and so there was no need to make the recounts any
different.
Of course, if the brief suggested weak preparation, David Boies's
argument confirmed it. When asked whether different counties might
apply the intent of the voter standard differently, a question that obvi-
ously required a delicate response, Boies volunteered that two differ-
ent individuals sitting at the same counting table might apply the
standard differently to the same ballot."'1 This shows how, over the
course of the case, the lawyers had stopped listening to their instincts,
because not twenty days earlier Boies had stated that wide variations
in the standards applied to ballots might be unconstitutional. 158 2
Boies quickly tried to qualify his response, by adding that the differ-
ences between individuals would be only "on the margin,' ' 1583 but the
cavalier way in which he had answered the question left a terrible im-
pression of the Gore camp's attitude toward integrity in the process.
Later in the argument, Boies stumbled again. Ostensibly because
the lawyers had finally begun to recognize that Bush's equal protec-
tion argument presented a real threat, they had argued in the brief
that even if the Court found that there should be a more specific stan-
dard to guide the counting, the proper remedy would be to remand for
the counting to continue under a newly announced, more specific
standard. 158 4 Justice Souter had obviously seized upon this point as
the one possibility of saving the recount, and so he questioned Boies
on what that standard should be. 1585 Boies, however-notwithstand-
ing that Gore's own brief had raised the question and Justice Breyer
had put the same question to Ted Olson before him 1586-was not
ready. He paused, and sighed, and finally suggested a standard that
would not even correct the problem, because it incorporated the very
same open-ended "intent of the voter" evaluation at which most of
the justices were balking.'
587
One would have thought from the argument that Gore was simply
out of ammunition, pinned to the wall because there really was a clear
equal protection violation. But that simply was not the case. If
1581. See supra notes 1377-78 and accompanying text.
1582. See supra note 550 and accompanying text.
1583. See supra notes 1379-80 and accompanying text.
1584. See supra note 1316 and accompanying text.
1585. See supra notes 1384-85 and accompanying text.
1586. See supra notes 1316, 1346 and accompanying text.
1587. See supra notes 1386-87 and accompanying text. Boies's hesitance might have
been explained by his fear of the electoral appointments clause problem discussed
earlier-the idea that any standard not drawn only from the legislature might violate
the electoral appointments clause-except that, inexplicably, Ted Olson had conceded
moments before that it would not be unconstitutional for the Florida court to devise
one. See supra note 1351 and accompanying text.
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Gore's lawyers had been paying attention to the equal protection is-
sues throughout the proceeding, they would have known there were
many ways to defend both the counting and the "intent of the voter"
standard.
First, they could have pointed directly to Anderson v. Celebrezze,
and cases that followed it, and argued that those cases required the
Court to adopt a more deferential approach, weighing any burden on
those invoking equal protection against the state's interest in permit-
ting the recount.1588 This would have enabled Gore to accentuate, in
legally cognizable terms, the lopsided choice between having a few
ballots evaluated differently (the burden) and completely foregoing
an effort to honor the intent of thousands of voters whose ballots had
in effect been discarded by the machines (the state's interest). An
analogy would have been available from precedent in which the Court
tolerated unconstitutional vote dilution when the choice was forego-
ing an election altogether.
158 9
Second, as alluded to above, the lawyers could have emphasized the
line of Supreme Court cases making clear that it is intentional discrim-
ination at which the Equal Protection Clause is aimed.1590 Doing so
would not have eliminated Bush's claim: a finding that it was con-
ducted in an arbitrary manner could still have invalidated the
count. 159' Yet by focusing the Court on the purpose behind the Equal
Protection Clause-and making clear that the Florida court could not
possibly have intended to discriminate against any Florida voters
whose ballots might be treated differently-the justices might have
become more willing to show deference to the Florida court's
decision.
Third, the lawyers could have made an argument in favor of the
decentralized approach to evaluating ballots that the Florida court
had adopted. Specifically, just as some counties in Florida used opti-
1588. See supra notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
1589. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 739 (1964).
1590. See cases cited supra note 1579.
1591. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000). The Court
made clear in Olech that at least some state actions could be violations of the Equal
Protection Clause if they were intentional and "irrational or wholly arbitrary," even if
unaccompanied by a discriminatory intent. The plaintiff in Olech complained that the
Village had arbitrarily demanded a thirty-three-foot easement from her before it
would connect her water. Id. at 563. The district court dismissed her case, and the
Seventh Circuit reinstated it. Id. at 563-64. In affirming the decision, the Court was
even more receptive to her claim than the Seventh Circuit had been:
The complaint also alleged that the Village's demand was "irrational and
wholly arbitrary" and that the Village ultimately connected her property af-
ter receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot easement. These allegations, quite
apart from the Village's subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim
for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the alternative theory of
"subjective ill will" relied on by that court.
Id. at 565.
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cal scan equipment and some used punch card systems, different coun-
ties used different punch card systems and maintained those systems
differently.1592 These differences in turn could justify one county's
counting a dimpled ballot as a vote, and another's refusal to do so.
For example, if one county was using the stylus that had been de-
scribed at trial as defective, and had not cleaned its machines in many
years, it was much more likely that a dimpled ballot was intended as a
vote than it was in a county with the corrected stylus that had regu-
larly cleaned its machines. 1593 Hence, it made sense to permit local
officials, who had voted on the machines, and were uniquely familiar
with both their operation and their maintenance, make the call on
intent.
Fourth, the lawyers could have drawn from the record to show that
the "intent of the voter" standard was not in fact likely to lead to
arbitrary treatment of ballots. Bush's lawyers, for example, had Judge
Burton testify as to his canvassing board's application of the "intent of
the voter" standard, and then they argued that the Palm Beach board
had done "exactly what ... the Florida Supreme Court ... says you
should do," and what "any rational judgment of a human being sug-
gests you should do."'1594 This of course would have been impossible
if the standard was truly as amorphous and arbitrary as Bush was
claiming before the Supreme Court. Further, another of Bush's own
witnesses, the developer of the Votomatic punch card machine, testi-
fied that it was actually "simple" to distinguish a stylus mark on a chad
from some other indentation, because the stylus was pointed and of a
particular diameter. 1595 This witness added that the paper used for
ballots was designed to be durable enough that chads would not fall
out just from handling.1596 Thus, the popular impression that the
count would necessarily have been a chaotic exercise in guesswork,
with the ballots deteriorating by the moment and resulting in "false"
votes, could effectively have been discredited.
Finally, the lawyers could have cited record evidence to rebut the
claim that the "intent of the voter" standard improperly allowed parti-
san canvassing boards to find votes for Gore. Gore's trial statistician
had studied the recovery of votes in Broward County, and compared
the percentages of votes for Bush and Gore resulting from the man-
ual recount with the percentages of votes for Bush and Gore recorded
by the machines. The results showed that Bush actually received a
higher percentage of votes during the manual recount than he had in
1592. See supra notes 794, 799, 823, 828 and accompanying text.
1593. See supra notes 796, 834, 838-39 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg
seemed to be sensing this point when she asked during Olson's rebuttal how one
could have a uniform standard when there were so many different voting systems in
place. See supra note 1393 and accompanying text.
1594. See supra notes 81.9-22, 877 and accompanying text.
1595. See supra note 831 and accompanying text.
1596. See supra note 837 and accompanying text.
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the machine count, even though two of the three board members were
Democrats. 1597 This evidence went unrebutted at trial, but Gore's
lawyers never mentioned it in response to Bush's charges that the "in-
tent of the voter" standard would allow partisanship to taint the
count.
In light of the extraordinary time constraints on writing the brief
and presenting the case at oral argument, one certainly cannot fault
Gore's lawyers for failing to raise all of these arguments. But one can
fault them for not raising any of them. Bush had been complaining all
along about the unconstitutionality of the counting standard (however
quietly), 598 two different federal judges had written extensive opin-
ions defending the constitutionality of the standard, 599 there was an
entire team of lawyers handling the federal proceeding to which the
lawyers in the Florida and Supreme Court proceedings could have
turned,'1600 and Boies himself had conducted a trial during which a
great deal of evidence relevant to the "intent of the voter" standard
was discussed. 60' So time should not have been that much of a factor.
If Gore's lawyers had taken the weakness in their case seriously from
the start, and begun developing arguments to address it even then,
they would have been prepared when the final bell rang.
In some defense of Laurence Tribe, it has been reported that Tribe
unsuccessfully "tried to get David Boies and Ron Klain to spend more
time on the equal-protection issue in the various briefs before the
Florida Supreme Court.' 16°2 If this is so, Tribe cannot be faulted for
the absence of any equal protection analysis by the Florida court that:
could have had improved the outcome. But there is another level on
which the reporter's observation indicts Tribe, because it shows that
he knew all along that Bush's equal protection claims needed to be
taken seriously. Yet Tribe wrote the final Supreme Court brief, and it
was sorely lacking in arguments the Supreme Court needed to hear.
Indeed, it now appears that different members of the team may
have had different reasons for being unprepared on the equal protec-
tion issue, but that none of those reasons is compatible with good
lawyering. In explaining why Tribe was unsuccessful in convincing the
team to brief the equal protection issue, the same reporter writes:
Part of the reason was logistics and the crunch of time: Tribe was
never in Tallahassee and always had to get in his two cents by
phone. More important, though, Boies and Klain had decided that,
strategically, they needed to concentrate on state law; getting into
1597. See supra note 808 and accompanying text.
1598. See supra notes 512-13, 1104 and accompanying text.
1599. See supra notes 370-79, 1050-76 and accompanying text.
1600. See supra note 1471 and accompanying text.
1601. See supra notes 1591-96 and accompanying text.
1602. KAPLAN, supra note 1006, at 220.
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federal matters, statutory or constitutional, only made the litigation
more appealing to federal judges.
160 3
This strongly suggests that Tribe's failure to fully address the equal
protection issue resulted from his inability to devote his full attention
to the litigation. If so, his performance simply cannot be justified:
working part-time on a case this large, with such extraordinary stakes,
in a knowingly accelerated time frame, was just not an acceptable
choice. No matter how brilliant, how experienced, or even how in-
comparable they may seem to be, lawyers cannot perform properly
without adequate time for preparation, and if their circumstances do
not allow for the time required, they should not undertake the
representation.
The ostensible explanation for the other lawyers' failure to prepare
is similarly inadequate. It was one thing for Boies and Klain to decide
that the equal protection issues should not be briefed in Florida, but
wholly another not to take the issues seriously behind the scenes and
develop a strategy to address them. As discussed above, at the mo-
ment Judge Sauls ruled that it was unfair to count undervotes in some
counties and not in others-if not much earlier-it should have been
clear that the Equal Protection Clause was not just going away, but
coming at Gore with full force.
The hardest question, of course, remains. Would the outcome really
have been different if Gore's lawyers had mastered and presented his
equal protection response as they should have? This "causation"
question is in many ways easier to answer with respect to the other
two errors Gore's lawyers made (mischaracterizing § 5 and finding
McPherson too late), because in those instances the lawyers urged af-
firmatively wrong visions of the law, and one certainly hopes that the
courts would have taken different paths had they known their impres-
sions of the governing law were incorrect or incomplete. The equal
protection issues, in contrast, were never susceptible of a definitively
right or definitively wrong answer.
Thus, the Supreme Court majority might have rejected whatever
analysis Gore's lawyers presented. But it is worth noting the justices'
own words: "Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes gen-
erally presents many complexities.' ' 604 What if the "circumstances"
had looked very different, and the "complexities" not nearly so
daunting?
D. A Necessary Additional Comment
The intense focus here on Gore's lawyers may seem to some un-
kind, one-sided. Some may complain that it shows disrespect for a
1603. Id.
1604. See supra note 1437 and accompanying text.
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group of attorneys who obviously tried very hard and worked to ex-
haustion to advance their client's cause.
Although these would be understandable reactions, there are sev-
eral responses. First, although it is true that this Part of the Article
emphasizes the mistakes of Gore's lawyers, that is purely because only
the errors on Gore's side were of ultimate consequence, and the pur-
pose here has been to examine the role the lawyering played in the
outcome. In presenting the history of the case, in Part Two, every
effort has been made to be comprehensive and evenhanded: to ob-
serve the weak moments, but also the strong moments, of both sides.
Further, no disrespect is or has been intended. The lawyers' con-
duct would not have been studied at all were it not for its significance
as an historical matter, and criticism offered solely for its historical
value should not be equated with disrespect. Most trial lawyers will at
some point in their lives have a case on which they make critical mis-
takes, and it would be particularly shortsighted to treat any one such
case, especially a case as peculiar as the election controversy, as repre-
sentative of their abilities as lawyers.
Indeed, even if they made mistakes that came back to haunt them,
Gore's lawyers deserve great credit for sustaining his campaign as
long as they did. They managed to have well over a million ballots
manually recounted, 6 °5 an extraordinary feat. They tried the case
with a grace that inspired a remarkable level of patience in the Ameri-
can public. They made hard but wise decisions on the allocation of
their various resources, choosing not to devote them to the butterfly
ballot or absentee ballot cases that were eventually unsuccessful.160 6
These accomplishments alone are worthy of respect. In fact, they
make it especially important to dispel some of the common miscon-
ceptions about the lawyers' work.
III. THE UNFOUNDED CHARGES OF ERROR
In the aftermath of the election, several legal commentators have
condemned Gore's lawyers for two decisions. Some have insisted that
Gore's lawyers should have asked, from the beginning, for a statewide
recount. 160 7 Others have questioned their decision to seek an exten-
1605. See supra text accompanying notes 336, 680-81.
1606. See supra notes 756-58, 1467 and accompanying text.
1607. One commentator, for example, has written:
"If Gore's lawyers had asked for a statewide recount with uniform standards
from the beginning, they, and not Bush, would have had the more reasona-
ble argument. The Gore side would not have appeared to be unfairly pursu-
ing a tactical advantage, and they would not have wasted five weeks going
after something that ultimately the courts could not uphold."
H. Lee Sarokin, David v. Goliath: A Law School Debate About Bush v. Gore, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1081, 1085-86 (2001) (quoting University of San Diego law professor
Michael Ramsey). See also Barstow & Nagourney, supra note 316 ("'It had the ap-
pearance of being manipulative[.] It had the appearance of making it look as if he
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sion for the recounts rather than proceed immediately to a contest
action. 160 8 These criticisms, however, are entirely unfair. They are
nothing but potshots at legitimate judgment calls, accusations made
easy for those who know how things turned out, but have thought
little about the facts at the time the decisions were made.
A. The Decision To Seek Selective Recounts
At the time the lawyers decided where to seek recounts, they had
several immediate ramifications to consider. The first was resources.
Gore would need to staff every county with monitors qualified enough
that he could trust them to represent his interests. 160 9 The second was
public relations. Gore had to avoid appearing as though he was
throwing Florida into turmoil. 161° The third was Florida law. There
had never been a statewide recount and Florida law did not expressly
provide for such a thing.' 6 1 The fourth was likelihood of success:
whether one, two, or sixty-seven counties were likely to net him the
1700-plus votes he needed to win.
612
With these factors in mind, the decision to seek selective recounts
was entirely reasonable. The goal, after all, was to have Gore de-
clared the winner, and if the existing percentages were any indication
of what votes would be recovered, seeking a recount statewide could
well have made the overall results a wash. If the number of counties
was limited, they could be properly staffed and Gore would not ap-
pear as though he was just fomenting confusion. Florida law certainly
seemed to permit him to choose certain counties, and if Gore had
challenged the count statewide, there was the risk that state and local
officials would balk at the unprecedented nature of the move.
This does not mean that seeking recounts in selected, Democratic
counties was the fairest choice Gore could have made. Nor does it
mean that there were not very serious consequences of the choice.
The courts' discomfort with the selectivity is now quite obvious, and
this Article has already argued that Gore's lawyers should have pre-
dicted and defended against that discomfort.161 3 But it is absurd to
didn't want a level playing field. I think it seeped into the way the judicial system
perceived things."' (quoting Northwestern University law professor Thomas W. Mer-
rill)); DEADLOCK, supra note 1, at 247 ("Gore came under heavy criticism from
Republicans and some independent analysts for his decision to seek recounts in only
four counties that were heavily Democratic.").
1608. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 1546, at 111-12, 120 (criticizing "the fact that
Gore's lawyers asked for the extension of the certification deadline, only to be injured
by the ... shrinkage of the contest period"); Barstow & Nagourney, supra note 316
(quoting New York University law professor Joshua Rosenkranz describing the deci-
sion as "questionable").
1609. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
1610. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
1611. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
1612. See supra notes 30, 318 and accompanying text.
1613. See supra notes 1541-1604 and accompanying text.
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suggest that the entire decision should have turned on the potential
for negative perceptions, because Gore would not even get to the
point where the negative perceptions mattered unless he first reversed
the 1700-plus margin that existed at the time the decision was made.
There were defenses to an equal protection challenge,'161 4 but there
were no defenses to a vote tally that remained in Bush's favor.
Now, after all that happened, it is easy to observe that Gore's strat-
egy backfired on him. The equal protection elephant never went
away, and in the end, it caused the Florida Supreme Court to order a
recount statewide in such a short time frame that the count's integrity
was threatened. The mistake, however, was not in the initial decision
to seek a selective recount: it was in not preparing more vigorously to
defend it.
To the extent that the decision revealed a certain hypocrisy on
Gore's part, that is a legitimate discussion for another day. It suffices
to say that the charge of hypocrisy can be levied only at Gore, not at
his attorneys. His attorneys were responsible for surveying the
choices available within the law, laying out the potential consequences
of each choice, and presenting to their client the best avenue, within
the law, for accomplishing the result he wanted. If Gore uncondition-
ally wanted a victory, that called for one option. If he wanted a vic-
tory only on terms that would be considered the fairest, that might
have called for another option. But in the end, that decision was
Gore's, and Gore's alone, to make.
B. The Decision To Have the Recounts Included Before
Bringing Suit
Criticizing Gore's lawyers because he did not seek a statewide re-
count is unfair enough, but criticizing them for trying to have the man-
ual recounts included in the certification (as opposed to allowing the
certification to stand without them and proceeding immediately to the
contest action) is even more unjustified. Virtually every circumstance
that could have been known to Gore's lawyers at the time counseled
in favor of pursuing precisely the path he chose.
First, there was the ever-present "public consciousness" (to borrow
the term Bush's lawyers used in seeking the stay). In deciding
whether to challenge Katherine Harris's decision to exclude the re-
counts, Gore's lawyers had to imagine the effect on that consciousness
if he simply gave in and Bush was "certified" the winner of the elec-
tion. The lawyers may or may not have exaggerated the threat (as it
turned out, the public remained surprisingly tolerant even after certifi-
cation, although it may simply have become numbed to the contro-
versy by then), but they had to be concerned whether Bush's
certification alone would bring such an outcry for Gore to concede
1614. See supra notes 1588-97 and accompanying text.
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that he would have no choice but to do so. The gravity of that risk
cannot be overstated.
Second, there was the issue of how Gore best stood to recover
votes. From the beginning, Gore needed a pool of Democratically-
disposed ballots large enough that Gore might close the margin even
if his relative percentage within that pool stayed the same. As it stood
at the time Katherine Harris rejected any recounts, that pool, from
Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade Counties, consisted of well
over 1.5 million ballots. 16 15 It could not possibly have made more
sense for Gore to go to a judge and ask him, as opposed to four can-
vassing boards that were well on their way, to review a million and a
half ballots.
Of course, in the contest phase, in contrast to the recount phase, the
governing law did not require that Gore seek a recount of all of a
given county's ballots, 161 6 and so he might have asked the court to
count only the 34,000 or so undervotes from those counties. This
would have reduced the number the contest judge would have to
count, but it would also have dramatically reduced the number from
which Gore might achieve steady incremental gains (it would have, for
example, removed the overvoted ballots from consideration). And
there was no reason at all to believe that an unknown judge hearing a
contest action would find votes more readily than the canvassing
boards. Indeed, at the time Gore asked the Florida Supreme Court to
rule that the recounts must be accepted, both Palm Beach and Brow-
ard Counties were under a court order requiring them not to exclude




Third, if seeking the recounts spawned a lot of difficult and time-
consuming legal questions, there was no reason to believe that a con-
test action would be any different. The contest statute had been
amended in 1999, so there was little precedent addressing it, and it did
not provide at all for the context of a presidential election.1618 (The
reader will recall, for example, that Bush actually urged the United
States Supreme Court to hold that Gore could not invoke the contest
statute in the context of a presidential election. 1619)
Fourth, it was in large measure the number of votes found by the
Broward, Palm Beach, and Miami-Dade boards during the recounts
on which Gore relied in the contest proceeding to show the court that
there were a sufficient number of legal votes rejected to "place the
election in doubt." Yet if he had simply conceded the certification,
1615. See supra text accompanying notes 354, 432 (stating Palm Beach had more
than 460,000 ballots and Miami-Dade more than 654,000 ballots); supra note 355
(stating Broward had more than 580,000 ballots).
1616. See supra notes 111, 1147-48 and accompanying text.
1617. See supra notes 435-38 and accompanying text.
1618. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2001).
1619. See supra note 1194 and accompanying text.
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those boards would have stopped counting, and how many votes were
there would not have been available to him as proof.
Fifth, pure common sense dictated that Gore should seek first to
have the canvassing board's recounts included. There was no reason
not to take two bites at the same apple. If the first bite (the recount
requests) worked, and the canvassing boards reversed the outcome,
Gore would be certified the winner, and it would be Bush appearing
as the litigious loser. And even if the second bite (the contest action)
did become necessary, at least the issues would be markedly reduced,
and Gore would know a lot more about what was in the different
groups of ballots from having witnessed the recount efforts.
The only possible response to all of this is a post hoc observation
that Gore ran out of time. At the time the decision had to be made,
when Katherine Harris refused to allow the counties to amend their
returns, Gore had no reason to believe that it would be he who would
run out of time. It was just as likely that the boards' recounts would
yield him the votes, and that it would be Bush racing against the
clock.16 2 ° Indeed, if the Miami-Dade board had not been so slow and
indecisive in considering whether to count, 621 which in turn made it
impossible for the board to finish by November 26, it is easy to imag-
ine that reverse scenario. That the scenario did not materialize cannot
be laid at the feet of the lawyers. They could make decisions only on
the facts that were known at the time.
Finally, for the sake of accuracy (i.e., recognizing that Gore's law-
yers apparently did not know this at the time), it must be reiterated
that the entire premise of this criticism is wrong. Gore did not "run
out of time." As discussed at length above, everyone, the courts in-
cluded, just assumed that December 12 was a drop-dead date, when in
reality the only deadline was December 18.1622 And it is impossible to
know whether the contest action could have been completed by De-
cember 18, because the United States Supreme Court stopped it cold,
six days early.
In sum, Gore's lawyers made certain critical errors in representing
him, but the decisions not to seek a statewide recount and not to pro-
ceed directly to a contest action are not among them. The only com-
mentators who would claim otherwise either have not studied the case
in depth, or have no qualms about second-guessing what were reason-
able judgment calls on the information available at the time. In either
case, they do the profession a disservice by oversimplifying the events.
1620. In fact, this was the primary objection Bush raised in the first Florida Supreme
Court argument. See supra notes 553-57 and accompanying text.
1621. See supra notes 409, 432, 703-06 and accompanying text.
1622. See supra notes 1480-94 and accompanying text.
2002]
TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Ordinarily, scholarship focuses on the content of the law. It gener-
ally does not matter much what was argued in a case. It matters how
the case came out, what we can take forward from it, what ought to be
built on or revised in later decisions.
Bush v. Gore, however, was no ordinary case. The litigation over
the election polarized what had otherwise been a sleepy electorate.
The realms of politics and judgment became more dangerously inter-
twined in the American psyche. Even legal scholars began pointing
fingers at the institutions they had been trained to criticize but none-
theless revere. If you leaned Democratic, you pointed to Washington;
if you leaned Republican, you pointed to Tallahassee.
This Article was born squarely on the assumption that such con-
demnation of the judicial system is unhealthy and uncalled for, unless
there is no explanation other than partisanship for the result. That is
why it has traveled so far into the case, in so much detail. It has
sought to let the reader decide whether there are the grounds to con-
demn Bush v. Gore or the grounds to explain it.
In doing so, it has uncovered an uncomfortable combination of
both. It certainly does seem that the courts (much like the legal schol-
ars who have reviewed their work), leaned Republican and Demo-
cratic. Yet it also appears that the adversary system itself-which is
based on the idea that the most just results emerge when cases are
presented by those with opposing personal stakes in the outcome-
broke down. Time and time again, the lawyers made significant mis-
takes that failed to protect the courts from the humans at their center.
This might at once discourage and hearten us. It should discourage
us because it suggests that there could have been a wiser resolution of
the election, irrespective of who might have won. But it should
hearten us to discover that what seemed entirely to be partisanship
was merely a function of how important our profession really is.
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